Com. v. Seeney, T.

2024 Pa. Super. 103, 316 A.3d 645

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 21, 2024
• Docket: 1236 EDA 2023
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-A26006-23

2024 PA Super 103

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : TYREE T. SEENEY : No. 1236 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered May 10, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0004326-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 21, 2024

The Commonwealth appeals from the May 10, 2023 Order entered in

the Bucks Court of Common Pleas that granted Appellee Tyree Seeney’s

motion to suppress a statement that he made to a Warwick Township

constable. After careful review, we affirm.

A. We glean the following factual and procedural history from the

suppression court opinion and the certified record. On July 19, 2022, the

Commonwealth charged Mr. Seeney with Criminal Attempt-Possession of a

Prohibited Firearm and two counts of Materially False Written Statement-

Purchase, Delivery, or Transfer of Firearm as a result of Mr. Seeney’s alleged

attempt to purchase a firearm illegally. 1

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a) and 6111(g)(4)(ii), respectively. J-A26006-23

On August 29, 2022, Constable Alan Sigafoos transported Mr. Seeney

from the Bucks County Correctional Facility to the District Court in Warwick

Township for his preliminary hearing. Constable Sigafoos is the elected

constable for Warwick Township in Bucks County. As a constable, his

employer is the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency and part

of his duties include transporting inmates and serving warrants. Also,

Constable Sigafoos is a retired police officer in Newtown Township and is

currently a part-time police officer in Penndel Borough.

On the day of Mr. Seeney’s preliminary hearing, Constable Sigafoos and

his partner, Constable Jon Forest, transported Mr. Seeney and another inmate

from the county prison’s holding cell to the courthouse using a vehicle

equipped with a cage. Mr. Seeney was shackled and handcuffed from when

he left the prison until he returned. While at the courthouse, Mr. Seeney

waited for his preliminary hearing in what Constable Sigafoos “call[ed] a

conference room, but it’s a holding area where the constable is maintaining

watch over the defendant.” N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 4/28/2023, at 13.

While in the holding area, Constable Sigafoos asked Mr. Seeney why he

had a sling on his arm. Mr. Seeney responded that he had been shot while

working as a security guard and that he had shot back. Constable Sigafoos

then asked Mr. Seeney what brought him to court. Mr. Seeney responded

that he attempted to purchase a firearm at a certain store called Tanner’s.

Constable Sigafoos then asked why Mr. Seeney had not completed the

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purchase of the firearm and Mr. Seeney responded that he was not allowed to

purchase a firearm. Constable Sigafoos then commented that Mr. Seeney’s

employer would have done “a clearance on [him],” and Mr. Seeney responded

that “something is messed up.” Id. at 17.

Constable Sigafoos did not initially tell anyone else about Mr. Seeney’s

admission that he was ineligible to purchase a firearm, but attempted to do

so anyway. However, Detective Corporal Paul Fox was waiting outside of the

conference room and overheard part of this conversation, specifically the

mention of Tanner’s, which piqued his interest. He called Constable Sigafoos

the next day to ascertain the details of that conversation and Constable

Sigafoos informed him.

Before trial, Mr. Seeney filed a motion to suppress “any and all

incriminating statements” made to Constable Sigafoos and overheard by

Detective Corporal Fox, alleging that Constable Sigafoos failed to give Mr.

Seeney his Miranda warnings before questioning him. Motion to Suppress,

4/21/2023, at 1-2. At the suppression hearing, Constable Sigafoos and

Detective Corporal Fox testified in accordance with the above facts. On cross-

examination, Constable Sigafoos also testified that it is normal for him to ask

defendants why they are in court, but that he “always say[s] allegedly.” N.T.

Hr’g at 34.

The suppression court granted the motion to suppress, finding that

Constable Sigafoos’ questions “place[d Mr. Seeney] in a position where any

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response could be incriminating[.]” Suppression Ct. Op., 7/7/23, at 5. The

Commonwealth then filed a timely appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). 2 Both

the Commonwealth and the suppression court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

B.

The Commonwealth raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the suppression court err[] in granting suppression of statements made by [Mr. Seeney] to Constable Sigafoos where, even assuming he was a law enforcement officer, his words, actions, and the surrounding circumstances were such that he would not have reasonably known his statements were likely to elicit an incriminating response?

