Hill, J.
For a history of the prior “Cowlitz” litigation see State of Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Comm. (1953), 207 F. (2d) 391 (C. A. 9th); Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1953), 43 Wn. (2d) 468, 262 P. (2d) 214; Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1957), 49 Wn. (2d) 781, 307 P. (2d) 567; and Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1958), 357 U. S. 320, 2 L. Ed. (2d) 1345, 78 S. Ct. 1209.
Suffice it to say that at this point the City of Tacoma, a municipal corporation armed with a license issued November 28, 1951, by the Federal Power Commission which authorized it to build two dams1 on the Cowlitz River2, has proceeded to erect one of the dams and is ready to proceed with the other in violation of the expressed desires of a considerable segment of the people of the state of Washington3, the will of the legislature4, and the will of the people of the state5, that no dams be built on that river more than [68]*6825 feet in height. Ironically enough, the City of Tacoma did not go into the federal courts to secure a determination6 that its authority to proceed with the dams on the Cowlitz River, under its license from the Federal Power Commission, was unaffected by Initiative No. 25 with its prohibition of any person, including municipal corporations, from building dams more than 25 feet in height. Instead it invoked the jurisdiction of the courts of the state, whose public policy it had persistently flouted, to again give assurance to prospective bond purchasers7 that the city is em[69]*69powered by its license from the Federal Power Commission to disregard the law of this state. The right of the city to maintain the action is unquestioned.
The court in the first Cowlitz case8, recognized that the federal government’s constitutional authority to regulate commerce and navigation gave it the right — acting through the Federal Power Commission — to issue a license to the City of Tacoma to construct dams which would be in excess of 25 feet in height (the limit imposed by the state in the exercise of its police power to preserve the fishery resources of the state).
Implicit in both the first and second9 Cowlitz cases is the holding that since the City of Tacoma was a municipality empowered to construct, maintain, and operate power facilities10, and had a license from the Federal Power Commission empowering it to construct the Mossyrock and May-field dams on the Cowlitz River, the state — even by the exercise of its police power — could not prevent the building of such dams.
The trial court, in the present case, very ably spelled this all out again in its findings, conclusions of law, and judgment.
The defendant taxpayers, the intervenor State of Washington, and the other intervening taxpayers all appeal.
The appellants now concede the federal government’s “paramount” power to determine the height of dams, but take the position on this appeal that the city is a “creature” of the state, hence subject to its control; and the state, by adopting Initiative No. 25 (see footnote 5), has divested the city of its right to proceed to build the dams.
[70]*70This court had proceeded on a variation of that theory (and, if we may say so, a much more logical one) in the second Cowlitz case, in which we held that the city had no power to condemn property, except such as the legislature granted to it; and that it had been granted no power to condemn state property, already dedicated to a public use; in short, that the “creature” could not condemn the “creator’s” property, when the “creator” was using it for a public purpose, i.e., a fish hatchery.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed this court11, without meeting that issue, by saying that the state and its citizens were foreclosed by the judgment in the Court of Appeals12 from litigating further the power and the authority of the City of Tacoma to proceed under its Federal Power Commission license to build the dams. The Supreme Court quoted the following language from the Court of Appeals decision12,
“ ‘. . . we conclude [13] that the state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license or bar the licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a navigable stream since the stream is under the dominion of the United States. . . . ’ ”
We summarized the situation, with painful accuracy, when — following the reversal and remand — we entered a judgment in the second Cowlitz case, which read in part as follows:
“1. The United States has exclusive and paramount jurisdiction over navigable waters, under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, and, therefore, any State laws are inapplicable to the Mayfield and Mossyrock [Cow-litz dams] Hydroelectric Project insofar as the same conflict with the provisions of the Federal Power Act or the terms and conditions of the appellant’s license for said project, or [71]*71which would enable the State of Washington or any State official thereof to exercise a veto over said project, . . . ” (Italics ours.)
We would have thought that this language was sufficiently explicit to answer the present question for bond counsel, and, in the words of the United States Supreme Court in reversing this court, that attacks on the right of the City of Tacoma to proceed with the construction of these dams were “impermissible collateral attacks upon” the final judgment of the United States Court of Appeals.
Apparently the sovereign State of Washington recognized that “paramount jurisdiction” meant “paramount jurisdiction.” Despite the fact that Initiative No. 25 became effective December 8, 1960, and clearly prohibited any person, which included the City of Tacoma, from constructing or completing any dam over 25 feet in height on the Cowlitz River, the state stood by (from December 8, 1960, until June 8, 1961) while the City of Tacoma rushed the completion of the Mayfield dam (185 feet above tail water and 240 feet above bedrock) without seeking to stop what it urged in its answer as an intervenor, and now urges on this appeal, to be a violation of the initiative.
