Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. E. MacHlett & Son

36 F.2d 574
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit·Decided December 21, 1929·No. 137·Published·Cited by 28 cases

Opinions

L. HAND, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is a sequel of the decision of this court upon another occasion [Claude Neon Lights v. E. Machlett & Son, 27 F.(2d) 702], in which the patent was held valid and infringed by the electrode there in suit. The general nature of the invention and its scope we then considered at length, and it is not necessary to repeat what we said. The supplemental bill was filed to bring within the claims another sort of electrode, whose infringement we then declined to consider. It consists of an iron cathode whose area is less than one half that of the minimum which the claims prescribe, and which nobody asserts would alone infringe. Indeed it would not be operative at all, except that the defendant supplements its action by depositing upon the walls of the tube near the cathode a thin layer, or “mirror,” of cassium, an alkaline metal. For some reason which is not altogether understood, when the current excites the neon a part of the caesium vaporizes and invades it near the cathode, increasing the conductivity of either the gas in the “dark space,” or the surface of the cathode. This necessarily decreases the fall in potential and prevents the cathode from vaporizing, imprisoning atoms of neon with its particles upon the walls of the tube and so exhausting the gasi The result is coneededly the same in that the tube retains its luminosity, and this because the cathode is not disintegrated; the question is whether the cathode and “mirror” is the equivalent of a cathode whose area is 1.5 square decimeters for eaeh ampere of current used.

The plaintiff recognizes that on any theory of equivalents, however broad, it must show that all the elements of the claim are embodied in the infringement, but it argues that the invention, broadly construed, is to avoid the occlusion of the gas through the vaporization of the cathode, which takes place only because of the cathode drop. That the reduction of this drop is the heart of the invention, and therefore although the CEesium mirror is another means of securing the result, it is substantially the same as that disclosed. That the defendant therefore necessarily uses the “invention, because Claude alone disclosed that anything which reduces the drop preserves the gas.

However far-reaching Claude’s invention might have been, we should have some pause in holding that the claims could be stretched so far. The doctrine of equivalents, though well settled for many years, is anomalous, if the claim is measured only by its words, and for this reason we once went so far as to say that it means no more than that the language of claims shall be generously construed. Motion Pictures Co. v. Independent Co., 200 F. 411 (C. C. A. 2). Such a limitation is however irreconcilable with those extremely numerous decisions which have extended a elaim to structures which by no possibility it could cover, judged by any tenable canons of documentary interpretation. Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330, 343, 14 L. Ed. 717; Blake v. Robertson, 94 U. S. 728, 24 L. Ed. 245; Clough v. Gilbert & B. Mfg. Co., 106 U. S. 166, 1 S. Ct. 188, 27 L. Ed. 134; Royer v. Schultz Belting Co., 135 U. S. 319, 10 S. Ct. 833, 34 L. Ed. 214; Hoyt v. Horne, 145 U. S. 302, 12 S. Ct. 922, 36 L. Ed. 713; Reece Button-Hole Mach. Co. v. Globe Button-Hole Mach. Co., 61 F. 958 (C. C. A. 1); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co., 69 F. 371 (C. C. A. 6); McSherry Mfg. Co. v. Dowagiac Mfg. Co., 101 F. 716 (C. C. A. 6). In Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 343, 14 L. Ed. 717 (1853), the Supreme Court, apparently for the first time, laid down the doctrine over a strong dissent, and based it upon the theory that the elaim was not intended to be verbally definitive, but to cover the “invention” which should, to some extent anyway, be gathered from the disclosure at large.

It is plain that such latitude violates in theory the underlying and necessary principle that the disclosure is open to the public save as the elaim forbids, and that it is the elaim and that alone which measures the monopoly. Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phœnix Iron Co., 95 U. S. 274, 278, 24 L. Ed. 344; Yale Lock Co. v. Greenleaf, 117 U. S. 554, 559, 6 S. Ct. 846, 29 L. Ed. 952; White v. Dunbar, 119 U. S. 47, 52, 7 S. Ct. 72, 30 L. Ed. 303; McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419, 424, 12 S. Ct. 76, 35 L. Ed. 800; Minerals Separation v. Butte, etc., Co., 250 U. S. 336, 350, 39 S. Ct. 496, 63 L. Ed. 1019. The vacillation in the decisions is a necessary consequence of this inconsistency in theory, somewhat analogous to the similar inconsistency which pervades reissues and amendments. It is the claim which singles out from [576]*576the complex disclosed those elements which constitute the “invention,” and substantially the whole work of the Patent Office lies in determining, not whether the disclosure is new because all of it never is, but whether the claims proposed are. Strictly the disclosure should be used therefore only as the setting of the claims and to find what the words employed really mean. Otherwise courts would have to assume the duties of the office afresh and compose such claims as the prior art might have allowed, had the patentee been foresighted enough to include all possible variants of his meaning. Such a result the decisions have repeatedly repudiated, and it would result in an intolerable burden upon the public, which would be charged not only with a knowledge of the prior art at the time of the application and often earlier, but with a right conclusion as to how much room was left for invention, seldom an easy question.

On the one hand, therefore, the claim is not to be taken at its face — however freely construed — but its elements may be treated as examples of a class which may be extended more or less broadly as the disclosure warrants, the prior art permits, and the originality of the discovery makes desirable. On the other, it is not to be ignored as a guide in ascertaining those elements of the disclosure which constitute the “invention,” and without which there could be no patent at all. It is obviously impossible to set any theoretic limits to such a doctrine, which indeed its origin forbids, since it is in miserieordiam to relieve those who have failed to express their complete meaning. Somewhat the same process is indeed inherent in the interpretation of any verbal expression, and perhaps the best that can be said is that in the case of patent claims much greater liberties are taken than would be allowed elsewhere. Eaeh case is inevitably a matter of degree, as so often happens, and other decisions have little or no value. The usual ritual, which is so often repeated and which has so little meaning, that the same result must follow by substantially the same means, does not help much in application; it is no more than a way of stating the problem.

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Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. E. MacHlett & Son, 36 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1929).

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