BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge.
Claimant Cobern Hamilton appeals from the district court’s grant of the Secretary’s motion to affirm previous agency decisions denying Claimant’s applications for social security benefits.1 Claimant initially applied for social security disability benefits and supplemental security income benefits in 1985, alleging disability resulting from lower back pain, ulcers, and gout. Applications, Appellant’s App., Transcript at 61, 88. After his applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, Claimant requested and received a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge (AU). The hearing resulted in a denial, and the Appeals Council denied Claimant’s request for review. Action of Appeals Council, id. at 5. Claimant filed suit in district court. After a hearing, the district court remanded the case to the Appeals Council for consideration of Claimant’s nonexertional limitations in connection with the AU’s previous determination that Claimant could perform light work. Journal Entry, Appellant’s App. at tab 12. The Appeals Council remanded the ease to the AU, and a supplemental hearing was held.
The Secretary has established a five-step evaluation process pursuant to the Social Security Act for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir.1988) (describing five steps in detail). In this case, the AU reached the fifth step of the pertinent analysis, assuming that Claimant could not perform his past relevant work. Recommended Decision, Appellant’s App., Transcript at 186. The AU concluded that, although Claimant’s nonexertional impairments limited the range of light work he could perform, Claimant retained the functional capacity to perform certain light and sedentary jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. The AU’s recommended decision denied Claimant benefits; the Appeals Council adopted the AU’s recommended decision. Decision, id. at 180.
The Appeals Council then agreed to consider additional evidence in the case. Its subsequent decision, discussing the additional evidence, also denied Claimant benefits. Decision, id. at 282. That decision, adopting the previous Appeals Council decision, which in turn adopted the AU’s recommended decision, became the final decision of the Secretary for purposes of review. See Williams, 844 F.2d at 749.
On appeal, Claimant argues that the Secretary failed to give the proper weight to the opinions of Claimant’s treating physicians, failed to properly analyze evidence of Claimant’s pain and depression, and failed to consider the combined effect of Claimant’s impairments. Judicial review of the Secretary’s determination that Claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is limited; our only function is to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s decision and whether the Secretary applied the cor[1498]*1498rect legal standards. See Bernal v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir.1988). The Secretary’s findings stand if they are supported by “ ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 414 (10th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420-1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)).
I
Claimant first argues that the AU and the Appeals Council, in evaluating Claimant’s physical impairments, improperly rejected the opinions of Dr. Schnelle and Dr. Summerhouse, two treating physicians. Dr. Schnelle opined that Claimant “is currently unable to work” because of back problems, Letter of January 13, 1987, Appellant’s App., Transcript at 177, and Dr. Summerhouse, in a letter considered by the Appeals Council, stated that Claimant’s osteoarthritis would preclude “all but sedentary work,” Letter of August 19, 1988, id. at 287.2 In reaching his conclusions, the AU instead chose to rely on the report of Dr. Jarrott, as supported by reports from Doctors Sutton and Sifford, all examining physicians.
Claimant asserts that Dr. Jarrott’s report did not consider Claimant’s complaint of pain, and notes that Dr. Jarrott saw Claimant for only fifteen minutes and did not test numerous capabilities or test capabilities repetitively. Claimant points to differences between the diagnoses of Dr. Sutton and Dr. Jarrott which could be interpreted to support Claimant’s allegations. Finally, Claimant says that Dr. Sifford’s report is entitled to no weight because he “is well known to the Federal District Court in Kansas for his biased evaluations.” Despite Claimant’s views of these physicians and their evaluations, his criticisms do not contradict the specific and legitimate reasons the AU gave for rejecting Dr. Schnelle’s and Dr. Summerhouse’s opinions of Claimant’s disability.
The AU rejected Dr. Schnelle’s opinion that Claimant was disabled because Dr. Schnelle’s conclusion was not supported by specific findings and his report was “not as comprehensive” as the reports of the examining physicians. Recommended Decision, id. at 185. The Appeals Council noted that Dr. Summerhouse’s letter “contained essentially the same statements regarding the claimant’s physical condition” as his previous reports. Decision, id. at 283. The AU rejected Dr. Summerhouse’s previous diagnoses because his latest report did not mention the lumbosacral spine, and because Dr. Jarrott and Dr. Sutton are orthopedic specialists and their evaluations included extensive testing. Recommended Decision, id. at 185.
