Colorado State Bank of Walsh v. United States

18 Cl. Ct. 611, 1989 U.S. Claims LEXIS 197, 1989 WL 139113
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 5, 1989
DocketNo. 104-85C
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 18 Cl. Ct. 611 (Colorado State Bank of Walsh v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Colorado State Bank of Walsh v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 611, 1989 U.S. Claims LEXIS 197, 1989 WL 139113 (cc 1989).

Opinion

OPINION

HARKINS, Senior Judge:

Colorado State Bank of Walsh (the Bank) seeks to recover on a contract made by the Department of Agriculture, Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), to guarantee a loan made under the Emergency Agriculture Credit Adjustment Act of 1978.1 The complaint, filed February 20, 1985, sought judgment in the amount of $350,000, plus interest in the amount of $263,836.03 accrued to January 11, 1985, and further interest from that date at the rate of $122.26 per day. Defendant’s amended answer, filed February 12, 1986, raised four affirmative defenses: (1) negligent servicing of the loan; (2) forfeiture of claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2514 (1982) for fraud; (3) cancellation of contract because of common law fraud and misrepresentation; and (4) breach of the contract provision that prohibited “fraud or misrepresentation of which lender has actual knowledge at the time it became such lender.”

Procedurally, this case has been complicated by widely disparate views of the facts involved in preparation of the application and the actions of the participants at the closing of the loan guaranteed by the FmHA. These facts concerned activities of the Bank’s president, the borrower, and the FmHA county supervisor during the period February 26, 1980, through the closing on May 1, 1980.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on March 17, 1986, that was based on allegedly undisputed contentions of fact applicable to the affirmative defenses other than negligent servicing of the loan. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on April 10, 1986, to strike any defense based upon fraud and misrepresentation. Defendant’s motion was grounded on facts that were conceded to permit disposition of the legal issues raised in the motions for summary judgment. Defendant reserved the right to dispute such facts in the event its motion failed. In addition to the issues of forfeiture and cancellation because of fraud and misrepresentation, the motion papers raised the issue of whether defendant was estopped to show that the county supervisor exceeded the scope of his authority in approving a guarantee in circumstances that involved a failure to comply with applicable FmHA regulatory procedures.

After argument on September 23, 1986, defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied on the ground that the facts asserted with respect to fraud and misrepresentation did not establish that defendant was entitled to a forfeiture under 28 U.S.C. § 2514, or that the Contract of Guarantee could be set aside because tainted by fraud of the Bank, or because of fraud and misrepresentation of which the lender had actual knowledge. Plaintiff’s cross-motion, as to defendant’s fraud and misrepresentation defenses, was allowed on the basis of the facts conceded for purposes of the motion. Subsequent proceedings establish that the facts asserted by defendant and by the Bank were erroneous. The question whether approval of the guarantee was within the scope of the county supervisor’s authority was not resolved after the argument because material facts were in dispute as to that issue.

During pretrial preparation, after further discovery, defendant requested and was permitted to file a renewed motion for summary judgment. The renewed motion concentrated on the contention that the county supervisor had exceeded his authority because the Contract of Guarantee was not executed in accordance with controlling regulations and procedures. At argument on November 16, 1987, it became clear numerous material issues of fact were in dispute. Defendant’s renewed motion, aceord-[614]*614ingly, was denied. Disputed factual issues included: (1) the scope of the assistance rendered by the county supervisor to the borrower in the preparation of the loan application; (2) whether the loan application at the May 1, 1980, closing contained the appraisal report required by 7 C.F.R. § 1980.511(c)(6); and (3) the content of the phrase “current chattel appraisal” in 7 C.F.R. § 1980.511(c)(6)(iii), as defined in practice in Colorado by the FmHA and banks for cattle loans. Further discovery was undertaken by the parties, and a trial de novo on all questions was held during the period January 24, 1989—February 2, 1989.

