Beckham v. Commonwealth

248 S.W.3d 547, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 71, 2008 WL 746499

• Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
• Decided: March 20, 2008
• Docket: 2006-SC-000136-MR
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion of the Court by

Justice MINTON.

A circuit court jury convicted Rodney Douglas Beckham of murder and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFOl). The trial court sentenced Beck-ham to life imprisonment. He appeals to this Court as a matter of right,¹ raising two issues. First, Beckham contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements he made to police during a lengthy interrogation process that preceded Miranda2 warnings. Second, he contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting him from discussing his testimony with his attorneys during an overnight recess that interrupted his cross-examination by the Commonwealth. We reject both arguments and, thus, affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

The cleaning crew at an Econo Lodge discovered a badly beaten woman in a room at the motel. The ensuing investigation eventually targeted Beckham because he was the last person seen with the victim. Before locating Beckham, the officers obtained a search warrant granting authority to take samples of blood, saliva, body hair, head hair, and pubic hair from Beckham³ and to take nude photographs of him.

About an hour after the search warrant issued, the police located Beckham at his cousin’s home in a neighboring county. Then, at around 4:30 p.m., two officers went to the door to ask Beckham if he would speak with them while three other officers were nearby.⁴ Beckham apparently agreed to speak to the officers, and the officers transported him in a police vehicle to a local probation and parole office.

The two lead investigators, Boone County Sheriffs Department Detectives Pate and Lavender, met Beckham at the probation and parole office. Detectives Pate and Lavender questioned Beckham for about two hours in an office behind a closed door. Beckham then agreed to make a written statement, at which time, Detectives Pate and Lavender left Beck-ham alone for the length of time it took him to write out his statement.

At the suppression hearing, it was established that Beckham took approximately thirty minutes to complete his written statement, which Beckham signed at 7:07 p.m. In that statement, Beckham admitted to being with the victim in the hours before she was discovered at the Econo Lodge. He further admitted in his statement that his effort to have sexual intercourse with the victim was unsuccessful because of his inability to achieve an erection. Beckham also wrote that at the victim’s request, he went to a grocery store and bought some items to be used to smoke cocaine. Beckham wrote that his encounter with the victim ended shortly before dawn when she let him out of her vehicle and drove away.

At 7:30 p.m., shortly after he signed his written statement, Beckham gave the police permission to retrieve the clothes he claimed he was wearing when he was with the victim. Beckham was then driven back to his cousin’s home in a police vehicle to get the clothes. Beckham was returned to the probation and parole office, where, at around 8:00 p.m., the police taped a thirty-minute interview with Beck-ham. At that time, they informed him for the first time that they had the search warrant. The police then took Beckham to the hospital so the “perk kit” could be obtained. There is no indication that Beckham objected to going to the hospital or to the process required to obtain the evidence specified in the search warrant.

While Beckham was at the hospital, Detective Pate learned that another officer had found a bloodstained shirt in the trash at the home where Beckham was staying.⁵ Apparently, the officers had also viewed the surveillance video from the grocery store Beckham mentioned in his written statement and had determined that the clothes he claimed he was wearing did not match those shown on the surveillance tape. After the perk kit evidence was obtained at the hospital, Beckham agreed to return to submit to further questions, at which time, he was taken to the local police department.

Around 11:00 p.m., the police told Beck-ham that there had been a “dramatic turn of events” or a “dramatic discovery” and asked him if he had anything he needed to say to them. Beckham then said something about needing help, after which the police first read him his Miranda rights. After Detective Lavender informed Beck-ham of his rights, Beckham exercised his right to counsel, thereby ending the interrogation at 11:16 p.m., nearly seven hours after the police first encountered Beckham at his cousin’s house.

The victim died several weeks later, and Beckham was indicted for one count of murder. He filed a motion to suppress all statements he made to the police and all evidence seized as a result of those statements. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The charge against Beckham proceeded to trial, after which the jury found Beckham guilty of murder and of being a PFOl. In accordance with the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced Beckham to life imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS.

