FOURTH DIVISION DILLARD, P. J., MERCIER, J., and SENIOR JUDGE FULLER
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
March 12, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A1813. LUNDY et al. v. KEMP et al.
FULLER, Senior Judge.
After Eric Walker committed suicide while being held in jail, Cijii Lundy, as
Walker’s surviving spouse and the administrator of his estate, filed a wrongful death
action.1 The matter proceeded to a jury trial; the jury returned a verdict for the two
remaining defendants, jail officers Joel Kemp and Gregory Phillips; and the trial court
entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict and thereafter denied Lundy’s
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. Lundy appeals,
contending that the trial court erred in: (1) permitting the defendants to present
evidence and argue that they had discretion with regards to a particular jail policy and
1 This is the second appearance of this matter before this Court. See Lundy v. Hancock County, 368 Ga. App. 772 (890 SE2d 92) (2023). allowing the jury to answer a related special interrogatory; (2) excluding evidence of
and argument as to additional acts of alleged negligence by the defendants;
(3) admitting into evidence only a redacted jail policy, rather than a more complete
version of the policy; (4) denying her motion for a directed verdict; (5) permitting the
defendants to present evidence that Walker’s suicide, rather than the defendants’
negligence, was the proximate cause of his death and make an argument to that effect;
and (6) excluding evidence as to the defendants’ insurance coverage and denying her
request to voir dire the jury as to the insurance carrier. We conclude that the trial
court erred in permitting the defendants to present evidence and argue that a
particular jail policy was discretionary and in allowing the jury to answer a related
special interrogatory, and we therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand
the case with direction. We also address additional claims of error to the extent that
the issues could recur if the case is retried.
“On appeal following a jury trial, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict.” Preferred Women’s Healthcare LLC v. Sain, 367 Ga.
App. 821, 822 (888 SE2d 599) (2023). See Meadows v. Beam, 302 Ga. 494, 495(1) (807
2 SE2d 339) (2017) (viewing the evidence in an appeal from a jury verdict in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party).
So viewed, the evidence shows that Kemp and Phillips were working the
overnight shift as jailers at a detention center in Hancock County on the night of July
30, 2020. They were the only jailers “on the floor,”2 and they were required to
supervise 20 or more inmates. Walker was brought into custody. He was agitated and
uncooperative, and he appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or some other
substance. Walker was allowed to telephone his mother, and both Kemp and Phillips
overheard him say something to the effect of, “You better get my death certificate
ready. I’m going to die in here tonight.” After the phone call, Walker was placed in
a cell.
Kemp knew Walker and considered him a friend. Kemp also knew that Walker
had previously threatened to harm himself in jail while intoxicated, but was fine the
next day. Kemp talked to Walker that night in an attempt to get him to settle down.
However, while Kemp was attending to other inmates, Walker was left alone for a
period of time and intentionally struck his head against his cell door. Upon returning
2 There was an additional person working in a central control facility, but she was not permitted to leave her post. 3 to Walker’s cell, Kemp discovered that Walker had also ripped a sheet or towel and
looped it around his neck. Kemp took several items from Walker’s cell, but left
Walker — who assured Kemp he would not hurt himself — with his t-shirt, boxers,
and wave cap . A few minutes later, Phillips checked on Walker, who had ripped up
his t-shirt, tied it to the bedpost, and looped it loosely around his neck. Phillips called
Kemp back into Walker’s cell, and once again, Walker told Kemp that he would not
hurt himself. Walker seemed calm, and Kemp left Walker in his cell, wearing his
boxers, socks, and wave cap. Approximately 20 minutes later, Phillips checked on
Walker again. Phillips discovered that Walker had hanged himself from the bed using
his wave cap, resulting in his death.
Lundy thereafter filed a wrongful death suit against Hancock County, the
Hancock County Sheriff’s Office (collectively, HCSO), and numerous individual
defendants, including Kemp, Phillips, and several other officials with the sheriff’s
office and jail. The trial court granted HCSO’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
on the basis of sovereign immunity and granted summary judgment to the individual
defendants, including Kemp and Phillips, based on official immunity. Lundy appealed,
and this Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Kemp and Phillips and
4 affirmed the other rulings. See Lundy v. Hancock County, 368 Ga. App. 772 (890 SE2d
92) (2023). As relevant here, this Court noted that subsection (E) of Policy 2.5 of the
jail operations manual provided:
1. Close Observation is reserved for the detainee who is not actively suicidal, but expresses suicidal ideation and/or has a recent prior history of self-destructive behavior. This detainee should be observed by detention officers at staggered intervals not to exceed every 15 minutes.
