City of Riverside v. Rivera

477 U.S. 561, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 91 L. Ed. 2d 466, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 69, 54 U.S.L.W. 4845, 40 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 36,285, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 65

Opinions

Justice Brennan

announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens join.

The issue presented in this case is whether an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 is per se “unreasonable” within the meaning of the statute if it exceeds the amount of damages recovered by the plaintiff in the underlying civil rights action.

I

Respondents, eight Chicano individuals, attended a party on the evening of August 1, 1975, at the Riverside, California, home of respondents Santos and Jennie Rivera. A large number of unidentified police officers, acting without a warrant, broke up the party using tear gas and, as found by the District Court, “unnecessary physical force.” Many of the guests, including four of the respondents, were arrested. The District Court later found that “[t]he party was not creating a disturbance in the community at the time of the break-in.” App. 188. Criminal charges against the arrest-ees were ultimately dismissed for lack of probable cause.

On June 4,1976, respondents sued the city of Riverside, its Chief of Police, and 30 individual police officers under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 for allegedly violating their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The complaint, which also alleged numerous state-law claims, sought damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. On August 5, 1977, 23 of the individual police officers moved for summary judgment; the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 17 of these officers. The case against the remaining defendants proceeded to trial in September 1980. The jury returned a total of 37 individual verdicts in favor of the respondents and against the city and five individual officers, finding 11 violations of § 1983, 4 instances of false arrest and imprisonment, and 22 instances of negligence. Respondents were awarded $33,350 in compensatory and pu nitive damages: $13,300 for their federal claims, and $20,050 for their state-law claims.¹

Respondents also sought attorney’s fees and costs under § 1988. They requested compensation for 1,946.75 hours expended by their two attorneys at a rate of $125 per hour, and for 84.5 hours expended by law clerks at a rate of $25 per hour, a total of $245,456.25. The District Court found both the hours and rates reasonable, and awarded respondents $245,456.25 in attorney’s fees. The court rejected respondents’ request for certain additional expenses, and for a multiplier sought by respondents to reflect the contingent nature of their success and the high quality of their attorneys’ efforts.

Petitioners appealed only the attorney’s fees award, which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Rivera v. City of Riverside, 679 F. 2d 795 (1982). Petitioners sought a writ of certiorari from this Court. We granted the writ, vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983). 461 U. S. 952 (1983). On remand, the District Court held two additional hearings, reviewed additional briefing, and reexamined the record as a whole. The court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, and again concluded that respondents were entitled to an award of $245,456.25 in attorney’s fees, based on the same total number of hours expended on the case and the same hourly rates.² The court again denied respondents’ request for certain expenses and for a multiplier.

Petitioners again appealed the fee award. And again, the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that “the district court correctly reconsidered the case in light of Hensley . . . .” 763 F. 2d 1580, 1582 (1985). The Court of Appeals rejected three arguments raised by petitioners; First, the court rejected petitioners’ contention that respondents’ counsel should not have been compensated for time spent litigating claims other than those upon which respondents ultimately prevailed. Emphasizing that the District Court had determined that respondents’ attorneys had “spent no time on claims unrelated to the successful claims,” ibid., the Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he record supports the district court’s findings that all of the plaintiffs’ claims involve a ‘common core of facts’ and that the claims involve related legal theories.” Ibid. The court also observed that, consistent with Hensley, the District Court had “considered the degree of success [achieved by respondents’ attorneys] and found a reasonable relationship between the extent of that success and the amount of the fee award.” 763 F. 2d, at 1582. Second, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the fee award was excessive because it exceeded the amount of damages awarded by the jury. Examining the legislative history of § 1988, the court found no support for the proposition that an award of attorney’s fees may not exceed the amount of damages recovered by a prevailing plaintiff. Finally, the court found that the District Court’s “extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law” belied petitioners’ claim that the District Court had not reviewed the record to determine whether the fee award was justified. The Court of Appeals concluded:

“In short, the district court applied the necessary criteria to justify the attorney’s fees awarded and explained the reasons for the award clearly and concisely. As required by Hensley, the district court adequately discussed the extent of the plaintiffs’ success and its relationship to the amount of the attorney’s fees awarded. The award is well within the discretion of the district court.” Id., at 1583 (citation omitted).

