Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Department of Justice

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: March 30, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-1497
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 1497 (LLA) v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) filed this suit

pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking records related to

the now-closed criminal investigation of former Congressman Matt Gaetz (Count I). ECF No. 1.

CREW also claims that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) violated FOIA by employing a policy

or practice of refusing to confirm or deny the existence of records related to investigations of public

officials (known as a Glomar response) (Count II). Id.1 Before the court are CREW’s motion for

summary judgment on Count I, ECF No. 22, and the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment

on Count II, ECF Nos. 18, 23. For the reasons explained below, the court denies CREW’s motion

for summary judgment on Count I as moot and denies both parties’ motions for summary judgment

on Count II.

1 CREW also brought a claim that DOJ violated FOIA by categorically withholding records without conducting a case-by-case analysis (Count III), ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 46-51, which the court dismissed, ECF No. 12, at 21-24. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Gaetz Request (Count I)

In February 2023, CREW submitted a FOIA request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(“FBI”) and DOJ seeking

all records related to the now-closed investigation conducted by DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) of Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL) that are not covered by grand jury secrecy pursuant to Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including but not limited to DOJ’s decision not to bring criminal charges against Rep. Gaetz.

ECF No. 22-3, at 6.2 CREW sought the records because they would “help explain why

Rep. Gaetz—a prominent member of Congress—was not charged with any crime despite public

reporting suggesting an abundance of evidence that he likely violated sex-trafficking laws and the

conviction of his close associate on similar charges.” Id. at 8. It further argued that “[t]he public

has a vital interest in learning whether the decision not to prosecute Rep. Gaetz was motivated,

even in part, by considerations apart from the sufficiency of the evidence against him.” Id.

In November 2023, the FBI “categorically denied” CREW’s request pursuant to FOIA

Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. at 14; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).3 While the FBI acknowledged that it

had completed a search for responsive records, it declined to reveal them because doing so “would

constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” ECF No. 22-3, at 14. CREW

2 When citing ECF Nos. 18-3 to 18-6, 22-3, 23-2, 23-3, 29-1 to 29-3, and 32, the court refers to the CM/ECF-generated numbers at the top of each page rather than any internal pagination. 3 Exemption 6 carves out “personnel . . . [,] medical . . . [,] and similar files[,] the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Meanwhile, Exemption 7(C) excuses disclosure of “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).

2 administratively appealed the FBI’s decision, id. at 19-23, and that appeal was closed in

September 2024 after CREW filed this suit, id. at 25 (“[A]n appeal ordinarily will not be acted

upon by [DOJ] if the FOIA request becomes the subject of litigation.”); see 28 C.F.R. § 16.8(b)(2).

In October 2024, the FBI notified CREW that it was reviewing responsive records “on an interim

basis for segregability.” ECF No. 22-3, at 27.

B. CREW’S FOIA Requests Concerning Investigations of Public Officials (Count II)

In recent years, CREW has filed more than a dozen FOIA requests to various DOJ

divisions, also known as components, seeking records related to investigations of public officials.

In response to some of these requests, DOJ components have issued “Glomar” responses, neither

confirming nor denying the existence of responsive records. These responses have led CREW to

believe that DOJ has a policy or practice of “issuing Glomar responses to CREW simply because

a FOIA request seeks records relating to an investigation of a third party, even when that

investigation has been publicly disclosed,” in violation of FOIA. ECF No. 1 ¶ 43. Responses to

these requests by five DOJ components—the FBI, Criminal Division, Executive Office of United

States Attorneys (“EOUSA”), Office of Information Policy (“OIP”), and Office of Professional

Responsibility (“OPR”)—form the basis for CREW’s policy-or-practice claim.

1. Morehead request

In April 2024, CREW submitted a request to the EOUSA and OPR seeking records relating

to former Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) Terra Morehead’s “proven or alleged violations” of

the law, Constitution, DOJ’s U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Kansas’s disciplinary rules, or “any other

professional misconduct.” ECF No. 23-3, at 156-57. The request also sought “[a]ll records

relating to any DOJ investigations, actions . . . , or decisions not to take action, in regard to

3 AUSA Morehead’s conduct as an AUSA or prosecutor for the State of Kansas.” Id. at 157. In the

request, CREW cited examples of federal courts criticizing AUSA Morehead “for her serious

misconduct as a federal prosecutor related to undue influence of witnesses, failure to disclose

material information, and unauthorized access to attorney-client communications.” Id. at 158; see

ECF No. 23-2, at 8 ¶ 33.

The next day, the EOUSA issued a response stating that “[t]o the extent that non-public

responsive records exist, without consent, proof of death, or an overriding public interest,

disclosure of law enforcement records concerning an individual could reasonably be expected to

constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and citing FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

ECF No. 23-3, at 163. The EOUSA also wrote that “[b]ecause any non-public records responsive

to [the] request would be categorically exempt from disclosure, this Office is not required to

conduct a search for the requested records.” Id. In November 2024, OPR issued its response,

stating that it “refuse[d] to confirm or deny the existence of any records that are subject to the

protection of Exemption 6” and “[t]o the extent that [the] request seeks law enforcement records,

OPR refuse[d] to confirm or deny the existence of records responsive to [the] request pursuant to”

Exemption 7(C). Id. at 168.

2. Kelsey request

In April 2023, CREW submitted a request to the Criminal Division and two U.S.

Attorney’s Offices seeking “all documents related to DOJ’s investigation of Tennessee State

Senator Brian Kelsey for violating campaign finance laws and conspiring to defraud the Federal

Election Commission (‘FEC’) as part of a scheme to benefit his 2016 campaign for U.S. Congress”

that mention seven names, including, as relevant here, “Amanda Bunning Kelsey (formerly

Amanda Bunning)” and “Josh Smith.” Id. at 147. In its request, CREW stated that DOJ had

4 “issued a press release announcing that Senator Kelsey had pleaded guilty to violating campaign

finance laws and conspiring to defraud the FEC.” Id. at 148; see ECF No. 23-2, at 3 ¶ 8. The

request also cited a local news article reporting on Senator Kelsey’s guilty plea and his

co-conspirators. ECF No. 23-3, at 149.

In response, the Criminal Division addressed the part of CREW’s request regarding

Mr. Smith separately from the other six names. Id. at 153. With respect to Mr. Smith, the Criminal

Division responded that “to the extent that non-public responsive records exist, without consent,

proof of death, or an overriding public interest, disclosure of law enforcement records concerning

an individual could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy” and

cited Exemption 7(C). Id. And with respect to the rest of CREW’s request, including records

mentioning Ms. Bunning, the Criminal Division “decided to neither confirm nor deny the existence

of [responsive] records pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C).” Id. CREW then administratively

appealed, and OIP affirmed the Criminal Division’s determinations. ECF No. 18-3, at 21-22.

3. Fortenberry request

In March 2025, CREW submitted a request to the EOUSA and Criminal Division seeking

“[a]ll records relating to the investigation of former United States Representative Jeffrey

Fortenberry [for] proven or alleged violations . . . of any provisions of law or constitution,

including but not limited to those relating to his indictment by a federal grand jury” in

October 2021, as well as “[a]ll records relating to any DOJ investigations, actions, or decisions not

to take action, . . . including but not limited to records related to DOJ’s motion to dismiss”

Representative Fortenberry’s indictment with prejudice. ECF No. 23-3, at 191-92. The request

cited a DOJ press release announcing that Representative Fortenberry had been indicted by a grand

jury. Id. at 192.

5 In response, the EOUSA stated that “[t]o the extent that non-public responsive records

exist, without consent, proof of death, or an overriding public interest, disclosure of law

enforcement records concerning an individual could reasonably be expected to constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and cited Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. at 196. The

Criminal Division responded that CREW’s request appeared to seek investigation records

maintained by a U.S. Attorney’s Office, so the EOUSA was the proper recipient of the request.

Id. at 201. The Criminal Division further stated that “[t]o the extent [CREW was] seeking other

investigation records on . . . Representative Jeffrey Fortenberry, . . . [it] decided to neither confirm

nor deny the existence of such records” pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id.

4. Evans request

In March 2023, CREW submitted a request to the EOUSA seeking the “full case file of the

United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia for United States v. Derrick Evans,

21-cr-337 (D.D.C), including but not limited to any video evidence or other evidence documenting

Evans’ actions on or around January 6, 2021.” Id. at 204. The request explained that then-West

Virginia House Delegate Evans had “pled guilty to a felony charge in which, as part of his plea

agreement, he admitted to joining the mob, breaching the Capitol, obstructing law enforcement

during a civil disorder, and disrupting the certification of the 2020 presidential election.” Id.

at 205.

In response, the EOUSA stated that “[r]ecords pertaining to a third party generally cannot

be released absent express authorization and consent of the third party, proof that the subject of

[the] request is deceased, or a clear demonstration that the public interest in disclosure outweighs

the personal privacy interest and that significant public benefit would result from the disclosure of

the requested records.” Id. at 209. Because CREW had not made any such showing, the EOUSA

6 explained that “the release of records concerning a third party would result in an unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy and would be in violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.§ 552a” and

that such records were “generally exempt from disclosure” pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

Id.

5. Mastriano request

In September 2022, CREW submitted a request to the FBI seeking “[a]ll interview notes,

summaries, memoranda, video recordings, audio recordings, or other records concerning

Pennsylvania State Senator Douglas Mastriano,” “[a]ll records provided by Senator Mastriano to

the FBI,” and “[a]ll complaints, tips, referrals, allegations, or other submissions received by the

FBI relating to Senator Mastriano.” ECF No. 18-4, at 20; see ECF No. 23-2 at 4 ¶ 15. The request

stated that, according to a news article, “Senator Mastriano’s attorney ha[d] publicly

acknowledged Mastriano ‘sat for a voluntary interview with the FBI’ regarding [his involvement

in the ‘Stop the Steal’ movement] and claim[ed] ‘the FBI cleared him.’” ECF No. 18-4, at 21

(citation omitted); see ECF No. 23-2, at 4 ¶ 16.

Later that month, the FBI advised that it would “neither confirm nor deny the existence of

such records” pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). ECF No. 18-4, at 27 (“The mere

acknowledgement of the existence of FBI records on third[-]party individuals could reasonably be

expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”). CREW then

administratively appealed, arguing that the FBI could not issue a Glomar response where, as here,

the “subject of a law enforcement investigation ha[d] publicly disclosed the existence of the

investigation.” Id. at 34. CREW also argued that there was a significant public interest in “shining

a light on the FBI’s investigation of the unprecedented January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol

[and] the FBI’s alleged decision to clear Mr. Mastriano of any wrongdoing,” which rendered

7 improper the FBI’s “categorical withholding” of records. Id. at 34-35 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

OIP then partially remanded the request to the FBI for “further review of the first subpart

of [the] request”—regarding interview records—and affirmed the FBI’s response as to the rest of

the request. Id. at 39. On remand, the FBI determined that the first part of CREW’s request sought

“records on a third[-]party individual that is exempt from disclosure” pursuant to Exemptions 6

and 7(C), and it closed CREW’s request. Id. at 44.

6. Egyptian President request

In September 2024, CREW submitted to the FBI, OIP, and the EOUSA a request for “all

records related to the now-closed investigation conducted by DOJ and the [FBI] concerning a $10

million withdrawal from the National Bank of Egypt which aligned with classified U.S.

intelligence indicating that Egyptian President Abdel Fatah El-Sisi sought to give $10 million to

support former President Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign.” ECF No. 23-3, at 213.

CREW’s request cited a news article reporting on DOJ’s investigation. Id. at 214.

In its response, the FBI stated that the request sought “records on one or more third[-]party

individuals” and declined to confirm or deny the existence of such records pursuant to

Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. at 218. The FBI also refused to confirm or deny the existence of

responsive records by invoking Exemption 1, which protects against disclosure of classified

national security information, and Exemption 7(E), which protects law-enforcement records that

would “disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions.”

Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (b)(7)(E).

8 7. Giuliani and Kallstrom requests

In November 2016, CREW submitted a request to the FBI for “all communications

between any agents or employees of the [FBI] and Rudy Giuliani from July 4, 2016 to the present.”

ECF No. 23-3, at 223. The request cited statements made by former New York City

Mayor Giuliani to news outlets referring to his conversations with FBI agents about the FBI’s

investigation of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Id. at 224. CREW submitted the same

request for “communications between any agents or employees of the [FBI] and James Kallstrom

from October 1, 2015 to the present.” Id. at 227. CREW’s request cited statements made by

Mr. Kallstrom, a former FBI official, about discussions with FBI agents about the Clinton

investigation. Id. at 228. In response to both requests, the FBI declined to confirm or deny the

existence of responsive records in the absence of “an authorization and consent from the

individual(s),” “proof of death,” or “a justification that the public interest in disclosure outweighs

personal privacy,” citing Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. at 231, 234.

8. Kindred request

In August 2024, CREW submitted a FOIA request to the EOUSA, OPR, and the Office of

the Inspector General, seeking internal communications among employees of the U.S. Attorney’s

Office for the District of Alaska and Office of the Federal Defender for the District of Alaska

relating to misconduct by former federal judge Joshua Kindred and relating to the AUSA “from

whom Judge Kindred received nude photographs (as found by the Judicial Council of the Ninth

Circuit on May 23, 2024).” Id. at 237-38. The request also sought “[a]ll records of any DOJ

investigations, actions . . . , or decisions not to take action, in regard to any communication

between Judge Kindred” and the AUSA. Id. at 238. CREW’s request cited a Judicial Council of

9 the Ninth Circuit order and certification finding that Judge Kindred had engaged in misconduct.

Id. at 239-40.

The EOUSA responded that CREW was requesting records concerning a “third party” and

that “[t]o the extent that non-public responsive records exist, without consent, proof of death, or

an overriding public interest, disclosure of law enforcement records concerning an individual could

reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” and it cited

Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. at 243. Accordingly, the EOUSA stated that it was “not required to

conduct a search” because “any non-public records responsive to [the] request would be

categorically exempt from disclosure.” Id. The EOUSA also noted that the request sought

“records concerning Joshua Kindred” and declined to confirm or deny the existence of such records

pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id.

9. Zinke request

In March 2022, CREW submitted a request to the Criminal Division seeking “[a]ll records

relating to U.S. Department of Interior Office of Inspector General (‘Interior OIG’) referral to DOJ

concerning its finding that former Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke” violated various ethical

standards and “[a]ll records relating to DOJ’s summer 2021 decision to decline prosecution of

Ryan Zinke following Interior OIG’s referral.” ECF No. 18-3, at 24. In its request, CREW

indicated that, the previous month, the “Interior OIG [had] stated in a public report that DOJ

declined to prosecute the former Secretary of the Interior following a referral by the Interior OIG.”

