Cities Service Gas Co. v. Kelly-Dempsey & Co.

27 F. Supp. 547, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2964
District Court, N.D. Oklahoma·Decided May 17, 1939·No. No. 2675·Published

Opinion

FRANKLIN E. KENNAMER, District Judge.

This action was instituted for the recovery of a money judgment upon a written contract entered into between plaintiff and the defendant, on November 14, 1931. The contract sued upon was executed in compromise of a pending law suit between the same parties, and the pertinent provisions are set forth in the subjoined notea. [548] An agreed statement of facts has been filed, and it is stipulated that if plaintiff is entitled to recover, the amount thereof shall be $7,000. It is further stipulated that the construction contracts described in plaintiff’s petition are within the scope of the contract sued on herein.

The determination of the case is reduced to a single question, and a judicial construction of the contract is determinative of it. It is contended by plaintiff that the contract provides, and it is entitled to recover, thirty per cent of the profits as defined by the contract, upon each construction contract awarded the defendant by plaintiff during the term of six years, but that the ultimate amount to which plaintiff is entitled is $50,000. It is insisted that the contract provides for a contingent liability of defendant, having a limitation of $50,000, but contains an express obligation to pay thirty per cent upon each contract separately until such thirty per cent shall equal $50,000. In the event a loss is sustained upon one or more of the contracts, but profits are realized upon one or more of said contracts so awarded during the six year term, that plaintiff would be entitled to thirty per cent of the profits realized, without any deduction being made therefrom on account of losses sustained, but the limitation of such payments being $50,000, defendant construes the contract, and urges, that its liability is contingent upon plaintiff awarding to it contracts during the six year term, which will entitle it to make profits in an amount sufficient to pay plaintiff thirty per cent thereof, when such thirty per cent equals or exceeds $50,-000. In other words, the defendant’s posi-. tion is that if contracts are not awarded to it which produce a profit, thirty per cent [549] of which amounts to $50,000, that nothing is due plaintiff. It is further insisted that a fund was required to be set up on defendant’s books, but if the fund, computed upon thirty per cent of the net profits upon such construction contract, does not amount to $50,000 during the six year term, that plaintiff is entitled to no part of it. It is conceded that construction contracts have been awarded defendant by plaintiff, but that thirty per cent of the profits therefrom have not amounted to $50,000 during the six year term.

A consideration of the contract compels a construction thereof as urged by the defendant. The contract must be construed as a whole and the intention is to be collected from the entire instrument and not from detached portions. The various parts of the contract must be considered in order to determine its meaning, and individual paragraphs or clauses, or particular words, must be considered in connection with the other part of the agreement, and if possible, every part of the contract will be given effect. The following cases announce the above rules of construction of contracts: Lamont Gas, etc., Co. v. Doop & Frater, 39 Okl. 427, 135 P. 392; Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Lindsay Bridge Co., 32 Okl. 31, 121 P. 639; Tecumseh v. Burns, 30 Okl. 503, 120 P. 270; Farmers’ Nat. Bank of Tecumseh v. McCall, 25 Okl. 600, 106 P. 866; Union Trust Co. v. Shelby Downard Asphalt Co., 55 Okl. 251, 156 P. 903; Brown v. Coppadge, 54 Okl. 88, 153 P. 817.

The Statutes of Oklahoma provide for the construction of contracts as follows: that the whole of the contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, Sec. 9465, O.S.1931, 15 Okl.St.Ann. § 157; that the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible, Sec. 9463, O.S.1931, 15 Okl.St.Ann. § 155; and in cases of uncertainty the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist, Sec. 9478, O.S.1931, 15 Okl. St.Ann. § 170.

It is unnecessary to interpret the contract against either of the parties hereto, because the contract shows the intention of the parties, and is sufficiently plain in its terms to do so without the necessity of ascertaining the intention of the parties other than from the writing itself.

The portion of the contract most strongly supporting the contention of plaintiff is the last paragraph of the third division, which provides that from the net profits, as received from said contract, defendant agrees to apply five per cent to the liquidation of the negotiable notes absolutely payable, and an additional twenty five per cent upon the contingent obligation. This indicates that the profits, as received, shall be applied upon the absolute and contingent obligations. The five per cent was applied to the payment of the notes, but the twenty-five per cent was not applied upon the contingent obligation. The notes were absolutely payable, and the five per cent was paid thereon, while the liability of $50,000 was contingent and not absolutely payable, and no payments were made thereon. It is further insisted by plaintiff that the contract provides that a portion of the profits shall be.payable to the plaintiff to the extent of the sum of $50,000, which sum is contingently payable, and that such expression is a limitation upon the amount payable contingently. Portions of the contract cannot be singled out, but the same must be considered as a whole. With this in mind, it should be noted that in the paragraph of the contract where a portion of the profits is limited to $50,000, there is stated, “that the obligation of said Construction Company to pay said $50,000.00 is contingent”, and in the same paragraph it is again referred to as “the said $50,000.00”. In paragraph numbered Fourth, the sum is referred to again as “said sum of $50,000.00”. This clearly indicates that the parties were dealing with a sum of $50,000 and not a lesser sum.

The action of the parties in paying five per cent of the profits upon the five notes, and not making the payments upon the contingent liability, is not inconsistent with the construction being placed upon the contract, for the reason that the five per cent payments were made upon absolute liabilities, and although the contract provided for an acceleration of the notes to the extent of the five per cent of net profit payments, still such a requirement of the contract is not antagonistic to the obligation to pay $50,000 contingently. As two different and separate liabilities are involved, and as the contract expressly provided for the payment of the five per cent [550] upon the note liability, there is nothing in the contract to show, except by singling out the provision, and by inference, that because the five per cent was absolutely payable, even if it accelerated the payment of the notes, that the contingent sum was also payable at the rate of twenty-five per cent of such net profits.

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Cities Service Gas Co. v. Kelly-Dempsey & Co., 27 F. Supp. 547, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2964 (N.D. Okla. 1939).

27 F. Supp. 547 (Cities Service Gas Co. v. Kelly-Dempsey & Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Lamont Gas & Oil Co. v. Doop & Frater
1913 OK 558 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1913)
Farmers' Nat. Bank of Tecumseh v. McCall
1910 OK 44 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1910)
Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Lindsay Bridge Co.
1912 OK 132 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1912)
Union Trust Co. v. Shelby Downard Asphalt Co.
1916 OK 160 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1916)
City of Tecumseh v. Burns
1911 OK 495 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1911)
Brown v. Coppadge
1915 OK 1064 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1915)