Petitioners again sought a writ of certiorari from this Court, alleging that the District Court’s fee award was not “reasonable” within the meaning of § 1988, because it was disproportionate to the amount of damages recovered by respondents. We granted the writ, 474 U. S. 917 (1985), and now affirm the Court of Appeals.

a

<i

In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240 (1975), the Court reaffirmed the “American Rule” that, at least absent express statutory authorization to the contrary, each party to a lawsuit ordinarily shall bear its own attorney’s fees. In response to Alyeska, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which authorized the district courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in specified civil rights litigation. While the statute itself does not explain what constitutes a reasonable fee, both the House and Senate Reports accompanying § 1988 expressly endorse the analysis set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714 (CA5 1974). See S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976) (hereafter Senate Report); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 8 (1976) (hereafter House Report). Johnson identifies 12 factors to be considered in calculating a reasonable attorney’s fee.³

Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, announced certain guidelines for calculating a reasonable attorney’s fee under §1988. Hensley stated that “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id., at 433. This figure, commonly referred to as the “lodestar,” is presumed to be the reasonable fee contemplated by § 1988. The opinion cautioned that “[t]he district court. . . should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not ‘reasonably expended’” on the litigation. Id., at 434 (quoting Senate Report, at 6).

Hensley then discussed other considerations that might lead the district court to adjust the lodestar figure upward or downward, including the “important factor of the ‘results obtained. ’ ” 461 U. S., at 434. The opinion noted that where a prevailing plaintiff has succeeded on only some of his claims, an award of fees for time expended on unsuccessful claims may not be appropriate. In these situations, the Court held that the judge should consider whether or not the plaintiff’s unsuccessful claims were related to the claims on which he succeeded, and whether the plaintiff achieved a level of success that makes it appropriate to award attorney’s fees for hours reasonably expended on unsuccessful claims:

“In [some] cases the plaintiff’s claims for relief will involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories. Much of counsel’s time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. Instead the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id., at 435.

Accordingly, Hensley emphasized that “[w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee,” and that “the fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit.” Ibid.

B

Petitioners argue that the District Court failed properly to follow Hensley in calculating respondents’ fee award. We disagree. The District Court carefully considered the results obtained by respondents pursuant to the instructions set forth in Hensley, and concluded that respondents were entitled to recover attorney’s fees for all hours expended on the litigation. First, the court found that “[t]he amount of time expended by counsel in conducting this litigation was reasonable and reflected sound legal judgment under the circumstances.” App. 190.⁴ The court also determined that counsel’s excellent performances in this case entitled them to be compensated at prevailing market rates, even though they were relatively young when this litigation began. See Johnson, 488 F. 2d, at 718-719 (“If a young attorney demonstrates the skill and ability, he should not be penalized for only recently being admitted to the bar”).

The District Court then concluded that it was inappropriate to adjust respondents’ fee award downward to account for the fact that respondents had prevailed only on some of their claims, and against only some of the defendants. The court first determined that “it was never actually clear what officer did what until we had gotten through with the whole trial,” App. 236, so that “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, it was reasonable for plaintiffs initially to name thirty-one individual defendants ... as well as the City of Riverside as defendants in this action.” Id., at 188. The court remarked:

“I think every one of the claims that were made were related and if you look at the common core of facts that we had here that you had total success. . . . There was a problem about who was responsible for what and that problem was there all the way through to the time that we concluded the case. Some of the officers couldn’t agree about who did what and it is not at all suprising that it would, in my opinion, have been wrong for you not to join all those officers since you yourself did not know precisely who were the officers that were responsible.” Id., at 235-236.

The court then found that the lawsuit could not “be viewed as a series of discrete claims,” Hensley, 461 U. S., at 435:

“All claims made by plaintiffs were based on a common core of facts. The claims on which plaintiffs did not prevail were closely related to the claims on which they did prevail. The time devoted to claims on which plaintiffs did not prevail cannot reasonably be separated from time devoted to claims on which plaintiffs did prevail.” App. 189.

