[116]*116OPINION
NIX, Chief Justice
In this matter we granted allocatur to address the important issue of whether the attorney-client privilege precludes an attorney from disclosing the whereabouts of a fugitive client. By order dated June 27,1983, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County entered a judgment of civil contempt against Holly Maguigan, Esquire, (“appellee”) because she refused to comply with its order requiring disclosure of the whereabouts of her client, Carlos Aquino (“Aquino”). In Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 323 Pa.Super. 317, 470 A.2d 611 (1983), the Superior Court reversed the Court of Common Pleas, holding that the information concerning the whereabouts of appellee’s client was privileged. The Commonwealth appealed to this Court and we now reverse for the following reasons.
I.
Appellee represented Aquino on outstanding charges of rape, statutory rape, corrupting the morals of a minor, indecent assault, and indecent exposure which allegedly occurred on various dates in April, 1981. Aquino had been extradited from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and was subsequently released on bail. Aquino last appeared in court on January 19, 1983 for a motion to compel a bill of particulars. At that time he was served with a subpoena which required his appearance for trial on April 7, 1983 on the aforementioned charges. During the interim, a federal district court issued an arrest warrant for Aquino on February 9, 1983 for immigration. violations, and an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with those charges revealed that appellee may have received a telephone call from Aquino on February 23, 1983.
On April 7, 1983, Aquino failed to appear for his scheduled trial. Following a forfeiture of bail and the issuance of a bench warrant for Aquino, the Commonwealth made a [117]*117motion to compel appellee to provide the “address and phone number” of her client.1 Appellee’s counsel, David Rudovsky, Esquire, immediately raised a Fifth Amendment claim on behalf of appellee because he believed the Commonwealth would charge appellee with harboring a fugitive.2 The Commonwealth, however, denied any intention of charging appellee with harboring a fugitive, stating that it merely wanted to know Aquino’s address:
Ms. McDonough [Assistant District Attorney]:
We are not asking Ms. Maguigan to tell us how to find him or anything. We have a right to know. This Court has a right to know where he is, if she knows, and that’s all. We are not asking what communications he has had with her, anything he said with regard to where he has been hiding. Nobody is suggesting that she is going to be prosecuted for anything. We are merely asking is there an address, if she knows his address and the Court deserves to have that.
R. 68a-69a.
Mr. Rudovsky also raised the attorney-client privilege as a reason why appellee would not disclose the whereabouts of Aquino. The trial court proceeded under the assumption that appellee knew Aquino’s address, and scheduled argument on the attorney-client privilege issue for April 13, 1983. At that argument, the following discussion occurred between the court and appellee’s attorney, Mr. Rudovsky:
THE COURT: Counsellor, it seems to me to avoid engaging in a fruitless exercise whether Ms. Maguigan knows the whereabouts of the Defendant—
MR. RUDOVSKY: You have just asked the question of whether Ms. Maguigan knows the whereabouts of the Defendant. This is slightly different than, materially [118]*118different than the question that was posed at the hearing last week, does she know the address and phone number of Defendant.
THE COURT: Essentially, that’s what I want to know.
MR. RUDOVSKY: I can address that. She does not know the address and phone number of the Defendant.
THE COURT: ... If I am to rule on whether or not she is obligated to notify the Court, or to disclose to the District Attorney the address, phone number or whereabouts of the Defendant I should do so in the context of an actual controversy and all I want to know is whether or not she knows, and that’s all I’m going to pursue. I think the Court is entitled to know this.
MR. RUDOVSKY: Judge, without waiving any rights I can represent to the Court that during the course of what we consider to be an attorney-client conversation, as a result of that conversation, [appellee] has some general information about the possible whereabouts of the Defendant, and I put it that way because there is a difference between that and the address issue.
R. 76a-77a.
At the conclusion of the April 13,1983 argument, the trial court held that the information concerning Aquino’s whereabouts was not privileged and ordered appellee to disclose such information. When appellee refused to do so, the court found her in contempt and fined her one hundred dollars ($100.00) per day until she complied with the order.