2. Constant Observation is reserved for the detainee who is actively suicidal, either by threatening or engaging in the act of suicide. This detainee should be observed by a staff member on a continuous, uninterrupted basis.
3. Other supervision aids (e.g. closed circuit television, detainee companions/watchers, etc.) can be utilized as a supplement to, but never as a substitute for, the above observation levels.
Id. at 779(8)(a). This Court held that “these policies clearly establish ministerial
duties for detention officers to observe a detainee who has expressed suicidal ideation
at intervals not to exceed 15 minutes and to observe a detainee who is either
threatening or engaging in an act of suicide on a continuous basis.” Id. We further
determined that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Kemp and
5 Phillips “negligently failed to perform the ministerial duties of observing Walker at
least every 15 minutes,” as required by jail policy. Id. at 780(8)(a).
On remand, Lundy filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence or argument
that Walker was contributorily or comparatively negligent or assumed the risk of
injury, which the trial court denied. Kemp and Phillips (collectively, the defendants)
filed a motion in limine to exclude, inter alia, any evidence or argument regarding any
claims of negligence against them that — following this Court’s prior opinion — they
claimed did not survive summary judgment and to exclude any evidence or jury voir
dire regarding insurance coverage. The trial court granted, in part, the defendants’
motion in limine, excluding (1) any evidence or argument as to acts of negligence other
than the defendants’ failure “to perform the ministerial task of checking on the
deceased every 15 minutes,” and (2) any evidence or voir dire as to the defendants’
insurance. The defendants also requested a special interrogatory on official immunity,
which the trial court agreed would be given to the jury.
The matter proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury heard testimony from the
defendants, as well as a forensic pathologist, who testified that Walker’s blood alcohol
concentration was almost twice the legal limit for driving and that he also had
6 methamphetamine in his system. Evidence was also admitted that pursuant to Policy
2.5(E)(1), inmates who have expressed suicidal ideation and/or have a recent prior
history of self-destructive behavior “should be observed by detention officers at
staggered intervals not to exceed every 15 minutes.” The forensic pathologist,
however, testified that Walker would have lost consciousness within fifteen to thirty
seconds of applying pressure to his neck and would have died within three to five
minutes. She further explained that if Walker had hanged himself within five minutes
of the last time the jailers had checked on him, he would have been dead five minutes
later, and a check fifteen minutes after the last check most likely could not have saved
his life. The jury was also able to view surveillance video footage that showed the
doorway to Walker’s cell, which the defendants argued demonstrated that Walker
hanged himself within five minutes of their last check on him.
During trial, the court decided that it was for the jury to determine whether the
15-minute check required by Policy 2.5(E)(1) applied and whether the defendants
violated the policy. And, over Lundy’s objection, the court ruled that the defendants
could present evidence and argue that the policy was discretionary. Accordingly, a
defense witness testified over Lundy’s objection that the provision requiring 15-
7 minute checks was a “guideline” and that the officers had “flexibility” in applying it.
The defendants similarly argued to the jury that they had discretion in complying with
Policy 2.5(E)(1).
After the jury returned a verdict for the defendants, Lundy filed a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
This appeal follows.
1. (a) Lundy contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence and permitting
the defendants to argue that Policy 2.5(E)(1) was discretionary.3 We agree.
As we explained in the prior appeal of this matter, individual government
employees, such as Kemp and Phillips,
are shielded by official immunity from damages suits unless the plaintiff can establish that the official negligently performed a ministerial act or performed a discretionary act with malice or an intent to injure. A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act, however, calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.
3 We have taken Lundy’s claims of error out of order. 8 Lundy, 368 Ga. App. at 778(7) (citation modified). As set forth above, this Court
determined that Policy 2.5(E) clearly established a ministerial duty “for detention
officers to observe a detainee who has expressed suicidal ideation at intervals not to
exceed 15 minutes and to observe a detainee who is either threatening or engaging in
an act of suicide on a continuous basis.” Id. at 779(8)(a). See generally Grammens v.
Dollar, 287 Ga. 618, 620 (697 SE2d 775) (2010) (“Whether the act of a public official
is ministerial or discretionary is determined by the facts of each individual case,
particularly the facts specifically relevant to the official’s act or omission from which
the alleged liability arises.” (citation omitted)). See also Howell v. Willis, 317 Ga. App.
