Com. v. Peach, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 2, 2025
• Docket: 1932 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S21008-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MITH PEACH : : Appellant : No. 1932 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 27, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0016316-2022

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 2, 2025

Mith Peach appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of

Philadelphia denying his petition for a writ of certiorari from the Philadelphia

Municipal Court, where he was convicted of recklessly endangering another

person. He challenges the failure to dismiss his case under Rule 1013 of the

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure and the sufficiency of the evidence

to sustain his conviction. Based on insufficient evidence, we reverse.

Police initially charged Peach with driving under the influence and

recklessly endangering another person on September 18, 2022. In relevant

part, the complaint alleged that Peach “recklessly endangered another person

by crashing his vehicle into another vehicle and leaving the scene.”

Complaint, 9/18/22, at 2 (capitalization removed).

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S21008-25

The Commonwealth withdrew the complaint on March 23, 2023. On

May 12, 2023, the Commonwealth refiled the complaint. Peach moved to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 1013; the trial court denied the motion.

Ultimately, the case proceeded to a non-jury trial on December 11,

2023. At trial, Sonny Conto testified that Peach’s 12-passenger van struck

Conto’s car at 1:37 a.m. on September 18, 2022, at the intersection of South

10th Street and Oregon Avenue in Philadelphia. Conto then chased after

Peach for about five minutes to the parking lot of a high school.

Q. How did you first come into contact with [Peach]?

A. Yes, I was making a left hand turn. I was established in the left lane. This gentleman rear-ended me. My car spun out into the right lane doing a 360.

I noticed that my car was still driving. He takes off, makes a left up 9th Street. I chase him. I’m chasing him. I got the cops on the phone. I’m beeping.

He’s running through stop signs. He goes down to 9th and Jackson and makes a left. I’m still chasing him. I’m screaming out the window. He goes down to 11th Street and makes a right. So, now I’m still chasing him. He blows the red light on Snyder Avenue. I’m still behind him.

Then he turns into Neumann Goretti parking lot. Well it was blocked. He couldn’t get through.

N.T., 12/11/23, at 7–8. Conto clarified that his “car was still able to drive

after being hit at three miles an hour.” Id. at 7–8. Conto described the chase

as lasting about five minutes, covering “about twelve, fifteen blocks” with

Peach driving “[a]bout fifty miles an hour.” Id. at 12–14. He brought his car

to the body shop the next day. Id. at 11. Conto testified that he was injured.

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Philadelphia Police Officer David Edmond testified that he responded to

the parking lot to find a confrontation between Peach and Conto. Id. at 20–

21. Edmond observed that Peach slurred his speech, had bloodshot eyes, and

struggled to stand. Id. at 21–22. Peach admitted to Edmond that he drank

earlier in the night. Id. at 22. Edmond opined that Peach was under the

influence of alcohol and unable to safely operate a vehicle. Id. at 22–23.

The municipal court found Peach not guilty of driving under the influence

and guilty of recklessly endangering another person. The court made factual

findings on the record:

[T]here was enough evidence to support that Mr. Peach did in fact hit the car of Mr. Conto and . . . that he left the scene of the accident and was driving fifteen blocks and then drove into a parking lot area as the video showed and could not get out of the parking lot.

But, there is insufficient evidence to show that the defendant was [] incapable of operating the vehicle being that the evidence supported by Mr. Conto said he drove fifteen blocks.

Id. at 51. The prosecutor noted, for purposes of recklessly endangering

another person, that Peach admitted he was drinking and that Conto’s car had

“spun out 360 to the other lane.” Id. at 52.

The municipal court sentenced Peach to eighteen months of reporting

probation. Peach petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The court of common

pleas heard the matter on June 27, 2024, and denied Peach’s petition.

Peach timely appealed. Peach and the court of common pleas complied

with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

Peach presents two issues for review:

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1. Did the trial court err in denying [Peach’s] motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1013?

2. Was the evidence insufficient to support [Peach’s] conviction of recklessly endangering another person?

Peach’s Brief at 3.

