Com. v. Hall, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 20, 2024
• Docket: 915 EDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A01035-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JENNIFER MARIE HALL : No. 915 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered March 7, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003484-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and COLINS, J. *

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 20, 2024

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order, entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, granting Jennifer Marie Hall’s

motion to suppress.1 After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the evidence from the suppression hearing

as follows:

For purposes of the instant appeal, the underlying facts are not disputed. On April 19, 2022, Officer Kaila Balatgek of the Allentown Police Department was driving in a marked City of Allentown patrol vehicle dressed in full uniform. She was ____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 In accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), the Commonwealth certified that the

suppression order has substantially handicapped its prosecution of the case. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 69 A.3d 180, 185 (Pa. 2013) (Commonwealth’s appeal of suppression order proper where Commonwealth certifies in good faith that order substantially handicaps prosecution). J-A01035-24

conducting surveillance of a suspected narcotic location in the 300 block of Cedar Street, Allentown, Lehigh County, when she observed a female[,] later identified as [Hall,] enter the target location. [Hall] briefly remained inside and exited a few minutes later. Officer Balatgek observed [Hall] enter the front passenger seat of a green Buick sedan. Officer Balatgek noted that the driver’s side window was partially covered with a black garbage bag.

Officer Balatgek conducted a motor vehicle stop at approximately 8:55 p.m. and approached the vehicle. She spoke with the driver, Jesse Craner, and [Hall] and asked for their identification. Neither [] Craner [n]or [Hall] had a driver’s license. Officer Balatgek asked [Craner] to turn off the vehicle and remove the keys. She asked where they were coming from and [Hall] responded, “7 th and Tilghman Street[s].” Officer Balatgek then told them she was aware they were not coming from 7th and Tilghman and advised them that she saw them parked in a back alley.

[Officer Balatgek] also told them that if they were honest with her, she would “help [them] out.” Officer Balatgek noted, “I'm not worried about a few bags, I’m not worried about a few rocks, okay?” Neither [] Craner nor [Hall] were Mirandized.[2] Officer Balatgek testified during the [suppression] hearing [] that at this time, neither Craner nor [Hall] were free to leave. While waiting for a back-up [police] unit to arrive, [Hall] asked Officer Balatgek what was going to happen, to which Balatgek replied, “Cooperation and honesty is best.”

Once backup arrived, Officer Balatgek asked [] Craner to alight from the vehicle. When he was standing outside, she asked him how many bags he had on his person. He said he did not have any bags on his person, but implicated [Hall] by indicating she had two bags in her possession. [] Craner consented to a search and [Officer Balatgek] patted him down. She searched his pockets but did not find any narcotics. [] Craner also consented to a search of the vehicle. Officer Balatgek then approached [Hall] and asked, “Alright, honey. What do you got on you?” [Hall] replied, “It was just two bags.” Officer Balatgek responded, “Just two bags? Okay, and where is it at?” [Hall] pulled two bags out from her shirt or ____________________________________________

2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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jacket and handed them over to [Officer] Balatgek. The contents of the bags field tested positive for heroin. [Hall] was not taken into custody at that time. Both [Hall] and [] Craner were released at the scene.

Trial Court Opinion, 2-3 (citations omitted). 3

Hall was arrested and charged with one count each of possession of a

controlled substance4 and possession of drug paraphernalia.5 On January 6,

2023, Hall filed a motion to suppress her statements as being the result of a

custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Additionally,

Hall challenged the admissibility of the packets of heroin as fruits of the

poisonous tree.6 Hall contended that the police were not conducting a mere

traffic stop, but rather a drug investigation, as Officer Balatgek’s questions

were specifically intended to elicit incriminating responses when Hall was

under arrest and not provided her Miranda warnings.

On February 3, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing, after which it

took the matter under advisement. On March 7, 2023, the trial court entered

an order granting Hall’s motion to suppress her statements and the

____________________________________________

3 The dialogue quoted in the trial court opinion is from the officer’s body camera video introduced into evidence as Commonwealth Exhibit C-1 and cited in support of the quotations. We have reviewed the video evidence, as discussed infra, and conclude that the trial court’s recitation is accurate.

4 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).

5 Id. at § 780-113(a)(32).

6 “The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine prohibits the admission of evidence

at trial that was tainted by unconstitutional actions by law enforcement officials.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912, 914 (Pa. 2019).

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subsequently-seized heroin. See Order, 3/7/23; see also Memorandum

Opinion, 3/7/23, at 7.

On March 16, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider

and, on March 26, 2023, the trial court ordered argument and scheduled a

hearing. On March 31, 2023, the trial court conducted the hearing, after which

it took the matter under advisement. Later that same day, the

Commonwealth filed a post-hearing submission. On April 6, 2023, the trial

court denied the Commonwealth’s motion to reconsider.

The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal and presents the

following claim for our review: “Did the trial court err in concluding that [Hall]

was subjected to a custodial interrogation that required Miranda warnings

where the totality of the circumstances clearly demonstrate that the

interaction was an investigative detention?” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 4.

