Coleman v. Coleman

522 A.2d 1115, 361 Pa. Super. 446

Opinions

BECK, Judge:

Appellant Shirley Coleman and appellee Harrison Coleman were married in 1955. Wife filed a complaint in divorce in Pennsylvania in May, 1983, seeking dissolution of the parties’ marriage, equitable distribution of marital property, and counsel fees, costs, and expenses. In his answer to the complaint, husband admitted that no prior action had been initiated in Pennsylvania, but averred that a divorce suit, in which he was the plaintiff, was pending in Nevada. In the Pennsylvania action the court in September 1983 established an escrow account pursuant to a stipulation of counsel, to provide security for husband’s appearance at future proceedings and satisfaction of wife’s equitable distribution claims in the Pennsylvania action.

On May 8, 1984, both parties appeared before the Nevada Court which entered a divorce decree. The decree, inter alia, reserved wife’s right to pursue her economic claims in Pennsylvania.

The decree in pertinent part provided:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff shall transfer and convey by appropriate deed to the Defendant all of his right, title and interest in and to the marital home located in the State of Pennsylvania thereby vesting the property in the name of the Defendant as her sole and separate property absolutely;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the sum of $25,000.00 in lieu of Nevada alimony, and without prejudice to the Defendant’s rights to pursue any relief in the State of Pennsylvania relative to such matters and/or property within the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Domestic Relations Court;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant’s attorney, Jack G. Perry, Esquire, the total sum of $1,500.00 as and for attorney’s fees in this cause, as well as $41.00 in reimbursement for costs____

(emphasis added).

In response to wife’s assertion of her economic claims in Pennsylvania the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas disposed of the pending Pennsylvania divorce action in its order of August 7, 1984, holding that the entry of a foreign divorce decree in a proceeding in which both parties appeared precluded wife from pursuing any form of economic relief in Pennsylvania.

After wife filed her notice of appeal from the order of August 7, 1984, the trial court on October 10, 1984 granted husband’s motion to terminate the escrow account. Wife appealed this second order also. The appeals have been consolidated and both are before us.

The primary issue on appeal is whether under the Pennsylvania Divorce Code¹ wife is barred from seeking equitable distribution and counsel fees because of the adjudication in the Nevada divorce proceeding in which she appeared. We conclude that she is not, and therefore vacate and remand.

A threshold inquiry is whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to address wife’s claims. It is well established that the test of subject matter jurisdiction is simply the competency of the trial court to hear and determine controversies of the general class at issue; i.e., whether the court has power to enter into the inquiry, and not whether it will ultimately decide that it can or cannot grant relief in the particular case before it. In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 524, 412 A.2d 1099 (1980); Cheng v. Cheng, 347 Pa.Super. 515, 500 A.2d 1175 (1985); Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity v. University of Pennsylvania, 318 Pa.Super. 293, 464 A.2d 1349 (1983). Furthermore, “[p]arties to an action cannot ... confer jurisdiction upon a court for which jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking.” Cheng, 347 Pa.Super. at 519, 500 A.2d at 1177; see also T.C.R. Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 372 A.2d 721 (1977); Maxton v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 308 Pa.Super. 444, 454 A.2d 618 (1982); Zvonik v. Zvonik, 291 Pa.Super. 309, 435 A.2d 1236 (1981).

Under the Divorce Code the trial court clearly has the power to dispose of wife’s claims for equitable distribution and counsel fees. The jurisdictional breadth of Pennsylvania courts over economic issues incident to a foreign divorce decree has been delineated by this court in Cheng, which pointed out that under Sections 102(a) and (b) of the Divorce Code, the policy of the Commonwealth is to:

(a)

(1) Make the law for legal dissolution of marriage effective for dealing with the realities of matrimonial experience.

(4) Mitigate the harm to spouses ... caused by the legal dissolution of the marriage.

(6) Effectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced ... and insure a fair and just determination and settlement of their property rights.

(b) The objectives set forth in subsection (a) shall be considered in construing the provisions of this act and shall be regarded as expressing the legislative intent.

23 P.S. § 102(a), (b) (emphasis added).

In order to implement the Legislature’s intent, Sections 301(a)(1) and 401(c) of the Code grant the courts of this Commonwealth broad jurisdiction over the economic issues related to divorce. Cheng, 347 Pa.Super. at 519-21, 500 A.2d at 1178.