Peach’s second issue is dispositive. Peach argues that the evidence at

his trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for recklessly endangering

another person. He reasons that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he

was reckless as to the risk of actual danger due to his crash or driving while

Conto pursued him. Further, Peach contends that the trial court’s comments

in acquitting him of driving under the influence are inconsistent with finding

him guilty of recklessly endangering another person.

The Commonwealth counters that inconsistent verdicts do not render

the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction, even after a non-jury trial.

The Commonwealth submits that the evidence that Peach drank alcohol, rear-

ended Conto’s car, fled at 50 miles per hour over 12 to 15 blocks, and ran

stop signs and a red light all establish that Peach consciously disregarded the

risk of harm to others on the roadway.

This Court, in reviewing a sufficiency challenge, must determine

“whether viewing all of the evidence admitted at trial in the light most

favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-

finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Commonwealth v. Webber, 306 A.3d 921, 925 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 309 (Pa. Super. 2023)). We do

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not re-weigh evidence or substitute our judgment for the fact-finder’s; rather,

we recognize that the Commonwealth may meet its burden with circumstantial

evidence and “need not preclude every possibility of innocence.” See id. at

925–26. While the Commonwealth receives “the benefit of all reasonable

inferences” from the evidence, the trial evidence must not require the fact-

finder to guess between “two equally reasonable and mutually inconsistent

inferences.” In re J.B., 189 A.3d 390, 412–14 (Pa. 2018). Sufficiency review

recognizes that “a criminal conviction cannot be based upon mere speculation

and conjecture.” Commonwealth v. Duncan, 314 A.3d 556, 565 (Pa. Super.

2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jarman, 601 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Pa.

1992)).

The scope of our review requires us to evaluate “the entire record” and

consider “all evidence actually received” at trial. Webber, 306 A.3d at 926.

Although a verdict and factual findings are rendered after evidence has been

received at trial, reviewing courts can consider such matters during sufficiency

review. E.g., Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 335 A.3d 1047 (Pa. 2025)

(plurality) (reviewing a jury’s special factual finding); Commonwealth v.

Barkman, 295 A.3d 721, 738 (Pa. Super. 2023) (noting arguably inconsistent

verdicts while reviewing for sufficiency). However, we will not reverse a

conviction based on an inconsistent verdict if the trial evidence was sufficient

to sustain the conviction. Barkman, 295 A.3d at 738; see Muhammad, 335

A.3d at 1060 (Wecht, J., concurring) (applying this rule for a jury’s “special

findings”).

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The Crimes Code defines recklessly endangering another person: “A

person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly engages

in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or

serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. This prohibits conduct that is

reckless, not merely negligent. Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717,

719 (Pa. Super. 2014). “Recklessness is distinguishable from negligence on

the basis that recklessness requires conscious action or inaction which creates

a substantial risk of harm to others, whereas negligence suggest unconscious

inadvertence.” Id. (quoting Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., Inc., 47 A.3d

1190, 1200 (Pa. 2012)). Moreover, a conviction for recklessly endangering

another person requires proof “that the defendant had an actual present ability

to inflict harm and not merely the apparent ability to do so. Danger, not

merely the apprehension of danger, must be created.” Commonwealth v.

Cianci, 130 A.3d 780, 782 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 915 (Pa. Super. 2000)). Thus, where a defendant

shot a handgun out a window, but there was only evidence of one other person

in the area, we reversed a section 2705 conviction after concluding that the

other person was not positioned where he could be shot from the window.

Commonwealth v. Kamenar, 516 A.2d 770, 771–72 (Pa. Super. 1986).

Driving under the influence is not per se recklessness for purposes of

section 2705. Commonwealth v. Mastromatteo, 719 A.2d 1081 (Pa.

Super. 1998). For example, in Mastromatteo, the defendant drove “in a

relatively slow fashion” with her young son in the car. She did not come close

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to any other vehicles, although she drifted over the center line three times.

Id. at 1082. Chemical testing revealed unlawful levels of alcohol and

marijuana. Id. This Court rejected the proposition that “driving under the

influence, without more, equates to per se recklessness” for purposes of

section 2705. Id. To be sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for

recklessly endangering another person, evidence of a driver’s intoxication

“must be accompanied with other tangible indicia of unsafe driving to a degree

that creates a substantial risk of injury which is consciously disregarded.” Id.

at 1083.