On appeal from the grant of a suppression motion, we adhere to the

following standard of review:

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Richard, 238 A.3d 522, 525 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted).

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Our Supreme Court has explained the three levels of police encounters:

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to the development of three categories of interactions between citizens and the police. The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative detention[,]” must be supported by [] reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043, 1047–48 (Pa. 1995) (citations

omitted). Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that “the

term ‘custodial detention’ has generally been used by the United States

Supreme Court to describe incidents in which the police do not verbally inform

a suspect that [s]he is under arrest, but rather, undertake actions which result

in the conditions of the detention becoming so coercive as to amount to the

functional equivalent of a formal arrest.” Ellis, 662 A.2d at 1048 n.3 (citation

Critical to our present inquiry, “Miranda warnings are required only

when a suspect is in custody.” Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983,

987 (Pa. 2006). “In order to trigger the safeguards of Miranda, there must

be both custody and interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d

908, 914 (Pa. Super. 2002). In evaluating whether Miranda warnings were

necessary, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances. See

Commonwealth v. Gaul, 912 A.2d 252, 255 (Pa. 2006).

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“The usual traffic stop constitutes an investigative rather than a

custodial detention, unless, under the totality of the circumstances, the

conditions and duration of the detention become the functional equivalent of

arrest.” Id. at 202. “Since an ordinary traffic stop is typically brief in duration

and occurs in public view, such a stop is not custodial for Miranda purposes.”

Commonwealth v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en

banc). Thus, “police need only give Miranda warnings while detaining a

suspect by the side of a public highway when the suspect [has] actually [been]

placed under arrest or when the questioning of the suspect is so prolonged or

coercive as to approximate the atmosphere of a station house interrogation.”

Commonwealth v. Toanone, 553 A.2d 998, 1003 (Pa. Super. 1989).

“The fact that a police investigation has focused on a particular

individual does not automatically trigger ‘custody,’ thus requiring Miranda

warnings.” Mannion, 725 A.2d at 200 (emphasis in original). However, an

ordinary traffic stop may become custodial “when the stop involved coercive

conditions, including, but not limited to, the suspect being forced into a patrol

car and transported from the scene or being physically restrained.” Id. at

202.

The factors a court uses to determine whether a detention has become

so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest include: the

basis for the detention; its length; its location; whether the suspect was

transported against his or her will, how far, and why; whether restraints were

used; whether the law enforcement officer showed, threatened, or used force;

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and the investigative methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.

Mannion, 725 A.2d at 200; see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 650 A.2d

420, 427 (Pa. 1994) (setting out factors to determine “whether a person is in

custody for Miranda purposes”). “A reviewing court is to consider the

particular facts of each case in order to determine whether a detention is

custodial.” Mannion, 725 A.2d at 201.

Additionally, we must consider the impact the events had on the person

being interrogated. See Commonwealth v. Seeney, 316 A.3d 645, 649 (Pa.

Super. 2024) (citation omitted) (emphasizing custodial interrogation analysis

is dependent upon totality of circumstances with focus on suspect’s

perception). Indeed, whether a seizure is custodial in nature turns on

“whether the suspect is physically deprived of [her] freedom in any significant

way or is placed in a situation in which [she] reasonably believes that

[her] freedom of action or movement is restricted by said

interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 546 A.2d 26, 29 (Pa. 1988)

(emphasis added).

Instantly, Officer Balatgek’s body camera recordings reveal that, once

the stop commenced, she opened the driver’s side door because the window

was obstructed by a garbage bag, the purported basis for the stop. See

Commonwealth Exhibit 1 (Officer Balatgek’s Body Camera), at 20:55:20 –

20:55:41. Officer Balatgek then asked Craner and Hall for their licenses,

registration, and proof of insurance. See id. at 20:55:44 – 20:55:46. Both

occupants provided identification, along with the vehicle registration and proof

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of insurance. See id. at 20:55:46 – 20:56:47. The officer also asked for the

keys to the vehicle, which she took and placed upon the top of the stopped

car. See id. at 22:55:35. The vehicle keys remained on top of the vehicle

for the duration of the stop, and Officer Balatgek kept both occupants’ IDs as

well as the vehicle’s insurance and registration for the entire stop. See id.;

see also Trial Court Opinion, 5/10/23, at 12.

Next, Officer Balatgek did not return to her vehicle to run the

information or otherwise confirm vehicle ownership. See Commonwealth

Exhibit 1 (Officer Balatgek’s Body Camera). Rather, Officer Balatgek informed

Craner and Hall that she believed they were lying to her, that they needed to

be honest with her, and that they should tell her the truth about where they

were and what they bought. See id. at 20:58:15 – 20:59:13. Officer

Balatgek told them to “think about” being honest while she waited for backup

police to arrive on scene. Id. at 20:59:13 – 24. On Officer Balatgek’s body

camera recording, she appears to pocket Craner’s and Hall’s IDs, as well as

the vehicle registration and insurance cards. See id., at 21:00:34.

