Charge to Grand Jury

30 F. Cas. 992, 2 Sawy. 667, 1872 U.S. App. LEXIS 1162
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of California
DecidedAugust 22, 1872
StatusPublished
Cited by45 cases

This text of 30 F. Cas. 992 (Charge to Grand Jury) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 992, 2 Sawy. 667, 1872 U.S. App. LEXIS 1162 (circtdca 1872).

Opinion

FIELD, Circuit Justice,

then charged the grand jury as follows:

You are summoned as grand jurors of the circuit court of the United States for the district of California, and the duties with which you are charged are of the highest importance to the due administration of justice. By the constitution of the United States, no person can be "held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in eases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger. No steps, therefore, can be taken, with the exceptions mentioned, for the prosecution of any crime of an infamous character—and under that designation the whole series of felonies is classed—beyond the arrest, examination and commitment of the party accused, until the grand jury have deliberated and acted upon the accusation. Your functions are, therefore, not only as already stated, important; they are indispensable to the administration of criminal justice.

The institution of the grand jurv is of very ancient origin in the history of England: it goes back many centuries. For a long period its powers were not clearly defined: and it would seem, from the accounts of commentators on the laws of that country, that it was at first a body, which not only accused, but which also tried public offenders. However this may have been in its origin, it was, at the time of the settlement of this country, an informing and accusing tribunal only, without whose previous action no person charged with a felony could, except in certain special cases, be put upon his trial.2 And in the struggles which at times arose in England between the powers of the king and the rights of the subject, it often stood as a barrier against persecution in his name; until, at length, it came to be regarded as an institution by which the subject was rendered secure against oppression from unfounded prosecutions of the crown.

In this country, from the popular character of our institutions, there has seldom been any contest between the government and the citizen, which required the existence of the grand jury as a protection against oppressive action of the government. Yet the institution was adopted in this country, and is continued from considerations similar to those which give to it its chief value in England, and is designed as a means, not only of bringing to trial persons accused of public offenses upon just grounds, but also as a means of protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation, whether it come from government or be prompted bipartisan passion or private enmity. No person shall be required, according to the fundamental law of the country, except in the cases mentioned, to answer for any of the higher crimes, unless this body, consisting of not less than sixteen, nor more than twenty-three, good and lawful men, selected from the body of the district, shall declare, upon careful deliberation, under, the solemnity of an oath, that there is good reason for his accusation and trial.

From these observations, it will be seen, gentlemen, that there is a double duty cast upon you as grand jurors of this district; one a duty to the government, or more properly speaking, to society, to see that parties against whom there is just ground to charge the commission of crime, shall be held to answer the charge; and on the other hand, a duty to the citizen to see that he is not subjected to prosecution upon accusations having no better foundation than public clamor or private malice.

■The government has appointed the district attorney to represent its interest in the prosecution of parties charged with the commission of public offenses against the laws of the United States. He will, therefore, appear before you. and present the accusations which the government may desire to have considered by you. He will point out to you the laws which the government deems to have been violated: and will subpoena for your examination such witnesses as he may consider important, and also such other witnesses as you may direct.

In your investigations you will receive only legal evidence, to the exclusion of mere reports, suspicions and hearsay evidence. Subject to this qualification, you will receive all the evidence presented which may throw light upon the matter under consideration, whether it tend to establish the innocence or the guilt of the accused. And more: if, in the course of your inquiries, you have reason to believe that there is other evidence, not presented to you. within your reach, which would qualify or explain away the charge under investigation, it will be your duty to order such evidence to be produced. Formerly, it was held that an in[994]*994dictment might be found if evidence were produced sufficient to render tbe truth of the charge probable. But a different and a more just and merciful rule now prevails. To justify the finding of an indictment, you must be convinced, so far as the evidence before you goes, that the accused is guilty—in other words, you ought not to find an indictment unless, in your judgment, the evidence before you. unexplained and uncontradieted, would warrant a conviction by a petit jury.

How far you should proceed to inquire into other matters than such as are brought to your consideration by the government, through its prosecuting officer, the district attorney, has been a matter of much conflict of opinion among different judges.

Before giving our views upon this subject, it is proper to state that there is a wide difference between the powers and duties of grand juries of the state courts of California and of grand juries of the national courts.

By a statute of the state, grand juries of the state courts possess very great inquisitorial powers. They are required to inquire into the official misconduct of public officers of every description in their county, and are entitled to the examination of all its public records. They are bound by their oath to inquire into and presentment make of all public offenses against the laws of the state committed or triable in their county, of which they have, or “can obtain” legal evidence. In order to ascertain whether or not there has been any official misconduct in any public officer, they have, under the statute, authority to inspect all his books and records, and to subject him to a searching examination.

No such general authority to inspect the books of the officers of the United States, and to subject the officers themselves to examination in respect to the entries in those books, is possessed by the grand juries of the national courts. The exercise of such authority might prove of serious detriment to the public service, for it might interfere with the established system by which the accountability of the local officers of the United States to the executive departments at Washington is secured. You will readily perceive that an inspection by the grand jury, for instance, of the books of the collector of customs at this port, and requiring that officer to explain his entries and his conduct, often directed by private and confidential communications from those departments, might seriously embarrass the government in 'its action. So, too, embarrassment might follow from a similar inspection of the records and examination of other officers of the United States.

The examination of the books and accounts of the officers of the general government is provided for by law or by regulations of the executive departments.

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Bluebook (online)
30 F. Cas. 992, 2 Sawy. 667, 1872 U.S. App. LEXIS 1162, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charge-to-grand-jury-circtdca-1872.