§ 301 Jurisdiction

(a) The courts of this Commonwealth as defined in section 104 shall have original jurisdiction in cases of divorce and ... where they have jurisdiction, shall determine in conjunction with any decree granting a divorce ... the following matters, where raised in the complaint or the answer and issue appropriate decrees or orders with reference thereto and may retain continuing jurisdiction thereof:

(1) The determination and disposition of property rights and interests between spouses____

§ 401 Decree of court

(c) In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this act, and may grant such other relief or remedy as

equity and justice require against either party____

23 P.S. §§ 301(a)(1), 401(c) (emphasis added).

In addition, Section 505 specifically provides jurisdiction to Pennsylvania courts to grant alimony to a defendant in a foreign divorce action where the defendant has not appeared in the foreign proceeding:

§ 505 Alimony where a foreign ex parte divorce or annulment

Whenever a person who was a resident of this Commonwealth at the time such person was a defendant or respondent in a foreign ex parte action for annulment or divorce petitions a court of this Commonwealth for alimony and establishes the need therefor, such court, if it has jurisdiction over the person or property of the other party, may order that such alimony be paid in the same manner and under the same conditions and limitations which pertain when alimony is sought as provided in this chapter.

23 P.S. § 505 (emphasis added); Sohmer v. Sohmer, 318 Pa.Super. 500, 505-07, 465 A.2d 665, 668 (1983). It is important to note, however, that Section 505 is not the comprehensive definition of the trial court’s authority, which is contained in Sections 301 and 401(c), but rather is “[a] grant of a specific form of relief in particular circumstances.” Cheng, 347 Pa.Super. at 522, 500 A.2d at 1179.²

The relevant sections of the Code, 301, 401 and 505, grant broad jurisdiction to Pennsylvania courts. No section of the Code limits a court’s authority to address the equitable distribution and counsel fee claims of a litigant in a foreign divorce proceeding, regardless of whether or not that litigant appeared in the foreign forum. We must therefore abide by the established principle that if the legislature has shown no indication of its intention to limit jurisdiction, the act in question must be construed as imposing no limitation. In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 263 Pa.Super. 378, 398 A.2d 186, aff'd, 488 Pa. 524, 412 A.2d 1099 (1979).

The fact that the Nevada court had subject matter jurisdiction and exercised it to a limited degree did not extinguish the statutory authority of a Pennsylvania court to dispose of the matters at issue.

A determination that the Pennsylvania court has subject matter jurisdiction, however, does not end our inquiry. We must now examine whether the wife is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from asserting her claims in Pennsylvania.

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, applies where the cause of action in one suit is identical to that involved in a prior final judgment. The doctrine holds that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive of the rights of the parties and their privies and bars subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action and issues determined therein. Sea-Land, Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974); Keystone Building Corp. v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Assoc., 468 Pa. 85, 360 A.2d 191 (1976); In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 328 Pa.Super. 442, 477 A.2d 527 (1984); LeBeau v. LeBeau, 258 Pa.Super. 519, 393 A.2d 480 (1978); see also Noetzel v. Glasgow, Inc., 338 Pa.Super. 458, 487 A.2d 1372 (1985); Consolidation Coal Company v. Dist. 5, United Mine Workers, 336 Pa.Super. 354, 485 A.2d 1118 (1984); Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 18, 19, 24 (1982); Scoles, Conflict of Laws, § 24.1 at 917 (1984). Res judicata generally bars relit-igation of issues raised, as well as arguments that might have been raised but were not. Noetzel, 338 Pa.Super. at 466-67, 487 A.2d at 1376; Consolidation Coal Co., 336 Pa.Super. at 361-63, 485 A.2d at 1122. Moreover, res judicata is “a part of the ‘national jurisprudence’ by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution,” and may thereby bar relitigation of a claim based on a judgment rendered in a foreign forum. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 62 S.Ct. 608, 86 L.Ed. 885 (1942); Noetzel, 338 Pa.Super. at 466-67, 487 A.2d at 1376.

This court articulated the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Dist. 5, United Mine Workers:

The res judicata doctrine is a judicial creation aimed at preventing a multiplicity of suits. It protects a party from the vexation of having to defend itself against a claim for which a final judgment has already been entered. Furthermore, it serves the public interest by keeping the courts clear of disputes that have been decisively resolved. But as a matter of fairness to the party which believes it has a valid claim, the doctrine is not applied unless there in fact was a previous action in which the party did present, or had the opportunity to present, its claim. Hence, the general rule is that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied to preclude a claim absent a final judgment on the merits in a previous action.

336 Pa.Super. at 362, 485 A.2d at 1122 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also LeBeau, 258 Pa.Super. at 523-25, 393 A.2d at 482.

