Mackenzie, P.J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right a jury verdict for defendant in this handicap discrimination case. We affirm.
Plaintiff worked as a salesperson for defendant from November 1985 until June 29, 1990. He underwent a liver transplant in June 1989 for cirrhosis of the liver caused by alcoholism and was off work for approximately six weeks before being released to return to work by his physician. His employment was terminated approximately seven months later, allegedly because of his failure to meet sales quotas.
In October 1990, plaintiff instituted this action against defendant for violation of the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (hcra), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; [710]*710MSA 3.550(101) el seq., claiming that defendant terminated him because of the high health insurance costs attributable to his condition. A claim of breach of an employment contract was subsequently added to the complaint. Defendant moved for summary disposition of both counts. The trial court denied defendant’s motion in part and granted it in part, dismissing plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim but finding a material issue of fact remained regarding the discrimination claim. At trial, plaintiff argued that the carrying of a transplanted liver and the side effects thereof, without the use of medication, constituted a handicap. Defendant argued that plaintiff was not handicapped because (1) with medication, he does not have a determinable physical characteristic that substantially limits a major life activity, and (2) he is an alcoholic. A jury returned a verdict for defendant with regard to the discrimination claim.
Plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred in admitting at trial evidence of his alcoholism. We disagree.
Evidence that tends to make the existence of a fact at issue more probable or less probable is relevant and, therefore, admissible. MRE 401, 402. However, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403; McDonald v Stroh Brewery Co, 191 Mich App 601, 605; 478 NW2d 669 (1991). The fact that evidence is damaging and harms the opposing party does not indicate that it is unfairly prejudicial. Sclafani v Peter S Cusimano, Inc, 130 Mich App 728, 735; 344 NW2d 347 (1983). Further, error requiring reversal may not be predicated upon a ruling that admits evidence unless a substantial right [711]*711was affected. MRE 103(a); Temple v Kelel Distributing Co, Inc, 183 Mich App 326, 329; 454 NW2d 610 (1990).
The HCRA expressly excludes alcoholism, and determinable physical or mental characteristics caused by the use of alcohol, as a handicap with respect to employment discrimination when the condition prevents the employee from performing his job duties. MCL 37.1103(f)(ii); MSA 3.550(103)(f)(ii); Gazette v Pontiac, 212 Mich App 162, 168-169; 536 NW2d 854 (1995). Plaintiff contends that this restriction is not applicable to the present, case because defendant conceded that alcoholism did not affect his job performance. However, defense counsel argued during closing arguments that plaintiff’s poor work performance when he returned from his leave of absence resulted from plaintiff’s failure to fully recover from the injuries caused by his alcoholism. In its instructions, the trial court cautioned the jury regarding the manner in which the evidence of plaintiff’s alcoholism should be used in determining whether plaintiff could be considered handicapped:
Now, ladies and gentlemen, if the history of the physical characteristic was caused by the use of alcoholic liquor but the physical characteristic did not prevent the Plaintiff from performing his job, then you are to disregard the fact that use of alcohol caused the physical characteristic.
On the other hand, if you find that the Plaintiff has a determinable physical characteristic caused by the use of alcoholic liquor and that characteristic prevented the Plaintiff from performing the duties of his job, then the Plaintiff is not handicapped under the law.
A person, ladies and gentlemen, cannot have a history of [a] determinable physical characteristic to be construed as a handicap if the physical characteristic was caused by the [712]*712use of an alcoholic liquor which prevented the person from performing the duties of his job.
Because evidence of alcohol use is a consideration in determining whether the plaintiff fell within the definition of handicapped, evidence of plaintiff’s alcohol use was relevant and more probative than prejudicial. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of plaintiff’s alcohol use.
Further, the evidence was relevant and was more probative than prejudicial with regard to the issue of damages. According to the testimony of plaintiff’s physician, serious risks exist for patients who continue to consume alcohol after a liver transplant. Consequently, plaintiff’s alcohol use could affect his life expectancy and, therefore, defendant’s liability for damages.
Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant’s financial condition because defendant did not raise economic necessity as a defense. Under MCR 2.111(F)(3), affirmative defenses must be raised in the responsive pleading or in a motion for summary disposition made before the filing of a responsive pleading, and the failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the defense. Stanke v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 200 Mich App 307, 311; 503 NW2d 758 (1993). An affirmative defense is a defense that does not controvert the establishment of a prima facie case, but that otherwise denies relief to the plaintiff. Id. at 312.