The District Court also considered the amount of damages recovered, and determined that the size of the damages award did not imply that respondents’ success was limited:

“[T]he size of the jury award resulted from (a) the general reluctance of jurors to make large awards against police officers, and (b) the dignified restraint which the plaintiffs exercised in describing their injuries to the jury. For example, although some of the actions of the police would clearly have been insulting and humiliating to even the most insensitive person and were, in the opinion of the Court, intentionally so, plaintiffs did not attempt to play up this aspect of the case.” Id., at 188-189.⁵

The court paid particular attention to the fact that the case “presented complex and interrelated issues of fact and law,” id., at 187, and that “[a] fee award in this civil rights action will. . . advance the public interest,” id., at 191:

“Counsel for plaintiffs . . . served the public interest by vindicating important constitutional rights. Defendants had engaged in lawless, unconstitutional conduct, and the litigation of plaintiffs’ case was necessary to remedy defendants’ misconduct. Indeed, the Court was shocked at some of the acts of the police officers in this case and was convinced from the testimony that these acts were motivated by a general hostility to the Chicano community in the area where the incident occured. The amount of time expended by plaintiffs’ counsel in conducting this litigation was clearly reasonable and necessary to serve the public interest as well as the interests of plaintiffs in the vindication of their constitutional rights.” Id., at 190.

Finally, the District Court “focus[ed] on the significance of the overall relief obtained by [respondents] in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Hensley, supra, at 435. The court concluded that respondents had “achieved a level of success in this case that makes the total number of hours expended by counsel a proper basis for making the fee award,” App. 192:

“Counsel for plaintiffs achieved excellent results for their clients, and their accomplishment in this case was outstanding. The amount of time expended by counsel in conducting this litigation was reasonable and reflected sound legal judgment under the circumstances.” Id., at 190.

Based on our review of the record, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. We conclude that the District Court correctly applied the factors announced in Hensley in calculating respondents’ fee award, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees for all time reasonably spent litigating the case.⁶

Ill

Petitioners, joined by the United States as amicus curiae, maintain that Hensley’s, lodestar approach is inappropriate in civil rights cases where a plaintiff recovers only monetary damages. In these cases, so the argument goes, use of the lodestar may result in fees that exceed the amount of damages recovered and that are therefore unreasonable. Likening such cases to private tort actions, petitioners and the United States submit that attorney’s fees in such cases should be proportionate to the amount of damages a plaintiff recovers. Specifically, they suggest that fee awards in damages cases should be modeled upon the contingent-fee arrangements commonly used in personal injury litigation. In this case, assuming a 33% contingency rate, this would enti- tie respondents to recover approximately $11,000 in attorney’s fees.

The amount of damages a plaintiff recovers is certainly relevant to the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded under §1988. See Johnson, 488 F. 2d, at 718. It is, however, only one of many factors that a court should consider in calculating an award of attorney’s fees. We reject the proposition that fee awards under § 1988 should necessarily be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff actually recovers.

A

As an initial matter, we reject the notion that a civil rights action for damages constitutes nothing more than a private tort suit benefiting only the individual plaintiffs whose rights were violated. Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 266 (1978). And, Congress has determined that “the public as a whole has an interest in the vindication of the rights conferred by the statutes enumerated in §1988, over and above the value of a civil rights remedy to a particular plaintiff. ...” Hensley, 461 U. S., at 444, n. 4 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Regardless of the form of relief he actually obtains, a successful civil rights plaintiff often secures important social benefits that are not reflected in nominal or relatively small damages awards. In this case, for example, the District Court found that many of petitioners’ unlawful acts were “motivated by a general hostility to the Chicano community,” App. 190, and that this litigation therefore served the public interest:

“The institutional behavior involved here . . . had to be stopped and . . . nothing short of having a lawsuit like this would have stopped it. . . . [T]he improper motivation which appeared as a result of all of this seemed to me to have pervaded a very broad segment of police officers in the department.” Id., at 237.⁷

In addition, the damages a plaintiff recovers contributes significantly to the deterrence of civil rights violations in the future. See McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F. 2d 112, 129 (CA2 1983). This deterrent effect is particularly evident in the area of individual police misconduct, where injunctive relief generally is unavailable.

Congress expressly recognized that a plaintiff who obtains relief in a civil rights lawsuit “‘does so not for himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest importance.’” House Report, at 2 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968)). “If the citizen does not have the resources, his day in court is denied him; the congressional policy which he seeks to assert and vindicate goes unvindicated; and the entire Nation, not just the individual citizen, suffers.” 122 Cong. Rec. 33313 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Tunney).