199, 201 (729 SE2d 643) (2012) (explaining that where the facts concerning the
defendant’s behavior “are not in dispute, the court determines whether those acts
were discretionary or ministerial”). Nevertheless, as set forth above, the trial court
permitted the defendants to present evidence and argue that they had flexibility in
complying with Policy 2.5(E)(1), such that it was discretionary. Given this Court’s
prior ruling, the trial court erred.
A ruling by this Court on any issue is binding in all subsequent proceedings.
OCGA § 9-11-60(h) (“The law of the case rule is abolished; . . . provided, however,
9 that any ruling by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be
binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court and in the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals as the case may be.”). Accord Hicks v. McGee,
289 Ga. 573, 577(2) (713 SE2d 841) (2011). See also OCGA § 5-6-10 (providing that
any decision by an appellate court and direction given “shall be respected and carried
into full effect in good faith by the court below”). The only exception to Georgia’s
law-of-the-case rule is when the “evidentiary posture” of a case has changed between
appeals, as when “a new issue that the appellate court has not addressed is raised by
amended pleadings or otherwise,” or when “the original evidence submitted is found
to be insufficient, and the deficient evidence is later supplemented.” Choate Constr.
Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 335 Ga. App. 331, 336–37(1) (779 SE2d 465) (2015)
(citation modified). Accord McLean v. Cont’l Wingate Co., Inc., 222 Ga. App. 805,
807(1) (476 SE2d 83) (1996). See also Maree v. Phillips, 274 Ga. 369, 371(3) (552 SE2d
837) (2001) (“Under the ‘law of the case rule,’ [an appellate] decision is binding in
all subsequent proceedings in the trial court and in our appellate courts, absent a
change in the evidentiary posture of a case.”).
10 The defendants argue that whether Policy 2.5(E) was discretionary was a
question of fact for the jury. See generally Grammens, 287 Ga. at 620. But this Court
already ruled that Policy 2.5(E) was ministerial, and the defendants do not argue that
the evidentiary posture of the case has changed, either because a new issue was raised
by amended pleadings or because the original evidence submitted was found to be
insufficient and later supplemented. See Choate Constr., 335 Ga. App. at 336–37(1).
As a result, our prior ruling in Lundy, 368 Ga. App. at 779(8)(a) — that Policy 2.5(E)
imposes a ministerial duty — is the law of the case. See Choate Constr., 335 Ga. App.
at 339(1).
The defendants claim that this Court’s ruling in Lundy was erroneous and was
improperly issued sua sponte, and therefore denied them due process. But they point
to no such exceptions to the law-of-the-case rule, and we have found none. See
generally Hicks, 289 Ga. at 578(2) (“Even where the law subsequently changes,
appellate rulings remain binding as between parties to a case, so long as the evidentiary
posture of the case remains unchanged, despite all contentions that prior rulings in the
matter are erroneous.” (quotation marks omitted)); Widener v. Ashkouti, 239 Ga. App.
530, 530(1) (521 SE2d 215) (1999) (explaining that in civil actions, the superior court
11 and this Court are bound by this Court’s previous rulings “regardless of whether [the]
defendants contend those rulings may be erroneous”).4
Because our prior ruling — that Policy 2.5(E) was ministerial — is the law of
the case, we hold that the trial court erred. While the jury was entitled to determine
whether the defendants complied with Policy 2.5(E) and whether any failure to
comply caused Walker’s death, the jury was not entitled to consider evidence and
argument that Policy 2.5(E) was discretionary. Accordingly, the judgment must be
reversed, and Lundy is entitled to a new trial.
(b) In a related claim, Lundy contends the trial court erred in instructing the
jury to determine, via special interrogatory, whether Policy 2.5(E)(1) imposed a
discretionary guideline or a mandatory requirement. Once again, given the prior
proceedings in this matter, we agree.
At trial, over Lundy’s objection, the trial court propounded two special
interrogatories to the jury. The first interrogatory asked, “Do you find that [Policy
2.5(E)(1)] applied to the situation [Kemp and Phillips] had to handle with detainee
4 To the extent that the defendants were dissatisfied with this Court’s ruling in Lundy, 368 Ga. App. 772, their remedy was to file a motion for reconsideration or to petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for a writ of certiorari. They did neither. 12 Eric Walker?” The jury was to select “Yes” or “No.” The second interrogatory
asked, “If you answered ‘Yes’ to the question above, do you find that the section
providing ‘This detainee should be observed by detention officers at staggered
intervals not to exceed 15 minutes’ was a discretionary guideline or a mandatory
requirement?” and provided for the jury to choose one of the options. The jury
answered the first question in the affirmative and selected “Discretionary guideline”
for the second question.