In a handicap discrimination case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving as an element of the prima facie case that the employer discharged the plaintiff because of the handicap. Dzierbowicz v American Seating Co, 209 Mich App 130, 132; 530 NW2d 158 [713]*713(1995), rev’d on other grounds 450 Mich 966 (1996). Evidence that the decision to terminate the plaintiff was motivated by economic considerations directly controverted this element of the prima facie case and, therefore, by definition did not constitute an affirmative defense. Stanke, supra. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant’s financial condition.
Last, plaintiff contends that reversal is required because of instructional error. Again, we disagree.
Subsection 103(e)(i)(A) of the hcra, MCL 37.1103(e)(i)(A); MSA 3.550(103)(e)(i)(A), defines a handicap as
(i) A determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if the characteristic:
(A) . . . substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position. [Emphasis added.]
On the basis of this language, plaintiff contends that he was entitled to a supplemental jury instruction defining a handicapped person as one who
has a determinable physical characteristic which substantially limits one or more life activities . . .
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Mackenzie, P.J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right a jury verdict for defendant in this handicap discrimination case. We affirm.
Plaintiff worked as a salesperson for defendant from November 1985 until June 29, 1990. He underwent a liver transplant in June 1989 for cirrhosis of the liver caused by alcoholism and was off work for approximately six weeks before being released to return to work by his physician. His employment was terminated approximately seven months later, allegedly because of his failure to meet sales quotas.
In October 1990, plaintiff instituted this action against defendant for violation of the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (hcra), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; [710]*710MSA 3.550(101) el seq., claiming that defendant terminated him because of the high health insurance costs attributable to his condition. A claim of breach of an employment contract was subsequently added to the complaint. Defendant moved for summary disposition of both counts. The trial court denied defendant’s motion in part and granted it in part, dismissing plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim but finding a material issue of fact remained regarding the discrimination claim. At trial, plaintiff argued that the carrying of a transplanted liver and the side effects thereof, without the use of medication, constituted a handicap. Defendant argued that plaintiff was not handicapped because (1) with medication, he does not have a determinable physical characteristic that substantially limits a major life activity, and (2) he is an alcoholic. A jury returned a verdict for defendant with regard to the discrimination claim.
Plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred in admitting at trial evidence of his alcoholism. We disagree.
Evidence that tends to make the existence of a fact at issue more probable or less probable is relevant and, therefore, admissible. MRE 401, 402. However, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403; McDonald v Stroh Brewery Co, 191 Mich App 601, 605; 478 NW2d 669 (1991). The fact that evidence is damaging and harms the opposing party does not indicate that it is unfairly prejudicial. Sclafani v Peter S Cusimano, Inc, 130 Mich App 728, 735; 344 NW2d 347 (1983). Further, error requiring reversal may not be predicated upon a ruling that admits evidence unless a substantial right [711]*711was affected. MRE 103(a); Temple v Kelel Distributing Co, Inc, 183 Mich App 326, 329; 454 NW2d 610 (1990).
The HCRA expressly excludes alcoholism, and determinable physical or mental characteristics caused by the use of alcohol, as a handicap with respect to employment discrimination when the condition prevents the employee from performing his job duties. MCL 37.1103(f)(ii); MSA 3.550(103)(f)(ii); Gazette v Pontiac, 212 Mich App 162, 168-169; 536 NW2d 854 (1995). Plaintiff contends that this restriction is not applicable to the present, case because defendant conceded that alcoholism did not affect his job performance. However, defense counsel argued during closing arguments that plaintiff’s poor work performance when he returned from his leave of absence resulted from plaintiff’s failure to fully recover from the injuries caused by his alcoholism. In its instructions, the trial court cautioned the jury regarding the manner in which the evidence of plaintiff’s alcoholism should be used in determining whether plaintiff could be considered handicapped:
Now, ladies and gentlemen, if the history of the physical characteristic was caused by the use of alcoholic liquor but the physical characteristic did not prevent the Plaintiff from performing his job, then you are to disregard the fact that use of alcohol caused the physical characteristic.
On the other hand, if you find that the Plaintiff has a determinable physical characteristic caused by the use of alcoholic liquor and that characteristic prevented the Plaintiff from performing the duties of his job, then the Plaintiff is not handicapped under the law.
A person, ladies and gentlemen, cannot have a history of [a] determinable physical characteristic to be construed as a handicap if the physical characteristic was caused by the [712]*712use of an alcoholic liquor which prevented the person from performing the duties of his job.
