[100]*100Carr, J.
This case has resulted from a traffic accident occurring in the city of Dearborn on the 17th of April, 1955, at approximately 1 o’clock in the morning. On the occasion in question a member of the police department of the city was driving an automobile owned by plaintiff in a northerly direction on Miller road. At the intersection of. said highway with Eagle street, or Eagle Pass, the police car collided with an automobile operated by the defendant. Claiming that the latter was at fault in the matter, an action was brought in the municipal court of the city for damages, recovery of the alleged amount thereof in excess of $1,000 being waived. The declaration filed alleged negligence on the part of the defendant in making a left turn -without proper observations, and in proceeding against a red light. To the declaration defendant filed a plea of the general issue, reserving therein the right to file at a later date a detailed answer to plaintiff’s pleading. It does not appear from the record, however, that this was done. The trial in the municipal court resulted in a judgment for plaintiff, from which defendant appealed.
In the circuit court the parties to the cause waived the right to a jury trial, and the matter was heard before the circuit judge. In support of its claim plaintiff introduced the testimony of the police officer, Harold Monberg, who was driving the automobile, and also produced as a witness another officer who was riding in the car at the time of the accident. At the conclusion of plaintiff’s testimony counsel for defendant made a motion for judgment “on the basis of the plaintiff’s proofs.” In support of said motion it was claimed specifically that Officer Monberg, in the operation of plaintiff’s vehicle, failed to make proper observations as he entered the intersection, and'prior thereto, that had he exercised due care in such respect he would have been in position to avoid [101]*101the accident, and that, in consequence, on the basis of the proofs submitted plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The motion was granted for the reason asserted by defendant’s counsel in his motion, and for the further reason that plaintiff had not introduced proof as to the amount of damages sustained by it. Judgment in defendant’s favor was entered accordingly, and plaintiff has appealed.
At the time of the accident Miller road was a divided north and south thoroughfare, with 3 lanes for northbound traffic and like provision for southbound traffic. North and south of Eagle Pass the 2 sections of the highway were separated by a so-called island, approximately 8 feet in width. In the center of said intersection was a concrete structure on which was located a traffic light. It may be noted in this connection that the intersection was, at the time of the occurrence in question, protected by 3 signal lights designed to regulate traffic passing through it.
Plaintiff’s proofs indicated that the police car approached the intersection at a rate of speed of approximately 35 miles per hour, that Officer Monberg did not decrease said rate as he entered and attempted to pass through the intersection, and that he did not see defendant’s car until it appeared directly in front of him in the middle lane for northbound traffic. In view of the manner of disposition of the case the testimony of Officer Monberg becomes of controlling significance. After testifying that as he approached the intersection he noted that the traffic light was red against northbound traffic on Miller road, and that 3 cars were standing at the intersection waiting for the signal to change, the following testimony indicates the situation that the witness claimed existed immediately prior to and at the time of the collision between the cars:
[102]*102“Q. What did you do when you saw these 3 cars ■waiting for a red light, officer, in front of you, that is?
“A. i think, to make it simple, I was about 150 feet behind the intersection. The 3 cars were lined up, stopped for the red light. The light turned green and these 3 cars proceeded on across the intersection on the green light, and I continued my course, going north.
“Q. Bid these cars start up and proceed through the intersection before you arrived at the intersection?
“A. Yes.
“Q. So then we now have your car here, with a light green, and 3 cars clear ahead of you. They have gone on beyond you, is that right?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Nov/, tell us what happened as you arrived at the intersection?
“A. As I entered the intersection on the green light, a car coming south on Miller road made a fast turn in front of me and a collision occurred.”
Following an explanation by the witness as to where the cars were at the time of the collision, he continued his testimony as follows:
“The Court: The front portion of the plaintiff’s ear appears to strike the car driven by the defendant, at the right rear wheel, is that right?
“A. Yes.
“Mr. Campbell: That is correct.
“Q. Is that where you remember striking the other car?
“A. Approximately there, between the center post and the rear fender there, on the pink car.
“Q. Between the center post and the rear fender ■■of the pink car?
“A. Yes. That is approximately the way it happened, right here, just about so, and then from the collision;our car—
[103]*103“Q. Never mind that at the moment. I just want you to show us, as best you remember, where the point of impact was, and if you don’t remember, tell us.