Thereafter, appellee appealed to the Superior Court and petitioned for a stay of the contempt order pending the outcome of the appeal. The stay was granted on April 26, 1983. On April 29, 1983, however, the Commonwealth petitioned the Superior Court to remand the matter to the Court of Common Pleas for the purpose of granting immunity to appellee under the Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947 [119]*119et seq.3 It was the Commonwealth’s position that the grant of immunity would eliminate appellee’s Fifth Amendment claim. This petition for remand was granted by a Superior Court order dated May 13, 1983 and the trial court heard the Commonwealth’s petition for an order of immunity on June 27, 1983. At the June 27, 1983 hearing, the trial court first rejected appellee’s contention that it had no jurisdiction to grant immunity,4 and then granted appellee immunity under the Immunity Act, supra. Subsequently, the court issued the following order in language proposed by the Commonwealth which directed appellee to:
disclose to this Court and the District Attorney’s office any information she may have regarding the whereabouts of the ... defendant, Carlos Aquino, and any information she may have on how to locate the defendant Aquino.
Appellee declined to do so arguing: (1) that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant immunity; (2) that the grant of immunity did not effectively protect her rights under the Fifth Amendment; and (3) that the information she had been ordered to disclose was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Once again the trial court found appellee guilty of civil contempt and ordered her to pay a fine of one hundred dollars ($100.00) per day until she complied with its order.
[120]*120In a second appeal to the Superior Court appellee renewed the above arguments on jurisdiction and the attorney-client privilege.5 The Superior Court panel concluded that the information sought was within the attorney-client privilege and reversed the order of the trial court.6 By order dated March 30, 1984 we granted the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal. We disagree with the conclusion that the privilege was applicable and we further conclude that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was improperly deferred by the Superior Court.
II.
Succinctly stated the appellee contends that there was no proceeding pending before the trial court and, based upon that premise, concluded that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the Commonwealth’s petition for a grant of immunity under the Immunity Act, supra n. 3. It also follows from this argument that if there was no proceeding pending before the court, the trial judge was then without subject matter jurisdiction to compel appellee’s testimony and that all orders issued seeking disclosure by that court were without authority. President Judge Spaeth viewed the jurisdiction question as being both difficult and novel and justified his failure to resolve it on the basis that it was unlikely to arise again. Whether or not the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is “difficult” or “novel” does not afford a basis for ignoring the issue and permitting the court to decide the merits of a matter [121]*121not properly before that court. See In Re Estate of Pozzuolo, 433 Pa. 185, 249 A.2d 540 (1969) (action of appellate court cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court where jurisdiction is nonexistent); In Re Petition of Acchione, 425 Pa. 23, 227 A.2d 816 (1967) (appellate court has duty to determine whether lower court had jurisdiction); Stahl v. Insurance Company of North America, 408 Pa. 483, 184 A.2d 568 (1962) (appellate court will not determine merits of appeal where trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction). See also Arrott v. Allegheny County, 328 Pa. 293, 194 A. 910 (1937) (jurisdiction must be clearly conferred; it cannot be assumed by implication). We are constrained to conclude that the perceived difficulty as to this issue was not created by the question raised but rather by the circuitous analysis applied to address it.
It is clear that here there was a proceeding pending before the trial court. On April 7, 1983 the criminal trial of Aquino was scheduled to commence. All of the necessary parties were present with the exception of the defendant. It is unquestioned that the trial of this case was properly before the trial court. Incidental to the power of the trial judge to conduct the trial is the power to command the presence of the participants in that trial. In Matter of Shigon, 462 Pa. 1, 329 A.2d 235 (1974); sec also 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5904(d), 5905. To exercise this latter power the court is authorized and is expected to take the measures necessary to accomplish that result. Sweet v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 457 Pa. 456, 322 A.2d 362 (1974), (courts of this Commonwealth have inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for administration of justice); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied sub nom. Tate v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Jamieson, 402 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1665, 29 L.Ed.2d 138 (1971); Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949); Commonwealth ex rel. Burton v. Baldi, 147 Pa.Super. 193, 24 A.2d 76 (1942); Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa.Super. 107, 14 A.2d 907 (1940). Aquino had not only been subpoenaed to appear on that occasion, but his pres[122]*122ence was additionally required by the bond under which he had been released from custody. There was no question of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to try the criminal charges and also the court’s in personam jurisdiction to compel the defendant’s presence on that occasion.7
Here the record shows that the trial court had reason to believe that appellee possessed information that would facilitate bringing the defendant before the bar of that court for the trial of this case. The court’s jurisdiction for eliciting this information springs from the criminal proceeding that was then before it. To avoid responding to the court’s question, appellee raised, inter alia, her rights under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1 section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In response to that claim, the trial court ultimately granted immunity under the Immunity Act, supra. All of these actions were derived from and are ancillary to the court’s initial jurisdiction over the trial of these criminal charges. This procedure is frequently employed where a witness in a trial asserts a self-incrimination claim. Courts have traditionally in ancillary proceedings considered those claims and granted immunity where appropriate. It has never been suggested that the trial court would be required to establish an independent jurisdictional basis for the resolution of this ancillary matter. Nor does the absence of the defendant divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the cause.
