Clayton v. State
This text of 493 S.W.2d 176 (Clayton v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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OPINION
Appellant was convicted upon his pleas of guilty in two cases of robbery by assault. His punishment was assessed at twenty (20) years in each case.
The records reflect that appellant was taken from the Texas Department of Corrections to stand trial in these cases.
Appellant waived a jury trial and entered a plea of guilty of robbery in each case. The two cases were tried together. Appellant’s sole contention is that the court accepted appellant’s pleas of guilty without determining that such pleas complied with Article 26.13, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.
The record reflects that before the pleas were accepted, the following colloquy took place between the court and appellant:
“THE COURT: For robbery by assault you can still get life or any term of years not less than five. Now you wish at this time for the Court to hear both cases and you want to waive a jury, plead guilty in both cases before the Court, is that correct ?
“DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Now you do this freely and voluntarily, nobody has forced you or threatened you or scared you or beat you up or made you plead guilty, have they?
“DEFENDANT: No, sir.
“THE COURT: You are doing it of your own free will and accord? It is your decision?
“DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: All right, sir. And you are pleading guilty now in each case because you are guilty and for no other reason?
“DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: And your attorney, Mr. Bruder, has explained all of your rights to you and you have gone over these time and again and you know what you are doing and you understand what we are doing?
“DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I understand.
“THE COURT: The Court will accept the plea in both cases and the cases will proceed.”
[178]*178The appellant made judicial confessions in each case. He testified that he and his counsel had discussed his cases on numerous occasions, and after such discussions, he decided to enter pleas of guilty, and that his pleas were not the result of anybody having threatened him or offered any hope of probation or parole or anything like that.
Appellant in his brief contends that the court, although admonishing appellant regarding the voluntariness of his plea by speaking of force, threats, fright and bodily harm, made no inquiry of persuasion or delusive hope of pardon, under Article 26.-13, supra. He relies on our holding in Rogers v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 42, and cases there cited.
The Rogers case was reversed on the basis of Ex parte Battenfield, Tex.Cr.App., 466 S.W.2d 569, where the conviction was set aside because the mandatory provision of Article 26.13, supra, concerning the range of punishment was not followed. The Court also noted there that the court did not adequately determine the plea of guilty was “uninfluenced by any consideration of fear, or by any persuasion or delusive hope of pardon. . . . ”
The problem of complying with Article 26.13, supra, has been before the Court many times and the Court has been divided as to what constitutes compliance with Article 26.13, supra. In the present cases, the court determined from the appellant that he was entering the pleas freely and voluntarily, that he was not forced or threatened to do so. A majority of the Court has decided in cases such as these that the Article was complied with. See Mitchell v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 174 (1973), and the cases cited. See also Espinosa v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 172 (1973).
In addition, the record in these cases shows that the court ascertained from the attorney of appellant that his rights had been explained to him. The attorney during the trial asked the appellant if he had been offered any hope of probation, parole or anything like that and the appellant replied no. This is additional evidence that the pleas were voluntarily made. We hold that there was a sufficient compliance with Article 26.13, supra.
No reversible error being shown, the judgments are affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
493 S.W.2d 176, 1973 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2402, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clayton-v-state-texcrimapp-1973.