Id. at 25; see ECF No. 23-2, at 2 ¶ 3.

The following month, the Criminal Division responded that “[t]o the extent that non-public

responsive records exist, without consent, proof of death, or an overriding public interest,

disclosure of law enforcement records concerning an individual could reasonably be expected to

10 constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy” and cited Exemption 7(C). ECF No. 18-3, at 29.

CREW administratively appealed the Criminal Division’s determination, and OIP remanded the

request to the Criminal Division for further processing. Id. at 32. The Criminal Division

acknowledged receipt of the request and initiated a search, but it notified CREW that its request

presented “unusual circumstances” warranting an extension of time for the agency to respond. Id.

at 35; see id. at 4-5 ¶ 9 (providing no further update on the Criminal Division’s response).

10. Trump companies request

In February 2017, CREW submitted a request to the Criminal Division seeking “all records

related to investigations conducted by DOJ and the [FBI] of companies owned or associated with

Donald J. Trump, including, but not limited to, investigations under the Foreign Corrupt Practices

Act” that used various search terms. ECF No. 23-3, at 139-40. In response, the Criminal Division

declined to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records, explaining that, “with respect to

the named individual, lacking their consent, proof of death, an official acknowledgment of an

investigation of them, or an overriding public interest, even to acknowledge the existence of such

records pertaining to this individual would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy and could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of their personal

privacy” under Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. at 144.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

CREW filed this action against DOJ in May 2024, raising three counts under FOIA. ECF

No. 1. First, CREW alleged that DOJ had wrongfully withheld responsive records relating to the

investigation of former Representative Gaetz (Count I). Id. ¶¶ 36-41. Next, it argued that DOJ

and its components had improperly adopted a blanket policy of issuing Glomar responses to any

11 request for records relating to publicly disclosed investigations of public officials (Count II). Id.

¶¶ 42-45. Finally, it alleged that DOJ and its components had also improperly adopted a policy of

categorically denying such requests “without conducting any case-by-case balancing of the public

and private interests at stake” (Count III). Id. ¶¶ 46-51. CREW sought declaratory and injunctive

relief. Id. at 11-12.

In July 2024, DOJ moved to dismiss Counts II and III under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 8. The court denied the motion as to Count II, finding that CREW

had plausibly alleged that DOJ “adopted, endorsed, or implemented” a policy or practice that

violates FOIA. ECF No. 12, at 17-18 (quoting Muttitt v. Dep’t of State, 926 F. Supp. 2d 284, 293

(D.D.C. 2013) (“Muttitt II”)). Specifically, CREW had shown that various DOJ components

provided Glomar responses to six of its FOIA requests seeking records relating to a publicly

disclosed investigation of a public official. See id. at 9-20. The court granted DOJ’s motion to

dismiss Count III, however, determining that CREW had not sufficiently alleged a

policy-or-practice claim based on the FBI’s categorical denials. Id. at 21-24.

DOJ then filed an answer, ECF No. 15, and a motion for summary judgment on Count II,

ECF No. 18. CREW filed a motion for summary judgment on Count I, ECF No. 22, and a

cross-motion for summary judgment on Count II, ECF No. 23. In March 2026, DOJ filed a status

report indicating that the FBI had made its first production of records in response to CREW’s

request relating to the investigation of Representative Gaetz and that approximately 8,500

potentially responsive pages remain to be processed. ECF No. 32, at 4. The parties’ motions for

summary judgment are fully briefed. ECF Nos. 18, 22 to 24, 29 to 31.

12 III. LEGAL STANDARDS

The purpose of FOIA is “to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency

action to the light of public scrutiny.” Am. C.L. Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 655 F.3d 1, 5

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (“ACLU I”) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)).

Congress nonetheless included nine exemptions from disclosure that “are intended to balance the

public’s interest in governmental transparency against the legitimate governmental and private

interests [that] could be harmed by release of certain types of information.” Tipograph v. Dep’t of

Just., 83 F. Supp. 3d 234, 238 (D.D.C. 2015) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 601 F.3d 557, 559 (D.C. Cir. 2010));

see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), (a)(8)(A)(i), (b)(1)-(9).

Unless the requested records fall under one of FOIA’s nine exemptions, an agency must

generally search for and disclose any documents responsive to a request. In some cases, however,

“merely acknowledging the existence of responsive records would itself ‘cause harm cognizable

under [a] FOIA exception.’” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Nat’l Insts. of Health,

Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 745 F.3d 535, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“PETA”) (alteration in

original) (quoting Wolf v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). In such cases,

an agency may issue a Glomar response, “refus[ing] to confirm or deny the existence or

nonexistence of responsive records.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926, 931

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (“EPIC I”).4 A Glomar response is therefore “an exception to the general rule

that agencies must acknowledge the existence of information responsive to a FOIA request and

4 The Glomar response takes its name from the ship involved in Phillippi v. Central Intelligence Agency, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In that case, the Central Intelligence Agency refused to confirm or deny the existence of records about a ship called the “Hughes Glomar Explorer,” which was used in a classified Cold-War-era project.

13 provide specific, non-conclusory justifications for withholding that information.” Am. C.L. Union

v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 710 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“ACLU II”) (quoting Roth v. U.S. Dep’t

of Just., 642 F.3d 1161, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). An agency may issue a Glomar response only “if

the fact of the existence or nonexistence of agency records falls within a FOIA exemption.” PETA,

745 F.3d at 540 (quoting Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374).

As an alternative to a Glomar response, an agency may respond to a FOIA request with a

“categorical denial,” which is a categorical withholding of the contents of records pursuant to a

FOIA exception. Jurdi v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 3d 83, 92 (D.D.C. 2020); see Citizens for

Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 746 F.3d 1082, 1088-89 (D.C. Cir. 2014)

(“CREW I”) (explaining that categorical treatment is appropriate “only when the range of

circumstances included in the category characteristically supports an inference that the statutory

requirements for exemption are satisfied” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

While FOIA requests must generally be litigated individually, there is a narrow exception

permitting a plaintiff to raise a “policy or practice” claim under FOIA when the plaintiff argues

“that an agency policy or practice will impair [the plaintiff’s] lawful access to information in the

future.” Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 249 F. Supp. 3d 275, 281 (D.D.C. 2017)

(quoting Newport Aeronautical Sales v. Dep’t of Air Force, 684 F.3d 160, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).5

A plaintiff can establish such a claim by showing that an agency “has adopted, endorsed, or

implemented some policy or practice that constitutes an ongoing ‘failure to abide by the terms of

the FOIA.’” Muttitt II, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 293 (quoting Payne Enters., Inc. v. United States, 837

5 Courts in this Circuit use the terms “policy or practice” and “pattern or practice” interchangeably in addressing this type of FOIA claim. This court will use “policy or practice,” which is the D.C. Circuit’s chosen terminology. See Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 895 F.3d 770, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

14 F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). The policy can be “informal, rather than articulated in regulations

or an official statement.” Muttitt v. U.S. Cent. Command, 813 F. Supp. 2d 221, 231 (D.D.C. 2011)

(“Muttitt I”) (quoting Payne Enters., 837 F.2d at 491). “[I]solated” incidents of noncompliance

do not suffice. Payne Enters., 837 F.2d at 491.

“[T]he vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on summary judgment.” Brayton v.

Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011). A court should grant

summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary

judgment is properly granted against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The burden is on

the moving party to show that there is an “absence of a genuine issue of material fact” in dispute.

Id. at 323.

When the propriety of a Glomar response or the applicability of an exemption is at issue,

summary judgment may be awarded to the agency based solely on the agency’s affidavits or

declarations. See Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009). A court “may

grant summary judgment on the basis of agency affidavits that contain ‘reasonable specificity of

detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by

contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.’” EPIC I, 678 F.3d at 931

(quoting Gardels v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); see SafeCard

Servs., Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining that agency

affidavits and declarations are “accorded a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted

by ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents’”

15 (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981))).

“Ultimately, an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears

‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’” EPIC I, 678 F.3d at 931 (quoting Larson, 565 F.3d at 862). With respect

to policy-or-practice claims, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged policy

or practice exists and that it “will impair the [plaintiff’s] lawful access to information in the future.”

Am. Ctr. for L. & Just., 249 F. Supp. 3d at 281 (quoting Newport Aeronautical Sales, 684 F.3d

at 164); see Nat’l Sec. Couns. v. Cent. Intel Agency, 960 F. Supp. 2d 101, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Count I

The court begins by addressing Count I, which challenges DOJ’s categorical withholding

of responsive records relating to its investigation of former Representative Gaetz. After CREW

moved for summary judgment on Count I, DOJ withdrew its categorical denial of CREW’s request

for records relating to the investigation of Representative Gaetz and agreed to “process CREW’s

request and produce responsive, non-exempt records.” ECF No. 29, at 18 (noting that DOJ had

learned of Representative Gaetz’s “public acknowledgement of the existence of a DOJ

investigation implicating his official duties”); see ECF No. 32, at 4 (stating that the FBI released

thirty-nine pages to CREW on March 9, 2026 and “is making monthly interim releases” for the

remaining 8,500 potentially responsive pages). DOJ requests that the court deny as moot CREW’s

motion for summary judgment on Count I, ECF No. 29, at 18, and CREW does not oppose the

request, ECF No. 31, at 23. The court accordingly denies CREW’s motion for summary judgment

on Count I. CREW may renew its motion in the event that DOJ fails to effectively process its

request.

16 B. Count II

In Count II, CREW contends that DOJ has a policy or practice of issuing improper Glomar

responses to FOIA requests seeking records related to publicly disclosed investigations of public

officials. ECF No. 1 ¶ 43; see ECF No. 23-1, at 21 (criticizing DOJ’s “knee-jerk Glomar

responses”).6 In CREW’s view, this policy or practice has two aspects: (1) DOJ’s failure to

consider whether it has already disclosed the existence of responsive records, which would waive

the agency’s right to invoke a Glomar response under the “official acknowledgment” doctrine, see

ECF No. 23-1, at 23-29; and (2) DOJ’s misapplication of governing legal standards when

determining whether a non-Glomar response would actually cause harm under FOIA

Exemptions 6 and 7(C), see id. at 12-19, 29-34. As support, CREW points to ten FOIA requests

for which it received Glomar responses.7 Id. at 20-34.

DOJ disputes both aspects of this alleged policy, asserting that its components “process[]

FOIA requests pertaining to third-party investigations by performing an individualized analysis”

6 CREW has standing to pursue its policy-or-practice claim because of its “clear intent,” Nat’l Sec. Couns. v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 931 F. Supp. 2d 77, 93 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), to file further FOIA requests for records relating to publicly disclosed investigations, as evidenced by the slew of FOIA requests it has submitted in recent years, see generally ECF No. 23-3, and its stated “inten[t] to submit similar requests in the future,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 35. These future requests are “themselves likely to implicate the challenged policies in the future.” Nat’l Sec. Couns., 931 F. Supp. 2d at 93. 7 CREW relies on four requests cited in its complaint, see ECF No. 1 ¶ 31; ECF Nos. 1-9, 1-12 to 1-15 (Morehead, Kelsey, Zinke, and Mastriano requests), and additional requests raised for the first time in its summary judgment briefing, see ECF No. 23-1, at 21, 27-28, 31-34 (Trump companies, Fortenberry, Evans, Egyptian President, Giuliani/Kallstrom, and Kindred requests). While DOJ notes that CREW “cites additional FOIA requests for the first time in its [cross-motion and] opposition,” DOJ does not object to the court’s consideration of all of CREW’s requests. ECF No. 29, at 6. CREW’s complaint also cited requests it had submitted to the EOUSA and OIP for records relating to DOJ investigations of Mr. Giuliani. See ECF Nos. 1-10, 1-11; see also ECF No. 18-5, at 18; ECF No. 18-6, at 8. Since CREW does not rely on DOJ’s Glomar responses to these requests in its summary judgment briefing, see ECF No. 23-1, at 32 n.10, the court declines to address them.

17 in accordance with FOIA. ECF No. 18-1, at 14. As support, DOJ submitted seven declarations

from officials who oversee FOIA requests for the relevant components: the Criminal Division, see

ECF No. 18-3 (O’Keefe Declaration); ECF No. 29-3 (Butler Declaration); the FBI, see ECF

No. 18-4 (Hammer Declaration); the EOUSA, see ECF No. 18-6 (Jolly Declaration); ECF

No. 29-1 (Supplemental Jolly Declaration); OIP, see ECF No. 18-5 (O’Neill Declaration); and

OPR, see ECF No. 29-2 (McCarty Declaration).

The court concludes that CREW has not carried its burden of showing that DOJ has an

across-the-board policy or practice of issuing Glomar responses whenever a FOIA request for

investigation-related records identifies a subject by name, and it will accordingly deny CREW’s

motion for summary judgment on Count II. But that does not mean that DOJ is entitled to

summary judgment, because CREW has identified ways in which individual DOJ components

appear to be acting inconsistently with FOIA in a manner that could support component-specific

policy-or-practice claims. The court begins by addressing the propriety of DOJ’s challenged

Glomar responses before turning to whether the deficiencies identified by CREW—and further

revealed in DOJ’s declarations—establish a policy or practice that violates FOIA.

1. Official agency acknowledgment

CREW argues that DOJ ignores evidence that the agency has officially acknowledged the

existence of an investigation, pointing to four examples of FOIA requests it submitted to DOJ

components. ECF No. 23-1, at 24-28. Under the “official acknowledgment doctrine,” an agency’s

official acknowledgment of the existence of a requested record waives the agency’s right to make

a Glomar response. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 11 F.4th

810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see ACLU II, 710 F.3d at 427 (“[T]he plaintiff can overcome a Glomar

response by showing that the agency has already disclosed the fact of the existence (or

18 nonexistence) of responsive records, since that is the purportedly exempt information that a

Glomar response is designed to protect.”).8 “To establish official acknowledgment, a plaintiff

must identify information in the public domain that (1) matches the information requested, (2) is

as specific, and (3) has ‘been made public through an official and documented disclosure.’” Knight

First Amend. Inst., 11 F.4th at 815 (quoting Fitzgibbon v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 911 F.2d 755, 765

(D.C. Cir. 1990)). The requester “must pinpoint an agency record that both matches the plaintiff’s

request and has been publicly and officially acknowledged by the agency.” Montgomery v.

Internal Revenue Serv., 356 F. Supp. 3d 74, 82 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting James Madison Project v.