The availability of the Immunity Act to the court is expressly conferred by the language of the Act itself which provides for its use in proceedings before our courts. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(a)(1).8 Appellee in a very ingenious, albeit [123]*123artful, argument attempts to isolate the Commonwealth’s request for a grant of immunity under the Act and have us treat it as a matter independent of the criminal proceeding in which it arose.9 In reality, the application for the grant of immunity was ancillary to the underlying criminal proceeding. Thus, the premise upon which this argument of appellee is predicated is patently flawed. The proceeding from which the court derived its jurisdiction was the criminal trial of Aquino over which the trial court unquestionably had subject matter jurisdiction. Having concluded there was jurisdiction, we must now turn to the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
III.
The Commonwealth argues that the attorney-client privilege may not be invoked to shield the whereabouts of a defendant who has absconded while on bail and who has failed to appear for trial. Appellee counters that the information concerning the whereabouts of her client is privileged and also that the order of the trial court is so broad that it permits the Commonwealth to conduct a fishing expedition into Aquino’s case file. We will first determine whether the information sought to be elicited from appellee relating to Aquino’s whereabouts10 is privileged and then address the issue of overbreadth of the order.
[124]*124A.
The attorney-client privilege is deeply rooted in our common law and can be traced to the reign of Elizabeth I, where it was already unquestioned. See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961). It is the most revered of our common law privileges and, as it relates to criminal proceedings, has been codified in this Commonwealth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5916:
In a criminal proceeding counsel shall not be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial by the client.
This codification is merely a restatement of the common law privilege and its attendant case law interpretations. The rationale underlying this privilege was succinctly and graphically captured in the statement of Professor Mechem which has been quoted with approval by this Court in Slater v. Rimar, Inc., 462 Pa. 138, 148, 338 A.2d 584, 589 (1975):
“The purposes and necessities of the relation between a client and his attorney require, in many cases, on the part of the client, the fullest and freest disclosure to the attorney of the client’s objects, motives and acts. This disclosure is made in the strictest confidence, relying upon the attorney’s honor and fidelity. To permit the attorney to reveal to others what is so disclosed, would be not only a gross violation of a sacred trust upon his part, but it would utterly destroy and prevent the usefulness and benefits to be derived from professional assistance. Based upon considerations of public policy, therefore, the law wisely declares that all confidential communications and disclosures, made by a client to his legal adviser for [125]*125the purpose of obtaining his professional aid or advice, shall be strictly privileged; — that the attorney shall not be permitted, without the consent of his client, — and much less will he be compelled — to reveal or disclose communications made to him under such circumstances.” 2 Mecham on Agency, 2d Ed., § 2297.
462 Pa. at 148, 338 A.2d at 589.
In Estate of Kofsky, 487 Pa. 473, 409 A.2d 1358 (1979), we reasoned that the privilege is not concerned with the better ascertainment of the truth, but rather is grounded in a policy entirely extrinsic to protection of the fact-finding process. Id,. 487 Pa. at 482, 409 A.2d at 1362. We stated therein that its purpose is to foster a confidence between client and advocate that will lead to a trusting and open attorney-client dialogue. Id. See also Slater v. Rimar, supra; Alexander v. Queen, 253 Pa. 195, 97 A. 1063 (1916); McCormick, Evidence § 87 (2d ed. 1972).
