Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. Lever Bros. Co.

90 F.2d 178, 33 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 292, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 3785
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedApril 8, 1937
Docket5774
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 90 F.2d 178 (Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. Lever Bros. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. Lever Bros. Co., 90 F.2d 178, 33 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 292, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 3785 (7th Cir. 1937).

Opinion

EVANS, Circuit Judge.

Appellants and appellee are competitors engaged in making and selling soap. Their activities cover the entire industry. The competition and the competitive methods which led to this litigation concern themselves with laundry soap. The size of this branch of the industry as conducted by the three parties to the litigation is tremendous.

Appellants assert that they jointly own the patent covering the product of the inventive mind which produced a better and more acceptable soap than was ever before offered to the housewife or the laundryman. They ask the court for the protection which this discovery deserves. Appellee denies all such claims of merit and distinction, disputes all its adversaries’ asserted *179 right to patent protection, and denies infringement ; hence, this controversy.

The patent granted to Dallas R. Lamout (and assigned to appellants) to reward one who made an original and unusually valuable contribution to the science of soap making, is asserted and assailed. The validity of the patent is denied; its infringement is disputed.

Many hundreds of thousand words have been spoken by witnesses who proclaimed their belief in the merit of Lamont’s discovery. An equal number of witnesses assert that it would be a travesty on justice to honor Lamont with the name of inventor or to characterize what his coworker did, as invention.

The District Court held the patent was not infringed. On the issue of validity, he found not squarely, but invoked disputes over inferences when he used the following language:

“Lamont patent is invalid unless limited to a process of controlled steam inflation and the product thereof and as so limited is not infringed.”

Validity and infringement of patent No. 1,652,900, issued December 13, 1927, to Dallas R. Lamont, are the subjects of our inquiry. The patent consisting of eleven claims covers both soap products and processes of manufacturing soap. The product is almost exclusively used for laundry purposes.

Lamont was an employee of the Industrial Spray Drying Company, which was entitled to his discoveries and inventions and to whom he duly assigned his patent. Through appropriate steps, the title and right to use the patent were transferred to appellants. Colgate-PalmolivePeet Company, formerly Colgate & Company, obtained an exclusive license and started production in 1927 of a soap, called Super Suds. The appellant, Procter & Gamble, soon came out with a product known as Selox. The latter company was sued for infringement, and it purchased a half interest in the patent.

In 1929, appellee, a pioneer and always a very large manufacturer of soap for laundry purposes, brought out a laundry soap. It obtained patents which covered both the product and the process for making this soap. The extent and rapidity with which this so-called new laundry soap business grew is shown by the fact that in 1930, three years after the appearance of Super Suds, the public had used 500,000,000 cartons of the combined products of the parties. It may be fairly and conservatively said, speaking generally and not technically, that the soaps made by the parties to this litigation, for laundry purposes, are much alike. Admittedly they today dominate the field of granular washing soap.

Appellee called its laundry soap Rinso long before 1927. It never changed its name. Appellants assert that while the. name remained the same, the product, and the process by which the soap was made, changed after appellants brought out their soap made in accordance with Lamont’s patent teachings.

Colgate first called its soap made under the Lamont patent, Super Suds. It later brought out Palmolive Beads.

Procter & Gamble has given its laundry soap different names: Selox, Chipso, Chipso Granules, Oxydol, and Ivory Snow.

' The application for Lamont’s patent was made May 25, 1927, and it issued December 13, 1927. The specifications are extremely long and somewhat involved. There are eleven claims of which eight are contested. The first five are product claims. Three process claims, 7, 8, and 9, are also in issue. In the margin appear claim 2, a product claim, and claims 7 and 8, two process claims. 1 These claims are presented as typical. Appellee emphasizes claim 1, a product claim, and it is also reproduced in the margin. 1

*180 A brief statement of the history and the art of soap making, as well as a statement of what Lamont did, follows:

Commercial soap is ordinarily made by boiling soda lye and fats and oils in a kettle. When salt water is added to the mass, the kettle contents separate into layers of which the top one forms the basis for the ordinary soap of commerce. This material at kettle temperature is a molten mass and its composition is surprisingly constant at 70 per cent solids combined with 30 per cent water. At the temperature at which this soap is finished, i. e., between 170° and 212° F¡, the soap is a heavy moltei? mass and will flow in the mass, although it is not a liquid and is not free-flowing. In this condition the soap is called kettle soap, or more technically, neat soap. This condition is spoken of as the “neat soap” phase.

When neat soap is cooled to a temperature of 150° F. or below, it changes and becomes what is known as solid soap. Also if moisture is driven out of soap when in the neat soap phase, the transformation *181 point from the neat phase to the solid phase takes place at higher and higher temperatures.

Appellants claim Lamont taught the art to spray this nonliquid material when in the neat phase, and during its transformation into the solid phase, to cause the soap substance itself to divide into particles which may be described as puffed or inflated.

If solid soap containing the percentage of water of neat soap is heated to a point above 150° F. (depending somewhat upon the particular fats used), the material is transformed into its neat soap or kettle soap phase, but once this phase has been reached, further rise in temperature can be continued without reducing the viscosity of the soap although in some instances its stringiness can be reduced at the higher temperatures. This quality of soap constitutes a sharp distinction between it and other kinds of heat fusible material, which as heat is increased become more fluid.

Appellants assert that the usual practice in spray processing of other materials required them to be first brought to a condition which formed fine round drops when sprayed which is impossible with neat soap. Neat soap is not film forming and will not break up into true drops when sprayed. It merely breaks into fragments.

Another phase in which soap can and does exist, is the “nigre” or soap solution phase. This phase, as in the instance of the neat phase, has a definite water content, and cannot exist with less than about 70 per cent of water. At a temperature around 170° F. and above, it is a true free-flowing thin liquid. When at lower temperature, about 150° F., and below, nigre does not change into solid soap but instead congeals into a wet-gelatinous, elastic-like material.

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Bluebook (online)
90 F.2d 178, 33 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 292, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 3785, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/colgate-palmolive-peet-co-v-lever-bros-co-ca7-1937.