A. Denial of Motion to Suppress.

Under the familiar dictates of Miranda, the authorities must inform a person to whom they are speaking of certain constitutional rights, including the interviewee’s right to counsel, provided that the interviewee “has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”⁶ So the crucial question to be determined in situations where a criminal defendant contends that the authorities failed to comply timely with the warnings required by Miranda is whether the defendant was “in custody.”⁷

In order to determine if a person was in custody, a court must determine “whether, considering the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he or she was free to leave.”⁸ A reviewing court must be careful to use an objective standard in determining whether a person was in custody because “the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”⁹

Beckham argues that his statements must be suppressed because the officers did not timely administer the Miranda warnings to him. Based on the standards we have already discussed, our task is to determine if the trial court correctly found that Beckham was not in custody when he spoke to the authorities. In making that determination, we must objectively assess the entire circumstances surrounding Beckham’s interaction with the authorities to determine whether a reasonable person in Beckham’s situation would have believed he was free to leave. The factual findings made by the trial court on this issue are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence.¹⁰ But the determination of whether a defendant is in custody is a mixed question of law and fact, meaning that we review de novo the trial court’s ultimate decision on that point.¹¹

Beckham argues that the fact that he interacted with the authorities for over six hours before being informed of his Miranda rights shows that he was “in custody” for Miranda purposes. And we agree that the length of the interrogation is a factor that a court may take into account in determining whether a person was in custody.¹² But the length of Beck-ham’s interaction with the police is not the only factor to be considered. At the suppression hearing, the officers testified that Beckham was told that he was free to go and, furthermore, that Beckham never gave an indication that his cooperation was anything other than voluntary. Additionally, there is no indication that the officers touched Beckham or engaged in any other physically coercive act during their interviews with him.¹³

Beckham also contends that the trial court misjudged the situation entirely because it mistakenly found that a probation and parole officer who knew Beckham went to his home and asked him to come to the probation and parole office. It is undeniable that the trial court made such a written finding in its order denying Beck-ham’s motion to suppress. And it is further undeniable that evidence adduced at the suppression hearing does not support that finding. But it does not follow that this mistaken finding of fact destroyed the foundation for the trial court’s ultimate conclusion regarding whether Beckham was in custody since there is no indication that Beckham did not voluntarily accompany the officers to the probation and parole office from his cousin’s home.

Despite Beckham’s argument, we find it unnecessary to remand this case for additional findings by the trial court due to this lone, clearly erroneous finding of fact. Beckham declined the trial court’s invitation to supplement the testimony given at the suppression hearing; and, more importantly, Beckham has not shown where, .he asked the trial court to make additional findings.¹⁴ Furthermore, Beckham has not shown the necessity or efficacy of a remand for an additional suppression hearing or additional findings by the trial court.

We also reject Beckham’s contention that he is entitled to a new suppression hearing under the dictates of Procunier v. Atchley,15 Procunier held that a defendant may be entitled to a new suppression hearing if (1) he can demonstrate shortcomings in the procedures used to determine the voluntariness of his confession and (2) he has alleged facts which, if true, would establish that his confession was involuntary.¹⁶

Procunier is inapplicable to the case at hand. First, Procunier was a habeas corpus post-conviction case and not a direct appeal. Second, Procunier focused on whether a confession a defendant gave to an insurance salesman was improperly obtained and admitted into evidence.¹⁷ Obviously, the issue in this case is vastly different in that Beckham complains about his interactions with the authorities, not a third party such as an insurance salesman. Third, the defendant in Procunier confessed to committing the crime, yet Beckham did not. Finally, even assuming — solely for the purposes of argument — that Beck-ham has identified shortcomings in the suppression hearing, he has not shown anything that would cause us to find that his interaction with the officers was custodial, not voluntary.

Finally, wé reject Beckham’s argument that he had to have been in custody because the authorities already held a warrant for a perk kit and photographs at the time they questioned him, meaning that the officers likely would not have simply let him leave. But this argument is unavailing. As mentioned before, the subjective intent of the officers is irrelevant in determining whether a person was in custody.¹⁸ So the question of whether the officers would have forcibly detained Beck-ham so that the DNA evidence could be obtained is of no constitutional significance. The existence of the search warrant would only have constitutional import if the officers had let Beckham know about the warrant before speaking with him, which they apparently did not.¹⁹ The question is whether a reasonable person in Beckham’s situation would have believed that he was not free to leave. Beckham apparently did not know about the search warrant for the first several hours of his interaction with the police; thus, the existence of the warrant does not defeat a finding that Beckham was not in custody.²⁰

This case presents some factors suggesting that Beckham was in custody, primarily the length of the interrogation and the presence of multiple officers. But the weight of the evidence tends to show that Beckham was not in custody. Specifically, the officers testified that they informed Beckham he was free to leave and that Beckham never showed any inclination to leave or otherwise to stop speaking and cooperating with them. And Beckham offered nothing at the suppression hearing to rebut the officers’ testimony. So, on balance, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that Beckham was not in custody.

