Acree v. County Board of Education

301 F. Supp. 1285, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10008
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedJuly 14, 1969
DocketCiv. A. No. 1179
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 301 F. Supp. 1285 (Acree v. County Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Acree v. County Board of Education, 301 F. Supp. 1285, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10008 (S.D. Ga. 1969).

Opinion

SECOND ORDER OF COURT

LAWRENCE, Chief Judge.

On December 27, 1968, 294 F.Supp. 1034, I handed down an order in which I ruled that the freedom of choice plan now in existence in Richmond County is constitutionally unacceptable. I held that a zoning plan should be put into effect. I did not rule out freedom of choice altogether but said that the Court “would give consideration to a plan formulated by the Board which combines automatic assignment of pupils within designated geographical zones and a limited freedom of choice of schools.”

[1286]*1286The Order fixed a time schedule for presentation of a new plan by the Board of Education as follows:

“March 1, 1969. Filing of a progress report in connection with the presentation of the proposed plan.
April 1, 1969. Presentation of proposed attendance zones or areas (along with criteria), taking into effect the changes in zones that will necessarily accompany the completion of certain new schools by the 1970 school year.
May 1, 1969. Presentation to the Court of the proposed plan covering the school years 1969-70 and 1970-’71. The plan will be in line with the directions and rulings in this Order.
June 1, 1969. Approval by the Court of a new plan for desegregation of the Richmond County schools.”

The Board generally complied with this schedule. The Superintendent of Schools, Roy E. Rollins, prepared at its direction, proposed geographic attendance zones for each school. The Board informally approved same.

Last May counsel for the plaintiffs asked leave to file objections at some date after June 1st. This request I granted. At the earliest opportunity a hearing was held by me at Augusta. This was on June 16th. Plaintiffs presented their objections and the School Board defended the plan. Plaintiffs’ attorney rejects the proposed plan in toto. He contends that the evidence “showed conclusively that the Board has made little effort to dismantle the segregated system in Richmond County. Mr. Rollins testified that he has no idea of how many children are in the proposed zones, he left freedom of choice in three (3) areas where black and white schools are almost adjacent.” Plaintiffs further maintain that principals and faculties are still assigned to schools on a segregated basis.

In my December 27, 1968 Order I stated: “Zones must, of course be drawn without an eye to racial consequence except to promote desegregation and not to perpetuate segregation. Zoning will be of primary significance in any new plan presented by the Board.”

No transcript of the evidence at the hearing on June 16, 1969 was made. As I recall the testimony, Mr. Rollins said that the basic criteria used were natural boundaries, proximity of pupils to schools., .and , inaximum utilization of school buildings.

The decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit say that geographic zones are acceptable only if they tend to disestablish rather than reinforce the dual system of segregated schools. Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 393 F.2d 690; United States of America v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School District, 406 F.2d 1086 (Feb. 4, 1969); Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District, 409 F.2d 682. A school board must strive for promotion of desegregation and “conscious effort should be made to move boundary lines and change feeder patterns which tend to preserve segregation.” See 393 F.2d at 694.1

In Adams v. Mathews, 403 F.2d 181, the Court of Appeals of this Circuit said: “If in a school district there are still all-Negro schools or only a small fraction of Negroes enrolled in white schools or no substantial integration of faculties and school activities then, as a matter of law, the existing plan fails to meet constitutional standards as established in Green.” Further, the duty of a Board to desegregate a dual school system includes the constitutional obligation to take affirmative action to redistribute and assign faculties and staff members, United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. [1287]*1287225, 89 S.Ct. 1670, 23 L.Ed.2d 263 (June 2, 1969) 2; United States v. Board of Education of City of Bessemer, 396 F.2d 44; Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 393 F.2d 690; United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836; Aff’d. en banc 380 F.2d 385.

The school desegregation mandates of the Fifth Circuit, as I said in a recent case, beat out, “in cicadian and circadian refrain * * * a tom-tom ostinato of ‘affirmative duty,' ‘unitary, nonracial system,’ ‘failure of freedom of choice,’ ‘wiped out root and branch,’ ‘meaningful and immediate progress,’ ‘not tomorrow but now.’ ” In one of its recent cases that Court has said, “As a matter of law, there must be student desegregation now, not 10 per cent in 1968-69, 20 per cent in 1969-70, and so on until desegregation eventually is effected.” United States v. Choctaw County Board of Education, June 26, 1969.

What the attendance zones will accomplish in bringing about greater racial mixing of the school population is uncertain. At the June hearing the Superintendent of Schools estimated that it will produce a 50:% increase which would raise the total number of pupils attending schools in which another race predominates to something over 1500 out of a total enrollment of about 36,500 pupils.

While the Board proceeded in good faith, it did not approach geographical zoning with the purpose of producing greater integration. This a Board must do. In United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School District, supra, it was held that the Yazoo River, “the most natural geographic zone imaginable,” could not be used as a school boundary line since it lacks “the potential of promoting desegregation because it covers an all-white residential section.”

Mr. Rollins anticipates that under the proposed zoning Negroes will possibly attend every school in the system next year except James L. Fleming Elementary. In the Order handed down last December I suggested that limited freedom of choice would be considered where there were white and Negro schools in a single zone. (Since that time there has been more judicial erosion of the choice concept and its use in any case is constitutionally precarious). The Board proposes freedom of choice schools in three zones. In one of them there are at present two junior high schools (Tubman and Langford) each of which is now predominantly white. Richmond Academy and Tutt High are located in the same zone. The former is predominantly white; the latter entirely colored.

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Related

Acree v. Drummond
336 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D. Georgia, 1972)
Clark v. Campbell
341 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Texas, 1972)
Stevenson v. Wheeler County Board of Education
306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Georgia, 1969)

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Bluebook (online)
301 F. Supp. 1285, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10008, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/acree-v-county-board-of-education-gasd-1969.