Commonwealth v. Leet

585 A.2d 1033, 401 Pa. Super. 490, 1991 Pa. Super. LEXIS 188

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 23, 1991
• Docket: 462
• Status: Published

Opinions

WIEAND, Judge:

Does a deputy sheriff have authority in Pennsylvania to make warrantless arrests for Vehicle Code violations occurring in his or her presence? The trial court held that deputy sheriffs did not have such authority and suppressed contraband found in the motorist’s vehicle following an arrest by a deputy sheriff. The Commonwealth appealed. We affirm.

On May 17, 1988, while driving a marked sheriffs vehicle on Route 56 in Armstrong County, Deputy Sheriff Kevin Gibbons observed a vehicle, driven by Marshall Leet, cross double yellow lines and pass several vehicles stopped in a line of traffic. Gibbons shouted to Leet and instructed him to pull to the side of the road. When Gibbons thereafter approached Leet’s car, he observed a can of beer on the front seat. Consequently, he asked Leet to exit the vehicle in order to perform a field sobriety test. Leet complied and successfully passed the test administered by Gibbons. When Leet returned to his vehicle, Gibbons asked to see Leet’s driver’s license, owner’s card and insurance card. Leet was unable to produce a driver’s license. Gibbons then initiated a call to determine the status of Leet’s driving privileges and to summon police assistance. Leet’s license, it was learned, was under suspension, and Officer Donald Weber arrived on the scene shortly thereafter to assist. When Gibbons entered Leet’s car, with Leet’s consent, to move it to a safer parking place, he observed a live “357 shell” on the floor and two paper bags behind the front seat. Subsequently, marijuana was found in one of the paper bags, and methamphetamine was found in the tape deck. Weber thereupon issued citations for driving with an expired license,¹ driving with an open can of beer in the car,² and passing in a no-passing zone.³ Leet was also charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver. Subsequently, Leet moved to suppress all physical evidence obtained by police following Deputy Sheriff Gibbons’ allegedly unauthorized stop of Leet. The suppression court determined, after hearing, that Gibbons had lacked authority to stop Leet’s vehicle for a traffic violation and suppressed the evidence.

Although the sheriff has traditionally been the principal law enforcement officer of the county, this is no longer always true today; as communities grew local police departments were created resulting in a dichotomy between the daily functioning of police officers and sheriffs. In some states, the establishment of a police department resulted in an erosion of the office of sheriff. In others, when a local police force is established, the power and authority of the sheriff to enforce the law and preserve the peace is not legally diminished; both forces act cooperatively and in concert to achieve this desired purpose.

70 Am.Jur.2d Sheriffs, Police, and Constables § 3 (1987). In Pennsylvania, the Office of Sheriff is provided for by Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Constitution, however, does not define the duties of the sheriff. The Act of June 29, 1976, P.L. 475, 16 P.S. § 1216, amending the County Code, provides that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs “shall perform all those duties authorized or imposed on them by statute.” The Judicial Code, at 42 Pa.C.S. § 2921, in a section entitled, “powers and duties of the sheriff,” provides that the “sheriff, either personally or by deputy, shall serve process and execute orders directed to him pursuant to law.” There is nowhere to be found any statutory provision authorizing sheriffs or deputy sheriffs to stop vehicles and issue citations for motor vehicle violations.

“It is well settled that ‘[w]hen vesting a group with police powers and duties, the Legislature does so with specificity.’ ” Allegheny County Deputy Sheriffs Association v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 95 Pa. Commw. 132, 135, 504 A.2d 437, 439 (1986), quoting Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 64 Pa.Commw. 525, 532, 441 A.2d 470, 475 (1982). That the legislature intended to vest police, not sheriffs, with authority to enforce the provisions of the Vehicle Code is clear from the numerous provisions granting police powers to police officers without any corresponding authority to sheriffs or deputy sheriffs. The authority to arrest without warrant for Vehicle Code violations has been vested in police officers by 75 Pa.C.S. § 6304 as follows:

(a) Pennsylvania State Police.—A member of the Pennsylvania State Police who is in uniform may arrest without a warrant any person who violates any provision of this title in the presence of the police officer making the arrest.

(b) Other police officers.—Any police officer who is in uniform may arrest without a warrant any nonresident who violates any provision of this title in the presence of the police officer in making the arrest.

(c) Other powers preserved.—The powers of arrest conferred by this section are in addition to any other powers of arrest conferred by law.