The principal issues in this case center around actions of the borrower (W. Royce Moffett), the FmHA county supervisor (Christopher Wysock), and the Bank president (Marvin R. Daniels), during the period February 26, 1980, through May 1, 1980, and the actions Bank personnel took to service the loan during the period May 1, 1980, to December 31, 1981. During pretrial preparation, each of the witnesses involved in the May 1, 1980, closing had been deposed two or more times. At trial, the testimony of each manifested an uncommon degree of selective recall for details that supported the position asserted by their party, and a corresponding failure of memory as to comparable details that undermined their position or that would advance the position of their opponent. Facts relevant to the amount of assistance the county supervisor allegedly provided to the borrower apparently had changed in succeeding depositions, and versions at trial differed from the facts that had been asserted in the motions for summary judgment. These fluctuating versions of the facts as to what occurred on May 1, 1980, the lack of recall for the sequence of significant events, when considered in the light of an extraordinary lack of seemingly routine documentation by both the lender Bank and the FmHA county office, make the testimony of these individuals highly suspect. The record establishes that the testimony of Messrs. Moffett, Daniels and Wysock as to the details of their actions during the February 26, 1980, to May 1, 1980, period lacks credibility.

FACTS

W. Royce Moffett had been a loan customer of the Bank since 1976. For 12 years prior to November 1976, he had been the FmHA county supervisor in Baca County, Colorado. In 1980, he was the chief agricultural loan officer and a vice president of the First National Bank, Springfield, Colorado.

Royce Moffett in 1980 also conducted a cow/calf agricultural operation. His herd was pastured at two locations: a ranch located approximately 190 miles from Springfield at Thatcher, Colorado, in Las Animas County (the Thatcher Ranch) and a ranch located in Baca County, 14 miles north of Springfield, Colorado, (the Springfield Ranch). The Thatcher Ranch consisted of approximately 15,000 acres, 8,475 acres of which were owned by Royce Mof-fett, and the balance was leased; the Springfield operation was on leased land. The herd at the Thatcher Ranch was commingled with cattle owned by his brother, Hubert Moffett, and with cattle owned by other relatives. Some cattle at Thatcher Ranch were owned jointly by Hubert and Royce Moffett. In a visit to the Thatcher Ranch in 1981, nine different brands were observed on the cattle.

In a cow/calf operation, the basic security for an operating loan is the livestock and equipment on hand when the loan is made, and livestock purchased with loan proceeds. Calves produced are treated as normal income security and may be sold to pay operating expenses (such as feed and pasture rent) and for the repayment of the loan.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

First Tennessee Bank National Ass'n v. Johanns
618 F. Supp. 2d 778 (M.D. Tennessee, 2008)
FIRST TENNESSEE BANK NAT. ASS'N v. Johanns
618 F. Supp. 2d 778 (M.D. Tennessee, 2008)
Long Island Savings Bank, FSB v. United States
54 Fed. Cl. 607 (Federal Claims, 2002)
Landmark Land Co. v. United States
46 Fed. Cl. 261 (Federal Claims, 2000)
Crane Helicopter Services, Inc. v. United States
45 Fed. Cl. 410 (Federal Claims, 1999)
Kirby Corporation v. Pena
109 F.3d 258 (Fifth Circuit, 1997)
Kirby Corporation v. USA
Fifth Circuit, 1997
Supermex, Inc. v. United States
40 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,897 (Federal Claims, 1996)
First Interstate Bank of Billings, N.A. v. United States
27 Fed. Cl. 348 (Federal Claims, 1992)
Union Bank & Trust Co. v. United States
27 Fed. Cl. 403 (Federal Claims, 1992)
Godley v. United States
38 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,386 (Court of Claims, 1992)
Kiewit/Tulsa-Houston v. United States
37 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,255 (Court of Claims, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 Cl. Ct. 611, 1989 U.S. Claims LEXIS 197, 1989 WL 139113, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/colorado-state-bank-of-walsh-v-united-states-cc-1989.