Because damages awards do not reflect fully the public benefit advanced by civil rights litigation, Congress did not intend for fees in civil rights cases, unlike most private law cases, to depend on obtaining substantial monetary relief. Rather, Congress made clear that it “intended that the amount of fees awarded under [§ 1988] be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases and not be reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuniary in nature.” Senate Report, at 6 (emphasis added). “[CJounsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, ‘for all time reasonably expended on a matter.’” Ibid, (quoting Van Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 EPD ¶9444 (CD Cal. 1974) (emphasis added)). The Senate Report specifically approves of the fee awards made in cases such as Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F. R. D. 680 (ND Cal. 1974); Van Davis v. County of Los Angeles, supra; and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F. R. D. 483 (WDNC 1975). In each of these cases, counsel received substantial attorney’s fees despite the fact the plaintiffs sought no monetary damages. Thus, Congress recognized that reasonable attorney’s fees under §1988 are not conditioned upon and need not be proportionate to an award of money damages. The lower courts have generally eschewed such a requirement.⁸

B

A rule that limits attorney’s fees in civil rights cases to a proportion of the damages awarded would seriously undermine Congress’ purpose in enacting §1988. Congress enacted § 1988 specifically because it found that the private market for legal services failed to provide many victims of civil rights violations with effective access to the judicial process. See House Report, at 3. These victims ordinarily cannot afford to purchase legal services at the rates set by the private market. See id., at 1 (“Because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their cases to the courts”); Senate Report, at 2 (“In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer”); see also 122 Cong. Rec. 35127 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman) (“Plaintiffs who suffer discrimination and other infringements of their civil rights are usually not wealthy people”); id., at 35128 (remarks of Rep. Seiberling) (“Most Americans . . . cannot afford to hire a lawyer if their constitutional rights are violated or if they are the victims of illegal discrimination”); id., at 31832 (remarks of Sen. Hathaway) (“[R]ight now the vindication of important congressional policies in the vital area of civil rights is made to depend upon the financial resources of those least able to promote them”). Moreover, the contingent fee arrangements that make legal services available to many victims of personal injuries would often not encourage lawyers to accept civil rights cases, which frequently involve substantial expenditures of time and effort but produce only small monetary recoveries. As the House Report states:

“[WJhile damages are theoretically available under the statutes covered by [§ 1988], it should be observed that, in some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy. Consequently, awarding counsel fees to prevailing plaintiffs in such litigation is particularly important and necessary if Federal civil and consitutional rights are to be adequately protected.” House Report, at 9. (emphasis added; footnote omitted).

See also 122 Cong. Rec., at 33314 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (“[C]ivil rights cases — unlike tort or antitrust cases — do not provide the prevailing plaintiff with a large recovery from which he can pay his lawyer”). Congress enacted § 1988 specifically to enable plaintiffs to enforce the civil rights laws even where the amount of damages at stake Would not otherwise make it feasible for them to do so:

“[F]ee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vin dicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain.

. . If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.” Senate Report, at 2.

See also Kerr v. Quinn, 692 F. 2d 875, 877 (CA2 1982) (“The function of an award of attorney’s fees is to encourage the bringing of meritorious civil rights claims which might otherwise be abandoned because of the financial imperatives surrounding the hiring of competent counsel”).

A rule of proportionality would make it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals with meritorious civil rights claims but relatively small potential damages to obtain redress from the courts. This is totally inconsistent with Congress’ purpose in enacting § 1988. Congress recognized that private-sector fee arrangements were inadequate to ensure sufficiently vigorous enforcement of civil rights. In order to ensure that lawyers would be willing to represent persons with legitimate civil rights grievances, Congress determined that it would be necessary to compensate lawyers for all time reasonably expended on a case.⁹

