Therm-O-Proof Insulation Co. v. Slayter & Co.

80 F.2d 557, 28 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 98, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 3356
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedDecember 21, 1935
DocketNo. 5399
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 80 F.2d 557 (Therm-O-Proof Insulation Co. v. Slayter & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Therm-O-Proof Insulation Co. v. Slayter & Co., 80 F.2d 557, 28 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 98, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 3356 (7th Cir. 1935).

Opinion

EVANS, Circuit Judge.

Patentee was most unfortunate in wording his claim. He entitled his patent “Method of Heat Insulating.” His first claim starts with these words: “The method of building a wall whereby to increase the insulating and fire resisting properties thereof.” From these two statements it is assumed that his was a process patent. The first paragraph of the specifications confirms this conclusion, for the inventor there says:

“This invention relates to method for heat insulating buildings and the like and refers more particularly to an improved process by means of which houses or other buildings already standing can be conveniently, economically and efficiently heat insulated although the invention in' certain of its broader aspects is not limited to the heat insulation of buildings already constructed.”

His second paragraph injects doubt and confusion into the study for there he says:

“Another object of the invention is to provide material which can be economically produced and applied in the walls of the building ip the carrying out of the method and which in addition to its heat insulation qualities will be fire-resisting.”

This product was not the subject of the claim which was allowed. All product claims were disallowed. In the license contract which appellee offered in evidence in order to show extensive use, it is significant, however, that the royalty was on the product.

When the claim is carefully analyzed, we find it to be a hybrid. It begins as a process and ends like a product claim. We quote and analyze the single claim of the patent:

“What I claim as my invention is: The method of building a wall whereby to increase the insulating and fire resisting properties thereof without undue added weight, which comprises utilizing spaced apart walls of a building previously constructed as a form for receiving heat insulating material, (1) providing openings to afford access to the air spaces between said spaced apart walls, (2) inserting the outlet end of a conduit through said openings, (3) and forcing through the said conduit a comminuted heat insulating material, said material being of sufficiently light weight and devoid of free moisture content of sufficient amount to cause bulging or other injurious effects upon the ■ exposed surfaces of said walls.” (The numerals are inserted by the court.)

We are not without sympathy for counsel who is called upon to determine whether a process or a product claim best protects his client’s discoveries. It is at times difficult for him as it is for us to decide this question. It is unfortunate that form should play any substantial part in determining the validity of a patent monopoly covering a patentable discovery.

In solving the problem it would seem safe for courts to assume that patent applications should be as liberally construed as pleadings, and we should endeavor to give effect to the pleader’s good faith efforts to describe his discovery and secure protection therefor. Courts cannot, of course, add what is omitted or subtract that which is clearly inserted in the claim. In many cases it has been observed that what is not claimed is dedicated to the public. It would seem, however, a violent assumption to so infer even an implied dedication. The same conclusion is reached, however,' but by better [559]*559reasoning, by holding that the claim is a contract between the Government and the patentee and bespeaks the agreement of the parties. Accepting as we do the view that additions and subtractions may not he made, we still believe a claim, like the one before us, may be construed so as to give effect to the efforts of the inventor and his solicitor. It may result in narrowing the claim, but we think it unfair to give it a construction which would result in its instant annihilation.

Undoubtedly, Slayter believed he had made a discovery and tried to describe it. Approaching the patent from this angle, we can view the claim as a process claim and restrict the last step to blowing the comminuted heat insulating material therein specifically described and it only. While novelty, if any there be, resides in the last step — the blowing of this particular material — yet validity will be accorded it, if we can find patentable originality in this step.

Turning to the claim as analyzed, the first words ending with “weight” merely describe the art — patentee’s field of operation. The next clause is not so readily reconciled grammatically. We assume “which” is attached to the word “method.” Again, the draftsman was describing the fidd of his operation — his art. Neither clause describes a step in the patented, or any, process. The next clause “providing openings to afford access to the air spaces between said spaced apart walls” is the first step of this process claim. It was old, well known, commonly used, and never could evidence more than mechanical skill. The second step, “inserting the outlet end of a conduit through said openings,” was likewise anything but novel. The last step, “forcing through the said conduit a comminuted heat insulating material,” was likewise old.

There was not a sign of inventive genius in providing an opening in a wall, or in inserting in said opening the outlet end of a conduit (a nozzle), or in blowing or forcing "material through a conduit. Prior art need not be cited, but, if necessary, it is in the record. See, also, Powers-Kennedy Contracting Corp. v. Concrete Mixing, etc., Co., 282 U.S. 175, 51 S.Ct. 95, 75 L.Ed. 278.

The only novelty, which may be asserted for this claim is in forcing the specified materials described as follows: “Said material being of sufficiently light weight and devoid of free moisture content of sufficient amount to cause bulging or other injurious effects upon the exposed surfaces of said walls.”

“Comminuted material” is defined in the specifications as follows: “By the term ‘comminuted material’ is of course included various degrees of fineness but does not mean that the material is reduced to a powdered condition. In fact the particles are preferably of sufficient size to give a large body for the amount of weight.”

Unfortunately for the validity of the claim, greater indefiniteness and more vagueness could hardly be found. It is so worded (accidentally or intentionally) as to catch an alleged infringer coming or going. But, fearful that the description be not sufficiently elastic, Slayter further says in his specifications: “While I have described one material and one method of applying it I do not wish to limit the method to the particular material mentioned, except as ultimately set forth in the claim.”

Can we, in these words, find a product sufficiently described to permit us to say it is patentably novel? “Comminuted heat insulating material” is a broad and comprehensive term. “Heat insulating material” needs no definition. “Comminuted” is also pretty well understood. It means “reduced to minute particles,” “pulverized.” The prior art is loaded with descriptions of “comminuted heat insulating material.” The patent originally had a claim covering the product which was rejected, the examiner saying:

“ * * * The method claimed is not a ‘method of heat insulating a building,’ but is in reality a part of the process of building a heat insulating wall. The material is in such cases forced into the air spaces in the walls of a building.

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Bluebook (online)
80 F.2d 557, 28 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 98, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 3356, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/therm-o-proof-insulation-co-v-slayter-co-ca7-1935.