Charles E. Hill & Associates, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.

65 F. Supp. 2d 924, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6170, 1999 WL 711099
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedApril 9, 1999
DocketIP 97-0434-C M/S
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 65 F. Supp. 2d 924 (Charles E. Hill & Associates, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charles E. Hill & Associates, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 924, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6170, 1999 WL 711099 (S.D. Ind. 1999).

Opinion

*926 ORDER

McKINNEY, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court following a hearing held to assist with construction of the claim language in the patent at issue in this infringement dispute. Guided by the Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview Inst., Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-90, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996) (“Markman II”), and the Federal Circuit in Markman v. Westview Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.Cir.1995) (“Markman I”), the Court held a hearing on January 6 and 7, 1999, to receive and consider the parties’ evidence and arguments with respect to disputed claim language. The two Markman cases authorize such a hearing, at which “extensive testimony” may be presented “on the various issues and- arguments concerning the scope of the claims in the context of the accused structures.” See EMI Group North Amer., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887, 892 (Fed.Cir.1998). Specifically, Markman I held that, even in a case tried to a jury,. “the court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of language .used in the patent claim.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.

Patent litigation practice has evolved after Markman to include an early hearing on claim construction, sometimes independent of a dispositive motion, after which the parties obtain a ruling from the court regarding the meaning of disputed claim language. See Mantech Env’l v. Hudson Env’l Serv., 152 F.3d 1368, 1375, n. 12 (Fed.Cir.1998) (noting the absence of evidence regarding the accused methods because the case terminated following the court’s claim construction ruling); but c.f. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1473 (Fed.Cir.1998) (Rader, J., dissenting) (questioning validity of court construing claims “unencumbered by the trial process”). Following the January 1999 hearing in this case, the parties submitted post-hearing briefs in which each presented its complete position with respect to claim construction and sought the Court’s ruling on the meaning of the claim terms and language in dispute. Not only have the parties here sought a resolution of their claim construction disputes prior to filing a dispositive motion, they have taken pains to avoid presentation of any evidence regarding the merits of the infringement claim. Instead, they seek a construction of the claim terms apart from any determination of the scope of the claims or whether they are infringed by the accused product.

Accepting this “procedural deviation” as an unavoidable consequence of Markman I, the Court will proceed with its analysis. See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1474, n. 2 (Rader, J., dissenting) (providing an “incomplete list of procedural deviations required by Markman I ”); see also Id. at 1479 (Newman, J., joined by Mayer, C.J., additional views) (noting difficulties that may flow from “premature claim interpretation”). The claim construction rendered herein will not be a “tentative one” subject to change upon receipt of additional information and evidence, but a definitive one based on all of the evidence of record at this point in the litigation. See International Comm. Mat’ls, Inc. v. Ricoh Co., Ltd., 108 F.3d 316, 318-19 (Fed.Cir.1997) (noting that district court performed a “tentative construction” of the claim language to facilitate a decision of the preliminary injunction issue). Having been fully advised by the parties of their relative positions, the Court now turns to a discussion of the relevant legal rules and its own application of those rules to the patent in dispute.

I. STANDARDS

A. Claim Construction

When construing patent claims, a court must determine the meaning of the language used before it can ascertain the scope of the claims the plaintiff alleges are being infringed. Markman I, 52 F.3d at 979. In doing so, the court’s interpretive focus is not the subjective intent of the parties employing a certain term, but the objective test of what one of ordinary skill *927 in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to mean. Id. at 986. When the court undertakes its duty of construing the claims, it first must look to the intrinsic evidence: the asserted and unasserted claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Id. at 979; Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996). Most of the time, such evidence will provide sufficient information for construing the claims. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.

The patent claims should “ ‘particularly point out and distinctly clai[m] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.’ Markman II, 517 U.S. at 373, 116 S.Ct. 1384 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112). During claim construction, the appropriate starting point for the court’s inquiry is always the words of both the asserted and unasserted claims. Comark Comms., Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed.Cir.1998); see Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582; see also Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1998). It is the claims, not the written description, that define the scope of the patent and accordingly, the patentee’s rights. Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed.Cir.1998); Markman I, 52 F.3d at 970-71. As the Federal Circuit has recently noted, “[a]b-sent a special and particular definition created by the patent applicant, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning.” Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. The court further clarified that when there are several common meanings for a term, “the patent disclosure serves to point away from the improper meanings and toward the proper meaning.” Id. at 1250.

A claim term will not be given a common dictionary meaning, however, if such a reading would be nonsensical in light of the patent disclosure, or specification. Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1250. Accordingly, the correct claim construction is also the one that “stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention.” Id. That description, or specification, serves an important purpose.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
65 F. Supp. 2d 924, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6170, 1999 WL 711099, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-e-hill-associates-inc-v-compuserve-inc-insd-1999.