BROSKY, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence imposed upon appellant after she was convicted in a non-jury trial of driving under the influence and recklessly endangering another person. Appellant raises two issues for our consideration, whether the evidence was sufficient to prove reckless endangerment beyond a reasonable doubt and whether the court abused its discretion in imposing [1082]*1082sentence? We affirm in part and reverse in part.
In the early morning hours of April 6, 1996, Lebanon City Police Officer Wendy (Dressier) Mannion observed appellant driving her vehicle past Officer Mannion’s location. Appellant had been involved in a domestic confrontation with her husband earlier and a call had been placed to the police. Officer Mannion had just completed her response to the call during which appellant’s husband had described the vehicle appellant would be driving. Upon observing appellant drive by Officer Mannion began following appellant. Appellant continued to drive in a relatively slow fashion and never came close to any other vehicles, however; appellant drifted over the middle line on three occasions prompting Officer Mannion to effectuate a traffic stop of appellant’s vehicle. Upon effectuating the stop Officer Mannion discovered that appellant was accompanied by her young son and that there was also a glass in the front seat which appeared to contain an alcoholic beverage. Since, in addition to the discovery of the alcohol, appellant exhibited signs of being intoxicated, she was requested to submit to field sobriety tests which she failed. Consequently, appellant was arrested and taken to a local hospital for chemical testing of her blood and urine.1 Chemical analysis revealed a .168 blood alcohol level and 570 nanograms per decileter for marijuana.
Based upon the above appellant was charged with various counts of driving under the influence and a single count of reckless endangerment and found guilty in a non-jury trial of four counts of driving under the influence and one count of reckless endangerment. Post-trial motions were filed and granted in part with the court dismissing two counts of driving under the influence grounded upon controlled substances. All other aspects of the post-trial motions were denied. The present appeal followed.
Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a charge of reckless endangerment. We agree. In the present case the Commonwealth seeks to impose criminal liability for reckless endangerment upon appellant for what is essentially an unremarkable offense of driving under the influence. In so stating this we do not wish to trivialize the offense of Driving Under the Influence, which is indeed a serious matter. However, despite any arguments to the contrary, in reality, appellant’s driving did not evidence any greater “recklessness” than is seen in most eases of Driving Under the Influence or, to be quite frank, than is commonly seen on an almost daily basis driving around town or to the local mall by so-called “sober” drivers. Thus, the Commonwealth essentially wishes to impose reckless endangerment liability upon appellant based solely upon the fact that she was driving while legally intoxicated.2 In other words, the Commonwealth would have us hold that driving under the influence, without more, equates to per se recklessness sufficient to support a conviction for reckless endangerment.
The Commonwealth provides us with no cases that have held that driving under the influence, without more, constitutes recklessness sufficient to sustain a reckless endangerment charge. Commonwealth v. Scofield, 360 Pa.Super. 552, 521 A.2d 40 (Pa.Super.1987), may be the closest case to do so, but that case involves substantially more than simply driving under the influence. In Scofield the appellant was found to have operated his vehicle in “an intentionally reckless manner.” In so doing Scofield engaged in driving conduct which created a much more immediate and substantial risk of injury to other people and, in fact, did cause serious injury to another. Just as importantly, “Waving lost control of his vehicle before the collision, he continued to drive, thus manifesting ‘an extreme indifference to human life,’ including his own.” We would add that in so doing he also consciously disregarded [1083]*1083the substantial risk of injury or death he was creating.
In Commonwealth v. O’Hanlon, 539 Pa. 478, 653 A.2d 616 (1995), our Supreme Court rejected an analogously similar attempt by the Commonwealth to impose aggravated assault liability upon a drunk driver who caused serious injury to another. Although that case involved a higher degree of criminal culpability/recklessness than does reckless endangerment, the majority apparently disagreed with Justice Papadakos’ dissenting view which argued that “driving in a state of voluntary intoxication is recklessness per se.” Further, in discussing Scofield our Supreme Court felt compelled to discuss the various other aspects found in Scofield to support the finding of recklessness. The Court did not evidence an adoption of the theory that driving while intoxicated created per se recklessness.
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Comer, — Pa. —, 716 A.2d 593 (1998), the Court again rejected an attempt to impose aggravated assault liability upon a driver who caused injury to one individual (and death to another) when struck by Comer’s vehicle while waiting for a SEPTA bus. The appellant lost control of his vehicle and ran into a bus stand while driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs3 and in an undeniably reckless manner. In discussing this matter, and the Scofield case, the Court stated “[t]he fact that both Appellant and the defendant in Scofield drank alcohol and ingested some amount of a controlled substance is not controlling.” Id., at —, 716 A.2d at 597. The Court, while concluding that the appellant’s conduct did not meet the level of recklessness necessary for aggravated assault did conclude that there was a sufficient basis for finding the lesser degree of “recklessness” relevant to the offense of reckless endangerment. However, and quite notably, the Court did not discuss or rely in any part upon the appellant’s voluntary ingestion of intoxicating substances. Apparently the court found a sufficient basis for reckless endangerment in the appellant’s extremely reckless driving prior to the accident.