As a general rule, “[a] trial court may submit questions of fact to the jury in the
form of special verdicts if, in its discretion, it desires to seek a jury’s aid to resolve
specific factual disputes.” Outlaw v. Nasworthy. 250 Ga. App. 362, 364(1) (551 SE2d
785) (2001) (quotation marks omitted). And a trial court is authorized to submit a
special verdict form to the jury to decide factual issues necessary to determine
whether a defendant is entitled to official immunity. Id. As such, the trial court was
entitled to ask the jury the first special interrogatory. However, because under the law
of the case, Policy 2.5(E) was ministerial, rather than discretionary, we conclude that
the trial court erred in submitting the second question to the jury.
13 Lundy raises several additional claims of error. To the extent that these claims
concern issues that may recur if the case is retried, we will address them.
2. Lundy contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of and
argument regarding violations of other jail policies by the defendants. Specifically,
Lundy argues that this Court, in reversing the grant of summary judgment to the
defendants as to the violation of Policy 2.5(E), also reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment to those defendants as to all other allegations of negligence. We
agree and thus direct the trial court to reconsider its evidentiary ruling if the case is
retried.
As set forth above, the individual defendants, including Kemp and Phillips,
sought summary judgment on the basis that, inter alia, they were entitled to official
immunity. In response, Lundy asserted that the individual defendants failed to comply
with numerous jail policies and procedures, including Policy 2.5(E), and that official
immunity did not bar her claims because the policies established ministerial duties. In
granting summary judgment to all of the individual defendants, the trial court found,
inter alia, that although Kemp and Phillips had ministerial duties to supervise Walker
every 15 minutes, those duties were not triggered because the officers had been unable
14 to complete an intake screening on Walker and determine whether he was a suicide
risk which, in any event, would be a discretionary act. On appeal to this Court for the
first time, Lundy once again argued that the individual defendants were negligent in
failing to comply with various jail policies, each of which established ministerial duties.
In our prior ruling, this Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Kemp
and Phillips and otherwise affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to
the other individual defendants. Lundy, 368 Ga App. at 777–85(6)–(9). Notably, in our
prior decision, this Court did not address any other specific allegations of negligence
— aside from the allegations as to Policy 2.5(E) — against Kemp and Phillips. See id.
Nevertheless, before trial, the defendants sought to exclude evidence of any negligent
acts other than their failure to supervise Walker every 15 minutes. They asserted that
any other claims of negligence had been excluded as a result of the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment to them as to those issues, and what they claimed was this
Court’s affirmance of that ruling. On remand, the trial court ruled that based upon its
review of the briefing in this Court, as well as the record, “the only instance of
negligence that survives for determination is that of the failure to perform the
15 ministerial task of checking on the deceased every 15 minutes” in accordance with
As an initial matter, to the extent that Kemp and Phillips contend that this
Court reversed in part the grant of summary judgment to them only as to the 15-minute
provision and otherwise affirmed the grant of summary judgment to them, nothing in
this Court’s prior decision indicates that the reversal of summary judgment to them
was in part. See Lundy, 368 Ga. App. at 773, 778–81(8). Rather, by reversing in full the
grant of summary judgment to Kemp and Phillips, this Court restored the parties to
the position they occupied before that judgment was entered. See Franklyn Gesner
Fine Paintings v. Ketcham, 259 Ga. 3, 4(6)(a) (375 SE2d 848) (1989) (“The legal effect
of the reversal of a judgment on appeal is to nullify the judgment below and place the
parties in the same position in which they were before judgment.” (quotation marks
omitted)). Accord J. Michael Vince, LLC v. SunTrust Bank, 352 Ga. App. 791,
794(2)(a) (835 SE2d 809) (2019).
Moreover, although this Court held that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the defendants had failed to comply with Policy 2.5(E), see Lundy,
16 368 Ga App. at 778–80(8)(a), it did not specifically consider any other allegations of
negligence against Kemp and Phillips.5 The law-of-the-case rule encompasses only our
explicit holdings. See Hicks, 289 Ga. at 579(2) (explaining that a court errs by
expanding the law-of-the-case rule to encompass implied rulings); Morrison v.