To preserve the sanctity of the confidence, this Court has historically held that the burden of proof is upon the party asserting that disclosure of the information would not violate the attorney-client privilege. See Estate of Kofsky, supra; Nadler v. Warner Co., 321 Pa. 139, 184 A. 3 (1936); Moore v. Bray, 10 Pa. 519 (1849); Brennan v. Brennan, 281 Pa.Super. 362, 422 A.2d 510 (1980); Commonwealth v. Trolene, 263 Pa.Super. 263, 397 A.2d 1200 (1979); 2 G. Henry, Pa.Evidence, § 693 (4th ed. 1953). Moreover, when determining whether the attorney-client privilege is properly invoked, it has been and still remains the practice of this Court to resolve the question upon the particular facts of each case. Estate of Kofsky, supra; Slater v. Rimar, Inc., supra; Alexander v. Queen, supra; Moore v. Bray, supra; Brennan v. Brennan, supra; Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Company, 238 Pa.Super. 456, 357 A.2d 689 (1976).
Although this Court has not had the opportunity to consider whether the whereabouts of a client under court order to disclose his address is protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, other jurisdictions which have addressed the question have concluded that it is not so pro[126]*126tected. See, e.g., U.S. v. Woodruff, 383 F.Supp. 696 (E.D.Pa.1974) (attorney may be questioned as to the whereabouts of a client who has jumped bail as long as the questioning does not implicate the underlying case); Jafarian-Kerman v. Jafarian-Kerman, 424 S.W.2d 333 (Mo.App.1967) (defendant under order of court absconded with child; whereabouts not privileged); In the Matter of John Doe, 117 Misc.2d 197, 456 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1982) (assertion of privilege as to client’s whereabouts where client had jumped bail would aid and abet advancement of an unlawful act); In the Matter of Jacqueline F., 94 Misc.2d 96, 404 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1978) (no privilege as to address where privilege could aid guardian’s continued evasion of compliance with court’s order); Falkenhainer v. Falkenhainer, 198 Misc. 29, 97 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1950) (attorneys for defendant in divorce action were not protected from divulging client’s address where defendant defied child custody order); Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash.2d 1, 448 P.2d 490 (1968) (where client defied custody order, client’s address was not privileged).
We are also cognizant that in those cases where a client’s address was held to be privileged, the client was not under a court order which was being violated and the information sought went to the heart of the legal advice sought by the client. See, e.g., Brennan v. Brennan, supra; Matter of Grand Jury Subpoenas Served Upon Field; 408 F.Supp. 1169 (S.D.N.Y.1976); In re Stolar, 397 F.Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y.1975).
Appellee contends that the information sought from her by the Commonwealth and trial court, i.e., the “whereabouts” of her client, renders the precedent established in the “address inquiry” cases inapplicable.11 We disagree. Where, as here, a defendant is under bail he is under a legal obligation to keep the court informed of his address and there is no legitimate expectation that his address will not be disclosed. Nor is there a legitimate expectation to [127]*127believe that those facts leading to his “address” will not be disclosed. “Whereabouts” is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary as “the place or general locality where a person or thing is.” “Address” is defined therein as “the designation of a place (as a residence or place of business) where a person or organization may be found or communicated with.” Although the term “address” is more specific than “whereabouts,” both pertain to the place where a person or thing may be found or located. Both further the general inquiry in attempting to secure the presence of the defendant. Thus the initial question presented is the legitimacy of a per se rule limiting the inquiry as to a missing defendant to the narrowest possible ground, i.e., his precise address, where the broader inquiry as to whereabouts does not undercut the purpose of the privilege. As noted above, prior precedent established in the “address inquiry” cases is relevant and strongly argues against a per se rejection of an inquiry into the whereabouts of a missing defendant.