This case illustrates why the enforcement of civil rights laws cannot be entrusted to private-sector fee arrangements. The District Court observed that “[g]iven the nature of this lawsuit and the type of defense presented, many attorneys in the community would have been reluctant to institute and to continue to prosecute this action.” App. 189. The court concluded, moreover, that “[c]ounsel for plaintiffs achieved excellent results for their clients, and their accomplishment in this case was outstanding. The amount of time expended by counsel in conducting this litigation was reasonable and reflected sound legal judgment under the circumstances.” Id., at 190. Nevertheless, petitioners suggest that respondents’ counsel should be compensated for only a small fraction of the actual time spent litigating the case. In light of the difficult nature of the issues presented by this lawsuit and the low pecuniary value of many of the rights respondents sought to vindicate, it is highly unlikely that the prospect of a fee equal to a fraction of the damages respondents might recover would have been sufficient to attract competent counsel.¹⁰ Moreover, since counsel might not have found it economically feasible to expend the amount of time respondents’ counsel found necessary to litigate the case properly, it is even less likely that counsel would have achieved the excellent results that respondents’ counsel obtained here. Thus, had respondents had to rely on private-sector fee arrangements, they might well have been unable to obtain redress for their grievances. It is precisely for this reason that Congress enacted § 1988.

IV

We agree with petitioners that Congress intended that statutory fee awards be “adequate to attract competent counsel, but. . . not produce windfalls to attorneys.” Senate Report, at 6. However, we find no evidence that Congress intended that, in order to avoid “windfalls to attorneys,” attorney’s fees be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff might recover. Rather, there already exists a wide range of safeguards designed to protect civil rights defendants against the possibility of excessive fee awards. Both the House and Senate Reports identify standards for courts to follow in awarding and calculating attorney’s fees, see ibid.; House Report, at 8; these standards are designed to ensure that attorneys are compensated only for time reasonably expended on a case. The district court has the discretion to deny fees to prevailing plaintiffs under special circumstances, see Hensley, 461 U. S., at 429 (citing Senate Report, at 4), and to award attorney’s fees against plaintiffs who litigate frivolous or vexatious claims. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 416-417 (1978); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U. S. 5, 14-16 (1980) (per curiam); House Report, at 6-7. Furthermore, we have held that a civil rights defendant is not liable for attorney’s fees incurred after a pretrial settlement offer, where the judgment recovered by the plaintiff is less than the offer. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U. S. 1 (1985).¹¹ We believe that these safeguards adequately protect against the possibility that § 1988 might produce a “windfall” to civil rights attorneys.

In the absence of any indication that Congress intended to adopt a strict rule that attorney’s fees under § 1988 be proportionate to damages recovered, we decline to adopt such a rule ourselves.¹² The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby

Affirmed.

Footnotes

1

Counsel for respondents explained to the District Court that respondents had not pursued their request for injunctive relief because “the bottom line of what we would ask for is that the police officers obey the law. And that is virtually always denied by a court because a court properly, I think, says that for the future we will assume that all police officers will abide by the law, including the Constitution.” App. 219. The District Court’s response to this explanation is significant:

“[I]f you [respondents] had asked for [injunctive relief] against some of the officers I think I would have granted it. ... I would agree with you that there is a problem about telling the officers that they have to obey the law. But if you want to know what the Court thought about some of the behavior, it was — it would have warranted an injunction.” Ibid.

2

The District Court determined that $125 per hour was the “rate typical of the prevailing market rate for similar services by lawyers of comparable skill, experience and reputation within the Central District at the time these services were performed,” id,., at 190, and that “[t]he rate of $25 per hour, which counsel seeks as compensation for the time expended by two law clerks, was lower than the customary hourly rate for such services at the time those services were performed.” Ibid.

3

These factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 488 P. 2d, at 717-719.

4

Hensley stated that a fee applicant should “exercise ‘billing judgment’ with respect to hours worked.” 461 U. S., at 437. Petitioners maintain that respondents failed to exercise “billing judgment” in this case, since they sought compensation for all time spent litigating this case. We think this argument misreads the mandate of Hensley. Hensley requires a fee applicant to exercise “billing judgment” not because he should necessarily be compensated for less than the actual number of hours spent litigating a case, but because the hours he does seek compensation for must be reasonable. “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or other wise unnecessary. . . Id., at 434. In this case, the District Court found that the number of hours expended by respondents’ counsel was reasonable. Thus, counsel did, in fact, exercise the “billing judgment” recommended in Hensley.

