Colvin v. Syrian Arab Republic

363 F. Supp. 3d 141
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedFebruary 1, 2019
DocketCivil Action No. 16-1423 (ABJ)
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 363 F. Supp. 3d 141 (Colvin v. Syrian Arab Republic) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Colvin v. Syrian Arab Republic, 363 F. Supp. 3d 141 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Opinion

The Syrian government responded with a strategy to quash the dissent using military *148and intelligence forces, coordinated by a group established by President Bashar al-Assad called the Central Crisis Management Cell ("CCMC"). Pls.' Mem. at 4; Brown Rpt. ¶¶ 44-45. The CCMC was the highest national security body in the Syrian government, and it was comprised of senior members of the government, included the Minister of Defense, Deputy Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, heads of the four Syrian intelligence agencies, and Maher al-Assad, brother of President al-Assad and commander of the Fourth Division of the Syrian Army. Brown Rpt. ¶¶ 26, 46; Barakat Decl. ¶¶ 11-12. Operating out of Damascus, the CCMC gathered all of the military and intelligence reports from across Syria regarding the political opposition. Brown Rpt. ¶¶ 44, 47-48; Barakat Decl. ¶ 10, Compl. ¶ 27.

The CCMC used the reports it received from regional intelligence committees to inform President al-Assad's anti-opposition strategy. Barakat Decl. ¶ 15. Armed with information, the Syrian government engaged in widespread suppression of demonstrators and rebel groups, Compl. ¶ 28, and thousands were killed, detained, tortured, or kidnapped. Pls.' Mem. at 5; Ford Rpt. ¶¶ 37-40. The violence led to the formation of an armed opposition, called the Free Syrian Army ("FSA"), which consisted of civilians and defectors from the Syrian military and government. Ford Rpt. ¶ 36. By the end of 2011, the clash between the government and the FSA sent Syria into a full-scale armed conflict. Brown Rpt. ¶¶ 181-85; Kaye Rpt. ¶ 32.

B. Suppression of the Media and the Rise of the Independent Media

Suppression of traditional forms of media led to the rise of the "independent media," in which "citizen journalists" disseminated news through social media networks. Salah Decl. ¶¶ 17-19; Kaye Rpt. ¶¶ 12-13. Baba Amr, a district in the city of Homs, was "the heart of the independent media movement." Pls.' Mem. at 6. There, a local activist named Khaled Abu Salah (a pseudonym he used to protect his identity) and a group of citizen journalists formed the Baba Amr Media Center, where they would document and broadcast demonstrations occurring throughout the country and the government's response, using proxy internet servers to hide their location. Salah Decl. ¶¶ 17-20; Doe Decl. ¶¶ 7-10. These individuals were not part of the formal opposition, and they did not participate in the hostilities. Salah Decl. ¶ 23.

The Syrian government considered media activists to be the biggest threat to the regime, because it was through the media that demonstrators could organize protests. Barakat Decl. ¶¶ 30-32. Thus, media activists and journalists became high priority targets. Ford Rpt. ¶¶ 62-64 (detailing examples of arrests, disappearances, and deaths of journalists in 2011 and 2012); Ulysses Decl. ¶ 14. In August 2011, the CCMC issued orders to government forces to "[l]aunch daily joint security-military campaigns" against "those who tarnish the image of Syria in foreign media and international organizations." Brown Rpt. ¶¶ 173-77. This policy resulted in a pattern and practice of targeting journalists and other media personnel, "subjecting them to ... detention, torture, forced disappearance, extrajudicial killing, and other abuses." Kaye Rpt. ¶ 30; see Ford Rpt. ¶ 59; Ulysses Decl. ¶ 14.

C. The Government's Focus on Baba Amr and its Media Center

By the end of 2011, "Homs had become a key center" of the revolution, and "intelligence services in Homs were tasked with suppressing the opposition movement and ending the massive anti-government protests." Ulysses Decl. ¶ 8. The Syrian government formed a committee with the sole purpose of coordinating the military and *149intelligence operations against the opposition in Homs, called the Homs Military Security Committee ("HMSC").5 Id. ¶ 9. A leader of the HMSC, Major General Rafiq Shahadah, was involved in coordinating military and intelligence operations in the country's first battle of the Civil War: the siege of Baba Amr. Id. ¶ 24; Brown Rpt. ¶¶ 212-13. Baba Amr became a focal point in the war because of its "very active media center." Ulysses Decl. ¶ 25.

From December 2011 to February 2012, the CCMC directed the HMSC to isolate Baba Amr. Brown Rpt. ¶¶ 256-59 ("[T]he CCMC instructed that military and security commanders were to ... wear[ ] down and drain[ ] the enemy."). Military surrounded the neighborhood, cutting off telecommunications, electricity, and food and water supplies. Ulysses Decl. ¶ 27. To protect themselves and civilians, rebel groups established a defensive perimeter around the neighborhood. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28; Doe Decl. ¶ 12; Brown Rpt. ¶¶ 252-54. The Syrian military shelled "the neighborhood on a daily basis with various forms of artillery, including ... rocket launcher systems ... and ... mortars." Ulysses Decl. ¶¶ 29-30; see Salah Decl. ¶¶ 29-30 ("It was the most intense shelling I had ever experienced. It was constant."); Doe Decl. ¶ 16 ("The shelling was systematic, it happened every day."); Nouar Decl. ¶ 20 ("We visited this neighborhood every day, and every day we observed bombardments and sniper fire."). The level of violence was extreme - "bombs were being fired into densely populated areas," and snipers were "targeting and killing small children, women and other unarmed civilians." Brown Rpt. ¶¶ 261-62. The government's "official line was that Baba Amr was full of terrorists." Ulysses Decl. ¶ 32; see Nouar Decl. ¶¶ 27-32 (describing conversations with Syrian government officials where they referred to media activists as terrorists).

Through intelligence sources, such as drone surveillance and informants, the Syrian government learned that media activists had smuggled in satellite transmitters that gave them access to the internet, and foreign journalists in Baba Amr were "reporting on the siege, uploading videos to the Internet, and talking to international news agencies like CNN and al-Jazeera." Ulysses Decl. ¶ 33.

II. The Death of Marie Colvin

A. Marie Colvin and Her Assignment in Homs, Syria

Marie Colvin was a highly respected American war journalist, revered for her courage in reporting the humanitarian crises that result from war. Colvin Decl. ¶¶ 16-18. "Marie viewed it as her job to make the world aware of the impact war had on civilians, despite the risk. Occasionally, she also viewed it as her job to take action herself." Id. ¶ 18. She spent over twenty-five years writing for the British newspaper, The Sunday Times , covering conflict zones in Iraq, Chechnya, the Balkans, East Timor, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and Libya. Compl. ¶ 21. She was in Baghdad through the Gulf War bombing in 1991, witnessed the American bombing of Tripoli in 1992, and interviewed both Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Yasser Arafat of Palestine. Witherow Decl. ¶ 22. When a grenade blinded her in one eye in Sri Lanka, she became known for wearing a signature black eye patch. Id. ¶ 24. Colvin received dozens of accolades for her reporting, including the British Press Awards' Foreign Reporter of the Year (2000, 2009, and 2012), the Foreign Press Association's Journalist of the Year (2000), *150

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363 F. Supp. 3d 141, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/colvin-v-syrian-arab-republic-cadc-2019.