“A. That is approximately it.
“Q. Now7, just before this collision occurred, I believe you testified that the light was green, and you were about here. Now, between the time that — from here to the point where the 2 cars collided, did you at any time see the other car, officer?.
“A. No. All I saw from the other car was a blue flash in front of the scout car.
“Q. You say an instant, is that right?
“A. Yes, just — just an instant. (Witness snaps fingers.)
“Q. Now, after this accident, did you have any discussion with the man who w7as driving the other car?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Is he here in court today?
“A. Yes, he is.
“Q. Where is he?
“A. The gentleman in the checkerboard sport jacket.
“Mr. Campbell: Referring to the defendant, Eli Bacila.
“Mr. Garlow: Yes.
“Q. Did you discuss how7 this accident happened, with Mr. Bacila, or did he discuss it w7ith you?
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[100]*100Carr, J.
This case has resulted from a traffic accident occurring in the city of Dearborn on the 17th of April, 1955, at approximately 1 o’clock in the morning. On the occasion in question a member of the police department of the city was driving an automobile owned by plaintiff in a northerly direction on Miller road. At the intersection of. said highway with Eagle street, or Eagle Pass, the police car collided with an automobile operated by the defendant. Claiming that the latter was at fault in the matter, an action was brought in the municipal court of the city for damages, recovery of the alleged amount thereof in excess of $1,000 being waived. The declaration filed alleged negligence on the part of the defendant in making a left turn -without proper observations, and in proceeding against a red light. To the declaration defendant filed a plea of the general issue, reserving therein the right to file at a later date a detailed answer to plaintiff’s pleading. It does not appear from the record, however, that this was done. The trial in the municipal court resulted in a judgment for plaintiff, from which defendant appealed.
In the circuit court the parties to the cause waived the right to a jury trial, and the matter was heard before the circuit judge. In support of its claim plaintiff introduced the testimony of the police officer, Harold Monberg, who was driving the automobile, and also produced as a witness another officer who was riding in the car at the time of the accident. At the conclusion of plaintiff’s testimony counsel for defendant made a motion for judgment “on the basis of the plaintiff’s proofs.” In support of said motion it was claimed specifically that Officer Monberg, in the operation of plaintiff’s vehicle, failed to make proper observations as he entered the intersection, and'prior thereto, that had he exercised due care in such respect he would have been in position to avoid [101]*101the accident, and that, in consequence, on the basis of the proofs submitted plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The motion was granted for the reason asserted by defendant’s counsel in his motion, and for the further reason that plaintiff had not introduced proof as to the amount of damages sustained by it. Judgment in defendant’s favor was entered accordingly, and plaintiff has appealed.
At the time of the accident Miller road was a divided north and south thoroughfare, with 3 lanes for northbound traffic and like provision for southbound traffic. North and south of Eagle Pass the 2 sections of the highway were separated by a so-called island, approximately 8 feet in width. In the center of said intersection was a concrete structure on which was located a traffic light. It may be noted in this connection that the intersection was, at the time of the occurrence in question, protected by 3 signal lights designed to regulate traffic passing through it.
Plaintiff’s proofs indicated that the police car approached the intersection at a rate of speed of approximately 35 miles per hour, that Officer Monberg did not decrease said rate as he entered and attempted to pass through the intersection, and that he did not see defendant’s car until it appeared directly in front of him in the middle lane for northbound traffic. In view of the manner of disposition of the case the testimony of Officer Monberg becomes of controlling significance. After testifying that as he approached the intersection he noted that the traffic light was red against northbound traffic on Miller road, and that 3 cars were standing at the intersection waiting for the signal to change, the following testimony indicates the situation that the witness claimed existed immediately prior to and at the time of the collision between the cars:
[102]*102“Q. What did you do when you saw these 3 cars ■waiting for a red light, officer, in front of you, that is?
“A. i think, to make it simple, I was about 150 feet behind the intersection. The 3 cars were lined up, stopped for the red light. The light turned green and these 3 cars proceeded on across the intersection on the green light, and I continued my course, going north.
“Q. Bid these cars start up and proceed through the intersection before you arrived at the intersection?
