WINTERSHEIMER, Justice.
This appeal is from an opinion of the Court of Appeals which reversed a judgment . based on a conditional guilty plea that convicted Lucas of first-degree sexual abuse and second-degree sexual abuse. He was sentenced to a total of one and a half years in prison.
The sole issue is whether the interrogation during which Lucas confessed was noncustodial and therefore did not require a Miranda warning.
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction holding that the motion to suppress should have been granted because Lucas was subject to custodial interrogation without the benefit of the Miranda warnings.
The police first interviewed Lucas on February 26, 2002, regarding a report of inappropriate touching of his stepdaughter. Lucas came to the police station voluntarily, was given Miranda warnings and was told that he was free to leave at any time, which he did after the questioning. The next day the police filed a criminal complaint for misdemeanor sexual abuse with regard to the stepdaughter and obtained an arrest warrant. The police detective also received an additional report from a nephew of Lucas who alleged that the defendant had abused him 20 years before when the nephew was about five years old.
The police again asked Lucas to come in for questioning on March 1, 2002, which he did voluntarily. On this occasion, he was not given Miranda warnings and was not told that he was free to leave at any time. The police detective informed him that she had filed a misdemeanor complaint for the incident with the stepdaughter, but did not tell him that she had obtained a warrant and intended to arrest him on that charge. The detective questioned Lucas further regarding the allegations of the stepdaughter and then inquired about the report from the nephew. Ultimately, he confessed to the abuse of the nephew during that period of questioning which lasted a little over one hour. He was then arrested.
Lucas sought to suppress his confession claiming that he did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights. After a suppression hearing at which the police detective was the only witness, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress finding that Lucas was not in custody when he made the confession. Lucas entered a conditional guilty plea to first degree sexual abuse, a felony, and second-degree sexual abuse, a misdemeanor. He reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial judge in a split opinion. One judge concurred in the result in the lead opinion and another dissented without opinion. The Court of Appeals decision was not published.
In an apparent misinterpretation of the trial court, the Court of Appeals opinion states that it was affirming the “finding of [405]*405fact” of the trial judge that the defendant was in custody during the second interview. However, a careful examination of the record indicates that the trial judge actually found that Lucas was not in custody during this questioning. This Court granted discretionary review.
I. Standard of Review
The parties disagree on which standard of review should be used in considering the determination by the trial judge that Lucas was not in custody. The Commonwealth contends that the determination that Lucas was never in custody is a finding of fact and as such, this Court should review the decision under the clearly erroneous standard. See Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347 (Ky.2001). Lucas claims that whether he was in custody is a legal conclusion and not a finding of fact and thus should be reviewed de novo, citing Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 376 (Ky.App.2000).
This Court has used a de novo standard of review in deciding whether the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination is applicable to a particular situation. See Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407 (Ky.2004). Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals have held that the question of whether a defendant is in custody is a mixed question of law and fact to be reviewed de novo. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) and United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943 (6th Cir.1998). We also recognize that the findings of the trial judge are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence and the decision must have been demonstrated to have been clearly erroneous. See Clark v. Commonwealth, 868 S.W.2d 101 (Ky.App.1993) citing RCr 9.78 and Harper v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 665 (Ky.1985), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1178, 106 S.Ct. 2906, 90 L.Ed.2d 992 (1986).
We conclude that the standard of review in this case is de novo.
II. Interrogation
Lucas alleges that he was in custody during the second questioning and should have received Miranda warnings again.
It has been held by the United States Supreme Court that Miranda warnings are only required when the suspect being questioned is “in custody.” Thompson v. Keohane, supra. Custodial interrogation has been defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. Thompson. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on the freedom of an individual as to render him in custody. The inquiry for making a custodial determination is whether the person was under formal arrest or whether there was a restraint of his freedom or whether there was a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with formal arrest. Thompson; See also United States v. Mahan, 190 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 1999). Custody does not occur until police, by some form of physical force or show of authority, have restrained the liberty of an individual. Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Ky.1999). The test is whether, considering the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he or she was free to leave. Baker, supra, citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Some of the factors that demonstrate a seizure or custody have occurred are the threatening presence of several officers, physical touching of the person, or use of a tone or language that might compel compliance with the request [406]*406of the police. Baker. In this case there is no evidence that any of these factors were present.
The circumstances in this case indicate that Lucas was not in custody as determined by the trial judge. The atmosphere for both questionings was identical. The same detective conducted the interrogation. There is nothing to suggest in either interview that coercive behavior on the part of law enforcement was present. The arrival at the police station was the same. The room was the same, the detective was the same. In both instances, Lucas volunteered to come for questioning and even initiated contact after the first interrogation seeking a status of any case against him.
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WINTERSHEIMER, Justice.
This appeal is from an opinion of the Court of Appeals which reversed a judgment . based on a conditional guilty plea that convicted Lucas of first-degree sexual abuse and second-degree sexual abuse. He was sentenced to a total of one and a half years in prison.
The sole issue is whether the interrogation during which Lucas confessed was noncustodial and therefore did not require a Miranda warning.
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction holding that the motion to suppress should have been granted because Lucas was subject to custodial interrogation without the benefit of the Miranda warnings.
The police first interviewed Lucas on February 26, 2002, regarding a report of inappropriate touching of his stepdaughter. Lucas came to the police station voluntarily, was given Miranda warnings and was told that he was free to leave at any time, which he did after the questioning. The next day the police filed a criminal complaint for misdemeanor sexual abuse with regard to the stepdaughter and obtained an arrest warrant. The police detective also received an additional report from a nephew of Lucas who alleged that the defendant had abused him 20 years before when the nephew was about five years old.
