Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.
The present petition, an original action under Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution, was filed in this court by petitioners Christian Civic Action Committee and Barry King. They request that we enjoin respondent Secretary of State W.J. “Bill” McCuen from placing proposed Amendment 4 on the ballot for the general election of November 8, 1994.
Although it is too late, as a practical matter, to prevent the proposed amendment from being added to the ballot, we hold that the ballot title, as designed, fails to convey an intelligible idea of the scope and import of proposed Amendment 4 and that the lengthy text is, under the precedents to which we have long adhered, misleading and tinged with partisan coloring. Thus, it is necessary that we grant the petition and declare the measure ineligible for consideration at the November 8, 1994, general election. We therefore enjoin the Secretary of State from canvassing and certifying the returns on Amendment 4.
Proposed Amendment 4 to the State Constitution bears the popular name:
AN AMENDMENT TO AUTHORIZE A STATE LOTTERY, NONPROFIT BINGO, PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, AND ADDITIONAL GAMES OF CHANCE AT RACE TRACK SITES.
The petitioners do not question this popular name but instead challenge the sufficiency of the ballot title, the complete text of which is appended to this opinion.
Pursuant to Amendment 7, “[t]he sufficiency of all State-wide petitions shall be decided in the first instance by the Secretary of State, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the State, which shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all such causes.” The challenge to the sufficiency of the proposed amendment’s ballot title is based on four grounds: (1) that the ballot title is too long to be read and comprehended during the time alloted the voter in the voting booth; (2) that the design of the ballot title will prevent the voter from comprehending that he or she is being asked to approve casino gambling and to grant a monopoly on for-profit gambling to the proposed amendment’s backers; (3) that approval of the ballot title will undermine the integrity of the initiative process; and (4) that the use of the word “authorizing” in the ballot title is misleading. While the fourth issue has been argued by all parties, it is unnecessary, in light of our decision, to address the question of the asserted misleading use of the word “authorizing.”
Facts
By initiative petition pursuant to Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution, proposed Amendment 4 was filed on July 5, 1994, with the Secretary of State, who certified it on July 27, 1994, to be placed on the ballot for the November 8, 1994, general election. It is undisputed that the proposed amendment was drafted at the behest of the owners of the Oaklawn race track in Hot Springs and the Southland race track in West Memphis.
On September 13, 1994, the Christian Civic Action Committee and Barry King, as petitioners, filed this original action, supported by briefs, for our review. Briefs in response from the Secretary of State and Craig Douglass, who was granted leave to appear as an intervenor on behalf of the Arkansas First Committee, were filed on September 26, 1994. The matter was argued before us on October 3, 1994.
Ballot-title sufficiency: standard of review
Upon proper application for review, this court is entrusted with the duty and responsibility to ensure that, when voters exercise their right under Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution to change a constitutional provision through the initiative process, they are allowed to make an intelligent choice, fully aware of the consequences of their vote. Dust v. Riviere, 277 Ark. 1, 638 S.W.2d 663 (1982).
Part of that duty and responsibility entails seeing that the individual voter has available a sufficient ballot title when deciding to accept or reject the amendment. Id. It has long been regarded as axiomatic that the majority of voters, when called upon to vote for or against a proposed measure at a general election, will derive their information about its contents from an inspection of the ballot title immediately before exercising the right of suffrage. Id.; Hoban v. Hall, 229 Ark. 416, 316 S.W.2d 185 (1958); Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 741, 43 S.W.2d 356 (1931). This, indeed, is the purpose of the ballot title. Dust v. Riviere, supra; Hoban v. Hall, supra.
The general principles governing our determination of the sufficiency of particular ballot titles have been well articulated in Bradley v. Hall, 220 Ark. 925, 927, 251 S.W.2d 470, 471 (1952):
On the one hand, it is not required that the ballot title contain a synopsis of the amendment or statute. ... It is sufficient for the title to be complete enough to convey an intelligible idea of the scope and import of the proposed law. . . . We have recognized the impossibility of preparing a ballot title that would suit every one. . . . Yet, on the other hand, the ballot title must be free from “any misleading tendency, whether of amplification, of omission, or of fallacy,” and it must not be tinged with partisan coloring. . . .