2. Did the suppression court err[] in granting suppression of statements made by [Mr. Seeney] to Constable Sigafoos as a constable is not a law enforcement officer and not subject to the prophylactic rules set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436 (1966)?

Commonwealth’s Br. at 4 (reordered for ease of disposition).

C.

Our standard of review for suppression determinations is well settled.

We review the grant of a suppression motion to determine “whether the record

supports the trial court’s factual findings and whether the legal conclusions

drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266

A.3d 1117, 1122-23 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (citation omitted). We defer

to the suppression court’s factual findings if they are supported by the record.

2 Rule 311(d) provides that “the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).

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Commonwealth v. Batista, 219 A.3d 1199, 1206 (Pa. Super. 2019). We,

however, give no such deference to the suppression court’s legal conclusions

and, instead, review them de novo. Id. An appellate court can affirm a valid

judgment for any reason supported by the record. Commonwealth v.

Hamlett, 234 A.3d 486, 488 (Pa. 2020).

“Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is the

Commonwealth's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant's

rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-48 (Pa. 2012)

(citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H).

It is well-settled that when a defendant is subject to a custodial

interrogation, the Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officers

provide a defendant with his Miranda warnings. U.S. CONST. amend. V;

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). See also Commonwealth

v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 1999) (applying Miranda).

The Commonwealth raises two issues on appeal. First, whether

Constable Sigafoos “interrogated” Mr. Seeney and second, whether an

interrogation by a constable rather than a law enforcement officer triggers the

requirement that the constable provide the Miranda warnings to a defendant.

We find that the trial court correctly found that Constable Sigafoos

“interrogated” Mr. Seeney and second, that in light of the coercive

environment that Constable Sigafoos created under governmental authority

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when he questioned Mr. Seeney, Mr. Seeney was entitled to the protections

of the Miranda warnings before Constable Sigafoos interrogated him.

D.

The suppression court, when determining whether an encounter

qualifies as a custodial interrogation, should consider objectively the totality

of the circumstances and the impression those circumstances have on the

defendant:

[t]he standard for determining whether an encounter with the police is deemed “custodial” or police have initiated a custodial interrogation is an objective one based on a totality of the circumstances, with due consideration given to the reasonable impression conveyed to the person interrogated. Custodial interrogation has been defined as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way.” “Interrogation” is police conduct “calculated to, expected to, or likely to evoke admission.”

Mannion, 725 A.2d at 200 (internal citations omitted).

We emphasize that this determination “does not depend upon the

subjective intent of the law enforcement officer interrogator.”

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 888 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation

omitted). Rather, to determine if a law enforcement officer should have

known that questioning was reasonably likely to produce an incriminating

response, we consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

interaction with a focus on the suspect’s perception and the police officer’s

knowledge. Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 323 (Pa. 2011).

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The Commonwealth argues that several factors weigh against finding

that Constable Sigafoos interrogated Mr. Seeney. Specifically, it emphasizes

that Constable Sigafoos always had conversations with the inmates that he

transported, always asks questions with the word “allegedly,” had no

knowledge of why Appellant was in custody, and did not tell anyone about the

statement until Detective Corporal Fox called him. Commonwealth’s Br. at

21-22. This argument is not persuasive.

First, contrary to the Commonwealth’s argument, Constable Sigafoos’

subjective intent when asking Mr. Seeney questions is irrelevant. Gonzalez,

979 A.2d at 888. In particular, it is irrelevant that Constable Sigafoos did not

know the basis for the prosecution of Mr. Seeney, that Constable Sigafoos

always asked the questions about the prosecution when transporting inmates

and did not tell anyone that Mr. Seeney admitted that he attempted to

purchase a firearm when he was ineligible to do so. Rather, the focus is on

whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Constable

Sigafoos was subjecting Mr. Seeney to an interrogation.