Dep’t of Just., 302 F. Supp. 3d 12, 21 (D.D.C. 2018)). In the Glomar context, an official disclosure

need only establish the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to the FOIA request, even

if the contents of the records themselves have not been disclosed. ACLU II, 710 F.3d at 427. The

D.C. Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that courts must apply the official-acknowledgment test

strictly, because “the fact that information exists in some form in the public domain does not

necessarily mean that official disclosure will not cause harm cognizable under a FOIA exemption.”

BuzzFeed, Inc. v. Dep’t of Just., 344 F. Supp. 3d 396, 408 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Wolf, 473 F.3d

at 378). “Disclosure by one federal agency does not waive another agency’s right to assert a FOIA

exemption.” Mobley v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 806 F.3d 568, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Similarly, “[t]he

press and other non-official sources cannot waive the government’s right to invoke a Glomar

response.” Buzzfeed, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 408.

8 CREW refers to this rule as the “public domain exception,” see, e.g., ECF No. 23-1, at 24, and the D.C. Circuit has used “public domain” and “official acknowledgment” interchangeably when referring to this doctrine, see Nat’l Sec. Archive v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 104 F.4th 267, 274 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (clarifying that the public domain doctrine is not “separate and distinct from the official acknowledgement doctrine”).

19 a. Morehead request

CREW first objects to the EOUSA and OPR’s Glomar responses to its request for records

relating to AUSA Morehead. ECF No. 23-1, at 25-26; see ECF No. 23-3, at 156-69. In another

suit in this court, CREW challenged OPR’s Glomar response to this same request, arguing that

DOJ had officially acknowledged the existence of AUSA Morehead’s alleged misconduct. See

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep’t of Just., No. 24-CV-2416, 2025 WL 2206945, at *2

(D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2025) (“CREW II”). Specifically, CREW’s request identified testimony in court

by the acting U.S. Attorney for the District of Kansas—where AUSA Morehead worked—stating

that he was aware of allegations that AUSA Morehead had violated her prosecutorial obligations

and that no disciplinary consequences had been imposed for her misconduct. See id.; see also ECF

No. 23-3, at 158-60 (stating that the acting U.S. Attorney had testified in court that

AUSA “Morehead’s reputation for veracity is poor” and that “despite evidence of her conduct in

both this and other criminal cases, the government ha[d] confirmed that it ha[d] not imposed

internal sanctions or discipline against AUSA Morehead on the basis of untruthfulness” (quoting

CCA Recordings 2255 Litig. v. United States, No. 12-CR-20003-03, 2021 WL 5833911, at *10,

*24 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2021), aff’d sub. nom., United States v. Hohn, 123 F.4th 1084 (10th Cir.

2024) (en banc))). The court in CREW II agreed, finding that the acting U.S. Attorney’s testimony

“publicly acknowledged Morehead’s alleged violations of legal and ethical duties, as well as the

lack of discipline she faced,” such that DOJ could not “claim ‘it would reveal anything not already

in the public domain’ to say the agency has records related to those alleged violations.” 2025 WL

2206945, at *2 (quoting ACLU II, 710 F.3d at 430); see id. (concluding that the acting U.S.

Attorney’s statement that “he was ‘aware that there have been allegations’ of Morehead refusing

to provide Brady or Giglio evidence . . . ‘ma[de] it neither logical nor plausible to maintain that

20 the Agency d[id] not have any documents’ related to allegations of misconduct against Morehead”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). The court further explained that the acting U.S. Attorney’s

public acknowledgments could bind other DOJ components. Id.; see Marino v. Drug Enf’t Admin.,

685 F.3d 1076, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that if a DOJ prosecutor introduces certain records

as evidence in court, other DOJ components may not invoke a FOIA exemption as to those

records).

This court, however, takes a different view. It is true that official disclosures by one

component of an agency may bind other components of the same agency, and DOJ does not dispute

that rule as it applies to the Morehead request. But that is only one piece of the inquiry. The prior

disclosure must also “establish[] the existence (or not) of records responsive to the FOIA request.”

Leopold v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 987 F.3d 163, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (second emphasis added)

(quoting Wolf, 473 F.3d at 379). Here, to constitute an official acknowledgment, the acting U.S.

Attorney’s testimony must have established the existence of DOJ records relating to

AUSA Morehead’s alleged misconduct as a prosecutor and any DOJ investigation of such

misconduct. See ECF No. 23-3, at 167. Applying the official-acknowledgment test “strictly,”

Moore v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 666 F.3d 1330, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2011), as it must, the court cannot

conclude that the acting U.S. Attorney’s testimony stretches that far. The acting U.S. Attorney

stated that he was aware of misconduct allegations against AUSA Morehead, but these statements

were made in response to questions about whether the U.S. Attorney’s Office had disciplined

AUSA Morehead and judicial findings of AUSA Morehead’s misconduct as a federal prosecutor.

See ECF No. 23-3, at 176-89. And while the acting U.S. Attorney testified about

AUSA Morehead’s “poor [reputation] for veracity,” the attorney questioning him specifically

asked him to opine on AUSA Morehead’s reputation in the “legal community,” referring “not to

21 [the U.S. Attorney’s] [O]ffice but the larger legal community.” Id. at 188. The acting U.S.

Attorney did not acknowledge any inquiry into AUSA Morehead’s alleged misconduct by his

office, nor did he state that his office had independently received misconduct complaints or

allegations. Put differently, his disclosure of his own awareness of AUSA Morehead’s alleged

misconduct did not confirm the existence of DOJ records about that alleged misconduct.

CREW’s official-acknowledgment argument is even weaker with respect to its request for

records of AUSA Morehead’s alleged misconduct as a Kansas prosecutor and records of any DOJ

investigations of AUSA Morehead in that capacity. See id. at 167. The acting U.S. Attorney’s

testimony was limited to AUSA Morehead’s tenure as a federal prosecutor, see id. at 185

(attorney’s statement “limiting this [questioning of the acting U.S. Attorney] to when

[AUSA Morehead] was a federal prosecutor”), so it did not match the requested information in

CREW’s request. As the court in CREW II observed, see 2025 WL 2206945, at *2, the acting U.S.

Attorney stated that he was “not aware of any disciplinary action taken [against AUSA Morehead]

at any time for untruthfulness,” ECF No. 23-3, at 186; see id. at 177-87. But that disclosure does

not confirm that his office—or any other DOJ component—ever investigated or contemplated

sanctioning AUSA Morehead. Accordingly, based on the acting U.S. Attorney’s testimony, it is

entirely “‘logical’ [and] ‘plausible,’” ACLU II, 710 F.3d at 431, for DOJ to maintain that the

EOUSA and OPR do not have documents about AUSA Morehead’s alleged misconduct as a

federal or state prosecutor or about any DOJ investigation of her.

Finally, DOJ’s declarations further belie CREW’s assertion that the EOUSA and OPR—

the components that responded to the Morehead request—systematically ignore official

acknowledgments. DOJ offers two declarations from Vinay J. Jolly, an Attorney Advisor at the

EOUSA, to explain the component’s approach to official acknowledgments. ECF Nos. 18-6, 29-1.

22 Mr. Jolly avers that in assessing whether a Glomar response is appropriate, the “EOUSA

determines whether there has been a public disclosure of the investigation.” ECF No. 29-1, at 2

¶ 5. “In determining whether the investigation has been officially acknowledged, EOUSA

searches DOJ public websites, official government press releases, and news articles referencing a

verifiable acknowledgement from an official of the government authorized to make such

statements[,] and consults with the individual U.S. Attorney’s Office . . . .” Id. at 2 ¶ 6. As for

OPR, DOJ offers a declaration from OPR Senior Associate Counsel Margaret S. McCarty, who

asserts that OPR “conducted open-source research and did not find any acknowledgment by DOJ

of an investigation into Ms. Morehead’s conduct.” ECF No. 29-2, at 5 ¶ 22 (“[A] district court

later disagreed with OPR’s reasoning and found that, although there was no reference to an OPR

investigation specifically, there was evidence of public acknowledgment by the acting United

States Attorney of alleged legal and ethical wrongdoing by Ms. Morehead.”). CREW offers no

evidence of bad faith to rebut the presumption of good faith afforded to these declarations. See

SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1200.9

9 DOJ argues that the EOUSA’s response to the Morehead request was a categorical denial, not a Glomar response. ECF No. 29, at 7 n.1. The court previously rejected this argument, concluding that the EOUSA’s use of hypothetical language effectively functioned as a Glomar response because it neither confirmed nor denied the existence of responsive records. See ECF No. 12, at 16-17 (explaining that while the response “stops short of explicitly invoking the Glomar language, it all but refuses to confirm or deny the existence of CREW’s requested records”). CREW also points out that in the CREW II litigation, DOJ described both the EOUSA and OPR’s responses as Glomar responses in a joint status report. ECF No. 23-1, at 23; see ECF No. 23-3, at 171 (“Defendant (both DOJ components EOUSA and OPR) did not confirm or deny the existence of responsive records or conduct searches for records responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request . . . .”); Joint Status Report ¶ 2, CREW II, No. 24-CV-2416 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2024), ECF No. 9. The CREW II court, however, evaluated the EOUSA’s response as a categorical denial. See 2025 WL 2206945, at *3-4. The court adheres to its view that the EOUSA’s response was a Glomar response, but, for the reasons explained above, it finds that the EOUSA did not improperly ignore an official acknowledgment as CREW asserts.

23 b. Kelsey request

Next, CREW challenges the Criminal Division’s Glomar response to its request for records

relating to DOJ’s investigation of Tennessee State Senator Kelsey that mentioned, among others,

Amanda Bunning and Josh Smith. ECF No. 23-1, at 26-27; see ECF No. 23-3, at 147-54. CREW

asserts that its FOIA request alerted DOJ that “it was public knowledge that Bunning was ‘listed

in the [Kelsey] indictment’ as someone who received and passed along information in the course

of his criminal conspiracy.” ECF No. 23-1, at 27 (alteration in original). As for Mr. Smith, CREW

claims that its request identified a DOJ press release that named Mr. Smith as a co-conspirator of

Mr. Kelsey and discussed Mr. Smith’s guilty plea.10 ECF No. 23-1, at 26; see ECF No. 23-3,

at 148. CREW therefore argues that DOJ officially acknowledged the existence of records relating

to both Ms. Bunning and Mr. Smith. ECF No. 23-1, at 27.

To begin, the court finds that DOJ did not officially acknowledge the existence of

responsive records about Ms. Bunning. CREW’s request cited a news article about

Senator Kelsey’s guilty plea in which the news outlet stated that it had obtained a copy of a

subpoena in the case seeking documents related to Ms. Bunning, among others. ECF No. 18-3,

at 14; see Sam Stockard, Ex-Sen. Brian Kelsey Pleads Guilty to Two Counts of Federal Campaign

Finance Violations, Tenn. Lookout (Nov. 22, 2022).11 But this news article falls far short of

satisfying the official-acknowledgment test, which requires an official disclosure by the agency

from which information is being sought. See Knight First Amend. Inst., 11 F.4th at 815-16. An

agency’s official acknowledgment cannot be established based on disclosures by other agencies,

10 CREW asserts that its request identified “two DOJ press releases” relating to Mr. Smith, but its request cited only one press release. ECF No. 23-1, at 26 (emphasis omitted); see ECF No. 23-3, at 148 n.1. 11 Available at https://perma.cc/Q29A-M42Y.

24 see Frugone v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 169 F.3d 772, 774-75 (D.C. Cir. 1999), or other branches of

government, see Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1982)—let alone

reporting in the news media, see EPIC I, 678 F.3d at 933 n.5 (“[T]he national media are not capable

of waiving [an agency’s] statutory authority to protect information related to its functions and

activities.”); see also Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 765 (“It is one thing for a reporter or author to

speculate or guess that a thing may be so or even, quoting undisclosed sources, to say that it is so;

it is quite another thing for one in a position to know of it officially to say that it is so.” (quoting

Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir. 1975))). Accordingly, a statement

in a news article about an alleged subpoena referencing Ms. Bunning cannot be considered

“tantamount to an acknowledgment that the [Criminal Division] has documents on the subject.”

ACLU II, 710 F.3d at 431.

The news article also contains the statement that Ms. Bunning appeared in

Senator Kelsey’s indictment “as an individual who received information from [Senator Kelsey]

and passed it on to . . . others.” Stockard, supra. But Ms. Bunning’s name does not appear in the

public indictment against Mr. Kelsey, see Indictment, United States v. Kelsey, No. 3:21-CR-264

(M.D. Tenn. Oct. 22, 2021), ECF No. 1, or the DOJ press release announcing Mr. Kelsey’s

indictment, see U.S. Dep’t of Just., Tennessee State Senator Pleads Guilty to Campaign Finance

Scheme (Nov. 22, 2022) (“DOJ Kelsey Press Release”).12 While the media may have inferred that

Ms. Bunning was an unnamed individual in the indictment, the indictment’s references to unnamed

individuals cannot constitute an official disclosure of the existence of records about Ms. Bunning.

See Moore, 666 F.3d at 1334 (stating that “[a]n agency’s official acknowledgement . . . cannot be

12 Available at https://perma.cc/ZKA9-T5TW.

25 based on . . . speculation, no matter how widespread” (alterations in original) (quoting Wolf, 473

F.3d at 378)).

As for the part of CREW’s request referring to Mr. Smith, there can be no dispute that

DOJ’s press release announcing Mr. Smith’s guilty plea as one of Mr. Kelsey’s co-conspirators

constitutes an official acknowledgment of the existence of responsive records about Mr. Smith.

See DOJ Kelsey Press Release, supra. The press release states that the Criminal Division’s Public

Integrity Section was prosecuting the case against Mr. Smith and Mr. Kelsey, see id., making the

existence of responsive Criminal Division records relating to Mr. Smith “plain on the face of the

official statement,” James Madison Project, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 22. Indeed, DOJ does not attempt

to argue that a Glomar response would have been appropriate to the part of CREW’s request

referring to Mr. Smith. See generally ECF Nos. 18-1, 29. DOJ instead maintains that it issued a

categorical denial, not a Glomar response, which used “to the extent” language. ECF No. 18-1,

at 8 n.2; see ECF No. 18-3, at 3-4, 8-9 ¶¶ 8, 20. DOJ emphasizes that the Criminal Division’s

response used explicit Glomar language for the rest of the request and different, “categorical”

language for the part regarding Mr. Smith, and the court must give effect to those different

wordings. See ECF No. 29-1, at 7 n.1. But, as the court previously found, “to the extent” phrasing

refers to records “hypothetically without confirming or denying their existence.” ECF No. 12,

at 16-17. The Criminal Division’s response therefore declines to confirm or deny the existence of

responsive records—or acknowledge whether it had conducted a search—as to records referring

to Mr. Smith and is effectively a Glomar response. See Cobar v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 953 F. Supp.

