City of Evansville v. Pfisterer

34 Ind. 36
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 15, 1870
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 34 Ind. 36 (City of Evansville v. Pfisterer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Evansville v. Pfisterer, 34 Ind. 36 (Ind. 1870).

Opinion

Pettit, C. J.

This was a complain? by the appellees against the appellants, to enjoin the. sale of sundry lots in the city of Evansville, for the payment of assessments made by the city authorities for street improvements.

The complaint alleges, that appellant Gavisk, the city collector, is about to sell sundry lots mentioned in the complaint, which are owned by the plaintiffs, severally and respectively, and enumerates the several lots owned by each of the plaintiffs, and shows that each of the plaintiffs is the owner in severalty of one or more lots mentioned, and that some of said lots front or abut upon Front street in said city, some of thfem upon High street, some on Fifth avenue, and others upon Fulton avenue; all within the corporate limits of said city; that in 1867, the common council passed an ordinance, fixing rules and specifications by which contractors were to be governed in the improvement of streets, of which a copy is made an exhibit to the complaint, and which, among other things, provides: 1. That the street is to be brought to the proper grade and shape under the direction of the mayor and surveyor. 2. That where streets are paved with gravel, screened river gravel shall be used, to be of the average depth of twelve inches, with a covering of mould of two inches. 3. Samples of the quality of the material to be used are to be deposited by the bidder. 4. The work to be done in the most approved manner, and all material to be of the best kind.

The complaint further alleges, that pretending that said lots described in the complaint are liable to be sold for the payment of certain assessments for improvements, made' by one Lowry, under a contract, which is set out as an exhibit to the [38]*38complaint, the defendant, Gavisk, as city collector, has advertised for sale at public aution, said several lots,, and will, unless restrained, sell the same for the satisfaction of said assessments.

The advertisement is also made an exhibit to the complaint, and contains the names of the plaintiffs, with a description of the lots mentioned in the complaint, with the sum assessed to each, and a notice that the same will be sold for the payment of the respective sums on a given day.

The contracts referred to are alike, except as to locality, and all bind the contractor to make the improvements upon the several streets according to the plans and specifications on file in the city clerk’s office, and under the direction of the mayor and city surveyor, or such committee as the common council of the city may appoint for the purpose. The specifications are made part of the contract, and part of the exhibit, and provide that the grading is to be done by the city to the proper form and depth, and under the direction of the city surveyor; in other respects these specifications are in exact compliance with the ordinance above referred to.

The complaint then alleges, that the proceedings of the common council, under which the assessments were made, and the payment thereon attempted to be enforced, are illegal and void:

1. Because Lowry, the contractor, without any authority, changed the grade of the streets upon which the improvements are made, and, under the pretense of performing his contract, placed on said streets a mixture of sand and gravel, in the proportion of óne-fourth of sand to three-fourths of gravel, and placed on the same some kind of clay, not mould, but did not'place on either of said streets the quantity of screened gravel specified in said contracts, and the shape of the surface of said streets was fixed by said Lowry, or some other person, and not by said common council.

2. That said pretended assessment and the alleged contract with said Lowry are based upon an order of said common [39]*39council, passed September 7th, 1868, and which is made an exhibit to the complaint.

The order referred to reads as follows:

“Monday, September 7th, 1868.

Ordered, That the clerk advertise for sealed proposals until the fifth day of October, 1868, for graveling on Front street, from the east side of Pigeon creek to the east side of Sixth avenue, thence parallel to the boundary line of Front street to the east side of Fulton avenue; also, on Fifth avenue from Front street up to the north line of Second street, thence along Second street to the eastern boundary of Lamasco; Fulton avenue from Front street to north side of Second street; and High street from the western boundary of the Fourth Enlargement to the west side of Leet street.”

And it is alleged that the same is illegal and void in this: that ' it is not shown that three-fourths of all the members of the common council concurred in ordering and requiring said improvements upon said streets, nor does it show the manner in which such improvements should be paid for, as required by the thirty-eighth section of the charter of said city.

3. That the mayor and city surveyor did not, within five days of the making of said contract, make to the common council a report in writing, in accordance with the second section of the ordinance on this subject (Ordinances, page 20); nor did they make any report in writing within the time required by law, and by reason of said failure to make said report the plaintiffs were prevented from executing the •written undertakings mentioned in sections four and five of said ordinances, and thereby they lost eight per cent, upon the amount of said assessments.

Prayer for an injunction.

The defendants moved the court to strike out all the names of the plaintiffs, and all the allegations in the complaint except the names of the owners of lots on High street, and those allegations relative to the improvement on High street, for irrelevancyand impertinence; but the motion was overruled, and the defendants excepted.

[40]*40The defendants then filed a demurrer to the complaint, assigning: i. The absence of sufficient facts. 2. A misjoinder of causes of action. 3. A defect of parties plaintiffs, in this: that several" parties plaintiffs were improperly united.

But the court overruled the demurrer, and the defendants excepted.

The,defendants then filed an answer in two paragraphs. The first paragraph admits that the order of the common council directing the assessment and which was the commencement of the proceedings referi-ed to in the complaint was, and is, informal, but alleges that said informality arose from a clerical error, which having been discovered, said order was, by a resolution and order, duly entered on the first day of November, 1868, and before the ratification of the contract with said Lowry and the approval of his bond, duly corrected, and said improvement of said streets duly authorized according to the requirements of the charter and ordinances of said city, a copy of the curative or nunc pro tunc order is made an exhibit to this paragraph, and is as follows :

It shows, by name, the presence of eight

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Bluebook (online)
34 Ind. 36, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-evansville-v-pfisterer-ind-1870.