Columbia Paper Bag Co. v. Carr

82 A. 442, 116 Md. 541, 1911 Md. LEXIS 95
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedNovember 15, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 82 A. 442 (Columbia Paper Bag Co. v. Carr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Columbia Paper Bag Co. v. Carr, 82 A. 442, 116 Md. 541, 1911 Md. LEXIS 95 (Md. 1911).

Opinion

Burke, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

By a decree of the Circuit Court Eo. 2 of Baltimore City, passed in the case of Christina Kaiss and others v. Edwin C. Kaiss and others, the fee simple property mentioned in the proceedings in that case was decreed to be sold, and the appellees on this record were appointed trustees to make the sale. They sold the property at public auction to the appellant, and reported the sale to the Court. An order of ratifi *543 cation nisi, was passed, to which exceptions were filed by the purchaser. It also filed a petition asking for an abatement of the purchase price. Testimony on the exceptions and the petition was taken in open Court, which dismissed the petition for an abatement, overruled tbe exceptions, and ratified the sale. This appeal is taken from those orders.

The qirecise grounds upon which the appellant relies to vacate the sale are stated in the exceptions which are here transcribed:

First. Because tbe proceedings herein are irregular and insufficient, and not in accordance with the legal requirements for a sale of the property in these proceedings under the decree herein.

Second. Because the property advertised and sold hereunder, by tbe trustees herein, is not the same to he sold by them under the decree in these proceedings.

Third. Because the property advertised and reported as sold to this exceptant sets forth that the same runs along Lawrence street, and could he changed from its present use so as to have frontage on Lawrence street, when in fact it does not so run and' said change could not he- made.

Fourth. Because a strip of ground eighteen feet nine inches, lying between this property and Lawrence street was advertised and sold as being open and for public use, when in fact said strip is private property.

Fifth. Because the property in these proceedings to be sold under the said decree is of much less value and less desirable than the property advertised for sale and sold by said trustees as set forth in said report of sale.

Sixth. And for other reasons io he set forth at the hearing of these exceptions.

This Court has announced in many cases the principles which control it in passing upon exceptions to trustees sales. It is said in Bolgiano v. Cooke, 19 Md. 375: “Trustees appointed by decrees of a Court of equity, to sell real estate, are agents or instruments of the Court; sales made by them are transactions between tbe Court and tbe purchasers, and *544 as such, are regulated by all the principles of equity applicable to judicial sales. Glenn v. Clapp, 11 G. & J. 1; Duvall v. Speed, 1 Md. Ch. 229; Goldsborough v. Ringgold, Ib. 239; Perrin v. Keithley, 9 Gill, 412.

Before the ratification of a sale made by authority of a Court of equity, all objections within these limits are open for consideration. The sale will be set aside upon proof of error, mistake, misunderstanding or misrepresentation as to the terms or manner of the sale; and it must appear to be in all respects fair and proper, or it can not receive the sanction of the Court. Tomlinson v. McKaig, 5 Gill, 276, 277.

The Court of Chancery, however, sells only the interest and estate of the parties to the cause, and the doctrine of ‘caveat emptoF applies to all such sales. Farmer’s Bank v. Martin, 7 Md. 342. A purchaser discovering a defect of title, at a proper time, may be relieved from his purchase by asking a recission of the sale. Duvall v. Speed, 1 Md. Ch. 229; Kauffman v. Walker, 9 Md. 229. When a Court can see injustice will be inflicted by the ratification of a sale upon a party not in default, the sale should not be ratified. Penn v. Brewer, 12 G. & J. 113.”

It is said in Kaufman v. Walker, supra, that “Judicial sales will not be set aside for causes that the parties in interest might, with a reasonable degree of diligence, have obviated. Every intendment will be made to support them. But where the Court can see that injustice will be inflicted by the ratification of a sale upon a party not in default, by reason of the carelessness or omission of its own officer, it should interfere to prevent it.”

We will consider the questions raised on this record in the light of these authorities.

By deed dated August 15th, 1881, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company acquired title to the lot of ground located at the southeast corner of Eort avenue and the east side of Lawrence street. This lot had a frontage of eighteen feet nine inches on the south side of Ebrt avenue, and ran par- *545 all el on the east side of Lawrence street for the distance of five hundred and ninety-five feet.

The railroad company appears to throw this strip open to public use. There are three railroad tracks on Lawrence street. The distance between the property sold and the east track is about twenty-eight feet, in which distance is included the eighteen feet nine inch strip acquired by the railroad company, the whole of which space is open and used by the public, and is apparently a part of the public highway, and has been so used, without obstruction or hindrance of any sought, for more than twenty years.

The property sold was formerly owned by W. C. Kaiss who died intestate in May, 1909. He acquired title to the property under a deed, which was filed as part of the bill in the above case, from John J. Myer, trustee, and others, dated June 6th, 1888.

This deed described the property as “being also at the distance of eighteen feet and nine inches southeasterly from the corner formed by the southwest side of Fort avenue and the southeast side of Lawrence street, and running then eastwardly binding on the southwest side of Fort avenue one hundred and fifteen feet and six inches, thence southwesterly at right angles to Fort avenue seven hundred and forty-five feet, more or less, to a point where formerly the middle of a creek or marsh, thence northerly binding along the middle of said creek and on ground formerly belonging to J. S. Gitlings’ estate, one hundred and seventy-five feet, three inches, more or less, to intersect a line drawn from the beginning southwesterly at right angles to Fort avenue, and thence reversing said line and binding thereon northeasterly six hundred and twenty feet, more or less, to the beginning.” A diagram is here inserted which shows the location of the property.

*546

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Bluebook (online)
82 A. 442, 116 Md. 541, 1911 Md. LEXIS 95, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/columbia-paper-bag-co-v-carr-md-1911.