2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 2013) (treating the same language from OIP as a Glomar response); see also

Tower v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. 23-CV-204, 2024 WL 3967322, at *4

(D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2024) (assuming that an agency’s response was a Glomar response where it was

26 “not a model of clarity” and could be construed as a Glomar or a categorical denial); Raw Story v.

U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 23-CV-2514, 2024 WL 4346214, at *10 (D.D.C. Sep. 30, 2024) (“Indeed,

the court does not understand how Defendants can claim a categorical exemption for records it has

not yet searched for and identified.”). But see Carzoglio v. Exec. Off. for U.S. Att’ys,

No. 24-CV-2080, 2026 WL 295387, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2026) (treating same language as a

categorical denial).

The court agrees with CREW on one additional point: the Criminal Division’s general

approach to official acknowledgments appears to be too narrow. DOJ offers a declaration from

Courtney O’Keefe, Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division’s FOIA/Privacy Act (“PA”) Unit, to

explain the Criminal Division’s process for issuing Glomar responses. See ECF No. 18-3.

Ms. O’Keefe states that, as part of its Glomar analysis, the Criminal Division considers whether

there has been an “official acknowledgment by the Criminal Division of a law enforcement

investigation of the subject of the request.” Id. at 6 ¶ 11 (emphasis added). This suggests that the

Criminal Division considers only its own official acknowledgments, see ECF No. 23-1, at 15, and

Defendants do not argue otherwise, see ECF No. 29, at 3. But, as noted, a disclosure by any DOJ

component may bind the Criminal Division, so long as the prior disclosure establishes the

existence or nonexistence of responsive records. See Knight First Amend. Inst., 11 F.4th at 817

(“[A] disclosure by one component of an executive department may bind ‘another component

within’ the same department.” (quoting Marino, 685 F.3d at 1082)). Put differently, if a disclosure

is “‘made by an authorized representative of the agency’s parent,’ it is ‘official’ as to the

subordinate agency.” Id. at 816 (quoting ACLU II, 710 F.3d at 429 n.7). Applied here, the

Criminal Division cannot limit its consideration of official acknowledgments to only Criminal

Division disclosures. With respect to the Kelsey request, it is not clear whether this overly narrow

27 focus caused the Criminal Division to err in processing the request, since the Criminal Division’s

parent, DOJ, officially acknowledged Mr. Smith’s indictment and there was no official

acknowledgment by any component regarding Ms. Bunning. The court will nonetheless consider

the Criminal Division’s narrow approach to official acknowledgments—along with its response to

CREW’s request regarding Mr. Smith—in evaluating CREW’s policy-or-practice claim. See infra

Section IV.B.3.

c. Fortenberry request

CREW also objects to the Criminal Division’s and EOUSA’s responses to its request for

records relating to the investigation of former Representative Fortenberry. ECF No. 23-1,

at 27-28; see ECF No. 23-3, at 191-202. CREW argues that a U.S. Attorney’s Office press release

announcing Representative Fortenberry’s indictment, which CREW cited in its FOIA request,

constitutes an official acknowledgment of the existence of responsive records. ECF No. 23-3,

at 191; see U.S. Att’y’s Off., Cent. Dist. of Cal., U.S. Rep. Jeff Fortenberry Charged with Scheme

to Deceive Federal Investigators Probing Illegal Campaign Contributions in 2016 (Oct. 19, 2021)

(“USAO Fortenberry Press Release”).13

Beginning with the Criminal Division’s Glomar response, ECF No. 23-3, at 201-02, DOJ

argues that the press release “does not indicate any involvement by the Criminal Division,” ECF

No. 29, at 6. The Criminal Division therefore “issued a partial Glomar to the extent CREW was

requesting Criminal Division records beyond the scope of the investigation by EOUSA and

maintained that any request for records associated with the press release were misdirected to the

Criminal Division.” ECF No. 29, at 6-7. The court agrees. If the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s press

13 Available at https://perma.cc/JD4Z-T425.

28 release had confirmed the Criminal Division’s involvement in the DOJ investigation of

Representative Fortenberry—as the press release for Mr. Smith did—then it would have officially

acknowledged the existence of Criminal Division records responsive to CREW’s request. But

“[p]rior disclosure of similar information does not suffice; instead, the specific information sought

by [CREW] must already be in the public domain by official disclosure.” Morley v. Cent. Intel.

Agency, 508 F.3d 1108, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Wolf, 473 F.3d at 378). For example, in

Marino, a DOJ component had made a specific reference to an investigation by another DOJ

component, waiving both components’ right to invoke a Glomar response. See 685 F.3d at 1082.

Here, however, the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s press release states that the FBI, Internal Revenue

Service, and U.S. Attorney’s Office were investigating and prosecuting

Representative Fortenberry, with no mention of the Criminal Division. See USAO Fortenberry

Press Release, supra. While the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office “are both arms of the DOJ, ‘there

is no basis to conclude . . . that the [Criminal Division] conducts all government investigations

mentioned by other components of DOJ.’” Webster v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,

No. 24-CV-387, 2025 WL 2144099, at *3 (D.D.C. July 29, 2025) (first alteration in original)

(quoting Donato v. Exec. Off. U.S. Atty’s, No. 16-CV-632, 2021 WL 5161740, at *4

(D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2021)). CREW therefore fails to establish that the Criminal Division investigated

Representative Fortenberry, and the Criminal Division correctly declined to treat the U.S.

Attorney’s press release as an official acknowledgment. See id. (holding that the U.S. Attorney’s

Office for the District of Columbia’s public disclosure of an investigation did not waive the FBI’s

right to issue a Glomar response regarding any FBI investigation); Greenspan v. Exec. Off. for

U.S. Att’ys, No. 23-CV-1816, 2025 WL 1040834, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2025) (concluding that an

official disclosure confirming that the FBI had investigated an individual did not constitute an

29 official acknowledgment that another DOJ component, the Drug Enforcement Administration, had

investigated him); Donato, 2021 WL 5161740, at *4 (finding that Bureau of Prisons documents

describing an investigation did not constitute an official acknowledgment of an FBI investigation).

To be sure, the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s press release may have diminished

Representative Fortenberry’s privacy interest in the existence of Criminal Division records, but

that is a separate issue from whether it ignored official acknowledgments, as CREW asserts.

As for the EOUSA’s response to CREW’s request, DOJ maintains that the EOUSA issued

a categorical denial, not a Glomar response. ECF No. 29, at 7. Again, DOJ does not attempt to

argue that a Glomar response from the EOUSA would have been proper, and it does not rely on

Glomar in the alternative. Nor could it, since the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s prosecution of

Representative Fortenberry is public. See USAO Fortenberry Press Release, supra. Mr. Jolly

avers in his declaration that the EOUSA “issued a categorical denial” in response to the

Fortenberry request “after weighing the asserted public interest with Mr. Fortenberry’s privacy

interests.” ECF No. 29-1, at 2 ¶ 8. His declaration also restates that, before issuing a Glomar

response, the EOUSA determines whether DOJ has officially acknowledged an investigation. Id.

at 2 ¶¶ 5-6. The declaration does not explicitly state why the EOUSA opted for, in its view, a

categorical denial, but it implies that the EOUSA did so after determining that DOJ had officially

acknowledged the investigation of Representative Fortenberry, which is consistent with CREW’s

view. See id. Accordingly, the court does not find that this example supports CREW’s claim that

the EOUSA systematically ignores official acknowledgments. The court notes, however, that DOJ

may easily avoid similar disputes in the future by expressly recognizing the existence of responsive

records when it wishes to issue a categorical denial, as many of its components already do. See,

e.g., ECF No. 22-3, at 14 (FBI’s initial response to CREW’s request for records relating to

30 Representative Gaetz, stating that the FBI “ha[d] completed its search” and the records were

“categorically denied”).

d. Evans request

Finally, CREW challenges the EOUSA’s Glomar response to its request for the case file

from the criminal prosecution of former West Virginia House Delegate Derrick Evans. ECF

No. 23-1, at 28; see ECF No. 23-3, at 204-10. CREW emphasizes that DOJ cannot refuse to

confirm or deny the existence of a “completed public prosecution.” ECF No. 23-1, at 28; see U.S.

Att’y’s Off., D.C., West Virginia Man Pleads Guilty to Felony Charge for Offenses Committed

During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach (Mar. 18, 2022).14

DOJ argues—and the court agrees—that the EOUSA’s response was a categorical denial,

not a Glomar response. ECF No. 29, at 7. The EOUSA’s response stated that “[r]ecords pertaining

to a third party generally cannot be released without the express authorization and consent of the

third party, proof that the subject of [the] request is deceased, or a clear demonstration that the

public interest in the disclosure outweighs the personal privacy interest and that significant public

benefit would result from the disclosure of the requested records.” ECF No. 23-3, at 209. It further

stated that without any of the required evidence for releasing records concerning a third party, the

release of responsive records “would result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and

would be in violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a” and that “[t]hese records are also

generally exempt from disclosure” under Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. The EOUSA also stated that

it would conduct a search for responsive public records if requested. Id.

14 Available at https://perma.cc/J3BD-L7G9.

31 Like DOJ’s other contested categorical denials, the EOUSA’s response lacks any explicit

acknowledgment of the existence of responsive records, admission that a search occurred, or

statement that the records are “categorically denied.” Cf. Jurdi, 485 F. Supp. 3d at 90, 92 (treating

as a categorical denial an agency’s response that “confirm[ed] that records exist” (alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, the response lacks the hypothetical

“to the extent that records exist” language contained in the other contested responses. And DOJ

components frequently use language similar to the EOUSA’s response to categorically deny FOIA

requests for third-party records, which courts have consistently treated as categorical denials, not

Glomar responses. See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 840 F.

Supp. 2d 226, 228, 230 (D.D.C. 2012) (“CREW III”) (treating an identical response from the FBI

as a categorical denial); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 846 F. Supp.

2d 63, 68, 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (treating an identical response from the EOUSA as a categorical

denial); Black v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 69 F. Supp. 3d 26, 31, 40 (D.D.C. 2014) (same), aff’d,

No. 14-5256, 2015 WL 6128830 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 6, 2015).

2. Application of Exemptions 6 and 7(C)

CREW also contends that DOJ improperly invokes FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) when

determining whether to issue a Glomar response. Exemption 6 permits the government to

withhold “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a

clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Exemption 7(C) protects

“records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” when disclosure “could

reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Id.

§ 552(b)(7)(C). Both exemptions require agencies and reviewing courts to “balance the privacy

interests that would be compromised by disclosure against the public interest in the release of the

32 requested information.” Beck v. Dep’t of Just., 997 F.2d 1489, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting

Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Exemption 7(C) “provides

broader privacy protection than Exemption 6 and thus ‘establishes a lower bar for withholding

material.’” CREW I, 746 F.3d at 1091 n.2 (quoting ACLU I, 655 F.3d at 6). Accordingly, “when

both Exemptions 6 and 7(C) could apply to all of the requested records, courts will ‘confine [the]

analysis to Exemption 7(C).’” United for FBI Integrity v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 22-CV-2885,

2024 WL 961001, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting PETA, 745 F.3d

at 541). Here, CREW agrees that the court may focus its analysis on Exemption 7(C) because

DOJ invoked Glomar responses under both provisions. See ECF No. 23-1, at 7.

As a threshold matter, to withhold records pursuant to Exemption 7(C), an agency must

show “that the records were compiled for a law enforcement purpose.” Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of

Just., 245 F. Supp. 3d 225, 249 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Kay v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm., 976 F.

Supp. 23, 37 (D.D.C. 1997)). “To establish a law enforcement purpose, [an agency’s] declarations

must establish (1) ‘a rational nexus between the investigation and one of the agency’s law

enforcement duties;’ and (2) ‘a connection between an individual or incident and a possible

security risk or violation of federal law.’” Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 331 F.3d

918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Campbell v. Dep’t of Just., 164 F.3d 20, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).

Once an agency establishes that the requested records fall under Exemption 7(C), the

agency must then show that disclosure of the requested information “would compromise a

substantial, as opposed to a de minimis, privacy interest.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton,

309 F.3d 26, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d

873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Where “no significant privacy interest is implicated (and if no other

Exemption applies), FOIA demands disclosure.” Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps., 879 F.2d

33 at 874. If the court concludes that a substantial privacy interest is at stake, the court must then

“balance the . . . privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v.

U.S. Dep’t of Just., 18 F.4th 712, 718 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“EPIC II”) (alteration in original) (quoting

Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004)).

The D.C. Circuit has recognized the “‘substantial’ privacy interest held by ‘the targets of

law-enforcement investigations . . . in ensuring that their relationship to the investigations remains

secret.’” PETA, 745 F.3d at 541 (alteration in original) (quoting Roth, 642 F.3d at 1174); see

CREW I, 746 F.3d at 1091 (“[I]ndividuals have an obvious privacy interest cognizable under

Exemption 7(C) in keeping secret the fact that they were subjects of a law enforcement

investigation.” (alteration in original) (quoting Nation Mag., Wash. Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv.,

71 F.3d 885, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1995))). The mere “mention of an individual’s name in a law

enforcement file will engender comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.”

Roth, 642 F.3d at 1174 (quoting Schrecker v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 349 F.3d 657, 666 (D.C. Cir.

2003)). Accordingly, when a FOIA request “is made for . . . investigative records regarding a

particular individual, the [agency’s] mere acknowledgment that it possesses responsive records

associates the individual named in the request with suspected criminal activity and therefore a

Glomar response may be appropriate.” CREW I, 746 F.3d at 1091. This privacy interest exists

“regardless of whether the person might be implicated as the target of a law-enforcement

investigation or merely a witness.” Prop. of People v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 310 F. Supp. 3d 57, 68

(D.D.C. 2018); see Roth, 642 F.3d at 1174 (explaining that “not only the targets of

law-enforcement investigations, but also ‘witnesses, informants, and . . . investigating agents’

have a ‘substantial interest’ in ensuring that their relationship to the investigations ‘remains

secret’” (alteration in original) (quoting Schrecker, 349 F.3d at 666)). Accordingly,

34 “Exemption 7(C) allows agencies to conceal the existence of responsive documents if the presence

of such records in the agency’s system would ‘associate the individual named in the request with

criminal activity’ or otherwise compromise the person’s privacy.” Prop. of People, 310 F. Supp.