The corresponding duty on motorists to exhibit a vehicle registration and driver’s license upon request exists only where a signal or request therefor is made by a “police officer.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(a).⁴ Other provisions of the Vehicle Code which vest in police officers the authority to enforce traffic laws include the following: 75 Pa.C.S. § 3352 (authorizing police officers to remove stopped, standing, or parked vehicles); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3353 (authorizing police officers to make exceptions to parking prohibitions); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368 (authorizing police officers to time rate of speed of any vehicle on any highway); 75 Pa.C.S. § 4729 (authorizing police officers to stop vehicles and remove certification of inspection); 75 Pa.C.S. § 4731 (authorizing police officers to inspect inspection stations and their records); 75 Pa.C.S. § 4981 (authorizing police officers to require driver of any vehicle to stop and submit vehicle to be measured and weighed); 75 Pa.C.S. § 6305 (procedure which police officers follow in arresting non-resident); 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) (authorizing police officers to stop vehicles for investigation); 75 Pa.C.S. § 6309 (authorizing police officers to impound vehicles for non-payment of fines); 75 Pa.C.S. § 6311 (duty of motorist to obey directives of police officer); 75 Pa.C.S. § 7105 (authorizing police officers to seize vehicles with removed or falsified vehicle identification numbers and to arrest person having possession); 75 Pa.C.S. § 7112 (persons falsely reporting to police officer theft or conversion of motor vehicle are guilty of misdemeanor); 75 Pa.C.S. § 7113 (police department has duty to report stolen and recovered vehicles to State police and owner upon recovery); 75 Pa.C.S. § 7123 (authorizing police officers to confiscate certificates or other documents issued by the department which are unlawfully possessed or used); 75 Pa.C.S. § 7310 (authorizing police officers to remove or direct removal of abandoned or wrecked vehicles and spilled cargo from any roadway).

There is no corresponding provision in the Vehicle Code, or in any other statute, which authorizes sheriffs or deputy sheriffs to arrest motorists without a warrant and request from such motorists their operator’s license, vehicle registration, or insurance card.⁵

It is well settled that the object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature as expressed by the words employed. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 485 Pa. 8, 400 A.2d 1284 (1979); Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass’n., 453 Pa. 124, 306 A.2d 881 (1973); Clearview Bowling Center, Inc. v. Hanover Borough, 430 Pa. 579, 244 A.2d 20 (1968).

It is fundamental that in ascertaining the legislature’s intent, the plain words of its laws may not be ignored. Stegmaier Estate, 424 Pa. 4, 225 A.2d 566 (1967). A court may not alter, under the guise of interpretation, the express language and intent of the legislature. Commonwealth v. Pope, 455 Pa. 384, 317 A.2d 887 (1974); see Zimmerman v. O’Bannon, 497 Pa. 551, 442 A.2d 674 (1982). Thus, where the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, a court may go no further to determine the legislative intent. Kritz Estate, 387 Pa. 223, 127 A.2d 720 (1956); Rich v. Meadville Park Theatre Corp., 360 Pa. 338, 62 A.2d 1 (1948); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Clark, 331 Pa. 405, 200 A. 41 (1938); see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b), (c). It is only when the words of the statute are not explicit that the intention of the legislature may be ascertained by considering other means of statutory interpretation or construction. Davis v. Sulcowe, 416 Pa. 138, 205 A.2d 89 (1964); Commonwealth v. Chester County Light and Power Co., 339 Pa. 97, 14 A.2d 314 (1940).

Barasch v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 516 Pa. 142, 155-156, 532 A.2d 325, 331-332 (1987), aff'd, 488 U.S. 299, 109 S.Ct. 609, 102 L.Ed.2d 646 (1989).

The language of the statute in this case is explicit. Enforcement of the Vehicle Code has been vested by the legislature in police officers. Sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are not police officers. Cf. Venneri v. County of Allegheny, 12 Pa.Commw. 517, 316 A.2d 120 (1974). A deputy sheriff has not been authorized to stop a motorist and make an arrest for a Vehicle Code violation, whether or not the violation has been committed in the deputy sheriff’s presence.

A review of the history of the Vehicle Code confirms this interpretation. Both section 1203 of the Motor Vehicle Code of May 1, 1929, P.L. 905, and section 1204 of the Motor Vehicle Code of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, authorized “peace officers, when in uniform and displaying a badge or other sign of authority [to] arrest, upon view, any person violating any of the provisions of [the Motor Vehicle Code], where the offense [was] designated a felony or a misdemeanor, or in cases causing or contributing to an accident resulting in injury or death to any person____” “Peace officers” were defined in section 102 of the Motor Vehicle Codes of 1929 and 1959 to include sheriffs, deputy sheriffs and constables. The Motor Vehicle Code of 1959, however, contained, in section 1201(c), the following limitation pertaining to arrests for summary offenses:

(c) Any salaried police officer, excluding any person compensated solely or in part by fees, who shall be a member of a police department organized and operating under the authority of cities of the first, second and third class, or a borough, incorporated town or township of the first class, when in uniform and exhibiting his badge or other sign of authority, whenever a summary offense as described in this act is committed in his presence, shall be vested with the authority to stop and present to the alleged offender a printed notice to appear before the nearest available magistrate or in cities of the first class or cities of the second class, any magistrate sitting in the central traffic court.

