Clark v. Campbell

341 F. Supp. 171, 29 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 574, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15665
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 7, 1972
DocketCA 3-3472-C
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 341 F. Supp. 171 (Clark v. Campbell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171, 29 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 574, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15665 (N.D. Tex. 1972).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM M. TAYLOR, Jr., District Judge.

This is an action seeking to enjoin the collection of federal income taxes determined by Ellis Campbell, District Director of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), to be due for the period January 1, 1969, through June 30, 1969.

On June 11, 1969, a search warrant was obtained by Eldrin Malone, Special Agent for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, to search the premises located at 4205 and 4207 Oakland Avenue, Dallas, Texas, on the grounds that narcotics and drugs were being concealed therein. Pursuant to the search warrant, officers of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Dallas County Sheriff’s Department, and City of Dallas Police Department searched the designated premises, arresting Elzie Clark and seizing a substantial amount of personal property belonging to Plaintiffs Clark and Stovall. The property was taken and stored in the Sheriff's storeroom.

A few days later Defendant Campbell, by letter dated July 14, 1969, notified Clark that his taxable year was immediately terminated pursuant to Section 6851 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code and that income taxes for that period were due and payable. The letter demanded prompt payment of taxes due.

Subsequently, the IRS served notices of levy on the Mercantile National Bank of Dallas, Liberty National Bank of Dallas, Sheriff’s Department of Dallas County, and Mr. Speer, Regional Director of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, informing them that Clark owed taxes in the sum of $104,697.20 requesting that all monies and property held in Clark’s name should be applied as payment on the unpaid taxes.

On the following dates the IRS made collections which were applied to the tax liability of Clark:

July 16, 1969 $28,084.51
July 29, 1969 4,413.03
Aug. 21, 1969 9,001.00
Aug. 27, 1969 20,500.00

Notices of levy were also posted July 15, 1969, on tracts of real estate allegedly owned by Clark.

Plaintiffs instituted this action on November 10, 1969, seeking to enjoin the collection of taxes and to remove clouds on title to real property.

After the filing of this suit, the District Director presented his report to Elzie Clark which reflected an over-assessment in taxes of $53,701.55.

Jurisdiction for this suit is based on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1340 and Section 6213 of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6213. Plaintiff relies primarily on Section 6213 which states in pertinent part:

“Within 90 days . . . after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed . . . the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the de *173 ficiency. Except as otherwise provided in section 6861 no assessment of a deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by subtitle A or B and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such 90-day period .... notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421(a), the making of such assessment or the beginning of such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court.” (Emphasis added)

Plaintiff’s first contention is that the Director’s termination of Clark’s taxable year was done at the request of law enforcement officers for the purpose of harassing and punishing Clark. He also challenges the facts upon which the Director made his findings. Plaintiff seeks to fall within the decisions in Rinieri v. Scanlon, 254 F.Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y.1966) and United States v. Bonaguro, 294 F.Supp. 750 (E.D.N.Y.1968) in which both courts stated that the IRS had not made findings to protect a revenue interest but were guilty of making a “colorable use of forms” at the request of another agency. The Court is not persuaded by the argument of Plaintiff’s counsel and chooses to adhere to the general rule that courts will not inquire into the circumstances surrounding the Director’s determination of jeopardy. Lloyd v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1957). The mere fact that Clark has a long list of arrests does not establish that any actions taken by the IRS were for purposes other than protection of revenue interest. It is common procedure for the IRS to be notified when large quantities of goods thought to be stolen are seized. In these cases the IRS should be notified so that they can determine whether a jeopardy situation exists.

The Plaintiff’s next contention is that in a case involving a jeopardy assessment a deficiency notice must be sent pursuant to Section 6861 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6861. Plaintiff contends that Section 6851, which has been relied on in previous cases by the Government, does not authorize an assessment of taxes. The importance of a deficiency notice being sent lies in the fact that it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the Tax Court for a redetermination of taxes assessed. Mason v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 210 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1954). Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to a “ticket” to the Tax Court rather than seek a redetermination in a tax refund suit.

The IRS’s position in this case is that neither Section 6851 nor 6861 provide the authority to make an assessment for a short-term year but rather assert that Section 6201 enables them to make an assessment. The IRS denies Clark is entitled to a deficiency letter. They argue that Plaintiff’s only available remedy is by means of a refund suit.

Section 7421 of the Internal Revenue Code is advanced by the Government as a jurisdictional bar to hearing and rendering a decision in this case. Section 7421 provides in part:

“Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), and 7426(a) and (b) (1), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.” 26 U.S.C.A. 7421(a).

This section would constitute a bar if the IRS is correct in maintaining that 6201(a) confers assessment power in a jeopardy case involving a short taxable year. Section 6201(a) provides that:

“The Secretary or his delegate is authorized and required to make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes (including interest, additional amounts, additions to the tax, and assessable penalties) imposed by this title, or accruing under any former internal revenue law, which *174 have not been duly paid by stamp at the time and in the manner provided by law.” 26 U.S.C.A. 6201.

Plaintiff seeks to establish Section 6861 1 as the proper statute authorizing an assessment for a taxable year, terminated pursuant to Section 6851. Plaintiff relies primarily on the ease of Schreck v.

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Clark v. Campbell
501 F.2d 108 (Fifth Circuit, 1974)
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376 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Massachusetts, 1974)
Jones v. Commissioner
62 T.C. 1 (U.S. Tax Court, 1974)
Schreck v. United States
375 F. Supp. 742 (D. Maryland, 1973)
Williams v. United States
373 F. Supp. 71 (D. Nevada, 1973)
Laing v. United States
364 F. Supp. 469 (D. Vermont, 1973)
Musso v. Commissioner
1973 T.C. Memo. 181 (U.S. Tax Court, 1973)
Riley v. Commissioner
1973 T.C. Memo. 180 (U.S. Tax Court, 1973)
Sanzogno v. Commissioner
60 T.C. No. 39 (U.S. Tax Court, 1973)
Irving v. Gray
479 F.2d 20 (Second Circuit, 1973)
Lisner v. McCanless
356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Arizona, 1973)
Rambo v. United States
353 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Kentucky, 1972)

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Bluebook (online)
341 F. Supp. 171, 29 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 574, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15665, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clark-v-campbell-txnd-1972.