3d at 68 (quoting Nation Mag., 71 F.3d at 893). As relevant here, “public officials ‘may have a

somewhat diminished privacy interest’ in the Exemption 7(C) balancing analysis,” EPIC II, 18

F.4th at 719 (quoting CREW I, 746 F.3d at 1092), but they “do not surrender all rights to personal

privacy when they accept a public appointment,” CREW I, 746 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Quinon v.

Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 86 F.3d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

On the other side of the balancing test, the “public interest to be weighed against the privacy

interest . . . is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purposes of the FOIA by

contribut[ing] significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the

government.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 309 F.3d at 33 (first alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282 (“It is well established that the only public

interest relevant for purposes of Exemption 7(C) is one that focuses on ‘the citizens’ right to be

informed about what their government is up to.’” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for

Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989))). The public interest includes an understanding

of the manner in which the federal government “handle[s] the investigation and prosecution of

crimes that undermine the very foundation of our government.” CREW I, 746 F.3d at 1093.

CREW cites six of its requests to support its assertion that DOJ fails to consider evidence

showing a public official’s privacy interests have been diminished. See ECF No. 23-1, at 29-34.15

According to CREW, DOJ’s failure takes two forms: DOJ ignores (1) evidence that the subject of

15 CREW relies on the Mastriano, Egyptian President, Giuliani/Kallstrom, Morehead, Kindred, and Zinke requests. ECF No. 23-1, at 29-34.

35 an investigation has publicly disclosed that they were under investigation and (2) evidence in the

“public record” acknowledging the existence of an investigation. Id. at 11, 29-34. CREW

separately contends that DOJ improperly requires FOIA requesters to establish a “significant” or

“overriding” public interest in disclosure to overcome Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. at 16-19 (citing

its own requests and other FOIA cases in this district where DOJ enforced this requirement). The

court agrees that several of CREW’s requests reveal potential deficiencies in DOJ’s processing of

FOIA requests, although it understands the scope of those deficiencies differently.

a. Subject’s acknowledgment

The parties do not dispute that, generally speaking, “an individual’s ‘well-publicized

announcement’ that he was the subject of an investigation diminishes his privacy interest in ‘that

very fact.’” Codrea v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, No. 21-CV-2201,

2022 WL 4182189, at *7 (D.D.C. Sep. 13, 2022) (quoting CREW I, 746 F.3d at 1092); see Tower,

2024 WL 3967322, at *6 (collecting cases where an individual’s “affirmative public disclosures

significantly diminish[ed]” the individual’s privacy interest). For example, in CREW I, the

D.C. Circuit considered a FOIA request for files related to an FBI investigation of Tom Delay, the

former Majority Leader of the House of Representatives. 746 F.3d at 1087. Mr. DeLay had made

“public statements confirming the fact that he had been, but was no longer, under investigation.”

Id. at 1091. The Court concluded that a Glomar response was inappropriate because “the FBI’s

acknowledgement that it had responsive records would not itself cause harm by confirming” a fact

that Mr. DeLay had already made public. Id. at 1092.

CREW argues that, for the Mastriano, Egyptian President, and Giuliani/Kallstrom requests,

the FBI ignored evidence showing that the subject of an investigation had publicly disclosed that

he was under investigation, which eliminated the subject’s privacy interest. ECF No. 23-1,

36 at 29-32. The court agrees that, for the Mastriano and Egyptian President requests, DOJ has not

adequately explained whether the FBI considered statements by the subject’s spokesperson

disclosing the existence of an investigation. With respect to the Giuliani/Kallstrom requests, DOJ

has provided no justification at all for the FBI’s Glomar response, leaving the court to question

whether the FBI even evaluated the threshold requirements for Exemptions 6 and 7(C), let alone

considered the subjects’ public statements disclosing the existence of responsive records.

Mastriano request. CREW first cites its request for records relating to Pennsylvania State

Senator Mastriano’s interviews with the FBI and any DOJ investigation of Senator Mastriano. Id.

at 29-30; see ECF No. 18-4, at 20-22. The FBI issued its “standard” Glomar response to the

request, ECF No. 18-4, at 27, and CREW appealed, id. at 31-35. OIP remanded the request “for

further review” of the first part of CREW’s request regarding interview records and upheld the

Glomar response as to the remaining parts. Id. at 39-40. On remand of the first part, the FBI stated

that CREW had “requested records on a third[-]party individual that is exempt from disclosure

pursuant to” Exemptions 6 and 7(C) and closed the request. Id. at 44.

CREW contends that the FBI’s determinations were improper because Senator Mastriano’s

attorney had “publicly acknowledged [that Senator Mastriano’s interview with the FBI] took

place,” eliminating Senator Mastriano’s privacy interest in that fact. Id. at 33; see ECF No. 23-1,

at 30. CREW’s request cited a news article that quoted the attorney as stating,

“[Senator Mastriano] previously was approached and sat for a voluntary interview with the FBI

and told them the truth about everything that happened [on January 6]. . . . The FBI cleared him.”

37 Farnoush Amiri & Marc Levy, Mastriano Willing to Talk to Jan. 6 Committee, Spoke to FBI,

Associated Press (June 2, 2022).16

DOJ does not meaningfully respond to CREW’s assertion that the agency failed to consider

whether Senator Mastriano’s attorney’s statements materially diminished Senator Mastriano’s

privacy interest—at least with respect to the existence of records about his interview with the FBI.

See ECF No. 18-4, at 10 ¶ 16 (Acting Section Chief of the FBI’s Record/Information

Dissemination Section Shannon R. Hammer’s declaration stating that CREW “did not provide

sufficient evidence of an official disclosure of the requested information by Senator Mastriano,

DOJ, or FBI”). Senator Mastriano’s attorney confirmed that the FBI had interviewed the senator,

eliminating his privacy interest in the existence of those interview records. See CREW I, 746 F.3d

at 1092 (concluding that because the third-party subject’s “public statements confirmed he had

been under investigation, the FBI’s acknowledgment that it had responsive records would not itself

cause harm by confirming that fact, rendering a Glomar response inappropriate”). While

“individuals have substantial privacy interests in relation to being associated with law enforcement

investigations because any such association can engender comment, speculation, or harassment

which can be embarrassing or stigmatizing,” ECF No. 18-4, at 4 ¶ 6, an agency is still required to

show that such substantial privacy interests exist based on the individual circumstances of the

request and third-party subject, see Bartko v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 898 F.3d 51, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2018)

(explaining that an agency has an “obligation to specifically identify the privacy interest at stake,

which can vary based on many factors, including frequency, nature, and severity of the

allegations”). Here, it is difficult to see how Senator Mastriano could have been harmed by the

16 Available at https://perma.cc/KUB6-DTYV.

38 FBI’s disclosure of the existence of records of his FBI interview after his own attorney had

confirmed that the interview had taken place, and Ms. Hammer’s declaration does not state if or

how the FBI considered the effect of those statements on the privacy interests at stake.17

In fact, Ms. Hammer’s declaration implies that the FBI only deemed Senator Mastriano’s

attorney’s statements relevant after CREW had shown a strong public interest. ECF No. 18-4,

at 12-13 ¶ 22 (explaining that the FBI rescinded its Glomar response on remand because CREW

had submitted additional statements about the public interest in disclosure in its appeal). But the

FBI was required to show a substantial privacy interest at the outset, before considering whether a

public interest in disclosure might exist. See PETA, 745 F.3d at 542 (“In light of the substantial

privacy interests at stake, Exemption 7(C) authorizes a Glomar response unless the public interest

in disclosure is strong enough to justify the privacy invasion”); Greenspan, 2025 WL 1040834,

at *12 (“Here, defendants fail at the first step of the inquiry: establishing a cognizable privacy

interest to support their Glomar responses.”). Ms. Hammer never explains why the FBI concluded

that Senator Mastriano had a substantial privacy interest in keeping secret the fact that he had been

interviewed by the FBI. Instead, the FBI concluded that Senator Mastriano had a “cognizable

privacy interest in any investigatory records the FBI may or may not have concerning him.” ECF

No. 18-4, at 10 ¶ 16 (emphasis added). Ms. Hammer never acknowledges whether the FBI

17 CREW also objects to the FBI’s requirement of an “official” disclosure by the third-party subject, arguing that “[n]othing in the legal standards regarding Glomar responses requires a subject’s acknowledgment of an investigation into him or her to be ‘official’ (whatever that means, and the DOJ does not say).” ECF No. 23-1, at 30. But Ms. Hammer explains how the FBI determines whether a subject’s acknowledgment diminishes his privacy interest, stating in her declaration that the FBI considers “verified statements from [elected officials] or their authorized spokesperson[s], in instances when the third[]party is an elected official” and “news articles referencing a verifiable acknowledgment . . . made by the third[]party themselves.” ECF No. 18-4, at 5 ¶ 7.

39 initially considered Senator Mastriano’s attorney’s statements and how they might have

diminished Senator Mastriano’s privacy interest in the existence of interview records specifically.

See id. at 13 ¶ 23. Rather, she simply states that the FBI “reconsidered” Senator Mastriano’s

attorney’s statements on remand, after CREW had appealed. Id. This suggests that in its first

analysis, the FBI ignored indicia of Senator Mastriano’s diminished privacy interest at the outset.18

That said, to the extent CREW argues that the attorney’s statements eliminated

Senator Mastriano’s privacy interests in the existence of an FBI investigation, CREW is incorrect.

The attorney’s disclosure was limited to the existence of Senator Mastriano’s voluntary interview

with the FBI, and it did not, as CREW asserts, confirm that Senator Mastriano was the subject of

an FBI investigation. See ECF No. 23-1, at 30. Because his attorney did not disclose that

Senator Mastriano “was ever the target of an FBI investigation outside of his association with the

[voluntary interview],” Senator Mastriano had “more than a de minimis privacy interest in the

existence of any FBI investigative records outside of the [interview] [his lawyer] publicly

acknowledged.” Prop. of the People, Inc. v. Dep’t of Just., No. 17-CV-1728, 2021 WL 6105680,

at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2021); see Codrea, 2022 WL 4182189, at *7 (concluding that a subject’s

public statements acknowledging a police investigation did not diminish his privacy interest

regarding whether he was the subject of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and

Explosives investigation); Lindsey v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1, 19-20

(D.D.C. 2020) (concluding that the subject retained his privacy interest in not being associated

18 Because the court agrees with CREW that the FBI’s initial Glomar response was flawed, it need not address the parties’ dispute over whether, on remand, the FBI issued a “rephrased Glomar response,” ECF No. 23-1, at 30, or a categorical denial, ECF No. 18-1, at 12; see ECF No. 18-4, at 44 (stating on remand that CREW had “requested records on a third party individual that is exempt from disclosure pursuant to” Exemptions 6 and 7(C)).

40 with FBI investigative records when he had made statements about being detained and questioned

by law enforcement officials but had not admitted that he was a subject of investigative interest to

the FBI).

Egyptian President request. Second, CREW cites the FBI’s Glomar response to its request

for records relating to an investigation into allegations that “Egyptian President Abdel Fatah

El-Sisi sought to give $10 million to support former President Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential

campaign.” ECF No. 23-3, at 213-19; see ECF No. 23-1, at 31. CREW’s request cited a news

article reporting that DOJ had closed its investigation into whether then-candidate Trump accepted

funds from Egypt; the article also quoted a spokesperson for Trump’s presidential campaign about

the investigation. ECF No. 23-3, at 214; see Aaron C. Davis & Carol D. Leonnig, $10M Cash

Withdrawal Drove Secret Probe into Whether Trump Took Money from Egypt, Wash. Post (Aug. 2,

2024).19 CREW thus contends that the FBI improperly refused to confirm or deny the existence

of responsive records about the investigation despite the Trump spokesperson’s public statement.

ECF No. 23-1, at 31.

In response, DOJ claims that the Glomar response was proper because the article “does not

constitute any official or public acknowledgment as it merely references DOJ’s and

President Trump’s spokesperson’s refusal to answer any questions regarding the purported

investigation.” ECF No. 29, at 8. But DOJ mischaracterizes the article, as the spokesperson for

President Trump’s campaign did not merely decline to comment or refuse to answer any questions.

Rather, the spokesperson expressly acknowledged the investigation, stating, “The investigation

referenced found no wrongdoing and was closed.” Davis & Leonnig, supra. And a spokesperson

19 Available at https://perma.cc/BWX4-J83T.

41 for the Egyptian government told the news outlet that it was “‘inappropriate to comment or refer

to rulings issued by the judiciary system or procedures and reports taken by Justice Departments’

in other countries . . . [and] emphasized that the Justice Department had closed the investigation

without charges.” Id. While DOJ is correct that the article does not contain an official

acknowledgment by DOJ, that “does not mean that the third-party’s acknowledgment of that

information has no bearing on the private-public interest balancing test underlying the FOIA

exemptions at issue.” Lindsey v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017);

see Prop. of the People, 2021 WL 6105680, at *6 (considering a congressman’s spokesperson’s

comments in the private-interest analysis). DOJ does not explain whether the FBI considered these

third-party acknowledgments in its determination of the privacy interests implicated by CREW’s

request. In fact, DOJ does not offer any declaration in support of the FBI’s response. The FBI

may well have had compelling reasons to issue a Glomar response notwithstanding the public

acknowledgments by the subjects’ spokespersons. Cf. In re Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the

Press, No. 24-CV-115, 2025 WL 92363, at *7 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2025) (concluding that the same

news article did not contain “sustained or repeated disclosure by the relevant parties” to justify

unsealing of grand jury documents). But since DOJ provides scant explanation for the FBI’s

conclusion and appears to have misunderstood the meaning of the spokespersons’ statements, the

court cannot conclude that the FBI considered whether those statements may have diminished the

subjects’ privacy interests.

Giuliani/Kallstrom requests. Third, CREW asserts that the FBI improperly issued Glomar

responses to its requests for records of “all communications between any agents or employees of

the [FBI]” and Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Kallstrom. ECF No. 23-3, at 223, 227; see ECF No. 23-1,

at 31. CREW’s requests cited statements made by Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Kallstrom to news outlets

42 referring to their conversations with FBI agents about the FBI’s investigation of former Secretary

of State Clinton. ECF No. 23-3, at 224, 228; see, e.g., Fox News, Giuliani: Case Is Clearer

Against Clinton Foundation; Comey Advisor: His Silence Would’ve Had Ramifications (Jan. 23,

2017);20 Fox News, FBI Reportedly Upset with Obama over Clinton Server Scandal;

Krauthammer Calls POTUS’ Remarks on Israel ‘Shameful’ (Jan. 24, 2017).21

The FBI’s responses to these requests highlight a threshold problem with the FBI’s

approach to Glomar responses, which the parties allude to but do not squarely address: the FBI

does not explain why Exemptions 6 and 7(C) apply to the requested records in the first place.

