Com. v. Williams, D.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 18, 2025
• Docket: 1916 EDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S04041-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DERRICK WILLIAMS : : Appellant : No. 1916 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 27, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010939-2013

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2025

Derrick Williams appeals from the order dismissing his first petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-

9546. On appeal, Williams contends that the court sentenced him to an illegal

sentence after a jury convicted him of aggravated assault. See 18 Pa.C.S. §

2702. Williams claims that, although the court sentenced him as a third-strike

offender, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(2) (“Third-Strike Statute”), there was no

proof that he committed the requisite second-strike offense insofar as he was

never sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence as a second-strike

offender. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that, at his

sentencing, Williams had been previously convicted of “two . . . crimes of

violence[,]” id. within the meaning of the Third-Strike Statute, rendering his

present sentence, as a third-strike mandatory minimum sentence, legal.

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S04041-25

Accordingly, in rejecting his sole argument on appeal, we affirm the dismissal

of his PCRA petition.

A prior panel of this Court summarized the underlying facts of this case

as follows:

On August 10, 2013, at Williams’[] home, he and his romantic partner, K.A., drank alcohol, smoked crack cocaine[,] and engaged in consensual sex, after which Williams became physically violent, slapping K.A. and slamming her into a door. K.A. subsequently went downstairs, pretending to need a glass of water, but, in truth, hoping to escape without provoking Williams’ ire. After discovering that Williams kept his front door locked from the inside, K.A began screaming, hoping someone would call the police. In response, Williams forced K.A. into a chair and proceeded to choke her until she lost consciousness. Williams then nudged K.A. When she moved, he reacted by stating, “I thought you was dead.” N.T. Trial, 8/11/16, at 71. After being assured she would be left alone, K.A. headed upstairs and pretended to sleep. When Williams fell asleep, K.A. searched for the key to the front door and found it hidden behind the television. K.A. left the house in her nightgown and jeans, heading for the nearby First District Police Station. Officer Jeffrey McGarvey spoke with her, later. describing K.A. as distraught, with visible bruising on her neck and arms. He escorted her to the Special Victims’ Unit, which documented and photographed her injuries.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 2019 WL 1119898 at *1 (Pa. Super., filed

March 8, 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (220 EDA 2018).

Correspondingly, a jury found Williams guilty of aggravated assault. At

sentencing, “the Commonwealth entered evidence of Williams’ prior conviction

for robbery and of his prior guilty plea to burglary as a felony of the first

degree.” Id. (noting, in two footnotes, these two convictions’ docket numbers:

CP-51-CR-0705841-1996 and CP-51-CR-0805631-1993, respectively). The

resultant effect was that the court found these two offenses to be “crimes of

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violence, requiring a minimum sentence of twenty-five years of incarceration.”

Id. In his direct appeal, this Court, inter alia, determined that Williams’ first-

degree burglary conviction was a predicate offense under the Third-Strike

Statute. See id. at *3.1

After we affirmed his judgment of sentence, Williams filed a petition for

allowance of appeal, which our Supreme Court denied on September 3, 2019.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 217 A.3d 789 (Pa. 2019) (table) (166 EAL

2019). Williams did not seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court,

rendering his judgment of sentence final ninety days later, on December 2,

2020, when the time for filing a writ of certiorari expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Williams timely filed the instant PCRA petition

on December 2, 2020, which the PCRA court ultimately dismissed as

meritless.2 Williams timely filed this appeal from the dismissal and ____________________________________________

1 We concluded that although he had been convicted and sentenced under a

previous version of the burglary statute, which, at that juncture and for first- degree purposes, only required proof that either Williams entered a building that was adapted for overnight accommodation or that an individual was present at the time of Williams’ entry, because Williams had been convicted of first-degree burglary “in tandem with [there being] prior testimony indicating Williams entered a structure adapted or overnight accommodation[] and did so while the structure was occupied[,]” Williams, 2019 WL 1119898 at *4, he perpetrated a crime of violence pursuant to Commonwealth v. Guilford. 861 A.2d 365, 374-75 (Pa. Super. 2004) (holding that burglary is crime of violence under Section 9714(g) of Third-Strike Statute when sentencing court determines that defendant entered building adapted for overnight accommodation while individual present).

2 Although Williams appeals from a dismissal order issued on June 27, 2023,

we note that the PCRA court filed two prior dismissal orders on February 22, (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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satisfactorily complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

On appeal, Williams presents one issue for review:

Did the court impose an illegal sentence of twenty-five to fifty years of incarceration for aggravated assault when it erroneously treated this conviction as a third strike even though he was never sentenced as a second-strike offender?

See Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we are “limited to examining

whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by evidence of record

and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Jordan, 182 A.3d

____________________________________________

2022, and July 18, 2022. As to the February order, because Williams attempted to amend his PCRA petition, “the Commonwealth requested the court vacate its dismissal order so that it may respond to [Williams’] additional claim on PCRA[,]” which thereafter resulted in the court vacating its dismissal on March 11, 2022. PCRA Court Opinion, 3/26/24, at 1-2 (unpaginated). However, because Williams had also appealed from the February order, this Court determined the March 11, 2022 order was a nullity, as it was filed while his appeal was pending. We thereafter vacated the February dismissal order and remanded for “further proceedings.” Order, 7/19/22. However, the record does not provide the rationale for the PCRA court’s additional July 18, 2022 dismissal order. See Order Dismissing PCRA Petition, 7/18/22 (dismissing “the Petition for PCRA” filed “by the __________” without any additional elaboration). We are able to determine that the PCRA court, on August 26, 2022, vacated its previous dismissal order, seemingly the one issued in February, and formally ordered the Commonwealth to respond to the additional issue Williams raised under the PCRA. However, that order is not in the certified record. Notwithstanding these procedural irregularities and an incomplete record, the PCRA court, the Commonwealth, and Williams all treat Williams’ appeal from the June 27, 2023 order as an appeal from the dismissal of his first timely PCRA petition. We do the same, especially where our appellate review is not hampered by the omissions in the certified record. See Commonwealth v. Harvard, 64 A.3d 690, 697 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2013) (this Court may disregard omission from certified record where it does not hamper appellate review).

