Opinion by
Mr. Justice O’Brien,
These two actions now before this Court arose under the Civil Procedural Support Law, Act of July 13, 1953, P. L. 431, as amended, August 14, 1963, P. L. 872, 62 P.B. Sec. 2043.31 et seq., originating in the Women’s Division of the County Court of Philadelphia on complaints filed by the respective mothers of two children born out of lawful wedlock. Our Court, by order elated August 3, 1965, consolidated them for argument as both eases present an identical question.
In Billworth’s case, the complaint was filed on November 26, 1963; in Murphy’s case, on November 21, 1963. In the Murphy case, plaintiff swore out a criminal information against Mnrphy charging Mm with the crimes of fornication and bastardy resulting in the subsequent birth of a child. In the Dill worth ease, plaintiff’s petition did not indicate under what act of the assembly the petitioner was proceeding. Prior to the time of trial however, both complaints were in the form as set forth in the Civil Procedural Support Law, as amended. (62 P.S. Sec. 2043.31 et seq.)1 Billworth’s [482]*482case was heard on February 3, 1984, at which time Dillwortb appeared witb counsel wbo demanded a jury trial. This was denied and tbe trial proceeded witb tbe court making a finding of paternity and ordering weekly support payments of $10.00. In tbe Murpby case, tbe original complaint as filed charged tbe defendant witb fornication and bastardy under Section 506 of Tbe Penal Code (18 P.S. §4506). However, following tbe effective date of tbe amendment to tbe Civil Procedural Support Law of August 14, 1963, tbe charge of fornication was dropped from the complaint and tbe case came to trial on February 3, 1964. Tbe defendant was represented by counsel wbo by motion requested a jury trial. Tbe motion was dismissed and tbe court, after making a finding of paternity, ordered tbe defendant to pay $7.00 a week until the child reached tbe age of eighteen.
Dillworth took an appeal to tbe Superior Court (October Term, 1964, No. 270), where tbe Order of tbe County Court of Philadelphia was affirmed. (204 Pa. Superior Ct. 420). We subsequently granted allocatur. In tbe Murpby case tbe appellant also appealed tbe order of tbe lower court to tbe Superior Court where, because it presented an identical question as bad been presented in tbe Dillworth case, tbe Superior Court certified Murphy’s appeal to this Court. On petition of both appellants, in which the Commonwealth joined, we consolidated both appeals. As these appeals question the validity of a statute, we also gave leave to tbe Attorney General of tbe Commonwealth to intervene; however, be has not seen fit to do so.
The same two questions are before us as were considered by tbe Superior Court in tbe Dillwortb case [483]*483(204 Pa. Superior Ct. 420), namely, (1) whether the legislature intended to authorize a determination of paternity of an illegitimate child by a judge alone and, if so, (2) whether such an authorization by the legislature violated the right of jury trial guaranteed by Section 6 and/or Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
Mindful of the judicial practice of not reaching constitutional issues if the case may properly be disposed of on other grounds, we find it unnecessary to resolve the second question. We are of the opinion that the legislature never intended to authorize a determination of paternity by a judge alone.
The Civil Procedural Support Law as originally enacted2 did not provide for the support of illegitimate children. In 1963, however, the statute was amended to include an action for support of illegitimate children.3 Prior to the adoption of this amendment, an order for support of an illegitimate child could only be entered after a determination of paternity had been established by criminal proceedings under The Penal Code of June 24, 1939. This determination could be made either in a prosecution for fornication and bastardy under §506 of the Code, 18 P.S. §4506, or in a prosecution for willful neglect to support a child born out of lawful wedlock under §732 of the Code, 18 P.S. §4732. The trial judge relied on the 1963 amendment to the Civil Procedural Support Act as enabling her to [484]*484make a finding of paternity without prior criminal proceedings as theretofore had been required.
Appellants contend, however, that the enactment of this 1963 amendment to the Civil Procedural Support Law was not intended by the legislature to discard the right to a jury trial in the determination of paternity, but, rather the act becomes operative only after a finding of paternity by prior criminal proceedings under The Penal Code.
The Superior Court, rejecting appellants’ contention, held that unless the 1963 amendment to the Civil Procedure Support Law was interpreted as authorizing a finding of paternity without a prior criminal proceeding it is “totally without effect and leaves the situation exactly as it was before.”4 The court based its conclusion on the fact that under the existing sections of The Penal Code, §506 and §732, the trial court had authority to make a support order in favor of an illegitimate child and to increase or decrease that order whenever such action was justified. Accordingly, the Superior Court construed the amendment as manifesting a legislative intent to abrogate the putative father’s right to have a jury decide the issue of paternity.