Notably, even causing a car accident while driving under the influence,

without more, is insufficient to sustain a conviction for recklessly endangering

another person. Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 42 A.3d 302 (Pa. Super.

2012). Driving on a flat road on a sunny day, the defendant in Hutchins

turned left and hit an oncoming car, damaging both cars and injuring the other

driver and his own children. Id. at 304. He told a responding officer that the

accident was his fault and admitted to smoking marijuana earlier in the day.

Id. This Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions for driving under the

influence but reversed on recklessly endangering another person. The

occurrence of the car accident, as well as his intoxication, were insufficient to

prove that the defendant recklessly endangered the lives of others “absent

additional evidence of his reckless driving or conduct.” Id. at 312.

By contrast, “indicia of unsafe driving” includes some evidence that a

drunk driver’s dangerous conduct caused a collision. Commonwealth v.

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Sullivan, 864 A.2d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2004). In Sullivan, the defendant

drove a quarter mile up an off-ramp in an unfamiliar area, colliding with

another car and injuring the five people in the other car. Id. at 1247–48. We

affirmed the defendant’s five convictions for recklessly endangering another

person, concluding that his actions were sufficient for the trial court to find his

mental state as required by section 2705. Id. at 1250. Similarly, we affirmed

a defendant’s conviction for reckless driving where he was highly intoxicated

while driving and weaved in and out of the turnpike roadway for several miles,

at a time when other drivers were on the road. Commonwealth v. Jeter,

937 A.2d 466, 468–69 (Pa. Super. 2007). The defendant ultimately drove

into the center barrier with enough force to blow out his front tire. Id.

Here, we initially reject Peach’s contentions that the trial judge’s

statements in acquitting him of driving under the influence somehow render

the evidence insufficient to convict him of recklessly endangering another

person. The trial judge’s determination that Peach was not impaired to a

proscribed degree does not preclude a finding that Peach consciously

disregarded a risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Nonetheless, our review of the trial record does not reveal sufficient

indicia of unsafe driving to prove that Peach was reckless, either in the crash

or driving away from it. The only evidence of the circumstances of the crash

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was Conto’s testimony: Peach rear-ended his car “at three miles an hour” 1

and spun it “360” into the right lane. The occurrence of a crash and Peach’s

admission that he drank earlier in the night do not, “absent additional evidence

of his reckless driving or conduct,” prove that the crash was anything more

than negligence on the part of Peach. Hutchins, 42 A.3d at 312.

Conto’s testimony was also the only evidence of how Peach drove from

the site of the crash to the high school parking lot. While Conto chased Peach,

Peach drove for five minutes at 50 miles per hour through stop signs and one

red light.2 Unlike in Sullivan and Jeter, where the defendants’ dangerous

driving caused accidents, there was no evidence that Peach’s high-speed flight

caused him to lose control of his van or put any other person in danger of

death or serious bodily injury. There was proof of only one other person in

the area at 1:37 a.m.: Conto, who was chasing Peach, screaming, and beeping

his horn. Because Conto was behind Peach, Peach could not have hit Conto’s

car while driving away from him. Cf. Kamenar, 516 A.2d at 771. Without

anyone else in Peach’s path, the evidence is not sufficient to prove an “actual

present ability to inflict harm.” Cianci, 130 A.3d at 782.

1 The court of common pleas cited Conto’s testimony from a prior proceeding

that Peach rear-ended him “at a high rate of speed.” However, Conto did not testify at the non-jury trial that Peach was traveling fast when he hit him. 2 There was also some evidence that when Peach reached the high school parking lot, he neglected to put his van in “park.” As with the initial crash, this would establish, at most, that Peach was negligent.

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Peach’s “acts in this matter are deplorable.” Hutchins, 42 A.3d at 312.

However, there was no evidence that recklessness caused him to rear-end

Conto or that his subsequent flight endangered anyone. We therefore reverse

Peach’s conviction for recklessly endangering another person.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Conviction reversed. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Date: 9/2/2025

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