Because evidence of alcohol use is a consideration in determining whether the plaintiff fell within the definition of handicapped, evidence of plaintiff’s alcohol use was relevant and more probative than prejudicial. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of plaintiff’s alcohol use.
Further, the evidence was relevant and was more probative than prejudicial with regard to the issue of damages. According to the testimony of plaintiff’s physician, serious risks exist for patients who continue to consume alcohol after a liver transplant. Consequently, plaintiff’s alcohol use could affect his life expectancy and, therefore, defendant’s liability for damages.
Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant’s financial condition because defendant did not raise economic necessity as a defense. Under MCR 2.111(F)(3), affirmative defenses must be raised in the responsive pleading or in a motion for summary disposition made before the filing of a responsive pleading, and the failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the defense. Stanke v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 200 Mich App 307, 311; 503 NW2d 758 (1993). An affirmative defense is a defense that does not controvert the establishment of a prima facie case, but that otherwise denies relief to the plaintiff. Id. at 312.
In a handicap discrimination case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving as an element of the prima facie case that the employer discharged the plaintiff because of the handicap. Dzierbowicz v American Seating Co, 209 Mich App 130, 132; 530 NW2d 158 [713]*713(1995), rev’d on other grounds 450 Mich 966 (1996). Evidence that the decision to terminate the plaintiff was motivated by economic considerations directly controverted this element of the prima facie case and, therefore, by definition did not constitute an affirmative defense. Stanke, supra. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant’s financial condition.
Last, plaintiff contends that reversal is required because of instructional error. Again, we disagree.
Subsection 103(e)(i)(A) of the hcra, MCL 37.1103(e)(i)(A); MSA 3.550(103)(e)(i)(A), defines a handicap as
(i) A determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if the characteristic:
(A) . . . substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position. [Emphasis added.]
On the basis of this language, plaintiff contends that he was entitled to a supplemental jury instruction defining a handicapped person as one who
has a determinable physical characteristic which substantially limits one or more life activities . . . even if the determinable characteristic is controlled with medication or medical care. [Emphasis added.]
When a party requests an instruction that is not covered by the standard jury instructions, the trial court may, in its discretion, give additional, concise, understandable, conversational, and nonargumentative instructions, provided they are applicable and [714]*714accurately state the law. MCR 2.516(D)(4); Wengel v Herfert, 189 Mich App 427, 431; 473 NW2d 741 (1991). The requested instruction does not accurately state the law, and thus was properly refused.
The alleged handicap at issue in this case is characterized by plaintiff as carrying a transplanted organ. However, it is undisputed that plaintiffs status as an organ donee in no way affected his major life activities or his ability to perform his job duties, as long as plaintiff took antirejection medication. Viewed in this context, plaintiffs condition is akin to that of a person whose high blood pressure or allergies are controlled by medication, or who receives hormone replacement therapy, or whose poor eyesight requires corrective lenses. In each instance, the chronic “handicapping” condition is ameliorated by medical means with relative ease.
Under the plain language of subsection 103(e)(i)(A) of the HCRA, to fall within the definition of a handicap, an individual’s condition-whether being treated or not-must substantially impair the person’s major life activities.1 The instruction requested by plaintiff does not state that proposition. Instead, it leaps to the conclusion that if a condition requires medication, then it [715]*715constitutes a substantial impairment per se. We find that conclusion to be unreasonable and incompatible with the purpose of the hcra. As stated in Forrisi v Bowen, 794 F2d 931, 934 (CA 4, 1986):
It would debase this high purpose [of protecting the disabled from discrimination in employment] if the statutory protections available to those truly handicapped could be claimed by anyone whose disability was minor and whose relative severity of impairment was widely shared. Indeed, the very concept of an impairment implies a characteristic that is not commonplace and that poses for the particular individual a more general disadvantage in his or her search for satisfactory employment.
In the final analysis, plaintiffs claimed handicap is that he must take medication to control a chronic condition. This “handicap” is shared by countless other individuals in the workplace and in society as a whole. To automatically label the condition as one that substantially impairs major life activities, as the requested instruction would do, is inconsistent with the HCRA and, as pointed out by the Forrisi court, does a gross disservice to the truly handicapped. Accordingly, we hold that the instruction was inconsistent with the HCRA and that it was properly withheld from the jury.
Affirmed.
J. P. O’Brien, J., concurred.