This intent was carried over into the present Vehicle Code. At 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308, the legislature authorized “police officers” to stop vehicles for any violations of the Vehicle Code.

The Commonwealth would nevertheless have us revert to the common law to find general peacekeeping duties in the sheriff. Based on authority vested in sheriffs and deputy sheriffs by the common law, the Commonwealth argues that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs have inherent power and authority to arrest without a warrant for all crimes, however defined, committed in their presence, including Vehicle Code violations. We are unable to accept this reasoning. In the first place, an attempt to imply power where the same has not been granted by statute would be in direct violation of the legislature’s mandate that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall perform the duties imposed by statute.

Moreover, although “the sheriff’s power at early common law was indeed formidable, [ ] it is not tenable to carry over such a broad base of authority in the present [day].” Venneri v. County of Allegheny, supra at 523 n. 2, 316 A.2d at 124 n. 2. The encroachment of other institutions, including the expertise and technology of modern law enforcement agencies, has greatly diminished the authority of the office of sheriff. Today, the sheriffs principal function is as an arm of the court, which is the duty specifically assigned to the office of sheriff by the legislature.

Finally, common law crimes have been abolished in Pennsylvania. “No conduct constitutes a crime unless it is a crime under this title or another statute of this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 107(b). The crime for which Leet was stopped was made an offense by the Vehicle Code. The legislature has vested the authority and the duty to arrest for violations thereof in police officers. To expand the authority of sheriffs and deputy sheriffs by implication to make such arrests is to violate the tenet that when the legislature intends to vest a group with police powers it will do so with specificity. Allegheny County Deputy Sheriffs Association v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, supra.

As has been argued by Amicus, “[t]here is a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing police training, arms certification and other areas which are vital to [the] critical public service [of enforcing the Vehicle Code]. The same regulations are generally not applicable to sheriffs’ employes. While no one can doubt the importance of the office of sheriff and the vital role it plays [in] the functioning of the court[s], these officials are not police [officers] by legislative design____” Whether sheriffs and deputy sheriffs continue to have general peace keeping duties is not now before this Court, and with respect thereto we express no opinion. It is quite clear, however, that they have not been entrusted with authority to enforce the Vehicle Code.⁶ This duty has been vested in “police officers” by the people of the Commonwealth, acting through their legislative representatives.

When Deputy Sheriff Gibbons stopped Marshall Leet for an alleged violation of the Vehicle Code, he was acting in his capacity as “deputy sheriff” and not as a “private citizen.” His conduct, therefore, implicated “state action.” See and compare: Commonwealth v. Eschelman, 477 Pa. 93, 383 A.2d 838 (1978). Because Gibbons did not have authority to arrest Leet for an alleged violation of the Vehicle Code, suppression of evidence seized as a result of his unlawful arrest was an appropriate remedy. To hold otherwise would be to vest in deputy sheriffs by indirection the right to effect warrantless arrests for Motor Vehicle Code violations by holding motorists at gunpoint or otherwise until a “police officer” arrives on the scene to make a lawful arrest. Because the trial court properly suppressed the contraband seized following Leet’s unlawful arrest by a deputy sheriff, its order will be affirmed.

Order affirmed.

MONTEMURO, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion. CIRILLO, President Judge, files a dissenting opinion joined by FORD ELLIOTT, J. KELLY, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

1 . 75 Pa.C.S. § 1501.

2 . 75 Pa.C.S. § 3715.

3 . 75 Pa.C.S. § 3307.

4 . The provisions of 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(a) are as follows:

(a) Duty of operator or pedestrian.—The operator of any vehicle or any pedestrian reasonably believed to have violated any provision of this title shall stop upon request or signal of any police officer and shall, upon request, exhibit a registration card, driver’s license and information relating to financial responsibility, or other means of identification if a pedestrian or driver of a pedalcycle, and shall write their name in the presence of the police officer if so required for the purpose of establishing identity.

5 . Although the Vehicle Code vests several powers in the sheriff, including duties regarding impounded vehicles and, when authorized, to direct traffic, it does not at any place vest in sheriffs or deputy sheriffs the authority to make arrests for Vehicle Code violations. See: 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3102, 6309, 6310.

6 . We do not restrict the powers of the sheriff except as herein set forth. We hold only that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs do not have authority under Pennsylvania law to make warrantless arrests for violations of the Vehicle Code.