These requests do not obviously concern “personnel [or] medical files [or] similar files,” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(6), or “records compiled for law enforcement purposes,” id. § 552(b)(7)(C). “Not every

document compiled by a law enforcement agency, such as the FBI, is compiled for a law

enforcement purpose,” Lindsey, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 6, and DOJ makes no attempt to show that all

communications between the FBI and these subjects were compiled for law enforcement purposes.

Indeed, DOJ does not offer any declaration from the FBI justifying its Glomar responses for these

requests, and its briefing emphasizes that CREW’s requests did not relate to any investigations.

ECF No. 29, at 8.

Ms. Hammer’s declaration about the FBI’s general approach to issuing Glomar responses

also omits any mention of this threshold determination. Ms. Hammer avers that when the FBI

receives a FOIA request concerning “third party individuals”—that is, anyone other than the

requester—the agency requires the requester to provide proof of death or a written waiver from

the third party because individuals have a “substantial privacy interest in not being associated with

20 Available at https://perma.cc/4SQ2-LFY3. 21 Available at https://perma.cc/GV6S-Y4QA.

43 an FBI investigation.” ECF No. 18-4, at 3 ¶ 5. But not all records in the FBI’s possession that

name a third-party individual are law enforcement records, and Ms. Hammer’s declaration

conspicuously omits that inquiry from the FBI’s process. While “an agency whose ‘principal

function is law enforcement’ [like the FBI] is entitled to deference when it claims that records

relating to an external investigation were compiled for law enforcement purposes,” United for FBI

Integrity, 2024 WL 961001 at *6 (quoting Pub. Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. U.S. Section, Int’l

Boundary & Water Comm’n, U.S.-Mex., 740 F.3d 195, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2014)), the FBI has not

made such claims with respect to CREW’s requests or in general.

DOJ argues that these requests cannot support CREW’s policy-or-practice claim because

they do not seek records relating to investigations of public officials. See ECF No. 29, at 8.

CREW, too, admits that these requests did not seek “records relating to the investigation of a third

party.” ECF No. 23-1, at 31 (stating that the requests were for records “not of an investigation”).

Nevertheless, the court finds the FBI’s Glomar responses probative in assessing CREW’s

overarching claim that “the use of [a] public official’s name triggers a Glomar response” from

DOJ components. Id. at 21. Here, CREW’s requests named two public officials, Mr. Giuliani and

Mr. Kallstrom, and DOJ does not explain the basis for its Glomar responses. Finally, even

assuming that Exemptions 6 and 7(C) applied to the requested records, DOJ does not explain

whether it considered Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Kallstrom’s public statements about their

conversations with FBI agents when weighing the relevant privacy interests.

b. Other governmental entities’ acknowledgments

CREW next argues that DOJ ignored acknowledgments by other governmental entities,

such as federal courts and other agencies, that significantly diminished a subject’s privacy interest

in the existence of an investigation, making DOJ’s invocation of Glomar inappropriate. Id.

44 at 32-34. As support, CREW points to DOJ’s responses to three of its requests: (1) the Morehead

request, ECF No. 23-3, at 156-69; the Kindred request, id. at 237-45; and the Zinke request, ECF

No. 18-3, at 24-36. The court concludes that CREW’s objections to these responses lack merit but

that these requests reveal a separate problem with DOJ components’ processing of FOIA requests,

which the court discusses in the next section. See infra Section IV.B.2.c.

CREW asserts categorically that “[s]ubjects of investigations suffer no . . . harm

when . . . their association with the investigation or conduct that is the subject of the request is

already a matter of public record.” ECF No. 23-1, at 29 (emphasis added). The problem with this

argument is two-fold: first, CREW assumes that public information about a subject’s alleged

conduct is sufficient to extinguish that subject’s privacy interest in the existence of a DOJ

investigation, even where the existence of a DOJ investigation is not public knowledge; and

second, CREW fails to recognize that even when information about a DOJ investigation is in the

public domain, that only diminishes, but does not eliminate, the subject’s privacy interest.

On the first point, CREW incorrectly asserts that public information about the conduct

allegedly targeted by a DOJ investigation is sufficient to extinguish a subject’s privacy interest in

the existence of a DOJ investigation. Information in the public domain may certainly bear on a

subject’s privacy interests, but that information must reduce the subject’s privacy interest in the

existence of the specific records being sought. See Codrea, 2022 WL 4182189, at *7 (“[A]n

individual’s public disclosure of information that could be potentially incriminating in a general

sense does not reduce his privacy interest in whether he was the subject of a particular federal

criminal investigation by a particular agency.”). As applied here, the existence of a DOJ

investigation itself must be a matter of public record to reduce the subject’s privacy interest, and

even then, the subject’s privacy interest may remain intact absent an acknowledgment by the

45 agency or subject. See Martin v. Dep’t of Just., 488 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (explaining

that under Supreme Court precedent “a person’s privacy interest in law enforcement records that

name him is not diminished by the fact that the events they describe were once a matter of public

record”).22

This holds true even when the subject’s conduct enters the public domain through another

governmental entity’s investigation. Indeed, CREW appears to conflate official acknowledgments

of DOJ investigations with acknowledgments by other governmental entities of their own

investigations.23 But information about a non-DOJ investigation is insufficient on its own to

eliminate a subject’s privacy interest in a DOJ investigation. That is because a subject has a

distinct privacy interest in the existence of a criminal investigation into them. See CREW I, 746

F.3d at 1091 (explaining that “[i]f a FOIA request is made for FBI investigative records regarding

a particular individual, the FBI’s mere acknowledgment that it possesses responsive records

associates the individual named in the request with suspected criminal activity”).

22 CREW relies on Bartko for this point, see ECF No. 23-1, at 32-34; ECF No. 31, at 3-4, but that case cuts in the opposite direction. In Bartko, the D.C. Circuit held that OPR improperly invoked Exemption 7(C) to withhold records relating to a prosecutor’s alleged misconduct in handling the requester’s criminal case. 898 F.3d at 68-70. With respect to the balancing of privacy and public interests, the Court held that the prosecutor’s privacy interest was “substantially diminished” because “the allegations of misconduct during the [requester’s] trial [were] already a matter of public record, as [was] the referral to OPR published in [a judicial] decision, and the U.S. Attorney’s public announcement that it too was referring the allegations of misconduct to OPR.” Id. at 69. The privacy interests were therefore diminished because the fact of the OPR investigation itself, as well as the conduct at issue in the investigation, were matters of public record. 23 CREW’s misunderstanding is understandable, as courts have used the term “public domain exception” as a way of referring to the official acknowledgment doctrine. See supra note 8. But the so-called public domain exception does not provide that any information in the public domain confirming the existence of any law enforcement investigation is sufficient to render a Glomar response inappropriate. See Nat’l Sec. Archive, 104 F.4th at 274 (“[T]he mere public disclosure of information . . . cannot overcome an otherwise valid FOIA exemption.”).

46 The court therefore rejects CREW’s categorical rule that public acknowledgments by other

governmental entities of a subject’s conduct or their own investigation of that conduct eliminate

the subject’s privacy interest in the existence of a DOJ investigation.24 For example, CREW argues

that federal courts’ acknowledgments of alleged misconduct by AUSA Morehead eliminated her

substantial privacy interest in the existence of any DOJ investigation into alleged criminal

wrongdoing. See ECF No. 23-1, at 32-33. AUSA Morehead’s privacy interests may be somewhat

“lowered because it is public knowledge that [she] has been accused of wrongdoing.” United for

FBI Integrity, 2024 WL 961001, at *10. But none of the court statements cited by CREW

acknowledged the existence of a DOJ investigation of AUSA Morehead, meaning she “plainly

ha[d] a ‘strong privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of any [EOUSA or OPR] investigation

of misconduct.’” Id. (quoting PETA, 745 F.3d at 541); see ECF No. 18-6, at 4 ¶ 16 (Jolly

declaration stating that CREW “merely identified federal court decisions that criticized

Ms. Morehead for misconduct, which is not the same as DOJ investigat[ing] Ms. Morehead for

misconduct, officially acknowledging any such investigation of Ms. Morehead, or finding that

Ms. Morehead committed misconduct”); ECF No. 29-2, at 6 ¶ 24 (McCarty declaration stating that

OPR considered “Ms. Morehead’s substantial private interest in nondisclosure of any association

with a misconduct investigation, if there was one”).

Likewise, CREW’s assertion that former Judge Kindred’s privacy interests evaporated

when the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council publicly disclosed its investigation of him also fails. ECF

24 CREW does not argue that DOJ components improperly balanced the privacy and public interests implicated by the following three requests. Instead, it argues categorically that no privacy interest existed based on other governmental entities’ public acknowledgments. Accordingly, the court does not address whether DOJ properly weighed the asserted public interests against the privacy interests in nondisclosure.

47 No. 23-1, at 33-34; see In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 22-90121

(9th Cir. Jud. Council May 23, 2024), aff’d, C.C.D. No. 24-02 (U.S. Jud. Conf. Aug. 22, 2024).

But the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council acknowledged the existence of its own investigation into

Judge Kindred, not the existence of a DOJ investigation. Judge Kindred has a distinct privacy

interest in the existence of a criminal investigation, and the fact that “the full extent of his conduct

had been authoritatively addressed in a public forum,” ECF No. 23-1, at 34, does not eliminate his

privacy interest in the existence of a law enforcement investigation, see Martin, 488 F.3d at 457;

see also Connell v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 110 F.4th 256, 270 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“[C]onfirmation that

an agency has responsive records (or not) by the agency itself is different from statements to that

effect by other sources—even trusted government sources—because confirmation by the agency

itself removes ‘any lingering doubts’ on the issue.” (emphasis added) (quoting Knight First Amend.

Inst., 11 F.4th at 816)).

On the second issue, CREW’s argument is based on the faulty legal premise that any

information in the public domain about a DOJ investigation is sufficient to eliminate a subject’s

privacy interest. The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that “the fact that information about

[an individual’s] case[] is a matter of public record simply makes their privacy interests ‘fade,’ not

disappear altogether.” Am. C.L. Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 750 F.3d 927, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2014)

(quoting ACLU I, 655 F.3d at 9); see Stein v. Cent. Intel. Agency, No. 17-CV-189, 2024 WL

4298757, at *3 (D.D.C. Sep. 26, 2024) (“It is true that a privacy interest may ‘fade when the

information involved already appears on the public record . . . ,’ but that ‘does not mean that it

should receive widespread publicity if it does not involve a matter of public concern.’” (quoting

Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 763 n.15)). Assessing a subject’s privacy

interest in the existence of investigatory records is a fact-specific inquiry that “can vary based on

48 many factors, including frequency, nature, and severity of the allegations.” Bartko, 898 F.3d at 66.

As relevant here, an external source’s acknowledgment of a DOJ investigation may diminish a

subject’s privacy interest in the existence of a law enforcement investigation, but it generally

cannot, on its own, extinguish that privacy interest. See, e.g., Codrea, 2022 WL 4182189, at *8

(concluding that “second-hand media reports of [a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and

Explosives] records inspection [did not] diminish Hunter Biden’s privacy interest” in the existence

of an agency investigation); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 394 F. Supp. 3d 111, 118

(D.D.C. 2019) (concluding that a former British intelligence operative retained a privacy interest

in whether the FBI suspected him of “some wrongdoing” even though his privacy interests were

diminished by public reporting that had “thrust [him] into the spotlight”).25

PETA is instructive on this point. There, the D.C. Circuit rejected a FOIA requester’s

argument that a university’s public acknowledgments of an agency investigation into its

researchers eliminated those researchers’ privacy interests. 745 F.3d at 542. The Court

emphasized that the agency’s “own official acknowledgement that it had investigated the named

researchers would carry an added and material stigma,” so, notwithstanding the university’s

statements, the researchers retained “substantial privacy interests.” Id.; see Hawkins v. Fed.

Bureau of Investigation, No. 20-CV-1483, 2022 WL 905577, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022)

25 CREW also argues that DOJ’s own guidance states that Glomar responses are inappropriate “where the subject of a request has already been publicly associated with agency law enforcement matters that would otherwise justify a Glomar response.” ECF No. 31, at 2 (citation omitted). From this, CREW suggests that any evidence in the “public record” associating the subject of a request with a law enforcement investigation is sufficient to render a Glomar response inappropriate. But CREW ignores that in all the cases cited in the DOJ guidance for the quoted proposition, the agency or third-party subject themselves had publicly acknowledged the existence of responsive records. ECF No. 31-1, at 41 n.121; see CREW I, 746 F.3d at 1091-92 (subject’s public statements); Kimberlin v. Dep’t of Just., 139 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (prosecutor’s public acknowledgments of his own disciplinary proceedings).

49 (“Exempt information only lose[s] [its] protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a

permanent public record[] if the information has been officially acknowledg[ed], i.e., made public

through an official and documented disclosure.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, CREW is also incorrect that the Interior OIG’s reference to a possible DOJ

investigation extinguished former Secretary Zinke’s privacy interest in the existence of such an

investigation. ECF No. 23-1, at 34; see ECF No. 18-3, at 29. The Interior OIG report stated that

the agency had “referred [its] findings to [DOJ], which declined prosecution of this matter in the

summer of 2021.” Off. of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 18-890, Former Secretary

Did Not Comply with Ethical Obligations and Duty of Candor 3 (Feb. 16, 2022).26 CREW claims

that the Criminal Division issued a Glomar response to its request, ECF No. 23-1, at 34, while

DOJ maintains that it categorically denied the request, ECF No. 18-1, at 10; ECF No. 29, at 7 n.1.

The Criminal Division’s initial response did not use explicit Glomar language, but, again,

hypothetical “to the extent” language does not confirm or deny the existence of responsive records

and has the same effect as a Glomar response. See ECF No. 12, at 17. Even treating the Criminal

Division’s response as a Glomar response, it is unlikely that the Interior OIG’s report fully

diminished Secretary Zinke’s privacy interest in the existence of Criminal Division records about

DOJ’s decision not to prosecute him. The report states only that the Interior OIG referred its

findings to “DOJ,” and CREW points to no acknowledgments by DOJ components or

Secretary Zinke confirming the existence of that referral or DOJ’s decision not to prosecute.