Claimant wants us to reweigh the evidence; this we cannot do. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.1991). In evaluating Claimant’s physical impairments, the AU and Appeals Council expressed specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of Claimant’s treating physicians. Our review of the record convinces us that those reasons are not in error. See Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir.1990).
II
In considéring Claimant’s contentions of pain, the AU determined that, while Claimant may have increased intermittent pain, his allegations of disabling pain were not credible. Recommended Decision, Appellant’s App., Transcript at 186. Claimant contends that the AU improperly analyzed his pain because, although the AU said he considered all of the evidence, he relied solely on objective, medical findings to support his conclusion. As Claimant points out, the AU is required, in assessing credibility, to consider all evidence, both objective and subjective. See Williams, 844 F.2d at 753. The AU stated that he considered all of the evidence; his [1499]*1499reliance on medical findings does not allow us to assume otherwise.
■ Claimant asserts that the AU’s reliance on Dr. Jarrott’s report is misplaced because Dr. Jarrott did not consider Claimant’s subjective complaints. Dr.
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BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge.
Claimant Cobern Hamilton appeals from the district court’s grant of the Secretary’s motion to affirm previous agency decisions denying Claimant’s applications for social security benefits.1 Claimant initially applied for social security disability benefits and supplemental security income benefits in 1985, alleging disability resulting from lower back pain, ulcers, and gout. Applications, Appellant’s App., Transcript at 61, 88. After his applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, Claimant requested and received a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge (AU). The hearing resulted in a denial, and the Appeals Council denied Claimant’s request for review. Action of Appeals Council, id. at 5. Claimant filed suit in district court. After a hearing, the district court remanded the case to the Appeals Council for consideration of Claimant’s nonexertional limitations in connection with the AU’s previous determination that Claimant could perform light work. Journal Entry, Appellant’s App. at tab 12. The Appeals Council remanded the ease to the AU, and a supplemental hearing was held.
The Secretary has established a five-step evaluation process pursuant to the Social Security Act for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir.1988) (describing five steps in detail). In this case, the AU reached the fifth step of the pertinent analysis, assuming that Claimant could not perform his past relevant work. Recommended Decision, Appellant’s App., Transcript at 186. The AU concluded that, although Claimant’s nonexertional impairments limited the range of light work he could perform, Claimant retained the functional capacity to perform certain light and sedentary jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. The AU’s recommended decision denied Claimant benefits; the Appeals Council adopted the AU’s recommended decision. Decision, id. at 180.
The Appeals Council then agreed to consider additional evidence in the case. Its subsequent decision, discussing the additional evidence, also denied Claimant benefits. Decision, id. at 282. That decision, adopting the previous Appeals Council decision, which in turn adopted the AU’s recommended decision, became the final decision of the Secretary for purposes of review. See Williams, 844 F.2d at 749.
On appeal, Claimant argues that the Secretary failed to give the proper weight to the opinions of Claimant’s treating physicians, failed to properly analyze evidence of Claimant’s pain and depression, and failed to consider the combined effect of Claimant’s impairments. Judicial review of the Secretary’s determination that Claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is limited; our only function is to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s decision and whether the Secretary applied the cor[1498]*1498rect legal standards. See Bernal v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir.1988). The Secretary’s findings stand if they are supported by “ ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 414 (10th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420-1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)).
I
Claimant first argues that the AU and the Appeals Council, in evaluating Claimant’s physical impairments, improperly rejected the opinions of Dr. Schnelle and Dr. Summerhouse, two treating physicians. Dr. Schnelle opined that Claimant “is currently unable to work” because of back problems, Letter of January 13, 1987, Appellant’s App., Transcript at 177, and Dr. Summerhouse, in a letter considered by the Appeals Council, stated that Claimant’s osteoarthritis would preclude “all but sedentary work,” Letter of August 19, 1988, id. at 287.2 In reaching his conclusions, the AU instead chose to rely on the report of Dr. Jarrott, as supported by reports from Doctors Sutton and Sifford, all examining physicians.