We must now consider the question of whether the purposes of the privilege are served in this case by curtailing an inquiry as to Aquino’s whereabouts. Aquino’s failure to appear for trial and his failure to inform the court of his whereabouts constituted a clear violation of the conditions of bail mandated by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 4013 which provides in pertinent part:
When a person is admitted to bail, the conditions of the bail bond shall be that such person will:
(a) Appear before the issuing authority or court at all times required until full and final disposition of the case;
(b) Submit to all orders and process of the issuing authority or court;
(c) Give written notice to the issuing authority, the clerk of courts, the district attorney, and court bail agency or other designated court bail officer, of any change of address within forty-eight (48) hours of the date of such change; ____
[128]*128We note in addition that Aquino’s deliberate failure to appear for his April 7, 1983 trial date constitutes a criminal act and, by its very nature, is a continuing one. Section 5124 of the Crimes Code provides:
(a) Offense defined. — A person set at liberty by court order, with or without bail, upon condition that he will subsequently appear at a specified time and place, commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, without lawful excuse, he fails to appear at that time and place. The offense constitutes a felony of the third degree where the required appearance was to answer to a charge of felony, or for disposition of any such charge, and the actor took flight or went into hiding to avoid apprehension, trial or punishment.
18 Pa.C.S. § 5124.
Aquino obligated himself to keep the court informed of his whereabouts and to make himself available at the direction of the court. He did not have the right to refuse to disclose his whereabouts to the court, nor could he have had a legitimate expectation that any information in this regard transmitted by him to his attorney would remain confidential. Since it is clear that the court had a right and an obligation to ascertain the requested information and the client had an obligation to supply that information, the only remaining question is whether the attorney-client relationship provides some basis for concluding that the attorney, who may be in possession of this information, should be permitted to refuse to disclose it.
The attorney’s oath of office requires fidelity to the court as well as to the client. 42 Pa.C.S. § 2522. The Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 7-27 states in part:
Because it interferes with the proper administration of justice, a lawyer should not suppress evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce____
E.C. 7-27.
Moreover, Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C) provides in pertinent part:
[129]*129(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.
DR 4-101(C) (emphasis added).
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States cited a similar provision in the Iowa Professional Responsibility Code for Lawyers in Nix v. Whiteside, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), noting that an exception to the attorney’s duty of confidentiality is a client’s announced intention to commit a crime. Although this decision is not binding upon us, we find it persuasive. Thus we must reject appellee’s assertion that the information concerning Aquino’s whereabouts is privileged.
Our conclusion as to the impact of the Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility is also buttressed by the following formal opinion of the American Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics, which addressed an almost identical factual circumstance:
When the communication by the client to his attorney is in respect to the future commission of an unlawful act or to a continuing wrong, the communication is not privileged. One who is actually engaged in committing a wrong can have no privileged witnesses, and public policy forbids that an attorney should assist in the commission thereof, or permit the relation of attorney and client to conceal the wrongdoing.
A defendant in a criminal case when admitted to bail is not only regarded as in the custody of his bail, but he is also in the custody of the laW, and admission to bail does not deprive the court of its inherent power to deal with the person of the prisoner. Being in lawful custody, the defendant is guilty of an escape when he gains his liberty before he is delivered in due process of law, and is guilty of a separate offense for which he may be punished. In failing to disclose his client’s whereabouts as a fugitive [130]*130under these circumstances the attorney would not only be aiding his client to escape trial on the charge for which he was indicted, but would likewise be aiding him in evading prosecution for the additional offense of escape.
It is the opinion of the committee that under such circumstances the attorney’s knowledge of his client’s whereabouts is not privileged, and that he may be disciplined for failing to disclose that information to the proper authorities. Equally, the attorney may be disciplined if, upon his client’s refusal to surrender upon his advice, he continues to act as his attorney, if the fugitive persists in so evading a trial upon the charges against him, the attorney should terminate their relations. Failing in this, the attorney is guilty of a violation of his oath and of his duty to society.
ABA Formal Opinion No. 155 (May 4, 1936).
In this case appellee, through her counsel, admitted she knew for a month prior to April 7, 1983 that Aquino would not appear for trial and that she had some general information as to his whereabouts. It is clear that the lawyer’s fidelity to the client does not extend to aiding and abetting a client in criminal activities, see Nadler v. Warner Co., supra; Commonwealth v. Trolene, supra; see also Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir.1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 551 F.2d 899 (2d Cir.1977); McCormick, supra § 95; Wigmore, supra § 2298, nor can the client have a legitimate expectation of such confidences.