26 Available at https://perma.cc/78NB-W8JP.

50 c. Scope of privacy interests

While the court rejects CREW’s sweeping rule about information in the public record

eliminating a subject’s privacy interest in the existence of a DOJ investigation, it concludes that

DOJ’s responses to the Morehead, Kindred, and Zinke requests—as well as CREW’s request for

records relating to investigations of companies owned by President Trump, see ECF No. 23-3,

at 139-45—reveal a different problem. Specifically, DOJ has failed to satisfy its obligation to

“specifically identify the privacy interest at stake,” Bartko, 898 F.3d at 66, for each requested

category of records.

First, the EOUSA’s and OPR’s responses to the Morehead request do not explain why “the

disclosure of any record regarding any allegation of misconduct,” id., would implicate a substantial

privacy interest of AUSA Morehead. CREW’s request did not only seek records relating to DOJ

investigations of AUSA Morehead but also records pertaining to “alleged violations by

AUSA Morehead of . . . the United States Attorney’s Manual . . . , any ethical duties imposed

upon [her] . . . , or any other professional misconduct.” ECF No. 23-3, at 156-57. But DOJ’s

justifications focus solely on her privacy interest in the existence of an investigation. See ECF

No. 18-6, at 4 ¶ 15 (stating that the EOUSA concluded that AUSA Morehead “had a substantial

privacy interest in the requested information because [she is] mentioned in the requested files”);

ECF No. 29-2, at 6 ¶ 25 (stating that AUSA Morehead “had strong privacy interests in not being

associated with an OPR misconduct investigation, if one existed”); see also CREW II, 2025 WL

2206945, at *3 (“Given that this information [about misconduct allegations] is already public, it

51 would not further harm Morehead’s privacy for DOJ to confirm or deny the existence of records

concerning allegations of misconduct.”).27

Next, the EOUSA’s response to the Kindred request fails to account for the different

privacy interests at stake for all the requested records. Only one part of CREW’s request sought

records of “any DOJ investigations, actions . . . , or decisions not to take action, in regard to any

communication between Judge Kindred and the AUSA from whom Judge Kindred received nude

photographs.” ECF No. 23-3, at 238. As noted, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council did not

acknowledge the existence of any DOJ investigation of Judge Kindred, so it did not meaningfully

diminish Judge Kindred’s privacy interests with respect to a DOJ investigation. But other parts of

CREW’s request sought communications among employees of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the

District of Alaska concerning Judge Kindred’s alleged conflicts of interest. See id. at 237-38.

DOJ’s proffered declaration does not explain what privacy interest the EOUSA identified in the

existence of such communications, stating only that the agency “conduct[ed] a step-by-step

consideration[] [and] issued a Glomar response because the disclosure of [the] requested

information would constitute an unwarranted invasion of Mr. Kindred’s personal privacy under

FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C).” ECF No. 29-1, at 3 ¶ 11. Accordingly, DOJ has not shown why

a blanket Glomar was appropriate. See PETA, 745 F.3d at 545 (explaining that when there is “a

category of responsive documents for which a Glomar response would be unwarranted, [an

agency’s] assertion of a blanket Glomar response to [that part of the] request cannot be sustained”).

27 The CREW II court did not parse the different parts of CREW’s request and instead found that OPR’s blanket Glomar response was not appropriate because of the information in the public record. See 2025 WL 2206945, at *3-4.

52 Third, while the court agrees with DOJ that the Interior OIG report did not fully eliminate

Secretary Zinke’s privacy interest in the existence of a DOJ investigation, CREW’s request did

not only seek records relating to an investigation—it also sought records relating to the Interior

OIG’s referral to DOJ concerning Secretary Zinke. ECF No. 18-3, at 29. And Secretary Zinke’s

privacy interest in the existence of records concerning the Interior OIG’s referral was substantially

diminished when the Interior OIG confirmed that it had referred its findings to DOJ. But DOJ

offers no meaningful explanation for whether and how the Criminal Division “specifically

identif[ied] the privacy interest at stake” for that and other parts of the Zinke request. Bartko, 898

F.3d at 66. Ms. O’Keefe states in her declaration that “the Criminal Division followed the analysis

described above [about a different FOIA request] and balanced the public interest in disclosure

against the third-party individual’s privacy interests,” and “[b]ased on information available at the

time of the request, the Criminal Division issued a categorical denial.” ECF No. 18-3, at 9 ¶ 21.

This explanation falls short of identifying Secretary Zinke’s privacy interest in the existence of

records related to the Interior OIG’s referral. Even if Secretary Zinke retained a substantial privacy

interest in the existence of records relating to DOJ’s decision not to prosecute (the second part of

CREW’s request), the court is doubtful that such a privacy interest existed for the first part.

Finally, CREW points to an additional FOIA request to support its claim that DOJ

“essentially rubber stamps Glomar responses whenever it receives a request for investigative files

relating to a named public official,” even when no privacy interest exists. ECF No. 23-1, at 20;

see id. at 22. CREW requested records from the Criminal Division related to DOJ and FBI

investigations of “companies owned or associated with Donald J. Trump.” ECF No. 23-3, at 139.

The Criminal Division issued a Glomar response, id. at 144, which CREW argues was improper

because Exemptions 6 and 7(C)’s protection against unwarranted invasions of “personal privacy”

53 does not extend to corporations, ECF No. 23-1, at 22. The court agrees. President Trump has “no

privacy interest in his mere affiliation with [his companies], even were the compan[ies] under

scrutiny,” and any companies owned or associated with President Trump have “no cognizable

privacy interest under FOIA.” Prop. of People, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 71-72; see Fed. Commc’ns

Comm’n v. AT & T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 408-10 (2011). DOJ does not meaningfully dispute this,

instead asserting that the Criminal Division later conducted a search after CREW appealed its

determination and OIP remanded the request. See ECF No. 29-3, at 16. DOJ thus argues that the

initial Glomar response “is not indicative of any improper DOJ-wide policy or practice because it

was reasonably based on the conclusion that the entities that were the subject of the FOIA request

never publicly acknowledged any DOJ investigation.” ECF No. 29, at 7. But DOJ does not

explain why those entities would have been protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C) in the first place.

See generally ECF No. 29-3. Instead, DOJ’s explanation suggests that the Criminal Division

treated President Trump, not his companies, as “the subject of the FOIA request,” even though

CREW did not seek records relating to an investigation into President Trump and, as noted,

President Trump likely lacked a cognizable privacy interest in the existence of responsive records.

Because DOJ does not provide any declarations explaining its basis for issuing an initial Glomar

response or for remanding the matter, the court cannot conclude that the Criminal Division made

the threshold determination that Exemptions 6 and 7(C) applied.

Beyond the specific issues with the Criminal Division’s response to the Zinke and Trump

companies requests, it appears that, like the FBI, see supra pp. 42-44, the Criminal Division does

not consider at the outset whether Exemptions 6 and 7(C) apply to the requested records.

Ms. O’Keefe avers that, upon receipt of a request, the Criminal Division first “assess[es] the

subject of the request, including whether the request is a targeted third-party request.” ECF

54 No. 18-3, at 5 ¶ 10. “If the request seeks records pertaining to a third-party individual and the

records sought could be of a particularly sensitive nature (i.e., a law enforcement investigation),”

the Criminal Division considers a Glomar response pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. But

according to Christina Butler, Chief of the Criminal Division’s FOIA/PA Unit, the Criminal

Division issued a Glomar response to CREW’s request “by following the analysis described in

[Ms. O’Keefe’s declaration], which included noting no official acknowledgment by the Criminal

Division of a law enforcement investigation of the subject of the request or an admission by the

subject of the request, including companies owned or associated with the subject.” ECF No. 29-3,

at 3 ¶ 9. Notably absent from Ms. Butler’s declaration is any justification for treating CREW’s

request as a “targeted third-party request.” ECF No. 18-3, at 5 ¶ 10; see generally ECF No. 29-3.

Accordingly, the Criminal Division’s declaration does not show that it makes a threshold

determination that Exemptions 6 and 7(C) apply when issuing Glomar responses.28

28 CREW cites one additional FOIA request it submitted to OPR for investigation-related records that did not reference any public official by name and did not receive a Glomar response. ECF No. 23-1, at 20-22. CREW sought records from OPR relating to complaints of professional misconduct by members of the federal judiciary “as acknowledged by the 2023 OPR Annual Report.” ECF No. 23-3, at 19. In response, the EOUSA—to which OPR had referred the request—released 108 responsive pages in full and three pages in part. Id. at 23. CREW asserts that the EOUSA’s production “implicated [a federal judge] in misconduct by name,” thereby reflecting the same privacy interests as its other requests about publicly disclosed investigations but resulting in disclosure rather than a Glomar response. ECF No. 23-1, at 21; see ECF No. 23-3, at 27-137 (production of court transcripts and filings related to a U.S. District Judge in the Southern District of Texas and three pages of redacted emails between federal prosecutors). According to CREW, DOJ’s differential treatment of this request reflects its policy or practice of issuing “knee-jerk Glomar responses” whenever a request references an official by name. ECF No. 23-1, at 21-22. But, as CREW acknowledges, its request did not refer to any third party by name, so confirming the existence of responsive documents would not have confirmed that OPR investigated any specific individuals. See PETA, 745 F.3d at 545 (holding that a Glomar response was unwarranted for a request seeking documents showing that, in response to complaints filed against three named individuals, the agency conducted an investigation that did not target those (continued on next page)

55 d. Public-interest analysis

Finally, CREW argues that, across the board, DOJ components require FOIA requesters to

establish a “significant” or “overriding” public interest in disclosure to overcome Exemptions 6

and 7(C).” ECF No. 23-1, at 16-19. According to CREW, this standard “is a work of fiction with

respect to Exemptions 6 and 7(C)” and applies only to cases where the requester is attempting to

overcome Exemption 2 or to recover attorney’s fees. Id. at 17. CREW thus argues that DOJ begins

its balancing of interests “with an artificially high standard for acceptable public interests,” when

it should be considering the specific public and privacy interests at stake for each request. Id.

at 19.

The court disagrees. It is well established that when an agency invokes Exemption 6 or

7(C) and privacy interests protected by those exemptions exist, the requester must demonstrate a

“significant” public interest. Favish, 541 U.S. at 172; see, e.g., Roth, 642 F.3d at 1175; Lindsey,

490 F. Supp. 3d at 18; Marin v. Driscoll, No. 24-CV-1508, 2025 WL 3152310, at *5

(D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2025). This rule comes from the FOIA statute itself, which provides that records

compiled for law enforcement purposes are presumptively exempt from disclosure if their

production “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C); see id. § 552(b)(6) (requiring a “clearly unwarranted invasion

of personal privacy” for personnel, medical, and similar files). The Supreme Court has interpreted

the term “unwarranted” to require courts to “balance the competing interests in privacy and

individuals). Indeed, CREW does not appear to argue that a Glomar response would have been appropriate. See ECF No. 23-1, at 21. Because a Glomar response likely would not have been warranted—and because neither party addresses that question—the court cannot conclude that DOJ declined to issue a Glomar response to CREW’s request simply because the request did not refer to an official by name. This example therefore offers little insight into whether DOJ’s other Glomar responses resulted from an unlawful policy or practice.

56 disclosure.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 172. And, in doing such balancing, “[w]here the privacy concerns

addressed by Exemption 7(C) are present, the exemption requires the person requesting the

information to establish a sufficient reason for the disclosure”—that is, “the citizen must show that

the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, an interest more specific than having

the information for its own sake.” Id. (emphasis added). Contrary to CREW’s assertions, this

requirement is not limited to Exemption 2 or requests for attorney’s fees. Indeed, in one of the

cases CREW cites about Exemption 2, the court went on to apply the “significant” public-interest

standard when considering Exemption 7(C). Kishore v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 575 F. Supp. 2d 243,

257 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The public interest ‘sought to be advanced [must be] a significant one more

specific than having the information for [one’s] own sake,’ however.” (alterations in original)

(quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 172)); see ECF No. 23-1, at 17.29

CREW appears to argue that no D.C. Circuit or Supreme Court precedent supports DOJ’s

approach, but Favish—a Supreme Court decision—clearly sets forth the relevant standard for

weighing public and privacy interests under Exemptions 6 and 7(C). CREW claims that Favish is

inapposite because the case “address[ed] standards for evaluating the use of [those exemptions] in

response to requests based on the need to discover misconduct in the course of investigations.”

ECF No. 23-1, at 18 n.6. It is true that Favish imposed the additional requirement that a requester

“establish more than a bare suspicion” of government impropriety when the public interest being

29 Additionally, in many of the cases CREW cites as examples of this allegedly improper practice, see ECF No. 23-1, at 16-17, the court looked for a “significant” public interest asserted by the requester, see, e.g., CREW III, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 234 (“The second step of the balancing test under Exemptions 6 and 7(C) is to determine whether there is a substantial public interest in releasing the requested documents.”); Garcia v. Exec. Off. for U.S. Att’ys, 302 F. Supp. 3d 79, 91 (D.D.C. 2018) (applying Favish); Black, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 37 (same); Graff v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 822 F. Supp. 2d 23, 36 (D.D.C. 2011) (same).

57 asserted is to show government misconduct, 541 U.S. at 174, and that additional requirement does

not apply when CREW is asserting a different public interest, see, e.g., CREW I, 746 F.3d

at 1094-96. But CREW misses the fact that the basic standard for evaluating Exemptions 6 and

7(C) set forth in Favish is equally applicable here. Regardless of whether a request seeks to

uncover government misconduct or has some other purpose, the requester must identify a

“significant” public interest wherever there is a privacy interest protected by Exemption 6 or 7(C).

See Favish, 541 U.S. at 172; Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 287 F. Supp. 3d 50,

71-72 (D.D.C. 2018) (considering whether the requester showed a significant public interest where

the asserted public interest was, as here, “understanding how the agency conducted its

investigation”).

While the court disagrees with CREW’s objections to the “significant public interest”

standard, it notes that DOJ’s declarations reveal potential errors in how two components—the

Criminal Division and FBI—conduct the public-interest analysis. First, as CREW points out, the

Criminal Division has a policy that “[w]ithout an official acknowledgment of an investigation, or

a public announcement by the subject regarding the existence of any investigation, the requester

cannot demonstrate that the requested information is likely to shed light on how the Criminal

Division operates and thus, will not articulate a substantial public interest.” ECF No. 18-3, at 8

¶ 17 (emphases added); see ECF No. 23-1, at 15-16. This categorical rule is inconsistent with

FOIA. The absence of an agency’s official acknowledgment does not directly bear on the public

interest in disclosure—rather, it simply means that the agency has not waived its right to invoke a

Glomar response by disclosing the existence of responsive records. See Knight First Amend. Inst.,

11 F.4th at 815. Moreover, the absence of a public announcement by the subject bears on the

subject’s privacy interests, not the public interest in disclosure. When substantial privacy interests

58 exist, an agency has an “obligation to ‘measure’ the public interest in disclosure and ‘weigh’ it

against the privacy interests at stake.” Cabezas v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 20-CV-2484, 2023

WL 6312349, at *2 (D.D.C. Sep. 28, 2023) (quoting Bartko, 898 F.3d at 66). But the Criminal

Division’s categorical rule that a requester cannot show a substantial public interest without

establishing an official acknowledgment or disclosure by the subject conflates the public and

privacy interests at stake.