B. Alleged Denial of Right to Counsel.

Beckham testified in his own behalf at trial. During Beckham’s cross-examination by the Commonwealth, the trial recessed for an overnight break. The next morning, the attorneys and the trial court discussed jury instructions before the cross-examination resumed. As the discussion between the court and counsel ended, Beckham’s attorneys asked permission to speak with Beckham regarding jury instructions and other matters. The trial court granted permission for Beck-ham’s attorneys to speak to him but admonished the attorneys not to talk with Beckham about his testimony. Defense counsel objected to the limitation on their right to confer with their client. The trial court responded by stating that it was not trying to limit Beckham’s access to counsel but, rather, was just trying to treat Beck-ham like any other witness. A short time later, the trial resumed; and Beckham was cross-examined further by the Commonwealth. Beckham now contends that the trial court’s limitation on his consultation with his attorneys violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We disagree.

In separate decisions, the United States Supreme Court has held that a court cannot prevent a criminal defendant from having any consultation with his attorney during an overnight recess²¹ but that it is constitutionally permissible for a trial court to bar a testifying defendant from consulting with his attorney during a briefer recess.²² The Court reconciled those two holdings by noting that an attorney would normally consult with his client about matters other than the client’s testimony during an overnight recess but that it “presume[d] that nothing but the [defendant’s] testimony will be discussed” during a brief recess.²³ Beckham contends that the trial court’s act of barring his counsel from discussing his ongoing testimony is reversible error under Geders.

We reject Beckham’s argument because Geders involved a trial court’s complete denial of a defendant’s right to consult with his attorneys dining an overnight recess. By contrast, the case at hand involves a trial court’s permitting the defendant to have contact with his attorneys during an overnight recess while limiting that contact by telling the attorneys to not discuss their client’s ongoing testimony. So the situation in the case before us is different from the blanket prohibition on attorney-client contact condemned in Ged-ers. As the Court held in Perry, “we do not believe the defendant has a constitutional right to discuss [his] testimony while it is in process.”²⁴ All the trial judge did in the case at hand was attempt to minimize the risk that Beckham would get “coaching tips” before the resumption of his cross-examination. Since the trial judge’s actions attempted to protect the integrity of the proceedings and did not impermissibly limit all attorney-client contact during the waning minutes of the overnight recess, we hold that the trial court’s admonition to counsel did not abridge Beckham’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

III. CONCLUSION.

Rodney Douglas Beckhám’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

All sitting. LAMBERT, C.J.; ABRAMSON, and CUNNINGHAM, JJ., concur. NOBLE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in which SCHRODER and SCOTT, JJ., join.

1 . See Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).

2 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

3 . The affidavit for a search warrant deemed this type of information to be a "male perk kit ..."

4 .Because none of ffie officers who initially encountered Beckham testified at the suppression hearing, it was not clear whether the three officers who did not go to the door were visible to Beckham at the time he agreed to speak to the authorities.

5 .There is no indication that the officers did not have permission from someone at the home where Beckham was staying to search the trash.

6 . Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

7 . Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Ky.2006).

8 . Id.

9 . Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994).

10 . Lucas, 195 S.W.3d at 405.

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12 . See, e.g., United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 861 (6th Cir.2000) (listing factors, in-eluding length of interrogation, which a court may consider in determining whether person was in custody).

13 . See Lucas, 195 S.W.3d at 405-06 (holding that factors indicating whether a person is in custody includes physical touching by officers).

14 . Likewise, we reject Beckham’s contention that we should rely heavily upon evidence presented at trial in reviewing the propriety of the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. If Beckham wanted to proffer more evidence to support of his motion to suppress, he should have accepted the trial court’s unequivocal invitation to present whatever evidence he believed was necessary.

15 . 400 U.S. 446, 91 S.Ct. 485, 27 L.Ed.2d 524 (1971).

16 . Id. 400 U.S. at 451, 91 S.Ct. 485.

17 . See id. 400 U.S. at 447, 91 S.Ct. 485.

18 . Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526; Lucas, 195 S.W.3d at 406.

19 . See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (stating that officer's views and beliefs as to likelihood of guilt are only relevant in initial custody determination if disclosed to defendant).

20 . Indeed, it has been held that "[e]ven when probable cause exists to arrest a suspect, Miranda rights do not necessarily attach.” United States v. Ozuna, 170 F.3d 654, 658 (6th Cir.1999).

21 . Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976).

22 . Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283-84, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624 (1989).

23 . Id. at 488 U.S. 284, 109 S.Ct. 594.

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