Furthermore, to construe the confidential communications covered under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5916 to entail information of this nature would lead to the absurd result where a fugitive can effectively use the attorney-client privilege to defy a lawful court order. We are bound under the rules of our Statutory Construction Act to avoid such absurd results and to promote public policy. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1901. The following reasons also support this construction.
[131]*131As stated earlier, the purpose for confidentiality is to assure the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the attorney and the client. It is thus limited to confidential communications and disclosures made by the client to his legal advisor for the purpose of obtaining his professional aid or advice. See Slater v. Rimar, Inc., supra. Here Aquino sought appellee’s professional services to obtain legal representation to defend against sexual assault charges. The information relating to the initial charges for which the representation was sought and established is separate and distinct from the client’s subsequent decision to flee the jurisdiction of the court. Appellee has at no point suggested that she is now representing Aquino for the possible future charges of being a fugitive. Moreover, an attempt to represent Aquino for this charge under these circumstances would amount to appellee becoming an accessory in Aquino’s continuing criminal conduct. This is prohibited and clearly does not serve as the basis of an acceptable attorney-client relationship. Thus, in this case, it was the communications relating to the circumstances surrounding the sexual assault charges which were essential to the attorney-client relationship and not those communications relating to Aquino’s unlawful decision to remove himself from the jurisdiction of the court during the pendency of those charges. As stated in Brennan, supra, “courts must balance the interests of the client against the potential harm to others.” Id. 281 Pa.Super. at 379, 422 A.2d at 518.12
[132]*132We note that inordinate delay was caused by appellee’s client as the result of his evasive and obstructive conduct in failing to appear at his scheduled trial on April 7,1983. We also recognize the disruption to the efficient administration of justice that accompanies such protracted delays. Problems that can typically result from such delays include: (1) the fading memories of witnesses, e.g., the ten-year-old rape victim and her young brothers; (2) the future unavailability of witnesses; and (3) the loss or destruction of indispensible evidence.
Our analysis thus leads us to conclude that where a client is under conditions of bail and defies a lawful court order to appear, his “whereabouts” are not unqualifiedly protected by the attorney-client privilege, and the attorney may be compelled to disclose information of the client’s whereabouts. Under the instant facts, the privilege cannot be maintained.
B.
Having determined that the attorney-client privilege does not bar disclosure of the client’s whereabouts in the instant case, we now address appellee’s contention that the order of the trial court was overbroad. At issue is that portion of the order which directed appellee to “disclose any information she may have on how to locate the defendant Aquino.” Under appellee’s interpretation of the order, the Commonwealth could find out virtually anything it wanted to know about her client’s case.13 Both opinions of the [133]*133Superior Court also envisioned the worst possible scenario and concluded that the order would sanction the prosecution’s access to information and material which is absolutely privileged.14 While we believe the Superior Court has raised a legitimate concern that in such instances the Commonwealth could attempt to engage in a fishing expedition, we believe that the hypothetical expressed in no way relate to the facts presently before us. It is clear from the record of this case that the court was only interested in ascertain[134]*134ing the whereabouts of Aquino. The questions posed by the trial court were strictly limited to the address, phone number and whereabouts of appellee’s client. The questions neither required nor sought names of other individuals who may have served as the source of appellee’s information. The trial court’s probe was thus restricted to the factual information appellee could personally testify to concerning the whereabouts of Aquino, and did not entail a search of Aquino’s file. Such limited inquiry is distinguishable from inquiries concerning how or from whom appellee obtained the information or questions with respect to motives or explanations concerning the origin of the information. Those questions could lead to the disclosure of confidential communications and we caution against any orders to that effect. However, we find no such circumstances to exist within the limited context pursued by the trial judge in this case. Additionally, any conceivable overbreadth of the Court of Common Pleas can be cured by in camera questioning of appellee that is limited to determining whether she has any information concerning the whereabouts of Aquino.
Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court is reversed and we reinstate the order of contempt issued by the Court of Common Pleas requiring appellee to disclose information concerning the whereabouts of her client.
ZAPPALA, J., concurs in the result.
PAPADAKOS, J., files a dissenting opinion in which FLAHERTY, J., joins.
This matter was reassigned to this writer.