“A. Yes.
“Q. So then we now have your car here, with a light green, and 3 cars clear ahead of you. They have gone on beyond you, is that right?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Nov/, tell us what happened as you arrived at the intersection?
“A. As I entered the intersection on the green light, a car coming south on Miller road made a fast turn in front of me and a collision occurred.”
Following an explanation by the witness as to where the cars were at the time of the collision, he continued his testimony as follows:
“The Court: The front portion of the plaintiff’s ear appears to strike the car driven by the defendant, at the right rear wheel, is that right?
“A. Yes.
“Mr. Campbell: That is correct.
“Q. Is that where you remember striking the other car?
“A. Approximately there, between the center post and the rear fender there, on the pink car.
“Q. Between the center post and the rear fender ■■of the pink car?
“A. Yes. That is approximately the way it happened, right here, just about so, and then from the collision;our car—
[103]*103“Q. Never mind that at the moment. I just want you to show us, as best you remember, where the point of impact was, and if you don’t remember, tell us.
“A. That is approximately it.
“Q. Now7, just before this collision occurred, I believe you testified that the light was green, and you were about here. Now, between the time that — from here to the point where the 2 cars collided, did you at any time see the other car, officer?.
“A. No. All I saw from the other car was a blue flash in front of the scout car.
“Q. You say an instant, is that right?
“A. Yes, just — just an instant. (Witness snaps fingers.)
“Q. Now, after this accident, did you have any discussion with the man who w7as driving the other car?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Is he here in court today?
“A. Yes, he is.
“Q. Where is he?
“A. The gentleman in the checkerboard sport jacket.
“Mr. Campbell: Referring to the defendant, Eli Bacila.
“Mr. Garlow: Yes.
“Q. Did you discuss how7 this accident happened, with Mr. Bacila, or did he discuss it w7ith you?
“A. I asked him how come he run the red light. He said he thought he had enough time.”
The following testimony on cross-examination further tends to explain the situation at the time of the accident, and the basis for the action of the circuit judge in granting defendant’s motion at the conclusion of the proofs:
“Q. Now, Officer Monberg, when you saw the 3 cars ahead of you on Miller, at the' intersection, I believe you testified at that time you were 150 feet back from the intersection, is that right?
[104]*104“A. Approximately 150 feet back from tbe intersection.
“Q. What was your speed at that time?
“A. Approximately 35 miles an hour.
“Q. What is the speed limit on Miller?
*‘A. 35 miles an hour.
“Q. And at about that time the light turned green and the 3 cars ahead of you proceeded, is that correct?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Were you in the center of the northbound lanes of travel of Miller at that time?
“A. Yes, I was in the center lane.
“Q. You didn’t change lane.s?
“A. I didn’t change lanes.
“Q. What was your speed as you entered the intersection of Miller and Eagle Pass?
“A. Approximately 35 miles an hour.
“Q. Still 35?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And what was the color of the light for northbound and southbound Miller traffic?
“A. It was green.
“Q. Now, when was the first time — strike that. You stated'that you saw a blue flash, as the other car, is that correct?
“A. Yes, the flash of the color.
“Q. Was that the first time that you had seen the other car ?
“A. That is the first time I saw the other car.
“Q. And you were already into the intersection at that time?
“A. I was in the intersection.
“Q. And when you saw the blue flash, what did you do?
“A. As soon as I saw the flash, there was a collision.
“Q. You didn’t put on your brakes?
“A. I didn’t have time.
[105]*105“Q. You didn’t take your foot off: the accelerator?
“A. Oh, I believe I took my foot off the accelerator, but I don’t believe there was any braking.
“Q. Did you make any attempt to turn right or left to avoid the collision?
“A. I don’t really remember if I did or not, because as soon as the collision occurred, we were turned around, and went backwards into a post on the opposite corner.
“Q. Now, the other car, which you have identified as a blue flash, wa<s it in the position as yon have already indicated on the board,- at the time that you saw it?
“A. Just as we — this car came around here. My lights were on, of course, and all I saw was the flash of the car, the blue flash, the color of the car, coming through the intersection. Just at the instant I saw the color of the car, the collision occurred.