It is evident that before determining the sufficiency of the present ballot title we must first ascertain what changes in the law would be brought about by the adoption of the proposed amendment. For the elector, in voting upon a constitutional amendment, is simply making a choice between retention of the existing law and the substitution of something new. It is the function of the ballot title to provide information concerning the choice that he is called upon to make. Hence the adequacy of the title is directly related to the changes that he is given the opportunity of approving.
(Emphasis added.)
The changes which would be wrought by proposed Amendment 4 will be reviewed in the context of the petitioners’ arguments. Ultimately, the central question to be resolved is whether, in the voting booth, the voter is able to reach an intelligent and informed decision for or against the proposal and to understand the consequences of his or her vote based on the ballot title itself. See Dust v. Riviere, supra.
Rightfully so, Amendment 7 places the burden of proof in legal challenges to initiative matters “upon the person or persons attacking the validity of the petition.” We liberally construe Amendment 7 in determining the sufficiency of ballot titles. Becker v. Riviere, 270 Ark. 219, 604 S.W.2d 555 (1980). Our adoption of that approach, however, does not imply that liberality is boundless or that common sense is disregarded. Dust v. Riviere, supra.
I. Length of ballot title
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice.
The present petition, an original action under Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution, was filed in this court by petitioners Christian Civic Action Committee and Barry King. They request that we enjoin respondent Secretary of State W.J. “Bill” McCuen from placing proposed Amendment 4 on the ballot for the general election of November 8, 1994.
Although it is too late, as a practical matter, to prevent the proposed amendment from being added to the ballot, we hold that the ballot title, as designed, fails to convey an intelligible idea of the scope and import of proposed Amendment 4 and that the lengthy text is, under the precedents to which we have long adhered, misleading and tinged with partisan coloring. Thus, it is necessary that we grant the petition and declare the measure ineligible for consideration at the November 8, 1994, general election. We therefore enjoin the Secretary of State from canvassing and certifying the returns on Amendment 4.
Proposed Amendment 4 to the State Constitution bears the popular name:
AN AMENDMENT TO AUTHORIZE A STATE LOTTERY, NONPROFIT BINGO, PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, AND ADDITIONAL GAMES OF CHANCE AT RACE TRACK SITES.
The petitioners do not question this popular name but instead challenge the sufficiency of the ballot title, the complete text of which is appended to this opinion.
Pursuant to Amendment 7, “[t]he sufficiency of all State-wide petitions shall be decided in the first instance by the Secretary of State, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the State, which shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all such causes.” The challenge to the sufficiency of the proposed amendment’s ballot title is based on four grounds: (1) that the ballot title is too long to be read and comprehended during the time alloted the voter in the voting booth; (2) that the design of the ballot title will prevent the voter from comprehending that he or she is being asked to approve casino gambling and to grant a monopoly on for-profit gambling to the proposed amendment’s backers; (3) that approval of the ballot title will undermine the integrity of the initiative process; and (4) that the use of the word “authorizing” in the ballot title is misleading. While the fourth issue has been argued by all parties, it is unnecessary, in light of our decision, to address the question of the asserted misleading use of the word “authorizing.”
Facts
By initiative petition pursuant to Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution, proposed Amendment 4 was filed on July 5, 1994, with the Secretary of State, who certified it on July 27, 1994, to be placed on the ballot for the November 8, 1994, general election. It is undisputed that the proposed amendment was drafted at the behest of the owners of the Oaklawn race track in Hot Springs and the Southland race track in West Memphis.
On September 13, 1994, the Christian Civic Action Committee and Barry King, as petitioners, filed this original action, supported by briefs, for our review. Briefs in response from the Secretary of State and Craig Douglass, who was granted leave to appear as an intervenor on behalf of the Arkansas First Committee, were filed on September 26, 1994. The matter was argued before us on October 3, 1994.
Ballot-title sufficiency: standard of review
Upon proper application for review, this court is entrusted with the duty and responsibility to ensure that, when voters exercise their right under Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution to change a constitutional provision through the initiative process, they are allowed to make an intelligent choice, fully aware of the consequences of their vote. Dust v. Riviere, 277 Ark. 1, 638 S.W.2d 663 (1982).