Second, when balancing privacy interests against the public interest, the Criminal Division

and FBI appear to consider the public interest only in confirming the existence of responsive

records. ECF No. 18-3, at 8-9 ¶ 20; ECF No. 18-4, at 6 ¶ 9. But when weighing the public interest,

an agency must consider not only “the benefits of acknowledging the existence or non-existence

of responsive records,” but also “the potential contents of such records.” Heritage Found. v. U.S.

Dep’t of Just., No. 23-CV-1148, 2024 WL 1856418, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2024) (emphasis

added) (“Even in Glomar cases where public interests other than revealing government misconduct

are asserted, the D.C. Circuit and other courts in this district have considered how the possible

contents of responsive records might weigh in favor of disclosure.”). For example, in PETA, the

D.C. Circuit observed that responsive records “would directly implicate the cognizable public

interest in shedding light on [the agency’s] investigatory processes.” 745 F.3d at 545. When

considering privacy interests, the agency must limit its consideration to the existence of responsive

records, but that is not the case for considerations of the public interest. See id. at 541-43. This

approach makes sense, because the “public may have an interest in confirming whether responsive

records exist precisely because of the information such records might contain.” Heritage Found.,

2024 WL 1856418, at *7. But Ms. O’Keefe avers in her declaration that the Criminal Division

considers “the public interest in confirming the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to

59 [the] FOIA request,” ECF No. 18-3, at 9 ¶ 20 (emphasis added); she does not state whether the

Criminal Division also considers the public interest in the contents of those records. The FBI’s

approach is similarly flawed. Ms. Hammer states that, in conducting the public-interest analysis,

the FBI “analyzes any alleged public interest in disclosure of the existence of records concerning

the third party.” ECF No. 18-4, at 6 ¶ 9. This narrow conception of the public interest does not

comport with the agency’s obligations under FOIA.30

3. Whether DOJ maintains an unlawful policy or practice

As explained, CREW has provided substantial evidence that DOJ issued improper Glomar

responses for: the Kelsey request with respect to records mentioning Mr. Smith (Criminal

Division, failure to recognize an official acknowledgment), the Mastriano request (FBI, failure to

consider his lawyer’s acknowledgment), the Egyptian President request (FBI, failure to consider

spokespersons’ acknowledgments), the Giuliani/Kallstrom requests (FBI, failure to consider

threshold exemption requirements and subjects’ acknowledgments), the Kindred request (EOUSA,

failure to consider privacy interest in the existence of each category of requested records), the

Morehead request (EOUSA and OPR, failure to consider privacy interest in the existence of each

category of requested records), the Zinke request (Criminal Division, failure to consider privacy

interest in the existence of each category of requested records), and the Trump companies request

(Criminal Division, failure to consider threshold exemption requirements). CREW has also

30 Because CREW is bringing a policy-or-practice claim and does not seek disclosure of the records at issue in these requests, the court does not address whether CREW established a sufficient public interest in the disclosure of its requested records for each of its requests. The court simply concludes that DOJ components were required to consider both the public interest in disclosure of the existence of responsive records and the public interest in disclosure of the contents of those records.

60 identified—and the court has further discerned—problems with the Criminal Division’s

constricted approach to official acknowledgments and the FBI and Criminal Division’s approach

to the public-interest analysis. But to prevail on Count II, CREW must show that DOJ “adopted,

endorsed, or implemented [a] policy or practice that constitutes an ongoing ‘failure to abide by the

terms of the FOIA.’” Muttitt II, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 293 (quoting Payne Enters., 837 F.2d at 491).

“[I]solated mistakes by agency officials” are not enough. Payne Enters., 837 F.2d at 491.

In seeking summary judgment, CREW asserted that DOJ had a pattern or practice of

issuing Glomar responses “simply because a FOIA request [sought] records relating to an

investigation of a third party.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 43. The summary judgment record shows that CREW

cannot prevail on that claim. To begin, DOJ’s declarations establish that each component engages

in an individualized analysis and does not issue Glomar responses automatically whenever a

request refers to an individual by name. See ECF No. 18-3, at 5 ¶ 10 (“The [Criminal Division’s]

FOIA/PA Unit reviews each request received and assesses the merits of every request . . . prior to

issuing a determination on the request.”); ECF No. 18-4, at 15 ¶ 27 (“[T]he FBI conducts a detailed

case[-]by[-]case analysis to determine an appropriate response. The FBI . . . only withholds

information, including by issuing Glomars . . . , if it determines there is a reasonably foreseeable

harm to an interest protected by an exemption.”); ECF No. 18-5, at 7 ¶ 14 (“[E]ach FOIA request

to OIP seeking investigatory records about a named individual and each potential Glomar response

is analyzed on a case-by-case basis and all reasonable efforts are made to ensure compliance with

the FOIA, DOJ’s regulations, and OIP’s Guidance. OIP has consistently advised all federal

agencies to consider whether there exists third-party consent, proof of death, or official

acknowledgment of the existence of the investigation and to consider on [a] case-by-case basis

whether the public interest outweighs the privacy interest.”); ECF No. 18-6, at 5 ¶ 21 (explaining

61 that, in determining whether Exemption 7(C) applied to CREW’s requests, the “EOUSA

considered: (1) whether the requested records were compiled for law enforcement purposes,

(2) whether there was a significant privacy interest in the requested information, (3) Plaintiff’s

asserted public interest in the requested information, and (4) whether the disclosure of information

would reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy”); ECF No. 29-2,

at 5 ¶ 19 (“When a requester seeks OPR records about a specific individual, OPR conducts an

individualized balancing of the interests to decide whether a Glomar response is appropriate.”).

While CREW has pointed to probative examples where DOJ may have fallen short of what FOIA

requires, those examples fail to overcome the presumption of good faith afforded to DOJ’s

declarations. See SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1200; see also Am. Oversight v. U.S. Env’t Prot.

Agency, 386 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2019) (rejecting a policy-or-practice claim based in part

on the agency’s declaration that “all FOIA requests are reviewed individually”).

Additionally, the fact that DOJ may have erred in issuing Glomar responses for some of

CREW’s requests does not lead to the conclusion that DOJ issued blanket Glomar responses

simply because the requests sought records relating to investigations of third parties. With respect

to official acknowledgments, CREW presents at most one instance of a DOJ component ignoring

an official acknowledgment of the existence of responsive records: the Criminal Division’s

Glomar response to the part of the Kelsey request regarding Mr. Smith. It is unclear whether that

official acknowledgment—a DOJ press release stating that the Criminal Division was prosecuting

Mr. Smith, see DOJ Kelsey Press Release, supra—should be attributed to the Criminal Division

or DOJ itself. If the Criminal Division ignored an official acknowledgment by DOJ, then this error

may constitute an example of the Criminal Division’s overly narrow approach to official

acknowledgments, which the court discusses below. But to the extent the Criminal Division

62 ignored its own official acknowledgment, its error appears to be an isolated mistake and is

insufficient to support the existence of a policy or practice of ignoring official acknowledgments.

See Am. Oversight, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 14 (granting summary judgment to the agency on the

plaintiff’s policy-or-practice claim based on one instance of the agency denying a FOIA request

solely for failure to provide a keyword or subject matter). And for the other components, DOJ

offers declarations stating that its components consider Department-wide official

acknowledgments in determining whether to issue a Glomar response. See supra pp. 22-23 (OPR

and EOUSA declarations). According to OIP Chief of Staff Sean O’Neill, DOJ’s Guide to the

FOIA instructs components that:

An agency may not be able to utilize a Glomar response where the subject of a request has already been publicly associated with agency law enforcement matters that would otherwise justify a Glomar response. For example, where there is a public acknowledgment of a law enforcement investigation by an agency official authorized to speak on behalf of the government, a Glomar response would be improper.

ECF No. 18-5, at 6 ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). CREW presents no evidence to the

contrary suggesting that components (other than the Criminal Division) deviate from this official

guidance.31

DOJ’s other problematic Glomar responses also appear to be the product of

request-specific judgment calls by DOJ components. For example, the issues the court has

identified with the EOUSA and OPR’s responses to the Morehead request, the EOUSA’s response

to the Kindred request, and the Criminal Division’s response to the Zinke request are examples of

31 CREW does not allege that the FBI and OIP ignored official acknowledgments, and DOJ’s declarations about those components demonstrate that those components properly consider official acknowledgments when determining whether to issue Glomar responses. See ECF No. 18-4, at 3-5 ¶¶ 5-8 (FBI’s approach); ECF No. 18-5, at 6-7 ¶ 13 (OIP’s approach).

63 individual components failing to parse the privacy interests implicated by each part of a FOIA

request, not a blanket policy of issuing Glomar responses whenever a request refers to an official

by name. And while CREW presents four examples of the FBI’s and the Criminal Division’s

failures to consider disclosures by the subject or their spokespersons and failures to consider the

threshold requirements of Exemptions 6 and 7(C), see supra pp. 37-44, 53-55 (Mastriano,

Egyptian President, Giuliani/Kallstrom, and Trump companies requests), it provides little evidence

that those components’ Glomar responses were the product of an unlawful policy or practice.

The court in American Oversight addressed a similarly deficient summary judgment

record. 386 F. Supp. 3d at 8-14. There, the plaintiff asserted that the Environmental Protection

Agency (“EPA”) had a policy of refusing to process FOIA requests for communications records

that did not provide specific keywords of subject matters. Id. at 8. As support, the plaintiff pointed

to six FOIA requests for which the agency had refused to conduct a search because the responses

failed to provide a keyword or a search term that could narrow the scope of the request, even

though the requests “reasonably described” the requested records. Id. For one of those requests,

the EPA argued that it could not process the request without specific domain names for the

potential authors or recipients of records. Id. at 10. The court found that the plaintiff’s dispute

was “not with some unspoken policy of refusing to process the request until the requestor provides

a keyword or subject matter for the email records sought, but with the EPA’s specific determination

that it could not search for the records without specifying non-[governmental] domain names for

the potential authors or recipients.” Id. Here, too, CREW’s dispute is not with some unspoken

policy of issuing “knee-jerk Glomar responses” whenever the request includes the name of a public

official, ECF No. 23-1, at 21, but rather with errors in the agency’s consideration of specific

interests for specific requests.

64 The court agrees with CREW, however, that the above examples and DOJ’s declarations

reveal potentially erroneous practices in the Criminal Division’s and the FBI’s approaches to

determining whether a Glomar response is appropriate. First, the Criminal Division appears to

limit its consideration of official acknowledgments to disclosures made by that component alone,

even though other DOJ components may bind it. See supra pp. 27-28. Second, the FBI’s

declarations do not state whether it considers statements by a subject or their spokesperson in

determining whether a subject’s privacy interests have been diminished. See supra

Section IV.B.2.a (Mastriano, Egyptian President, and Giuliani/Kallstrom requests). Third, it is not

clear from the Criminal Division’s and the FBI’s declarations whether the components make the

initial determination that responsive documents meet Exemptions 6 and 7(C)’s threshold

requirements. See supra pp. 42-44, 53-55 (Giuliani/Kallstrom and Trump companies requests).

Fourth and finally, the Criminal Division appears to follow an improper categorical rule that a

requester can never establish a public interest in disclosure without an official acknowledgment or

a public disclosure by the subject, and the Criminal Division’s and the FBI’s declarations suggest

that both components apply an overly narrow conception of the public interest in disclosure. See

supra pp. 58-60. These practices may support narrower policy-or-practice claims against the

Criminal Division and/or the FBI because individual DOJ components, like the agency writ large,

can engage in an unlawful policy or practice of asserting Glomar responses. See ECF No. 12,

at 13-14.

Of course, it may very well be that CREW, having learned that DOJ does not have a broad

policy of “issuing Glomar responses to CREW simply because a FOIA request seeks records

relating to an investigation of a third party,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 43, does not wish to proceed on narrower

policy-or-practice claims. And if CREW wishes to proceed, supplemental declarations from DOJ

65 could reveal that some of these apparent policies or practices—such as the FBI’s failure to consider

disclosures by subjects’ spokespersons—are “merely isolated mistakes.” Payne Enters., 837 F.2d

at 491. Supplemental declarations might also demonstrate that the Criminal Division’s and the

FBI’s consideration of official acknowledgments, the threshold requirements of Exemptions 6 and

7(C), and the public interest all comport with FOIA.32 Rather than make any of those

determinations without the benefit of the parties’ insights, the court denies both parties’ motions

for summary judgment on Count II and directs the parties to meet and confer regarding CREW’s

individual policy-or-practice claims.33

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that CREW’s Motion for Summary

Judgment on Count I, ECF No. 22, is DENIED as moot, and DOJ’s Motion for Summary

Judgment on Count II, ECF No. 18, and CREW’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on

32 For example, DOJ does not expressly contest CREW’s interpretation of the O’Keefe declaration that the Criminal Division only considers its own official acknowledgments. See ECF No. 29, at 3. But at the same time, DOJ argues that the Criminal Division, like every other component, “consider[s] . . . any official disclosure by DOJ.” Id.; see ECF No. 18-3, at 8-9 ¶ 20 (stating that the “Criminal Division was not aware of any evidence indicating that the Department publicly acknowledged the existence of an investigation involving the individuals referenced in parts” of the Kelsey request (emphasis added)). It is therefore possible that the Criminal Division does consider official acknowledgments by other DOJ components and its declaration did not state that explicitly because CREW had not raised that specific argument. 33 CREW also seeks discovery pursuant to Rule 56(d) to uncover “evidence of the existence of a policy and the extent of DOJ components’ noncompliance with FOIA by issuing even more Glomar responses to requests for investigative files that identify subjects by name.” ECF No. 23-1, at 37. The court concludes that discovery would be premature before the parties confer regarding the scope of CREW’s policy-or-practice claims.

66 Count II, ECF No. 23, are DENIED. It is further ORDERED that the parties shall meet, confer,

and file a joint status report on or before April 13, 2026, proposing next steps in this litigation.

SO ORDERED.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge Date: March 30, 2026