The trial court properly analyzed the facts of the situation by concluding

that by asking Mr. Seeney what brought Mr. Seeney to court that day, it is

reasonable to conclude that Mr. Seeney’s response was “likely to evoke

admission” or other incriminating information. This is especially true because

Constable Sigafoos continued to ask Mr. Seeney for details even after learning

from his initial question that Mr. Seeney was in court as a defendant, not as

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a shooting victim. Suppression Ct. Op. at 4-5; Mannion, 725 A.2d at 200

(citation omitted). Cf. Commonwealth v. Chester, 587 A.2d 1367, 1376-

77 (Pa. 1991) (concluding that the constable asking whether defendant’s

attorney wanted him to wear a bullet-proof vest was not interrogation; rather,

it was a yes or no question necessary for security, “not calculated [] to evoke

an admission,” and defendant added incriminating detail unprompted).

In sum, we agree with the trial court’s analysis and findings that

Constable Sigafoos subjected Mr. Seeney to a custodial interrogation and

reject this ground for the Commonwealth’s challenge to the trial court’s

decision to grant the Motion to Suppress.

E.

The Commonwealth next asserts that trial court erred in granting the

Motion to Suppress because constables are not law enforcement officers, and

thus, cannot create a custodial interrogation. In particular, the

Commonwealth argues that because a constable is not a “state employee,”

but rather an independent contractor who does not act for or under the control

of the Commonwealth, the constable cannot create a custodial interrogation.

Commonwealth’s Br. at 12 (citing In re Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d 985,

986-87 (Pa. 1991)).

The Commonwealth further cites constables’ limited powers to argue

that constables are not law enforcement officers, and also attempts to

distinguish Constable Sigafoos from law enforcement officers by describing his

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“primary purpose” as transportation. Id. at 12, 15, 20. Finally, the

Commonwealth maintains that there is no authority that confers police powers

on constables and contrasts constables to, among other positions, school

police officers. Id. at 16. (citing In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. 2002)

(school police must give Miranda warnings because they have the same

power as municipal police on school property)).

The foundation for the Commonwealth’s argument is that because no

statute explicitly grants to constables governmental authority when

transporting and guarding defendants, the government has not delegated any

authority to a constable and thus, a constable, who is transporting and

guarding a defendant, is no different from a private individual transporting

and guarding a defendant. In other words, an Uber driver transporting a

defendant to court has the same level of government authority as a constable

transporting a defendant to court. We disagree.

The Commonwealth ignores the fact that when the government

delegates to the responsibility to a constable to transport an incarcerated

defendant to court and guard him, the government is also delegating its

authority to control the defendant. The fact that the statutes do not explicitly

provide for such delegation of authority to control an incarcerated defendant

is irrelevant because it is reasonable to infer from the fact that the defendant

is incarcerated, the defendant is shackled, and the constable is guarding the

defendant with a firearm that the government is exercising its authority and

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control over the defendant. The constable is not acting like a private individual

or an Uber driver.

In this case, the suppression court correctly noted that Constable

Sigafoos was responsible not only for transporting Mr. Seeney to his

preliminary hearing, but also for maintaining Mr. Seeney’s detention, which

he did while armed with a firearm. Suppression Ct. Op. at 4. He drove Mr.

Seeney, who was handcuffed and shackled, from the prison to the courthouse

in a vehicle equipped with a cage, and guarded Mr. Seeney as he remained

shackled in a conference room. N.T. Hr’g at 13. Mr. Seeney was not free to

leave during this time, and it was Constable Sigafoos’ responsibility to ensure

that he did not.

Since Constable Sigafoos was responsible for creating and maintaining

the custodial environment at the behest of the government and asserted the

same authority that a law enforcement officer would assert in a similar

situation, we conclude that he was not allowed to question Mr. Seeney without

first providing him Miranda warnings. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Accordingly,

the court correctly suppressed Mr. Seeney’s responses to Constable Sigafoos’

questions.3

3 Although the suppression court erred in relying on 13 P.S. § 40, a partially

repealed statute, to analyze the constable’s status as a law enforcement officer, we may affirm its ruling on any basis. Hamlett, 234 A.3d at 488.

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F.

In sum, we conclude that the suppression court properly suppressed Mr.

Seeney’s statements provided to Constable Sigafoos in response to his

questions because Constable Sigafoos, acting with governmental authority,

subjected Mr. Seeney to a custodial interrogation without first giving him

Miranda warnings. Accordingly, we affirm the order granting the suppression

motion.

Order affirmed.

Date: 5/21/2024

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