Our reading of the above precedent leads us to conclude that driving under the influence of intoxicating substances does not create legal recklessness per se but must be accompanied with other tangible indicia of unsafe driving to a degree that creates a substantial risk of injury which is consciously disregarded. Whether, in this context, the unsafe driving results from diminished judgment, a more cavalier approach to driving or sheer physical incapacitation would seem immaterial, as is the degree to which any of these factors is actually related to the consumption of alcohol or drugs. What is material is actual reckless driving or conduct, for any reason, for it is this conduct which creates the peril in question. Since people vary in their response to alcohol we believe this is a sound principle.4
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BROSKY, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence imposed upon appellant after she was convicted in a non-jury trial of driving under the influence and recklessly endangering another person. Appellant raises two issues for our consideration, whether the evidence was sufficient to prove reckless endangerment beyond a reasonable doubt and whether the court abused its discretion in imposing [1082]*1082sentence? We affirm in part and reverse in part.
In the early morning hours of April 6, 1996, Lebanon City Police Officer Wendy (Dressier) Mannion observed appellant driving her vehicle past Officer Mannion’s location. Appellant had been involved in a domestic confrontation with her husband earlier and a call had been placed to the police. Officer Mannion had just completed her response to the call during which appellant’s husband had described the vehicle appellant would be driving. Upon observing appellant drive by Officer Mannion began following appellant. Appellant continued to drive in a relatively slow fashion and never came close to any other vehicles, however; appellant drifted over the middle line on three occasions prompting Officer Mannion to effectuate a traffic stop of appellant’s vehicle. Upon effectuating the stop Officer Mannion discovered that appellant was accompanied by her young son and that there was also a glass in the front seat which appeared to contain an alcoholic beverage. Since, in addition to the discovery of the alcohol, appellant exhibited signs of being intoxicated, she was requested to submit to field sobriety tests which she failed. Consequently, appellant was arrested and taken to a local hospital for chemical testing of her blood and urine.1 Chemical analysis revealed a .168 blood alcohol level and 570 nanograms per decileter for marijuana.
Based upon the above appellant was charged with various counts of driving under the influence and a single count of reckless endangerment and found guilty in a non-jury trial of four counts of driving under the influence and one count of reckless endangerment. Post-trial motions were filed and granted in part with the court dismissing two counts of driving under the influence grounded upon controlled substances. All other aspects of the post-trial motions were denied. The present appeal followed.
Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a charge of reckless endangerment. We agree. In the present case the Commonwealth seeks to impose criminal liability for reckless endangerment upon appellant for what is essentially an unremarkable offense of driving under the influence. In so stating this we do not wish to trivialize the offense of Driving Under the Influence, which is indeed a serious matter. However, despite any arguments to the contrary, in reality, appellant’s driving did not evidence any greater “recklessness” than is seen in most eases of Driving Under the Influence or, to be quite frank, than is commonly seen on an almost daily basis driving around town or to the local mall by so-called “sober” drivers. Thus, the Commonwealth essentially wishes to impose reckless endangerment liability upon appellant based solely upon the fact that she was driving while legally intoxicated.2 In other words, the Commonwealth would have us hold that driving under the influence, without more, equates to per se recklessness sufficient to support a conviction for reckless endangerment.
The Commonwealth provides us with no cases that have held that driving under the influence, without more, constitutes recklessness sufficient to sustain a reckless endangerment charge. Commonwealth v. Scofield, 360 Pa.Super. 552, 521 A.2d 40 (Pa.Super.1987), may be the closest case to do so, but that case involves substantially more than simply driving under the influence. In Scofield the appellant was found to have operated his vehicle in “an intentionally reckless manner.” In so doing Scofield engaged in driving conduct which created a much more immediate and substantial risk of injury to other people and, in fact, did cause serious injury to another. Just as importantly, “Waving lost control of his vehicle before the collision, he continued to drive, thus manifesting ‘an extreme indifference to human life,’ including his own.” We would add that in so doing he also consciously disregarded [1083]*1083the substantial risk of injury or death he was creating.
In Commonwealth v. O’Hanlon, 539 Pa. 478, 653 A.2d 616 (1995), our Supreme Court rejected an analogously similar attempt by the Commonwealth to impose aggravated assault liability upon a drunk driver who caused serious injury to another. Although that case involved a higher degree of criminal culpability/recklessness than does reckless endangerment, the majority apparently disagreed with Justice Papadakos’ dissenting view which argued that “driving in a state of voluntary intoxication is recklessness per se.” Further, in discussing Scofield our Supreme Court felt compelled to discuss the various other aspects found in Scofield to support the finding of recklessness. The Court did not evidence an adoption of the theory that driving while intoxicated created per se recklessness.