Part of that duty and responsibility entails seeing that the individual voter has available a sufficient ballot title when deciding to accept or reject the amendment. Id. It has long been regarded as axiomatic that the majority of voters, when called upon to vote for or against a proposed measure at a general election, will derive their information about its contents from an inspection of the ballot title immediately before exercising the right of suffrage. Id.; Hoban v. Hall, 229 Ark. 416, 316 S.W.2d 185 (1958); Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 741, 43 S.W.2d 356 (1931). This, indeed, is the purpose of the ballot title. Dust v. Riviere, supra; Hoban v. Hall, supra.
The general principles governing our determination of the sufficiency of particular ballot titles have been well articulated in Bradley v. Hall, 220 Ark. 925, 927, 251 S.W.2d 470, 471 (1952):
On the one hand, it is not required that the ballot title contain a synopsis of the amendment or statute. ... It is sufficient for the title to be complete enough to convey an intelligible idea of the scope and import of the proposed law. . . . We have recognized the impossibility of preparing a ballot title that would suit every one. . . . Yet, on the other hand, the ballot title must be free from “any misleading tendency, whether of amplification, of omission, or of fallacy,” and it must not be tinged with partisan coloring. . . .
It is evident that before determining the sufficiency of the present ballot title we must first ascertain what changes in the law would be brought about by the adoption of the proposed amendment. For the elector, in voting upon a constitutional amendment, is simply making a choice between retention of the existing law and the substitution of something new. It is the function of the ballot title to provide information concerning the choice that he is called upon to make. Hence the adequacy of the title is directly related to the changes that he is given the opportunity of approving.
(Emphasis added.)
The changes which would be wrought by proposed Amendment 4 will be reviewed in the context of the petitioners’ arguments. Ultimately, the central question to be resolved is whether, in the voting booth, the voter is able to reach an intelligent and informed decision for or against the proposal and to understand the consequences of his or her vote based on the ballot title itself. See Dust v. Riviere, supra.
Rightfully so, Amendment 7 places the burden of proof in legal challenges to initiative matters “upon the person or persons attacking the validity of the petition.” We liberally construe Amendment 7 in determining the sufficiency of ballot titles. Becker v. Riviere, 270 Ark. 219, 604 S.W.2d 555 (1980). Our adoption of that approach, however, does not imply that liberality is boundless or that common sense is disregarded. Dust v. Riviere, supra.
I. Length of ballot title
First, the petitioners contend that the ballot title in the present case is so lengthy that it cannot be read and comprehended within the time a voter is permitted to remain in the voting booth and, therefore, does not adequately inform the voter to enable him or her to make an intelligent choice for or against the amendment. We have held that a ballot title must not be unduly long because a voter is subject to statutory restrictions on the amount of time a voting booth may be occupied. Gaines v. McCuen, 296 Ark. 513, 758 S.W.2d 403 (1988). Here, the ballot title runs to 709 words in length and, as mentioned earlier, is reprinted in full for convenient reference in an appendix to this opinion.
Length, in itself, does not render a ballot title insufficient. In Newton v. Hall, 196 Ark. 930, 120 S.W.2d 364 (1938), for example, we held a 900-word ballot title (to the “Refunding Amendment”), which had been attacked for not providing enough detail, sufficient to apprise the voter of the contents of the proposal. Although the ballot title’s length was not actually an issue as such, we observed that:
The brevity of the ballot title here involved does not appear to be its chief fault. Rather, ... its very length is a more serious objection. The elector could not read many such ballot titles within the five minutes he is allowed . . . “to occupy a booth or compartment for the purposes of voting.”
196 Ark. at 948, 120 S.W.2d at 373.
The practical concern voiced in Newton was echoed in Dust v. Riviere, supra. There, in an opinion dealing with a challenge to the sufficiency of a 727-word ballot title (to “The Arkansas Utility Regulation Amendment”), we stated that:
While neither the length nor the complexity of the ballot title should be a controlling factor, it is a consideration.. . . [C]ommon sense requires that we ask whether the average voter can make an intelligent considerate decision based on the ballot title. . . .
We have concluded that the proposed ballot title is so complex, detailed, lengthy, misleading and confusing that the Arkansas voter cannot intelligently make a choice based on the title. The best evidence of that is the ballot title itself. We attach the ballot title as an addendum to this opinion and invite any disinterested person to read it in the time one would ordinarily use in a voting booth, and understand the changes that the amendment proposes.