The determination of whether a final judgment on the merits has been entered in a prior suit may depend in large measure upon how unfair it would be to the defendant in the second action to permit relitigation. Scoles, supra, at § 24.24. One commentator has noted that in deciding whether a claim should be precluded “all relevant circumstances [must be evaluated] including the extent to which the parties in the prior action had a full opportunity there to litigate, and actually litigated, the issues of their concern.” Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 44, 59 (1962) (emphasis added).

By ordering husband to convey his interest in the marital home to wife and to pay her counsel fees incurred in Nevada, the Nevada Court’s decree addressed to some degree the issues of property distribution and counsel fees, costs and expenses. Nonetheless, the doctrine of res judicata does not preclude an equitable division of property or claims for counsel fees in Pennsylvania because of two key facts in this case: (1) the parties agreed to reserve wife’s right to seek further economic relief in Pennsylvania; and (2) the Nevada decree was entered “without prejudice to [wife’s] rights to pursue any relief in the State of Pennsylvania relative to such matters [alimony] and/or property....”³

Since the Nevada Court disposed of some of the wife’s economic claims, it could be argued that permitting wife to pursue additional economic relief in Pennsylvania would constitute splitting a cause of action. The courts of this Commonwealth have long adhered to the generally accepted view disfavoring the splitting of claims. Spinelli v. Maxwell, 430 Pa. 478, 243 A.2d 425 (1968); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982). Nonetheless, in some circumstances parties may be permitted to split a cause of action so that res judicata will not operate to bar the latter suit. See Keystone Building Corp., 468 Pa. at 94-95 n. 10, 360 A.2d at 196 n. 10; Hook v. Hook & Ackerman, Inc., 383 Pa. 67, 117 A.2d 714 (1955). The Restatement of Judgments (Second) has framed the rule as follows:

When any of the following circumstances exists, the general rule of § 24 does not apply to extinguish the claim, and part or all of the claim subsists as a possible basis for a second action by the plaintiff against the defendant:

(a) The parties have agreed in terms or in effect that the plaintiff may split his claim, or the defendant has acquiesced therein; or

(b) The court in the first action has expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to maintain the second action____

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1) (1982).

The law of Pennsylvania is in accord with the approach taken by the Restatement. For example, we note that consent decrees may have res judicata effect. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Graybill, Inc., 482 Pa. 143, 393 A.2d 420 (1978); Jones & Laughlin, 328 Pa.Super. at 454-55, 477 A.2d at 533. However, if the parties did not intend the consent decree to act as an adjudication of the merits of the subsequent claim, then the decree may not bar the later action. Keystone Building Corp., 468 Pa. at 92-94, 360 A.2d at 195 (consent decree enforcing terms of contract not bar to later suit for damages); Jones and Laughlin, 328 Pa.Super. at 456-57, 477 A.2d at 534. Similarly, a stipulation entered into by the parties with the intention of limiting the scope of the proceedings may effectively leave open other issues not addressed for future determination. See, e.g., Fogel Refrigerator Co, v. Oteri, 398 Pa. 82, 86, 156 A.2d 815, 817-18 (1959) (stipulation by counsel limiting petition to open judgment to issue of forgery made judgment res judicata only to defense of forgery). Thus, whether a plaintiff may be permitted to bring a second suit on the undecided claims in the first action, and thereby split a cause of action, turns on the question of the parties’ and the court’s intent; i.e., where the parties and the court did not fully address the claims in the first suit did they intend the judgment not to be a final adjudication of all the issues? The conduct of the parties and the court, and the language of the decree, may be considered in ascertaining such intent.⁴ Keystone Building Corp., 468 Pa.Super. at 92-94, 360 A.2d at 195.

Furthermore, we are bound by the Full Faith and Credit clause of the United States Constitution, art. IV, § 1, to take this position. See, e.g., Morris Lapidus Associates v. Airportels, Inc., 240 Pa.Super. 80, 82-83, 361 A.2d 660, 662 (1976) (allocatur denied); see also Mulholland v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 418 Pa. 96, 209 A.2d 857 (1965) (determination of competency valid where Florida court reserved future dispositions for adjudication in Pennsylvania); Cheng, 347 Pa.Super. at 518-19, 500 A.2d at 1177 (reservation of economic issues for Pennsylvania recognized despite preservation of action in which claims raised in South Carolina).