Claimant asserts that Dr. Jarrott’s report did not consider Claimant’s complaint of pain, and notes that Dr. Jarrott saw Claimant for only fifteen minutes and did not test numerous capabilities or test capabilities repetitively. Claimant points to differences between the diagnoses of Dr. Sutton and Dr. Jarrott which could be interpreted to support Claimant’s allegations. Finally, Claimant says that Dr. Sifford’s report is entitled to no weight because he “is well known to the Federal District Court in Kansas for his biased evaluations.” Despite Claimant’s views of these physicians and their evaluations, his criticisms do not contradict the specific and legitimate reasons the AU gave for rejecting Dr. Schnelle’s and Dr. Summerhouse’s opinions of Claimant’s disability.
The AU rejected Dr. Schnelle’s opinion that Claimant was disabled because Dr. Schnelle’s conclusion was not supported by specific findings and his report was “not as comprehensive” as the reports of the examining physicians. Recommended Decision, id. at 185. The Appeals Council noted that Dr. Summerhouse’s letter “contained essentially the same statements regarding the claimant’s physical condition” as his previous reports. Decision, id. at 283. The AU rejected Dr. Summerhouse’s previous diagnoses because his latest report did not mention the lumbosacral spine, and because Dr. Jarrott and Dr. Sutton are orthopedic specialists and their evaluations included extensive testing. Recommended Decision, id. at 185.
Claimant wants us to reweigh the evidence; this we cannot do. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.1991). In evaluating Claimant’s physical impairments, the AU and Appeals Council expressed specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of Claimant’s treating physicians. Our review of the record convinces us that those reasons are not in error. See Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir.1990).
II
In considéring Claimant’s contentions of pain, the AU determined that, while Claimant may have increased intermittent pain, his allegations of disabling pain were not credible. Recommended Decision, Appellant’s App., Transcript at 186. Claimant contends that the AU improperly analyzed his pain because, although the AU said he considered all of the evidence, he relied solely on objective, medical findings to support his conclusion. As Claimant points out, the AU is required, in assessing credibility, to consider all evidence, both objective and subjective. See Williams, 844 F.2d at 753. The AU stated that he considered all of the evidence; his [1499]*1499reliance on medical findings does not allow us to assume otherwise.
■ Claimant asserts that the AU’s reliance on Dr. Jarrott’s report is misplaced because Dr. Jarrott did not consider Claimant’s subjective complaints. Dr. Jarrott’s report recites Claimant’s alleged symptoms and comments about the lack of physical findings to support those complaints. Letter of June 16, 1988, Appellant’s App., Transcript at 274. In light of this conclusion, we cannot say Dr. Jarrott did not consider Claimant’s allegations of pain. Additionally, the AU did not rely solely on Dr. Jarrott’s report to support his conclusion. We cannot reweigh the evidence.
Claimant alleged fatigue, which claim the AU credited in part, but on the whole found not credible: “I have concluded that even though there may be some fatigue present, it is not of disabling proportions.” Recommended Decision, id. at 186. Claimant argues that the record is undisputed that he suffers from fatigue. The AU noted an inconsistency between Claimant’s allegations that he slept very little at night and his claim that he rested only one hour during the day. Id. The AU is entitled to rely on objective evidence in the record, such as Claimant’s recount of his daily activities, in making his assess-' ment. Credibility is the province of the AU. Williams, 844 F.2d at 755. No medical evidence supports Claimant’s allegations of fatigue; his testimony alone cannot establish a nonexertional impairment. See Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (subjective complaints alone insufficient to establish disabling pain). Substantial evidence supports the AU’s determination that Claimant’s allegations of fatigue are not credible to the extent alleged.
Claimant complains that the AU ignored positive evidence of his credibility. Again, Claimant wants this court to reweigh the evidence. Following our review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the AU’s credibility determinations, for the reasons stated in his opinion.