Shortly thereafter, another officer arrived on the scene in another

marked police vehicle with its lights activated. See id., at 21:00:50. At that

point, Officer Balatgek ordered Craner to exit the vehicle, ordered Hall to

remain in the vehicle with her hands on the dashboard, and began questioning

Craner separately. See id., at 21:00:55 – 21:01:08. The second officer stood

outside of Hall’s passenger-side door. See id., at 21:00:55 – 21:02:05. While

questioning Craner, Officer Balatgek searched his pockets and asked him

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whether he had purchased any drugs. See id., at 21:01:10 – 21:02:05.

Craner responded in the negative, but stated that Hall possessed drugs. See

id. Officer Balatgek then swapped positions with the other officer, who went

to speak with Craner, and Officer Balatgek, standing outside of the vehicle

door, asked Hall “[a]lright honey, what do you got on you[?]” Id. at 21:02:05

– 16. Hall answered that she had “two bags,” and Officer Balatgek continued

to question her. See id., at 21:02:16. Ultimately, Officer Balatgek searched

Hall and the vehicle. See id. At no time during the interaction were Miranda

warnings issued.

Relevantly, this Court recently addressed the influence that an officer’s

retention of a defendant’s identification documentation can have on the court’s

constitutional analysis when evaluating the totality of the circumstances. See

Commonwealth v. Ochoa, 304 A.3d 390 (Pa. Super. 2023). In Ochoa, the

defendant was investigated for suspicion of driving under the influence. See

id. During the vehicle stop, the defendant provided his driver’s license to

police, who retained it for the duration of the stop. See id. at 399-400. This

Court concluded that, while the stop itself was lawful and supported by

reasonable suspicion, the defendant’s subsequent “consent” to search his

vehicle was tainted because the police still possessed his driver’s license. See

id. (citing Commonwealth v. Mattis, 252 A.3d 650 (Pa. Super. 2021) and

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 609 A.2d 177 (Pa. Super. 1992)). In particular,

this Court concluded that the defendant did not feel free to leave because, by

retaining his driver’s license, “the police created a legal impediment to

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[defendant]’s ability to leave the scene of the traffic stop.” Ochoa, 304 A.3d

at 399.

We note that Ochoa does not speak directly to whether an investigative

detention rises to the level of a custodial interrogation merely by the retention

of a defendant’s driver’s license. Nevertheless, we rely on Ochoa for the

proposition that police retaining a defendant’s driver’s license or identification

is a significant factor to consider when determining whether a reasonable

person would feel free to leave. Furthermore, as our Supreme Court noted in

Commonwealth v. Cost, 224 A.3d 641 (Pa. 2020), “the retention by police

of an identification card . . . will generally be a material and substantial

escalating factor within the totality assessment.” Id. at 651 (emphasis

added).

Here, the trial court properly considered the facts and relevant

circumstances and determined that Hall reasonably believed that her freedom

of action and movement was restricted by the officer’s interrogation. See

Trial Court Opinion, 5/10/23, at 5-13. Indeed, the trial court relied upon

Officer Balatgek’s vehicle and body camera footage in making its

determination. See id. The trial court emphasized that the record supported

the fact that Officer Balatgek had Hall’s and her co-defendant’s IDs and

the vehicle’s registration and insurance documents. See Trial Court

Opinion, 5/10/23, at 12 (“Officer Balatgek had confiscated [Hall’]s

identification and advised [Hall] . . . [that] she suspected them of buying

illegal drugs.”); see also N.T. Suppression Hearing, 2/3/23, at 20 (Officer

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Balatgek testifying she did not return IDs or vehicle documentation until end

of police encounter); id. at 22 (Officer Balatgek testifying Hall was not free to

leave). Additionally, the trial court noted that Officer Balatgek had ordered

Craner to turn off the vehicle and placed the keys on the roof of the vehicle.

See Trial Court Opinion, 5/10/23, at 12. Then, after back up arrived and

another officer positioned himself outside of Hall’s passenger-side door,

Officer Balatgek questioned Craner, who informed Officer Balatgek that Hall

possessed narcotics. See id. The trial court concluded that “an objective

review of those facts would lead a person in [Hall]’s position to believe she

was not free to leave and that she was being asked questions intending to

elicit incriminating information from her.” Id.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s factual

determinations are supported by the record and that its legal conclusions are

sound.7 See Trial Court Opinion, 5/10/23, at 5-13; see also Richard, supra;

Ochoa, supra; Cost, supra. The trial court properly suppressed Hall’s

statements and the subsequently-acquired heroin as she was subject to

custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Accordingly,

we affirm the trial court’s order granting Hall’s motion to suppress.

7 Moreover, we observe that Hall was not transported to the police station or

placed into a police cruiser. See Mannion, supra. Nevertheless, this is not dispositive of the issue before us because transportation of a defendant is but one factor that we must consider in addressing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interaction. See Gaul, supra; Seeney, supra.

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Order affirmed.

Panella, P.J.E., Joins the Memorandum.

Colins, J., Files a Dissenting Memorandum.

Date: 12/20/2024

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