Morrison, 299 Ga. App. 758, 760(1) (683 SE2d 696) (2009) (noting that the law-of-the-
case rule “encompasses only . . . explicit holdings.”); Parks v. State Farm Gen. Ins.
Co., 238 Ga. App. 814, 815(1) (520 SE2d 494) (1999) (holding that law-of-the-case
rule “applies only to actual decisions, not to issues raised by the parties but never ruled
upon”).
Thus, if this case is tried again, this Court’s prior decision provides no basis for
the trial court to categorically exclude evidence as to other alleged acts of negligence
by the defendants, including potential violations of policies other than Policy
2.5(E)(1). The trial court therefore should consider, in the first instance, whether any
of those acts might be admissible.
5 This Court rejected Lundy’s claim that any of the other individual defendants could be liable for failing to provide adequate medical care to Walker because, this Court explained, the provision of medical care is a discretionary act. Lundy, 368 Ga App. at 782(9)(b). Similarly, this Court rejected Lundy’s claim that any of the other individual defendants were personally liable for violating any other ministerial duties. Id. at 781–82(9)(a)–(b) . 17 3. Lundy also argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence only
a redacted version of Policy 2.5(E).
Before trial, Lundy sought to admit into evidence the jail’s entire suicide
prevention policy, which consisted of all of Policy 2.5, while the defendants sought to
admit only a redacted version, consisting of the title and the 15-minute check
contained in Policy 2.5(E)(1). The trial court ultimately ruled — over Lundy’s
objection and in accordance with its pretrial ruling that the only issue of negligence
that remained following this Court’s prior opinion was whether the defendants
complied with the 15-minute checks required by Policy 2.5(E)(1) — that only a
redacted version of Policy 2.5(E) was admissible.6 The redacted version of Policy 2.5
admitted at trial included only its preamble and section (E)(1), which provides that
inmates who have expressed suicidal ideation and/or have a recent prior history of
self-destructive behavior “should be observed by detention officers at staggered
intervals not to exceed every 15 minutes.”
6 The defendants argue that Lundy failed to obtain a ruling from the trial court on this issue and failed to object to the redacted policy, but this claim is belied by the record, which indicates that the court issued a final ruling on this issue by e-mail and that Lundy objected to the redacted policy. 18 Lundy argues that the trial court erred in using the redacted policy because this
Court quoted the entire Policy 2.5(E) in Lundy and held that “these policies clearly
establish ministerial duties for detention officers to observe a detainee who has
expressed suicidal ideation at intervals not to exceed 15 minutes and to observe a
detainee who is either threatening or engaging in an act of suicide on a continuous
basis.” Lundy, 368 Ga. App. at 779(8)(a) (emphasis added). If the case is retried, we
direct the trial court to reconsider the admission of jail policies in addition to Policy
2.5(E)(1) in light of our rulings in Divisions 1 and 2.
4. Lundy next argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a
directed verdict. This argument is not compelling.
“A directed verdict is authorized only when there is no conflict in the evidence
as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions
therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict.” Moore v. Singh, 326 Ga. App. 805, 805
(755 SE2d 319) (2014) (quotation marks omitted).
To prevail on her claim of negligence against the defendants, Lundy has to
establish “a duty, a breach of that duty, causation and damages.” City of Richmond Hill
v. Maia, 301 Ga. 257, 258(1) (800 SE2d 573) (2017) (quotation marks omitted). Even
19 assuming — as Lundy argues — that the defendants conceded that they had a duty to
Walker pursuant to Policy 2.5(E)(1) and that they breached that duty, there was
evidence from the forensic pathologist that even a timely check many not have
prevented Walker’s death. Because there was evidence that any breach by the
defendants of Policy 2.5(E)(1) — the only issue the jury was asked to decide — did not
cause Walker’s death, the record does not demand a verdict for Lundy, and the trial
court did not err in denying a directed verdict.
5. Lundy also asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence or
argument that Walker’s suicide, as opposed to the defendants’ negligence, was “the
proximate cause of his death.” We disagree.
Of course, to recover for injuries caused by another’s negligence, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant’s negligence was both the “cause in fact” and the
“proximate cause” of the injury. City of Richmond Hill, 301 Ga. at 258(1) (quotation
marks omitted). And there “may be more than one proximate cause of an injury in
cases involving the concurrent negligence of several actors.” Knight v. Roberts, 316 Ga.