We cannot agree that appellants’ view leaves the 1963 amendment totally without effect. The amendment serves a very worthwhile purpose if it is interpreted as creating a judicial short cut permitting the entry of a support order in the case of “a child born out of lawful wedlock” without a prior criminal proceeding when paternity is not disputed.5 Thus, if the putative father is willing to support his child but [485]*485simply disputes tlie amount lie is required to pay, the order can be entered without compelling him to suffer the stigma of pleading guilty to a criminal offense.
Surely the above interpretation of the legislative intent is the most consistent with prior treatment of the right to a jury trial. “The right to trial by jury has sometimes been figuratively referred to as ‘the jewel of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.’ ” Com. v. Fugmann, 330 Pa. 4, 29, 198 Atl. 99, 111 (1938) ; accord, William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 93, 173 A. 2d 59, 64, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897, 82 S. Ct. 174 (1961). The Superior Court stressed §3 of the Civil Procedural Support Act which provides that “the proceedings provided by this act are in addition to and not in substitution of proceedings provided by law where there is desertion or failure to support.” Emphasizing the “in addition to” phrase but ignoring the “not in substitution of” phrase, the Superior Court held that criminal proceedings were not required as the basis for a support order where paternity was disputed. Yet under this construction, the decision to dispense with a jury trial is given exclusively to the prosecutrix, or more realistically, the Commonwealth; clearly this is not in accord with the usual practice, in both civil and criminal cases, where the consent of both parties is a prerequisite for dispensing with a jury trial.6 The right to jury trial has been deemed so important that in Com. v. Hall, 291 Pa. 341, 140 Atl.
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Opinion by
Mr. Justice O’Brien,
These two actions now before this Court arose under the Civil Procedural Support Law, Act of July 13, 1953, P. L. 431, as amended, August 14, 1963, P. L. 872, 62 P.B. Sec. 2043.31 et seq., originating in the Women’s Division of the County Court of Philadelphia on complaints filed by the respective mothers of two children born out of lawful wedlock. Our Court, by order elated August 3, 1965, consolidated them for argument as both eases present an identical question.
In Billworth’s case, the complaint was filed on November 26, 1963; in Murphy’s case, on November 21, 1963. In the Murphy case, plaintiff swore out a criminal information against Mnrphy charging Mm with the crimes of fornication and bastardy resulting in the subsequent birth of a child. In the Dill worth ease, plaintiff’s petition did not indicate under what act of the assembly the petitioner was proceeding. Prior to the time of trial however, both complaints were in the form as set forth in the Civil Procedural Support Law, as amended. (62 P.S. Sec. 2043.31 et seq.)1 Billworth’s [482]*482case was heard on February 3, 1984, at which time Dillwortb appeared witb counsel wbo demanded a jury trial. This was denied and tbe trial proceeded witb tbe court making a finding of paternity and ordering weekly support payments of $10.00. In tbe Murpby case, tbe original complaint as filed charged tbe defendant witb fornication and bastardy under Section 506 of Tbe Penal Code (18 P.S. §4506). However, following tbe effective date of tbe amendment to tbe Civil Procedural Support Law of August 14, 1963, tbe charge of fornication was dropped from the complaint and tbe case came to trial on February 3, 1964. Tbe defendant was represented by counsel wbo by motion requested a jury trial. Tbe motion was dismissed and tbe court, after making a finding of paternity, ordered tbe defendant to pay $7.00 a week until the child reached tbe age of eighteen.
Dillworth took an appeal to tbe Superior Court (October Term, 1964, No. 270), where tbe Order of tbe County Court of Philadelphia was affirmed. (204 Pa. Superior Ct. 420). We subsequently granted allocatur. In tbe Murpby case tbe appellant also appealed tbe order of tbe lower court to tbe Superior Court where, because it presented an identical question as bad been presented in tbe Dillworth case, tbe Superior Court certified Murphy’s appeal to this Court. On petition of both appellants, in which the Commonwealth joined, we consolidated both appeals. As these appeals question the validity of a statute, we also gave leave to tbe Attorney General of tbe Commonwealth to intervene; however, be has not seen fit to do so.
The same two questions are before us as were considered by tbe Superior Court in tbe Dillwortb case [483]*483(204 Pa. Superior Ct. 420), namely, (1) whether the legislature intended to authorize a determination of paternity of an illegitimate child by a judge alone and, if so, (2) whether such an authorization by the legislature violated the right of jury trial guaranteed by Section 6 and/or Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
Mindful of the judicial practice of not reaching constitutional issues if the case may properly be disposed of on other grounds, we find it unnecessary to resolve the second question. We are of the opinion that the legislature never intended to authorize a determination of paternity by a judge alone.