“The Court: "When you say a blue flash, it wasn’t a flash, was it?
“A. Well, it was the color of the other man’s automobile.
“The Court: What you saw, then, was a blue automobile in front of you?
“A. Yes. The color — the color across the headlights of my car. * * *
“Q. And the blue car was moving from west to east, I think you said?
“A. The car was moving across the intersection, on a left turn.
“Q. I wonder if you could tell us how far in front of your scout car that blue car was when you first saw it?
“A. I would say approximately 10 to 15 feet.
“Q. So of your own knowledge and your own observations, you don’t know that the blue car had been traveling south on Miller and made a left turn in front of you?
“A. I didn’t see the car coming, south on Miller, no.
[106]*106“Q. That is your deduction, not your observation, is that right?
“A. That is my — yes, my deduction.”
The testimony of the other police officer indicated that he was not concerning himself with the operation of the police car. Apparently his observations were general in nature, and immediately before the collision occurred he had been looking to the east. He did not notice defendant’s car until it was immediately in front of plaintiff’s vehicle and proceediiig in an easterly direction. He was unable to testify as to the speed of either vehicle.
In stressing their claim as to defendant’s conduct, counsel for appellant call attention to CLS 1956, § 257.650 (Stat Ann 1952 Rev § 9.2350), which reads-as follows:
“The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver, having so yielded and having given a signal when and as required by this chapter, may make such left turn and the drivers of all other vehicles 'approaching the intersection from said opposite direction shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle making the left turn: Provided, That at an intersection at which a traffic signal is located, a driver intending to make a left turn shall permit vehicles bound straight through in the opposite-direction which are awaiting a go signal to pass through the intersection before making the turn.”
The interpretation of the above section was considered in Neander v. Clampett, 344 Mich 292, 295, where it was said:
“Next, plaintiff says that the court erred in charging that after defendant entered the intersection he was required to yield to vehicles approach[107]*107ing from the opposite direction, which, were either in or near the intersection, and to give the appropriate signal, and that then he might proceed to turn left and that other vehicles approaching from' the opposite direction at a greater distance were then required to yield the right-of-way to defendant'. ■ The instruction was in accord with CLS 1954, § 257.-650 (Stat Ann 1952 Rev § 9.2350), and was not in error. Plaintiff’s contention that it was improperly given appears to stem from her position that the law required defendant, after entering the -intersection under a favorable green light, to stop and wait for a change in the traffic light before completing the left turn. We are cited to no statutory or ordinance authority for that view.”
Plaintiff’s - argument undertakes to assume that defendant was guilty of violating the statute. In view of the fact, however, that the police car was at least 150 feet south of the intersection when the light turned, and in the absence of proof as to the precise location of defendant’s automobile at the time, the propriety of the assumption is open to question. Apparently plaintiff relies to some extent on an ordinance of the city which was not pleaded or offered in evidence in the case. However, the circuit judge entered judgment for defendant on the ground that plaintiff had not established the freedom of its driver from contributory negligence, such finding-being based on plaintiff’s proofs indicating that either the driver of the police car had not made observations for other traffic that might enter the intersection ahead of him, or that he had failed to see defendant’s automobile at any time prior to the instant of the impact.
Plaintiff’s employee owed the duty of making proper observations for' other traffic as he approached and entered the intersection. There was nothing to prevent the observance of such duty and [108]*108the exercise of reasonable precautions in driving through the intersection. It must be assumed that he had in mind the rights of other drivers to use the intersection. We think the testimony on which the judgment was based clearly supported the factual findings of the circuit judge. The testimony of plaintiff’s driver, above set forth at some length, clearly indicates the situation that existed. The facts here involved are not analogous to the situation shown in Travis v. Eisenlord, 256 Mich 264.
In view of the conclusion reached on the main question at issue, it becomes unnecessary to consider the effect of plaintiff’s failure to offer proof of damages on the trial in circuit court. The parties are apparently in accord that in the municipal court trial there was a stipulation as to the amount of recovery if plaintiff was found entitled to damages. As suggested, however, the effect, if any, to be. given such stipulation in circuit court does not require determination.
The judgment entered in circuit court is affirmed. Defendant may have costs.
Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly, J., concurred with Carr, J.