The record in this appeal firmly establishes that the parties and the court did not intend that the Nevada decree would fully resolve the economic issues of the parties. Consequently, the decree dealt with the status of the parties and certain specified economic claims and reserved other economic claims for later resolution in Pennsylvania. The husband admits that he entered into an agreement with wife whereby the conveyance to her of his interest in the marital home under the Nevada decree would not affect her right to pursue other economic relief in Pennsylvania. (Record at 54a). The Nevada court incorporated the parties’ agreement containing the reservation into its decree, and specifically limited its award of counsel fees and costs to those incurred in the Nevada action. The conduct of the parties and the court, and the language of the decree itself, indicates that neither the court nor the parties intended the decree to act as an adjudication of the claims reserved for later disposition in Pennsylvania; therefore the Pennsylvania court having jurisdiction may dispose of those economic issues which the Nevada court reserved and did not resolve.

The result we reach promotes the policies underlying both the Divorce Code and the doctrine of res judicata. The Code was enacted not only to effectuate economic justice, but also to harmonize Pennsylvania’s domestic relations law with the laws of other states. Chaney v. Chaney, 343 Pa.Super. 77, 493 A.2d 1382 (1985).

The res judicata values of judicial economy and fairness to the parties are also well-served by our approach. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted in Keystone:

[Tjhere .is no valid reason why, when the parties can expeditiously resolve one issue in an action, they cannot consent to a judgment on that issue, and preserve their right to fully litigate the other issue.

468 Pa. at 94, 360 A.2d at 196 (footnote omitted).

In addition, we need not be concerned with subjecting husband to the inconvenience of relitigation; when the issues of the first action have not been fully litigated and a final judgment has not been entered, the underlying reasons for application of the res judicata doctrine are absent. See Consolidation Coal, 336 Pa.Super. at 361-63, 485 A.2d at 1122. Conversely, viewing the Nevada decree as foreclosing wife’s rights to seek economic relief in Pennsylvania would lead to an unjust and harsh result. We cannot allow one party to use an agreement into which he freely entered to abandon it and thereby take advantage of the other party.

By agreeing with husband to limit the scope of the Nevada proceeding, wife gave up an opportunity to obtain in Nevada a judgment on the merits of the issues she now raises. If the parties and the Nevada court intended the Nevada decree to result in a waiver of wife’s claims, then such an intention should have been expressed unequivocally-

We therefore vacate the order of August 7, 1984 at No. 2334 and remand for proceedings to determine wife’s equitable distribution and counsel fee claims. In so doing, the trial court should consider the awards already made by the Nevada court.

In appeal No. 3016 from the trial court’s order of October 10, 1984, we hold that under Pa.R.A.P. 1701 the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act further once appellant’s notice of appeal in No. 2443 had been filed. Mandia v. Mandia, 341 Pa.Super. 116, 491 A.2d 177 (1985); Prozzoly v. Prozzoly, 327 Pa.Super. 326, 475 A.2d 820 (1984); Gordon v. Gordon, 293 Pa.Super. 491, 439 A.2d 683 (1981), aff'd per curiam 498 Pa. 570, 449 A.2d 1378 (1982). The trial court thus erred by terminating the escrow account while appellant’s appeal from the dismissal of her equitable distribution and counsel fee claims was pending. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand.

The orders entered at Nos. 2334 and 3016 are vacated. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.

CIRILLO, President Judge files a dissenting opinion. TAMILIA, J., files a dissenting opinion, in which POPOVICH, J., joins.

1 . The Divorce Code ("Code"), Act of April 2, 1980, P.L. 63, No. 26, 23 P.S. § 101 et seq.

2 . We recognize that the court in Sohmer focused on Section 505 not as a specific grant of relief in particular circumstances as did the court in Cheng, but rather viewed the provision as a bar to such relief. The differences between the two cases are reconciliable. Firstly, the two readings of Section 505 are not mutually exclusive. Secondly, jurisdiction in Cheng was grounded in Section 401(c), a section of the statute not construed in Sohmer. Cheng, 347 Pa.Super. at 521, n. 1, 500 A.2d at 1179 n. 1.

3 . In this case we are not called upon to decide whether a defendant in a foreign divorce suit would be entitled to pursue a particular economic claim in Pennsylvania if the foreign forum had failed to dispose of the claim entirely.

We believe, however, that petitions for equitable distribution, alimony, and counsel fees are separate claims because they involve considerably different inquiries and types of proof. Thus, an adjudication in a foreign forum which fails to address any one of them cannot constitute an adjudication on the merits of that claim, and consequently cannot preclude a subsequent action for that form of relief in Pennsylvania. This approach best serves the legislative mandate of the Code to “effectuate economic justice between parties.” 23 P.S. § 102(a)(6).

4 . We do not address the following issue because it is not before us: whether, in the absence of an agreement by the parties or a specific reservation by the foreign forum a Pennsylvania court may determine the economic issues incident to a divorce where both parties have appeared in the foreign proceeding.