App. 599, 608(1)(b) (730 SE2d 78) (2012) (citation modified). However,
20 the well-established doctrine of intervening causes states that there can be no proximate cause where there has intervened between the act of the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff, an independent act or omission of someone other than the defendant, which was not foreseeable by defendant, was not triggered by defendant’s act, and which was sufficient of itself to cause the injury.
City of Richmond Hill, 301 Ga. at 259(1) (quotation marks omitted).
Generally speaking, “suicide is deemed an unforeseeable intervening cause of
death which absolves the tortfeasor of liability.” City of Richmond Hill, 301 Ga. at
259(1). But there are exceptions to this general rule, including the special-relationship
exception. Id. at 260(1). Such a special relationship may exist between “a police
officer or jailer and his detainee or prisoner . . . because a duty to protect arises under
such circumstances.” Id. at 261(1). Accord Brantley v. Jones, 363 Ga. App. 466,
477(3)(c)(i) (871 SE2d 87) (2022).
Lundy asserts that because of the special relationship between a jailer and an
inmate, a jailer’s failure to protect an inmate from self-harm must be considered the
proximate cause of any resulting suicide. We do not agree. Under the general rule, a
suicide is always an intervening cause that precludes liability. However, under the
special-relationship exception, a jailer may be held liable for a suicide depending on
21 the facts and circumstances. See Brantley, 363 Ga. App. at 477(3)(c)(i) (holding that
jury could find that inmate’s death by suicide was caused by detention officer’s failure
to supervise inmate in accordance with mandated 15-minute watch). But our case law
does not demand a finding of liability in every such instance. Rather, questions of
proximate cause are generally left to the jury. City of Richmond Hill, 301 Ga. at 261(2).
And they should be in this case as well, particularly given the evidence that even
compliance with Policy 2.5(E)(1) may not have prevented Walker’s death.
6. Finally, Lundy asserts that the trial court erred in excluding any evidence as
to the defendants’ liability insurance and in denying her request to qualify all
prospective jurors as to the defendants’ insurance carrier.
(a) Evidence of liability insurance is not admissible except under specific
circumstances not present in this case. OCGA § 24-4-411 (“In all civil proceedings
involving a claim for damages, evidence that a person was or was not insured against
liability shall not be admissible except as provided in this Code section. This Code
section shall not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability in
proceedings [regarding motor carrier certificates of insurance] or when such evidence
is offered for a relevant purpose, including, but not limited to, proof of agency,
22 ownership, or control, and the court finds that the danger of unfair prejudice is
substantially outweighed by the probative value of the evidence.”). Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding any evidence as to the
defendants’ liability insurance.
(b) As to the jury, “[i]t is the longstanding rule in Georgia that, to ensure the
right of trial by an impartial jury, a party to a civil case is entitled to have the jury
qualified by the court as to any insurance carrier with a financial interest in the case.”
Ford Motor Co. v. Conley, 294 Ga. 530, 550(3)(b) (757 SE2d 20) (2014). See generally
OCGA § 15-12-135(a) (“All trial jurors in the courts of this state shall be disqualified
to act or serve in any case or matter when such jurors are related by consanguinity or
affinity to any party interested in the result of the case or matter within the third
degree as computed according to the civil law.”). It is an equally longstanding rule
that “where a civil jury was not properly qualified in this way, and where the party
seeking such qualification has properly preserved the issue for review, prejudice to
that party will be presumed, and in the absence of proper rebuttal, a new trial must be
ordered.” Ford Motor Co., 294 Ga. at 550(3)(b).
23 According to the defendants, they were covered under a policy issued by the
Association County Commissioners of Georgia-Interlocal Risk Management Agency.
The defendants argue that because an interlocal risk management agency “is not an
insurance company or an insurer under” Georgia’s Insurance Code, see OCGA § 36-
85-4, and is not a commercial insurer, no voir dire was required. But the rule set forth
in Ford requires voir dire as to any “insurance carrier” with a financial interest in the
case. Ford Motor Co., 294 Ga. at 550(3)(b). Here, the trial court did not allow any voir
dire of the jury as to the interlocal risk management agency, but its reasons for doing
so are not clear. If the case is retried, the trial court should determine, in the first
instance, if the interlocal risk management agency at issue constitutes an “insurance
carrier” with a financial interest in this case within the meaning of Ford Motor Co.,
such that the jury must be qualified as to it.
Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. Dillard, P. J., and Mercier,
J., concur.