Hensley also stated that a fee applicant should “maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims.” Id., at 437. Petitioners submit that the time records submitted by respondents’ attorneys made it difficult for the District Court to identify and separate distinct claims. The District Court, however, does not appear to have shared this view. In any event, while it is true that some of the disputed time records do not identify the precise claims worked on at the time, we find this lapse unimportant, in light of the District Court’s finding that all of respondents’ claims were interrelated.

5

At the second hearing on remand, the court also remarked:

“I have tried several civil rights violation cases in which police officers have figured and in the main they prevailed because juries do not bring in verdicts against police officers very readily nor against cities. The size of the verdicts against the individuals is not at all surprising because juries are very reluctant to bring in large verdicts against police officers who don’t have the resources to answer those verdicts. The relief here I think was absolutely complete.” App. 235.

6

In addition to the amount involved and the results obtained, the District Court also discussed several of the other factors identified in Johnson, including: the time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented; the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; the customary fee; the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; and the undesirability of the case.

With respect to the time and labor required to litigate the case, petitioners suggest that much of the time for which respondents’ counsel received compensation was not “reasonable.” See Brief for Petitioners 12-13. However, the District Court considered, and properly rejected, these arguments.- For example, petitioners object to fees being awarded for the 59 hours respondents’ counsel spent preparing jury instructions which, according to petitioners, “were subsequently mostly discarded by the trial court.” Id., at 12. The District Court, however, denied having discarded respondents’ jury instructions. App. 215. Similarly, petitioners object to fees being awarded for 197 hours of conversation between respondents’ two attorneys. The District Court however, noted: “I haven’t got any doubt that it probably took 250 hours of conversation about the case between the two of them.” Ibid. We believe that the District Court was in the best position to determine whether the time expended by respondents’ counsel was reasonable.

7

The District Court also observed that even though respondents ultimately dropped their request for injunctive relief, petitioners’ misconduct clearly “would have warranted an injunction.” Id., at 219; see n. 1, supra.

8

See DeFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F. 2d 231, 235 (CA2 1985); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F. 2d 546, 557 (CA10 1983); McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F. 2d 112, 128-129 (CA2 1983); Jones v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 685 F. 2d 236, 238-239 (CA8 1982); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F. 2d 1203, 1220 (CA5 1982); Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F. 2d 915, 917-918 (CA1 1980); Coop v. City of South Bend, 635 F. 2d 652, 655 (CA7 1980); Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600 F. 2d 1, 2 (CA1 1979); Walston v. School Board, 566 F.' 2d 1201, 1204-1205 (CA4 1977).

9

Of course, we do not mean to suggest that private-sector comparisons are irrelevant to fee calculations under § 1988. We have suggested that in determining an appropriate hourly rate for a lawyer’s services, “the rates charged in private representations may afford relevant comparisons.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886, 896, n. 11 (1984). We have also indicated that “[c]ounsel for a prevailing party should make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.” Hensley, 461 U. S., at 434. However, while private-market considerations are not irrelevant, Congress clearly rejected the notion that attorney’s fees under § 1988 should be based on private-sector fee arrangements.

10

The United States suggests that “[t]he prospect of recovering $11,000 for representing [respondents] in a damages suit (assuming a contingency rate of 33%) is likely to attract a substantial number of attorneys.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22-23. However, the District Court found that the 1,946.75 hours respondents’ counsel spent litigating the case were reasonable and that “[t]here was not any possible way that you could have avoided putting in that amount of time . . . App. 238. We reject the United States’ suggestion that the prospect of working nearly 2,000 hours at a rate of $5.65 an hour, to be paid more than 10 years after the work began, is “likely to attract a substantial number of attorneys.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23.

11

Thus, petitioners could have avoided liability for the bulk of the attorney’s fees for which they now find themselves liable by making a reasonable settlement offer in a timely manner. While petitioners did offer respondents $25,000 in settlement at the time the jury was deliberating the case, this offer was made, as the District Court noted, “well after [respondents’ counsel] had spent thousands of dollars on preparation for trial. . . .” App. 237-238. “The government cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in re sponse.” Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U. S. App. D. C. 390, 414, 641 F. 2d 880, 904 (1980) (en bane).

12

We note that Congress has been urged to amend § 1988 to prohibit the award of attorney’s fees that are disproportionate to monetary damages recovered. See e. g., The Legal Fees Equity Act, S. 2802, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 1580, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). These efforts have thus far not been persuasive.