The Civil Procedural Support Law as originally enacted2 did not provide for the support of illegitimate children. In 1963, however, the statute was amended to include an action for support of illegitimate children.3 Prior to the adoption of this amendment, an order for support of an illegitimate child could only be entered after a determination of paternity had been established by criminal proceedings under The Penal Code of June 24, 1939. This determination could be made either in a prosecution for fornication and bastardy under §506 of the Code, 18 P.S. §4506, or in a prosecution for willful neglect to support a child born out of lawful wedlock under §732 of the Code, 18 P.S. §4732. The trial judge relied on the 1963 amendment to the Civil Procedural Support Act as enabling her to [484]*484make a finding of paternity without prior criminal proceedings as theretofore had been required.
Appellants contend, however, that the enactment of this 1963 amendment to the Civil Procedural Support Law was not intended by the legislature to discard the right to a jury trial in the determination of paternity, but, rather the act becomes operative only after a finding of paternity by prior criminal proceedings under The Penal Code.
The Superior Court, rejecting appellants’ contention, held that unless the 1963 amendment to the Civil Procedure Support Law was interpreted as authorizing a finding of paternity without a prior criminal proceeding it is “totally without effect and leaves the situation exactly as it was before.”4 The court based its conclusion on the fact that under the existing sections of The Penal Code, §506 and §732, the trial court had authority to make a support order in favor of an illegitimate child and to increase or decrease that order whenever such action was justified. Accordingly, the Superior Court construed the amendment as manifesting a legislative intent to abrogate the putative father’s right to have a jury decide the issue of paternity.
We cannot agree that appellants’ view leaves the 1963 amendment totally without effect. The amendment serves a very worthwhile purpose if it is interpreted as creating a judicial short cut permitting the entry of a support order in the case of “a child born out of lawful wedlock” without a prior criminal proceeding when paternity is not disputed.5 Thus, if the putative father is willing to support his child but [485]*485simply disputes tlie amount lie is required to pay, the order can be entered without compelling him to suffer the stigma of pleading guilty to a criminal offense.
Surely the above interpretation of the legislative intent is the most consistent with prior treatment of the right to a jury trial. “The right to trial by jury has sometimes been figuratively referred to as ‘the jewel of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.’ ” Com. v. Fugmann, 330 Pa. 4, 29, 198 Atl. 99, 111 (1938) ; accord, William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 93, 173 A. 2d 59, 64, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897, 82 S. Ct. 174 (1961). The Superior Court stressed §3 of the Civil Procedural Support Act which provides that “the proceedings provided by this act are in addition to and not in substitution of proceedings provided by law where there is desertion or failure to support.” Emphasizing the “in addition to” phrase but ignoring the “not in substitution of” phrase, the Superior Court held that criminal proceedings were not required as the basis for a support order where paternity was disputed. Yet under this construction, the decision to dispense with a jury trial is given exclusively to the prosecutrix, or more realistically, the Commonwealth; clearly this is not in accord with the usual practice, in both civil and criminal cases, where the consent of both parties is a prerequisite for dispensing with a jury trial.6 The right to jury trial has been deemed so important that in Com. v. Hall, 291 Pa. 341, 140 Atl. 626 (1928), this Court, speaking through Chief Justice von Moschkisker, held that absent specific legislative authorization, when a defendant plead not guilty, the Court of Quarter Sessions had no power to try the [486]*486case without a jury even if the defendant waived his right to a jury trial. In neither the original Civil Procedural Support Law, enacted in 1953, nor in the 1963 amendment to that law involved in the present litigation did the Legislature refer to the manner in which the relevant facts were to be determined. As we said in Com. v. Turchetta, 404 Pa. 41, 47, 171 A. 2d 54, 57 (1961) : “We should not be ingenious to find reasons to deny a man his trial by jury when he presses for it at trial: . . .”. Statutes which tend to infringe on the right to trial by jury ought to be strictly construed. Gordon v. Biesinger, 335 Pa. 1, 6 A. 2d 425 (1939); Felt v. Cook, 95 Pa. 247 (1880); Rhines v. Clark, 51 Pa. 96 (1866).
We are unable to infer an intention to dispense with a jury determination of paternity from the language of the 1963 amendment.
The orders of the Superior Court and the County Court of Philadelphia are reversed, and the cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Mr. Justice Jones dissents.