Clark v. Commissioner

1958 T.C. Memo. 10, 17 T.C.M. 39, 1958 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 223
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJanuary 28, 1958
DocketDocket No. 60936.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1958 T.C. Memo. 10 (Clark v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clark v. Commissioner, 1958 T.C. Memo. 10, 17 T.C.M. 39, 1958 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 223 (tax 1958).

Opinion

Edwin M. Clark, Jr., and Kate B. Clark v. Commissioner.
Clark v. Commissioner
Docket No. 60936.
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1958-10; 1958 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 223; 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 39; T.C.M. (RIA) 58010;
January 28, 1958

*223 Petitioner acquired from a corporation, in 1949 and 1951, the ownership of two small-loan "brokerage" offices, including one of which he had been the office manager. In connection with such transfers, he executed and delivered to the corporation two long-term installment promissory notes, together with agreements written on the backs thereof which provided in part that it was mutually agreed between the "seller" and "buyer" that such notes constituted payment for the purchase price of the businesses of said offices, including all rights then vested in the "seller"; and that the "buyer" might sell his "equity" at any time, if the "seller" had no reasonable objection to such sale. Thereafter, petitioner operated the businesses, as sole proprietor, at the location and under the same trade name which the seller had been using. The seller, in accordance with supplemental oral arrangements, thereafter acted for the petitioner as a finder of loanable funds, and as a guarantor of borrowers' loans. Petitioner contends that the installment payments made by him during the taxable years on the above-mentioned promissory notes were for services performed for him by the corporation, and were not*224 payments on the purchase prices of the properties; and that such payments constitute deductible business expenses, for income tax purposes.

Held, that the character of the transactions and the purpose of the promissory notes depend principally upon the intent of the parties, at the time when the agreements and notes were executed and delivered; that such intent must be determined from an examination and the weighing of all relevant facts and surrounding circumstances; and that the mutual written agreements of the parties, that the notes were delivered as the purchase price of the going businesses, are to be given greater weight in determining such intent than the contrary contentions and conclusions presented by the petitioner at the trial several years later, without substantiation by any documentary evidence of record.

Held, further, that, since the petitioner, under the terms of the agreements, acquired not only possession and use of properties but also a transferable "equity" therein, the payments under such agreements are to be regarded as deferred installments on the purchase price of the properties.

Held, further, that such installment payments made by petitioner during*225 the taxable years involved do not qualify as deductible business expenses under section 23(a)(1)(A) of the 1939 Code.

James L. Davis, Jr., Esq., First Federal Savings Building, Jackson, Miss., for the petitioners. Homer F. Benson, Esq., for the respondent.

PIERCE

Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion

PIERCE, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners' income tax (and self-employment tax) for the calendar years 1951, 1952 and 1953 in the amounts of $385.74, $642.82 and $798, respectively.

Several of the adjustments set forth in the notice of deficiency were not challenged by petitioners. The sole issue for decision is whether certain installment payments made by petitioner Edwin M. Clark, Jr., during the taxable years involved, pursuant to the terms of two promissory notes which he delivered to Tower Underwriters, Inc. in 1949 and 1951 qualify as deductible business expenses, incurred during the taxable years in carrying on a small-loan "brokerage" business; or whether these payments represent nondeductible installments on the purchase price of two such brokerage businesses, which petitioner acquired from said corporation at the time of delivery*226 of said notes.

Findings of Fact

The petitioners, Edwin M. Clark, Jr. and Kate B. Clark, are husband and wife residing in Jackson, Mississippi. For each of the taxable years involved, they filed a joint income tax return with the collector or district director of internal revenue at Jackson, Mississippi.

Prior to June 1, 1949, petitioner Edwin M. Clark, Jr. (herein called the "petitioner") was employed by Tower Underwriters, Inc., a Mississippi corporation, as office manager of one of about 15 so-called small-loan "brokerage" offices which said corporation operated in the State of Mississippi. Two of these brokerage offices were located in the city of Jackson. The one that petitioner managed, which was the largest of all the offices, was operated under the name of Tower Loan Brokers, and was located on South State Street in Jackson., and the other Jackson office was operated under the name of Dollar Brokers, and was located on South President Street. Tower Underwriters had engaged in such business since the year 1940. Its organizer, principal stockholder, president and executive manager was Wyatt Robinson. Petitioner had been employed by the corporation since the end of the year*227 1947; and, in addition to being manager of the State Street office, was also a member of the corporation's board of directors.

Small-loan "brokerage" offices, such as those here involved, are more or less unique to the State of Mississippi. 1 That state, during the years involved, had no small loan law; and various persons who desired to engage in the business of making small loans were unwilling to deal directly with borrowers, because they considered that the legal rates of interest permitted to be charged in Mississippi on small loans were too low to justify the risks involved; because the penalties provided by the Mississippi usury statutes 2 for charging higher rates of interest were severe; and also because both the state and many of the municipalities thereof imposed privilege taxes of substantial amount on persons who engaged in the business of loaning money.

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Bluebook (online)
1958 T.C. Memo. 10, 17 T.C.M. 39, 1958 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 223, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clark-v-commissioner-tax-1958.