This matter comes before the courts again, not because anybody attempted to stop Tacoma’s construction of a 185-foot dam, now practically completed, but because Tacoma needed more money to construct the 325-foot Mossyrock dam. Prospective investors in Tacoma’s revenue bonds, and their timorous counsel, were apparently not certain that “paramount jurisdiction” meant “paramount jurisdiction,” so Tacoma — to reassure them — brought this declaratory judgment action (filed May 12, 1961). Not until Tacoma commenced this action was there any suggestion, implemented by legal action, that Tacoma should be enjoined from violating Initiative No. 25.
The trial court, by its judgment, gave the necessary reassurance to the prospective investors and their counsel: That the federal government still had “paramount jurisdiction” over navigable streams, despite the passage of Initia[72]
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Hill, J.
For a history of the prior “Cowlitz” litigation see State of Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Comm. (1953), 207 F. (2d) 391 (C. A. 9th); Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1953), 43 Wn. (2d) 468, 262 P. (2d) 214; Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1957), 49 Wn. (2d) 781, 307 P. (2d) 567; and Tacoma v. Taxpayers (1958), 357 U. S. 320, 2 L. Ed. (2d) 1345, 78 S. Ct. 1209.
Suffice it to say that at this point the City of Tacoma, a municipal corporation armed with a license issued November 28, 1951, by the Federal Power Commission which authorized it to build two dams1 on the Cowlitz River2, has proceeded to erect one of the dams and is ready to proceed with the other in violation of the expressed desires of a considerable segment of the people of the state of Washington3, the will of the legislature4, and the will of the people of the state5, that no dams be built on that river more than [68]*6825 feet in height. Ironically enough, the City of Tacoma did not go into the federal courts to secure a determination6 that its authority to proceed with the dams on the Cowlitz River, under its license from the Federal Power Commission, was unaffected by Initiative No. 25 with its prohibition of any person, including municipal corporations, from building dams more than 25 feet in height. Instead it invoked the jurisdiction of the courts of the state, whose public policy it had persistently flouted, to again give assurance to prospective bond purchasers7 that the city is em[69]*69powered by its license from the Federal Power Commission to disregard the law of this state. The right of the city to maintain the action is unquestioned.
The court in the first Cowlitz case8, recognized that the federal government’s constitutional authority to regulate commerce and navigation gave it the right — acting through the Federal Power Commission — to issue a license to the City of Tacoma to construct dams which would be in excess of 25 feet in height (the limit imposed by the state in the exercise of its police power to preserve the fishery resources of the state).
Implicit in both the first and second9 Cowlitz cases is the holding that since the City of Tacoma was a municipality empowered to construct, maintain, and operate power facilities10, and had a license from the Federal Power Commission empowering it to construct the Mossyrock and May-field dams on the Cowlitz River, the state — even by the exercise of its police power — could not prevent the building of such dams.
The trial court, in the present case, very ably spelled this all out again in its findings, conclusions of law, and judgment.
The defendant taxpayers, the intervenor State of Washington, and the other intervening taxpayers all appeal.
The appellants now concede the federal government’s “paramount” power to determine the height of dams, but take the position on this appeal that the city is a “creature” of the state, hence subject to its control; and the state, by adopting Initiative No. 25 (see footnote 5), has divested the city of its right to proceed to build the dams.
[70]*70This court had proceeded on a variation of that theory (and, if we may say so, a much more logical one) in the second Cowlitz case, in which we held that the city had no power to condemn property, except such as the legislature granted to it; and that it had been granted no power to condemn state property, already dedicated to a public use; in short, that the “creature” could not condemn the “creator’s” property, when the “creator” was using it for a public purpose, i.e., a fish hatchery.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed this court11, without meeting that issue, by saying that the state and its citizens were foreclosed by the judgment in the Court of Appeals12 from litigating further the power and the authority of the City of Tacoma to proceed under its Federal Power Commission license to build the dams. The Supreme Court quoted the following language from the Court of Appeals decision12,
“ ‘. . . we conclude [13] that the state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license or bar the licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a navigable stream since the stream is under the dominion of the United States. . . . ’ ”
We summarized the situation, with painful accuracy, when — following the reversal and remand — we entered a judgment in the second Cowlitz case, which read in part as follows:
“1. The United States has exclusive and paramount jurisdiction over navigable waters, under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, and, therefore, any State laws are inapplicable to the Mayfield and Mossyrock [Cow-litz dams] Hydroelectric Project insofar as the same conflict with the provisions of the Federal Power Act or the terms and conditions of the appellant’s license for said project, or [71]*71which would enable the State of Washington or any State official thereof to exercise a veto over said project, . . . ” (Italics ours.)