Ill
Claimant contends the AU. improperly analyzed evidence of his mental impairments, namely depression and alcohol problems, and that the Appeals Council erred in rejecting the opinions of Dr. Summerhouse and Dr. Schell. Dr. Summerhouse’s progress notes mention depression, but the AU chose to rely on the report of an examining psychiatrist, Dr. Romalis, in support of his conclusion that Claimant’s depression was minimal and reactive, and did not constitute a severe mental impairment. The evidence presented to the Appeals Council subsequent to the AU’s decision included Dr. Summerhouse’s August 19,1988 letter, opining that Claimant’s psychological impairment in combination with his osteoarthritis “would very well [disable him] even from sedentary work.” Letter, Appellant’s App., Transcript at 287. Additionally, Claimant was tested by a psychologist, Dr. Schell, whose forty-page report indicated a diagnosis of Major Depression. Psychological Evaluation, id. at 299. Claimant’s medical records, including Dr. Schell’s report, were then examined by Dr. Myers, a consulting psychiatrist. Dr. Myers opined that Dr. Schell’s report “attempts to overwhelm by its sheer volume and verbiage,” and concluded that the diagnosis was not supported by the record. Memorandum, id. at 830. Based on Dr. Myers’ report, the Appeals Council rejected Dr. Schell’s report. The Council rejected Dr. Summerhouse’s opinion because it was inconsistent with his previous progress notes indicating that Claimant’s depression was improving and alcohol was no longer a problem, and because Dr. Summerhouse is not a psychiatrist. Decision, id. at 283.
Claimant argues: 1) Dr. Summerhouse is competent to diagnose Claimant’s mental impairments, 2) Dr. Romalis’ report should not be relied on because he saw Claimant only once, 3) Dr. Romalis’ findings do not contradict Dr. Summerhouse’s diagnosis of depression because Dr. Romalis also noted depression, and therefore the difference is “a matter of degree,” 4) Dr. Romalis’ report should not be relied on because he did not test Claimant as Dr. Schell did, and 5) [1500]*1500Dr. Myers’ report should not be relied on to reject Dr. Schell’s conclusions because Dr. Myers never saw Claimant and didn’t support his criticisms of Dr. Schell’s report with specifics.
In essence, Claimant again urges us to re weigh the evidence. Our review of the record, however, convinces us that however differently we might have weighed the. evidence, both the AU and Appeals Council gave specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Summerhouse and Dr. Schell with regards to Claimant’s alleged mental impairments. Further, substantial evidence supports the AU’s determination that Claimant suffers no severe mental impairment.
IV
Claimant’s only legal challenge is his contention that the AU failed to consider his nonexertional limitations, his pain and mental impairments, in combination with his physical complaints, as required by Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir.1987). Although the AU’s opinion is not a model of clarity on this point, we cannot agree. The district court remanded the case to the AU for consideration of Claimant’s nonex-ertional limitations in conjunction with his physical impairments. Journal Entry, Appellant’s App. at tab 12. The AU’s opinion discusses each of Claimant’s nonexertional limitations in turn, including his allegations of pain and depression. The AU then states: “I conclude, based on all the evidence, that the claimant retains a limited, light, residual functional capacity and a fairly wide sedentary capacity.” Recommended Decision, Appellant’s App., Transcript at 186. We conclude from this statement that the AU considered all of Claimant’s impairments in combination in reaching his result. See Renner v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (AU need not precisely enunciate each de-cisional step).
In sum, the vast majority of Claimant’s arguments go to the weight of the evidence. Claimant argues the strength of the evidence in his favor and seeks to discredit the evidence the AU relied on, as well as the credentials of the physicians providing that evidence. However, our limited scope of review precludes this court from reweighing the evidence or substituting our judgment for that of the Secretary. Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir.1991). As long as substantial evidence supports the AU’s determination, the Secretary’s decision stands. See Lankford v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 301, 305 (6th Cir.1991) (per curiam).
We have considered the remainder of Claimant’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Following our careful review of the entire record on appeal, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the decision of the Secretary that Claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of. Kansas is AFFIRMED.