(Emphasis added.) 277 Ark. at 6, 638 S.W.2d at 666. Clearly, other factors were involved in our decision to enjoin the Secretary of State from certifying the proposed Utility Regulation Amendment as valid. But, it must be noted, the special prominence accorded the ballot title’s length obviously signaled our conviction that length can become a major, though not controlling, consideration in determining the sufficiency of a ballot title.
The appended ballot title in the present case, like the one in Dust, speaks eloquently for itself. On November 8, 1994, Arkansas electors will vote on other proposed amendments and choose between candidates for the United States House of Representatives, Governor of Arkansas, Attorney General of Arkansas, Secretary of State of Arkansas, and various other state and local offices. Under Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-522(d) (Repl. 1993), “[n]o voter shall remain in the voting booth longer than five (5) minutes, if voters are waiting in line.” It requires little imagination to foresee, under these statutory time constraints, the practical difficulty posed to the elector in the voting booth by a ballot title of such complexity and length.
Even so, we must emphasize that, standing alone, the present ballot title’s insufficiency is not attributable to its length. We are, however, troubled by the length in its relation to other critical factors — particularly, the strategic employment of abstract terminology to mask plain meaning and the tactical placement of key elements relating to for-profit gambling in the middle or near the end of the title’s text, the combination of which is unacceptable.
II. Terminology and information placement in ballot title
The petitioners argue, in their second point, that the design of the ballot title will prevent the voter from understanding that he or she is being asked to approve casino gambling and a monopoly for the proposed amendment’s backers on for-profit gambling. Specifically, the petitioners point to five types of gambling that the proposal would authorize: (1) “a state lottery”; (2) “bingo games” conducted by licensed “non-profit, tax-exempt charitable, religious and civic organizations”; (3) “raffles” conducted by “non-profit, tax-exempt charitable, religious and civic organizations”; (4) “pari-mutuel wagering” conducted by “pari-mutuel franchisees” in Garland and Crittenden Counties; and (5) “additional racetrack wagering” conducted by “pari-mutuel franchisees” in Garland and Crittenden Counties.
As the petitioners note, the first four forms of gambling named in the ballot title appear under common appellations that have a more-or-less general currency among the public. Each term is defined in the proposed amendment. It can be assumed that most voters will readily understand what a state lottery, a charitable bingo game, and a charitable raffle entail; a more limited number of voters, i.e., those who are familiar with horse or dog racing (long established in this state), will have little difficulty with the term “pari-mutuel wagering.” But “additional racetrack wagering” summons up, if anything, images of alternative methods of “playing the horses” or “running the dogs” — not casino-style gambling.
The term “additional racetrack wagering” is defined in the ballot title as “wagering on games of chance or skill conducted by mechanical, electrical, electronic or electromechanical devices and table games.” So hypertechnical a description, occurring midway through the long ballot title, offers little in the way of immediate enlightenment. It is more than a bit disingenuous on the part of the intervenor to counter that “[t]he ballot title defines ‘additional racetrack wagering’ exactly as the Amendment defines it.” Unless, on entering the voting booth, a voter possesses a ready frame of reference, it is unlikely that he or she will be able to translate the jargon within a reasonable amount of time into such relatively familiar concepts as video poker, slot machines, roulette wheels, blackjack, craps, poker, and other games of chance unrelated to betting on horses or dogs.
It is evident, as the petitioners suggest, that “additional racetrack wagering” is a euphemism and, further, that the definition consists of compounded euphemisms designed to cloak in semantic obscurity the actual nature of the proposed enterprise. What, in fact, the definition obliquely describes in highly technical terms are the elements of casino-style gambling. Yet voters favoring or opposing the inauguration of casino-style gambling may well be unaware that this is precisely what Amendment 4 seeks to accomplish.
Simply put, neither the term “additional racetrack gambling” nor its definition provides sufficient information to the voter. Moreover, in this context, “additional racetrack gambling” is impermissibly tinged with partisan coloring as it gives the voter only the impression that the proponents of the proposed amendment wish to convey of the activity represented by the words. See Arkansas Women’s Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 677 S.W.2d 846 (1984); Bradley v. Hall, supra.