We would have thought that this language was sufficiently explicit to answer the present question for bond counsel, and, in the words of the United States Supreme Court in reversing this court, that attacks on the right of the City of Tacoma to proceed with the construction of these dams were “impermissible collateral attacks upon” the final judgment of the United States Court of Appeals.
Apparently the sovereign State of Washington recognized that “paramount jurisdiction” meant “paramount jurisdiction.” Despite the fact that Initiative No. 25 became effective December 8, 1960, and clearly prohibited any person, which included the City of Tacoma, from constructing or completing any dam over 25 feet in height on the Cowlitz River, the state stood by (from December 8, 1960, until June 8, 1961) while the City of Tacoma rushed the completion of the Mayfield dam (185 feet above tail water and 240 feet above bedrock) without seeking to stop what it urged in its answer as an intervenor, and now urges on this appeal, to be a violation of the initiative.
This matter comes before the courts again, not because anybody attempted to stop Tacoma’s construction of a 185-foot dam, now practically completed, but because Tacoma needed more money to construct the 325-foot Mossyrock dam. Prospective investors in Tacoma’s revenue bonds, and their timorous counsel, were apparently not certain that “paramount jurisdiction” meant “paramount jurisdiction,” so Tacoma — to reassure them — brought this declaratory judgment action (filed May 12, 1961). Not until Tacoma commenced this action was there any suggestion, implemented by legal action, that Tacoma should be enjoined from violating Initiative No. 25.
The trial court, by its judgment, gave the necessary reassurance to the prospective investors and their counsel: That the federal government still had “paramount jurisdiction” over navigable streams, despite the passage of Initia[72]*72tive No. 25 by the voters of the state. We quote, approvingly, three conclusions of law made by the trial court:
“Congress had the constitutional power to enact the Federal Power Act, and in so doing it intended to exercise its full jurisdiction to authorize the Federal Power Commission to supersede state laws purporting to prohibit or limit the construction of dams on navigable streams. By passing the act, Congress preempted the entire field and authorized the Power Commission to issue licenses for such construction upon such conditions as it deemed proper, and the Federal Power Commission, in issuing its license to the Plaintiff [city of Tacoma], exercised that right and delegated to the Plaintiff, its licensee, as its agent and the agent of the Federal Government, the right and power to complete and to thereafter operate the Cowlitz Project in accordance with the terms and conditions of its license.” (Conclusion of Law VIII)
“There are no state laws, measures or regulations, including Initiative 25 (Chapter 4, Laws of 1961) that limit, control or affect in any way, or that bar the rights of the Plaintiff to finance, construct, complete and operate the Cowlitz Project under the provisions of the Federal Power Act and in accordance with the terms and conditions of its Federal Power License (Project No. 2016.)” (Conclusion of Law IX)
“The United States has exclusive and paramount jurisdiction over navigable waters under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution and under the supremacy clauses of the United States and Washington State Constitutions, and, therefore, any state laws, measures or regulations, whether such laws be in the form of prohibitions or curtailment or limitation of powers, or in any other form, are inapplicable to the Mayfield and Mossyrock hydroelectric project insofar as the same are in conflict with the provisions of the Federal Power Act or the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s license for said project or which would enable the State of Washington or any State official thereof or the citizen voters to exercise a veto over said project.” (Conclusion of Law X)
We agree, as heretofore indicated, that the decision of the United States Court of Appeals (see footnote 12) was res judicata of the issues raised. We agree, for the further reasons indicated in the foregoing conclusions of law, that [73]*73the trial court properly dismissed the cross-complaints, which challenged the right of the City of Tacoma to proceed under its license to construct the Cowlitz project and erect the Mayfield and Mossyrock dams, as provided in that license.
However, we do not agree with the trial court’s further conclusion that Initiative No. 25 is unconstitutional. It is a constitutional exercise of the state’s police power to protect its fishery resources, and valid except to the extent that it is superseded by the exercised “paramount jurisdiction” of the United States with reference to the Cowlitz project. There are, doubtless, nonnavigable streams tributary to the Columbia River14 below the McNary dam where the initiative could be effective; and, perhaps, navigable streams where it could be enforced until such time as the federal government should choose to exercise its “paramount jurisdiction” or “dominant servitude.”15
We go no further than to hold that Initiative No. 25 is superseded and is inoperative when it comes into conflict with the exercised “paramount jurisdiction” of the United States to determine who shall build dams on navigable streams and at what heights.
Within the limitations indicated, the judgment of the trial court — that Initiative No. 25 did not in any way affect the right or authority of the City of Tacoma, under its license from the Federal Power Commission, to proceed with the Cowlitz project and to erect and operate the Mossyrock and Mayfield dams in accordance with such license — is affirmed.
Weaver, Foster, Hunter and Hamilton, JJ., concur.