Commonwealth Investment Co. v. Frye

134 S.E.2d 39, 219 Ga. 498, 1963 Ga. LEXIS 491

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: November 7, 1963
• Docket: 22117
• Status: Published

Opinions

Duckworth, Chief Justice.

The arguments in this case cause us to feel that an emphatic statement should be made by this court that the legislature, and not the courts, is empowered by the Constitution to decide public policy, and to implement that policy by enacting laws; and the courts are bound to follow such laws if constitutional. With this fundamental principle thus stated, we look to the legislation, Code § 3-807, to see whether the limitation statute of four years to bring this suit applies until the fraud is discovered. This law plainly provides that: “If the defendant, or those under whom he claims, shall have been guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff shall have been debarred'or deterred from his action, the period of limitation shall run only from the time of the discovery of the fraud.” On demurrer, properly pleaded facts are treated as true. Therefore, the allegations of the petition that Pruett & Company forged the signature of plaintiff to the transfers of the shares of stock and the corporation issuing the stock and accepting the forged transfer, which is the defendant here, had on file a true signature of the petitioner which would have shown the transfer signature to be a forgery, are treated as true. It is trifling with terms to contend that the defendant is not claiming under Pruett & Company, the forger, and hence is not covered by Code § 3-807. Of course, the amended petition shows that Pruett & Company alone fraudulently placed title in the defendant. If so, defendant claims under Pruett & Company. They have no other basis for their claim, certainly not under the petitioner who was the owner and the victim of the forgery, which the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care and in fulfillment of its duty could have discovered by a comparison of signatures.

We regard further discussion here as surplusage in the light of the exhaustive opinion of the Court of Appeals. For the reasons stated above as well as those stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the amended petition, and the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing that judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Head, P. J., Mobley and Quillian, JJ., who dissent.