The police again asked Lucas to come in for questioning on March 1, 2002, which he did voluntarily. On this occasion, he was not given Miranda warnings and was not told that he was free to leave at any time. The police detective informed him that she had filed a misdemeanor complaint for the incident with the stepdaughter, but did not tell him that she had obtained a warrant and intended to arrest him on that charge. The detective questioned Lucas further regarding the allegations of the stepdaughter and then inquired about the report from the nephew. Ultimately, he confessed to the abuse of the nephew during that period of questioning which lasted a little over one hour. He was then arrested.
Lucas sought to suppress his confession claiming that he did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights. After a suppression hearing at which the police detective was the only witness, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress finding that Lucas was not in custody when he made the confession. Lucas entered a conditional guilty plea to first degree sexual abuse, a felony, and second-degree sexual abuse, a misdemeanor. He reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial judge in a split opinion. One judge concurred in the result in the lead opinion and another dissented without opinion. The Court of Appeals decision was not published.
In an apparent misinterpretation of the trial court, the Court of Appeals opinion states that it was affirming the “finding of [405]*405fact” of the trial judge that the defendant was in custody during the second interview. However, a careful examination of the record indicates that the trial judge actually found that Lucas was not in custody during this questioning. This Court granted discretionary review.
I. Standard of Review
The parties disagree on which standard of review should be used in considering the determination by the trial judge that Lucas was not in custody. The Commonwealth contends that the determination that Lucas was never in custody is a finding of fact and as such, this Court should review the decision under the clearly erroneous standard. See Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347 (Ky.2001). Lucas claims that whether he was in custody is a legal conclusion and not a finding of fact and thus should be reviewed de novo, citing Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 376 (Ky.App.2000).
This Court has used a de novo standard of review in deciding whether the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination is applicable to a particular situation. See Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407 (Ky.2004). Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals have held that the question of whether a defendant is in custody is a mixed question of law and fact to be reviewed de novo. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) and United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943 (6th Cir.1998). We also recognize that the findings of the trial judge are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence and the decision must have been demonstrated to have been clearly erroneous. See Clark v. Commonwealth, 868 S.W.2d 101 (Ky.App.1993) citing RCr 9.78 and Harper v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 665 (Ky.1985), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1178, 106 S.Ct. 2906, 90 L.Ed.2d 992 (1986).
We conclude that the standard of review in this case is de novo.
II. Interrogation
Lucas alleges that he was in custody during the second questioning and should have received Miranda warnings again.
It has been held by the United States Supreme Court that Miranda warnings are only required when the suspect being questioned is “in custody.” Thompson v. Keohane, supra. Custodial interrogation has been defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. Thompson. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on the freedom of an individual as to render him in custody. The inquiry for making a custodial determination is whether the person was under formal arrest or whether there was a restraint of his freedom or whether there was a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with formal arrest. Thompson; See also United States v. Mahan, 190 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 1999). Custody does not occur until police, by some form of physical force or show of authority, have restrained the liberty of an individual. Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Ky.1999). The test is whether, considering the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he or she was free to leave. Baker, supra, citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Some of the factors that demonstrate a seizure or custody have occurred are the threatening presence of several officers, physical touching of the person, or use of a tone or language that might compel compliance with the request [406]*406of the police. Baker. In this case there is no evidence that any of these factors were present.
The circumstances in this case indicate that Lucas was not in custody as determined by the trial judge. The atmosphere for both questionings was identical. The same detective conducted the interrogation. There is nothing to suggest in either interview that coercive behavior on the part of law enforcement was present. The arrival at the police station was the same. The room was the same, the detective was the same. In both instances, Lucas volunteered to come for questioning and even initiated contact after the first interrogation seeking a status of any case against him. The questioning was approximately an hour in length and does not reflect any long or arduous process in which the resistance of the suspect was worn down.
It has been held that whether a person is in custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation. Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604 (6th Cir.2003). The subjective view of the officer and the person being questioned are not the focus of the question.
The second interview involved both questions about the allegations of the stepdaughter as well as the nephew. During the course of the interview, Lucas admitting to fondling the nephew and having the victim fondle him. At the conclusion of the second interview, Lucas was arrested for the misdemeanor charge of sexual abuse with regard to the stepdaughter. Almost two weeks later, Lucas was served with a juvenile summons on two charges of first-degree sexual abuse in connection with the incidents twenty years earlier concerning his nephew.
In order for the Miranda warning to apply, a defendant must be in custody. Callihan v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 123, 127 (Ky.2004). Here, Lucas was not in custody during the second interview because he was not formally arrested at that time and voluntarily came to the police station for the questioning. It has been held that a policeman’s unarticulated plan to take a defendant into custody has no bearing on the question of whether a subject was in custody at a particular time. The only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in the position of the suspect would have understood the situation. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).
Certainly Lucas was not in custody during the first interrogation and also was not in custody during the second questioning. All the circumstances in the first interview were present when Lucas was questioned on the second occasion. The only significant difference as related to custody was that Lucas was told that a criminal complaint about the stepdaughter had been filed and that there were allegations made by a nephew. He was not told about the arrest warrant. Based on all the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would not have believed he was in custody.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of conviction is reinstated.
GRAVES, ROACH and SCOTT, JJ., concur.
COOPER, J., dissents by separate opinion and is joined by LAMBERT, C.J. and JOHNSTONE, J.