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Comer, — Pa. —, 716 A.2d 593 (1998), the Court again rejected an attempt to impose aggravated assault liability upon a driver who caused injury to one individual (and death to another) when struck by Comer’s vehicle while waiting for a SEPTA bus. The appellant lost control of his vehicle and ran into a bus stand while driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs3 and in an undeniably reckless manner. In discussing this matter, and the Scofield case, the Court stated “[t]he fact that both Appellant and the defendant in Scofield drank alcohol and ingested some amount of a controlled substance is not controlling.” Id., at —, 716 A.2d at 597. The Court, while concluding that the appellant’s conduct did not meet the level of recklessness necessary for aggravated assault did conclude that there was a sufficient basis for finding the lesser degree of “recklessness” relevant to the offense of reckless endangerment. However, and quite notably, the Court did not discuss or rely in any part upon the appellant’s voluntary ingestion of intoxicating substances. Apparently the court found a sufficient basis for reckless endangerment in the appellant’s extremely reckless driving prior to the accident.
Our reading of the above precedent leads us to conclude that driving under the influence of intoxicating substances does not create legal recklessness per se but must be accompanied with other tangible indicia of unsafe driving to a degree that creates a substantial risk of injury which is consciously disregarded. Whether, in this context, the unsafe driving results from diminished judgment, a more cavalier approach to driving or sheer physical incapacitation would seem immaterial, as is the degree to which any of these factors is actually related to the consumption of alcohol or drugs. What is material is actual reckless driving or conduct, for any reason, for it is this conduct which creates the peril in question. Since people vary in their response to alcohol we believe this is a sound principle.4
Additionally, no statistical evidence has been proffered to support the conclusion that driving under the influence alone creates the degree of risk legally necessary to convict for reckless endangerment. One recklessly endangers another person “if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. Under our Criminal Code one acts “recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material [1084]*1084element ... will result from Ms conduct.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, in order for us to conclude that driving while legally intoxicated results in recklessness per se we would have to conclude that driving while legally intoxicated creates a “substantial” risk that death or serious bodily injury will occur. However, this does not necessarily follow.
As unfortunate as it may be and as can be plainly seen upon a visit to a busy nightclub on any given night numerous individuals will operate motor vehicles , while legally intoxicated. On the fortunate side of the equation, the overwhelming majority of them will make their way safely home. Although certainly these drivers are more likely to be involved in an accident than if they were completely sober, the percentage chance of them causing injury is still relatively remote and would not create “a substantial risk” of death or serious bodily injury as is found in the relevant sections of the Crimes Code.
Of course, the same can be said of the driver talking on the cell phone or eating a sandwich or adjusting his/her hair in the rearview mirror. Those activities certainly increase the risk of an accident but do not make it so likely that an accident will occur that it is viewed as criminal conduct. Presumably this is precisely why the Commonwealth has not yet been seeking to convict such drivers of reckless endangerment. Although it certainly seems politically correct to crack down on drunk driving and although a drunk driver is more likely to get into a collision than if sober, the percentage chance of an accident is not sufficiently high enough to bring it within the purview of the crime of reckless endangerment unless it is shown that the driver exhibited reckless driving behavior or other indicia of incapacity that would create a substantial likelihood of an accident occurring.
None of tMs commentary should be construed as condoning or advocating drinking and driving. We are firmly against such practice and favor the criminal sanctions that the legislature has put in place to both discourage and punish this practice. However, neither do we favor attempts of zealous prosecutors and the judiciary to expand criminal defmitions to encompass criminal conduct which the offense was not designed for, nor the supplanting of the democratic process that such a practice involves. If the penalties for DUI are thought of as too lement then the legislature can increase them. If there should be additional offenses tied to DUI, say DUI with a passenger, then they likewise can be implemented by the legislature through the democratic process. However, we are unwilling to impose such value judgments upon the citizens of the Commonwealth by shoehorning conduct into the somewhat broad definitions of certain criminal offenses.
Appellant also argues that the court abused its sentencing discretion in sentencing appellant to a thirty day to twenty-three month term of imprisonment for the DUI offense. Appellant suggests that the court erred in not imposing the 48-hour mandatory minimum applicable for a first offense. We disagree. The court noted that although technically the mandatory minimum applicable to appellant was 48 hours this was actually her third offense as appellant had two offenses of DUI more than seven years ago. The court stated on the record that to sentence appellant to 48 hours would be to dimmish the fact that she had two prior convictions of DUI. We cannot conclude that this was an abuse of sentencing discretion.
For the above reasons we reverse the conviction of reckless endangerment. In all other respects the judgment of sentence is affirmed.5
Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and reversed in part. Jurisdiction relinquished.
CAVANAUGH, J., filed dissenting opmion.