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1046, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2018). Insofar as Williams’ claim requires this Court

to engage in statutory interpretation, our standard of review is well-settled:

Statutory interpretation is a question of law, therefore our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Hall, [] 80 A.3d 1204, 1211 ([Pa.] 2013). “In all matters involving statutory interpretation, we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq., which provides that the object of interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” Commonwealth v. McCoy, [] 962 A.2d 1160, 1166 ([Pa.] 2009) (citation omitted).

Generally, a statute’s plain language provides the best indication of legislative intent. Id. We will only look beyond the plain language of the statute when words are unclear or ambiguous, or the plain meaning would lead to “a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Therefore, when ascertaining the meaning of a statute, if the language is clear, we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning. Hall, 80 A.3d at 1211.

Commonwealth v. Torres–Kuilan, 156 A.3d 1229, 1231 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Popielarcheck, 151 A.3d 1088, 1091–92 (Pa.

Super. 2016)).

Williams argues that he was never “sentenced as a second-strike

offender,” and therefore cannot yet be sentenced as a third-strike offender,

forming the basis of his illegal sentencing claim. Appellant’s Brief, at 9. In

support of his contention, Williams submits that Commonwealth v. Shiffler,

879 A.2d 185 (Pa. 2005), is controlling. Therein, our Supreme Court

determined that the Three-Strikes Statute “reflects ‘a recidivist philosophy’

and should be construed to allow for heightened punishment for repeat

offenders only where their convictions for crimes of violence, and

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corresponding terms of incarceration, are sequential and each separated by

an intervening opportunity for reform.” Id. at 186.3

Here, Williams avers that, although he was convicted of robbery in 1996,

he was not sentenced as a second-strike offender for that crime, which would

have, at that juncture, necessitated the imposition of “a minimum sentence

of at least ten years of total confinement[.]”42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1); see

Appellant’s Brief, at 11. Instead, Williams notes that he “received a sentence

of eight to sixteen years’ incarceration[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 11. Williams

claims Shiffler applies here because the Three-Strikes Statute encompasses

a “recidivist philosophy,” and his illegal sentence deprived him of at least one

of “‘two opportunities to conform himself’ that arose from application of a

‘strike’ under the Three[-]Strikes [Statute].” Id. We disagree.

Under the relevant Three-Strikes Statute provision, the one the court

utilized in crafting Williams’ instant sentence, “[w]here the person had at the

time of the commission of the current offense previously been convicted of

3 The primary thrust of Shiffler is that a finding, or acceptance, of guilt at multiple “strike” offenses is treated under the Three-Strikes Statute as one prior offense when a defendant commits those crimes before having been convicted and sentenced at any of those offenses. See 879 A.2d at 194; see also Commonwealth v. Ford, 947 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2008) (finding applicability of Three-Strikes Statute appropriate where defendant “was sentenced for crimes of violence on [multiple] occasions prior to the instant offense[] and given intervening opportunities to reform[]”). In essence, as it applies to his case, Williams argues that he cannot be sentenced to a second and third strike in the same transaction under Shiffler. Here, as there were multiple years between each of Williams’ crimes, convictions, and imposition of sentences, Shiffler is inapplicable.

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two or more such crimes of violence arising from separate criminal

transactions, the person shall be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least

25 years of total confinement[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(2). Robbery is a “crime

of violence” under the Three-Strikes Statute. Id. § 9714(g). Similarly, this

Court, as illuminated supra, determined that Williams’ burglary conviction is

also a crime of violence under that same subsection. See Williams, 2019 WL

1119898 at *3. Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, the court received

information that Williams’ 1996 robbery conviction involved him breaking “into

an 81-year-old man’s house[,] threaten[ing] him with a firearm, and [stealing]

his car.” Sentencing Hearing, 3/27/17, at 14-15. The robbery conviction was

a “felony of the first degree[.]” Id. at 11.

After our review, we note that Williams has not presented any authority

to establish that because he did not receive “a minimum sentence of at least

ten years of total confinement[,]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1), for his robbery

conviction, it cannot serve as a second strike within the meaning of the Three-

Strikes Statute. Conversely, notwithstanding any sentence that he received

prior, the Statute’s plain text calls for the imposition “of at least 25 years of

total confinement” when an individual has “previously been convicted of two

or more … crimes of violence arising from separate criminal transactions[.]”

Id. § 9714(a)(2) (emphasis added); see also Torres–Kuilan, supra (stating

that we will only look beyond the plain language of the statute when words

are unclear or ambiguous). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carrera, 289 A.3d

1127, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2023) (noting that earlier direct review memorandum

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in Carrera’s case properly found that prior 1996 conviction was first strike

despite it not being included in Three-Strikes Statute until 2000).

We conclude that, under the plain text of the statute, Williams was

convicted of two previous and wholly separate crimes of violence in 1996 and

1993. See Torres–Kuilan, supra; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(g). Upon being found

guilty of aggravated assault in the present matter, due to his prior qualifying

offenses, Williams was properly subject to the Three-Strike Statute. See 42

Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(2), (g). Accordingly, the PCRA court’s determination that

Williams was not entitled to relief was appropriate, and we affirm its order

dismissing his petition. See Jordan, supra.

Order affirmed.

Date: 2/18/2025

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