In both the ballot title and Section 2 (“Activities Authorized”) of the proposed amendment, the drafters scrupulously avoided the use of commonly understood terms such as “casinos” and “gambling houses” in connection with the enterprises to be established at the racetracks in Hot Springs and West Memphis, employing instead the abstract, euphemistic “additional racetrack wagering.” They nevertheless took care in Section 3 of the proposed amendment to spell out the “Activities Prohibited” in plain, concrete English:
All wagering activities, including but not limited to, lotteries, casinos, gambling houses, gambling operations and other gambling and gaming activities, other than those activities authorized in Section 2 of this Amendment [i.e., the Arkansas State Lottery, bingo games, raffles, parimutuel wagering at the Oaklawn and Southland racetracks, and “additional racetrack wagering” at the Oaklawn and Southland racetracks], are prohibited and shall not be authorized by this State.
Yet “additional racetrack wagering” and “casinos” embrace the same activities — roulette, blackjack, poker, and so forth. Indeed, counsel for intervenor Douglass acknowledged as much at oral argument.
Contrary to Justice Glaze’s dissent, we have made it clear that the absence of the word “casino” is not the gravamen of this decision. It is the description of the additional gambling in conjunction with the term “racetrack” that is misleading and that suggests something other than casino gambling is at issue. That, of course, is not the case. What is at issue here is not merely “racetrack” gambling but a wholly new and expanded category of gambling associated with casinos.
Viewing in the context of the ballot title’s considerable length the specialized terminology, which obscures meaning, and the artful amplifications and omissions, which conceal the proposed amendment’s potential effect, we must hold that the ballot title manifests a fatal misleading tendency. See Dust v. Riviere, supra.
III. Integrity of the initiative process
Amendment 7’s reservation to the people of the initiative power lies at the heart of our democratic institutions. A ballot title must, as we have stated, convey an intelligible idea of the scope and significance of a proposed change in the law. See Bradley v. Hall, supra. Amendment 4’s ballot title does not. Therefore, it cannot stand. In order to uphold the integrity of the initiative process, we must declare the proposed amendment ineligible for consideration at the general election on November 8, 1994. See Arkansas Women’s Political Caucus v. Riviere, supra. The Secretary of State is hereby enjoined from canvassing and certifying any returns on the measure. See Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-120(c) (Repl. 1993).
Petition granted, and the mandate is ordered issued within five days unless a petition for rehearing is filed. If a petition for rehearing is filed, briefing will be on an expedited basis to be set by the clerk.
Dudley, Hays, and Glaze, JJ., dissent. ADDENDUM
The following is the complete text of the ballot title of proposed Amendment 4:
A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION AUTHORIZING ARKANSAS TO ESTABLISH A STATE LOTTERY, TO BE CONDUCTED BY THE STATE OR BY THE STATE IN CONJUNCTION WITH LOTTERIES IN OTHER STATES; CREATING A FIVE-MEMBER STATE LOTTERY COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR TO ADMINISTER THE LOTTERY; PRESCRIBING THE QUALIFICATIONS AND TERMS OF OFFICE OF COMMISSION MEMBERS AND THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION; AUTHORIZING THE GOVERNOR TO REMOVE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION FOR CAUSE; REQUIRING THE GOVERNOR TO APPOINT AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE STATE LOTTERY TO MANAGE THE OPERATION OF THE LOTTERY UNDER THE COMMISSION’S SUPERVISION; REQUIRING THE COMMISSION TO ALLOCATE THE TOTAL ANNUAL REVENUES FROM SALES OF LOTTERY TICKETS AS NEAR AS REASONABLY PRACTICAL AS FOLLOWS: 50% TO PRIZES, 34% TO REVENUES RETURNED TO THE PUBLIC TO BENEFIT CRIME PREVENTION AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS THROUGH APPROPRIATIONS BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 11% TO THE EXPENSES OF OPERATING THE STATE LOTTERY, AND 5% TO COMMISSION ON TICKET SALES; PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF STATE OR LOCAL TAXES UPON THE SALE OF LOTTERY TICKETS; AUTHORIZING NONPROFIT, TAX-EXEMPT CHARITABLE, RELIGIOUS AND CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN LICENSED BY THE STATE TO CONDUCT BINGO GAMES AND RAFFLES; PRESCRIBING THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS CONDUCTING BINGO GAMES OR RAFFLES; LIMITING THE ALLOWABLE EXPENSES AND COMPENSATION ASSOCIATED WITH A BINGO GAME OR RAFFLE; REQUIRING ALL NET RECEIPTS OVER AND ABOVE THE ACTUAL COST OF CONDUCTING A BINGO GAME OR RAFFLE TO BE USED FOR CHARITABLE, RELIGIOUS OR PHILANTHROPIC PURPOSES; AUTHORIZING A PARI-MUTUEL FRANCHISEE TO CONDUCT PARLMUTUEL WAGERING, INCLUDING SIMULCASTING AND MÉRGED-POOL WAGERING, ON HORSES IN GARLAND COUNTY, ARKANSAS, AND A PARI-MUTUEL FRANCHISEE TO CONDUCT PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, INCLUDING SIMULCASTING AND MERGED-POOL WAGERING, ON GREYHOUNDS IN CRITTENDEN COUNTY, ARKANSAS; PROVIDING THAT HORSE RACING AND GREYHOUND RACING AND PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING THEREON SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE A LOTTERY AND SHALL BE REGULATED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY; AUTHORIZING PARI-MUTUEL FRANCHISEES TO CONDUCT ADDITIONAL WAGERING ON OR ADJACENT TO THE SITES WHERE HORSE RACING IS CONDUCTED IN GARLAND COUNTY, ARKANSAS, AND WHERE GREYHOUND RACING IS CONDUCTED IN CRITTENDEN COUNTY, ARKANSAS; DEFINING THIS “ADDITIONAL RACETRACK WAGERING” AS WAGERING ON GAMES OF CHANCE OR SKILL CONDUCTED BY MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC OR ELECTROMECHANICAL DEVICES AND TABLE GAMES; PROVIDING THAT THIS ADDITIONAL RACETRACK WAGERING SHALL NOT BE LIMITED TO WHEN RACING IS BEING CONDUCTED AND SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE A LOTTERY; RENAMING THE ARKANSAS RACING COMMISSION THE ARKANSAS RACING AND WAGERING COMMISSION; EXPANDING THE COMMISSION BY TWO MEMBERS TO BE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR AND SETTING THEIR TERMS OF OFFICE; AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION TO REGULATE THE ADDITIONAL RACETRACK WAGERING; PERMITTING ONLY TYPES OF WAGERING REQUESTED BY THE PARI-MUTUEL FRANCHISEE AND APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION; REQUIRING THE COMMISSION TO ADOPT EMERGENCY REGULATIONS BEFORE JANUARY 1, 1995 SO THE ADDITIONAL RACETRACK WAGERING MAY BEGIN AT THAT TIME; ESTABLISHING A TAX ON NET ADDITIONAL RACETRACK WAGERING REVENUES EQUAL TO 8% TO BE PAID TO THE STATE, 1/2 OF 1% TO BE PAID TO THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE PARI-MUTUEL FRANCHISEE IS OPERATING, AND 1% TO BE PAID TO THE CITY IN WHICH THE PARIMUTUEL FRANCHISEE IS OPERATING; AUTHORIZING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO AMEND SUCH TAX RATES BY THREE-FOURTHS VOTE OF EACH HOUSE; DEDICATING 20% OF THE TAXES PAID TO THE STATE TO THE ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND TOURISM AND THE ARKANSAS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION; PROHIBITING THE LEVY OF OTHER TAXES OR FEES ON ADDITIONAL RACETRACK WAGERING OR ON A PARIMUTUEL FRANCHISEE WITH RESPECT TO ITS ADDITIONAL RACETRACK WAGERING ACTIVITIES; REQUIRING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO DETERMINE THE TAX ON PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING INVOLVING HORSE RACING OR GREYHOUND RACING; DECLARING THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT PERTAINING TO ADDITIONAL RACETRACK WAGERING TO BE SELF-EXECUTING; AUTHORIZING OTHER WAGERING ACTIVITIES APPROVED BY THE VOTERS AT THE GENERAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 8, 1994 IN A SEPARATE AMENDMENT OR AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION; PROHIBITING ALL WAGERING ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN THOSE AUTHORIZED BY THIS AMENDMENT; DEFINING CERTAIN TERMS USED IN THE AMENDMENT; AUTHORIZING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO IMPLEMENT THE AMENDMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE STATE LOTTERY, BINGO AND RAFFLES; REPEALING ALL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND LAWS TO THE EXTENT THEY CONFLICT WITH THE AMENDMENT; RENDERING THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT SEVERABLE; DECLARING THE AMENDMENT OPERATIVE UPON APPROVAL BY THE VOTERS.