Citizens Financial Services, FSB v. United States

57 Fed. Cl. 64, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 406, 2003 WL 21513053
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedJune 25, 2003
DocketNo. 93-306C
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 57 Fed. Cl. 64 (Citizens Financial Services, FSB v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Citizens Financial Services, FSB v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 64, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 406, 2003 WL 21513053 (uscfc 2003).

Opinion

OPINION

FIRESTONE, Judge.

This matter comes before the court on the defendant’s (“government’s”) motion for summary judgment on all of plaintiff Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Association’s (“Citizens’”) damage and restitution claims in this Wmsior-related case. Also pending is Citizens’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment on reliance damages. The government conceded the issue of liability and on May 1, 2002, plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on liability was granted.

For the reasons that follow, the government’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, IN PART, AND DENIED, IN PART. The plaintiffs cross-motion for partial summary judgment on reliance is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

I. FACTS

In 1983, Citizens acquired two failing savings and loan associations, First Federal of East Chicago (“First Federal”) and Gary Federal (“Gary”). The acquisitions were accomplished through mergers that were arranged by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”). As part of the arrangement, the FSLIC gave Citizens $12.75 million in cash assistance. The FSLIC also'agreed that Citizens could (a) mark down First Federal and Gary’s assets to estimated market value; (b) count the $40.15 million of excess acquired liabilities over the market value of acquired assets as “supervisory goodwill;” (c) treat the supervisory goodwill as regulatory capital, to be written off on a straight-line basis over thirty-five years; and (d) record a direct credit of $12.75 million to its regulatory capital and amortize this “capital credit” over thirty-five years. The agreement between Citizens and the government therefore gave Citizens the right to use $52.9 million of supervisory goodwill and capital credit for regulatory capital purposes.

At the time of the acquisition of First Federal and Gary, Citizens needed the supervisory goodwill and capital credit in order to meet its regulatory capital requirement. By late 1989, around the time that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (“FIRREA”) was enacted, however, Citizens no longer needed to use the supervisory goodwill or capital credit to meet the then-applicable regulatory capital requirement. The Office of Thrift Supervisory (“OTS”) 1989 examination report states that as of August 1989, Citizens had approximately $55.7 million in “regulatory capital,” or 10% of total assets. The “regulatory capital” included $30 million in the “supervisory goodwill” capital remaining from the 1983 assistance acquisition and $10 million remaining from the amortization of the $12.75 million “capital credit.” By virtue of Citizens’ successful management, it had tangible capital of $15.1 million or 2.7% of assets.

Enactment and implementation of FIR-REA led to changes in Citizens’ ability to use supervisory goodwill and capital credit for regulatory capital purposes. At the time of FIRREA’s implementation, Citizens had an unamortized balance of $38.5 million, which included $28.4 million of supervisory goodwill and $10.1 million of capital credit. Under FIRREA and its implementing regulations, [66]*66the government required Citizens to deduct these amounts from its regulatory capital accounts on an accelerated basis and to eliminate them entirely by 1994. As a result, once FIRREA was implemented, Citizens’ capital declined from over 10% of assets to less than 5.5% of assets.

II. Damage Theories

While it is not disputed that Citizens’ loss of supervisory goodwill did not interfere with its ability to meet its regulatory capital requirements,1 Citizens contends, through its expert, Dr. Paul M. Horvitz, that Citizens was, however, damaged by the loss of its excess regulatory capital. In particular, Dr. Horvitz contends that Citizens was forced to forego both internal as well as external growth opportunities in order to rebuild its capital levels. Citizens’ decision not to grow is reflected in its Investment Policies and Strategies document (“the Strategy”) for 1990, which was adopted in August 1989, following enactment of FIRREA. The Strategy states:

[S]ensible planning becomes ... complicated by the apparent abrogation of the Association’s contract with the FSLIC on goodwill accounting.
Currently, the Association’s primary goal is to maintain capital levels well above all regulatory and other methods of measurement. To accomplish this, all savings and lending products are priced to maintain adequate spreads for profitability and significant growth in assets. At the current time, a decrease in the deposit base is acceptable.

Pl.’s App. at 252. In keeping with this strategy, Citizens’ contemporaneous business plans from the early 1990s reflect its decision to shrink loans by 3% and to not grow deposits. Id. at 386. Citizens’ business plans called for additional loan shrinkage in 1993 and 1994. Id. at 320.

Citizens also decided that it could not grow by acquisition during this period of low eapital ratios. For example, Citizens’ 1991 Corporate Overview stated: “A local institution willing to merge will be explored only if there is no dilution of capital____Historically, sales have brought serious diminishment of capital to acquiring institutions.” Id. at 400-01. Citizens’ decision not to grow by acquisition is also discussed in the OTS’ 1992 examination of Citizens.

It is not disputed that by following its business strategy and plans, Citizens was able to achieve its goal of a 10% capital level by 1993 and thereafter began to use its net earnings to leverage and grow. By 1995, Citizens had grown from its pre-FIRREA $550 million to more than $600 million in assets, and by 1997, Citizens approached $750 million in assets. Id. at 34. In 1997, Citizens agreed to acquire another thrift, Suburban Federal Savings. In 1998, Citizens converted to stock ownership. Citizens raised $178 million in its initial public offering. Id. at 289. Of the amount raised, Citizens used $45.5 million to acquire Suburban and incurred $8.9 million in merger expenses.

It is against this backdrop that Dr. Horvitz proposes several alternative damage calculations.

A. Expectancy Damages

Dr. Horvitz calculates expectancy damages under two approaches. First, under Dr. Horvitz’ lost profit analysis, he concludes that Citizens would have leveraged its unamortized goodwill and capital credit and obtained an additional $20.9 million in profits over what Citizens otherwise obtained until 1998, when Citizens acquired Suburban and was able to achieve the size it would have reached absent FIRREA. Second, Dr. Horvitz also presents a cost of capital replacement analysis in which he asserts that had Citizens decided to replace its lost goodwill and capital credits, it would have cost Citizens $31.1 million to replace the $30.4 million of disallowed supervisory goodwill and capital credit remaining after FIRREA. Although [67]*67Dr. Horvitz acknowledges that Citizens had elected not to replace the lost regulatory capital, he opines that if Citizens had done so it would have issued preferred stock because preferred stock would have been the cheapest substitute.

The government challenges the assumptions and results of Dr. Horvitz’ expectancy damage analysis with a report by Professors Bernard Black and Jeffrey Zwiebel. With respect to Dr.

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57 Fed. Cl. 64, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 406, 2003 WL 21513053, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/citizens-financial-services-fsb-v-united-states-uscfc-2003.