OPINION
DOUGLAS, Judge.
Ronald Curtis Chambers appeals from a conviction for capital murder wherein the punishment was assessed at death.
Shortly after midnight on April 11, 1975, Mike McMahan and Deia Sutton, both college students, left a Dallas nightclub and entered McMahan’s car. Appellant, Clarence Ray Williams, Jr., and two other men occupied an adjacently parked automobile. Williams and appellant exited that automobile and forced their way into McMahan’s vehicle at gunpoint. Appellant ordered Sutton to get into the back seat with him. After laying a .410 shotgun on the rear floorboard, he pointed a pistol at her face and threatened to kill her.
McMahan was moved to the passenger side of the front seat. Williams then drove the car to the Trinity River bottoms while appellant robbed Sutton of her watch, coat, purse and its contents.
Williams parked the car on a levee when they arrived at the river bottoms. He and appellant pushed the students down the [318]*318side of the levee and, when they got near the bottom, appellant ordered them to stop. At this point five shots were fired at them, one of which lodged in Sutton’s skull. Both fell to the ground at the bottom of the levee.
Williams and appellant, apparently believing that the victims were dead, returned to the car. McMahan shouted at Sutton, asking her if she were hurt. The assailants heard him and came back to the levee. Appellant dragged McMahan to the water where he beat him viciously with the shotgun. Williams beat the woman with his fists and then choked her. When McMahan stopped screaming, appellant hit Sutton with the shotgun several times. Williams then remarked, “Well, she’s dead, let’s go.”
After Williams and appellant had left, Sutton crawled over to McMahan and attempted to aid him. He was dead. Somehow she got to the Le Baron Hotel where police were summoned.
Officer C. R. Heyse subsequently found McMahan’s body in the river bottoms. He also found a .410 gauge shotgun shell which had not been fired but which had its primer indented, a shotgun breech, and part of a gun stock.
Stephanie Jones observed appellant later that morning at her mother’s house. He was washing blood and hair off a shotgun. Appellant tried to sell Sutton’s coat that had been taken in the robbery.
Officer H. 0. Wilkerson arrested appellant the next day. A shotgun, which was broken into several pieces, several .410 cartridges, and a .22 caliber hollow-point rifle bullet were found in the Jones’ house. Credit and identification cards belonging to the deceased and Sutton were also discovered there.
An autopsy revealed that massive skull fractures and brain injuries caused McMa-han’s death. Part of the deceased’s cranial bone had been driven into the brain, and one of his ribs had been fractured and driven into the lung. He also had suffered gunshot wounds to the right arm and to the abdomen. The latter wound was made by a .22 caliber hollow-point rifle bullet which was recovered from his right hip.
I. The Voir Dire Examination
Appellant complains that the entire jury selection process was infected with constitutional error. Initially he urges that the court erred in excusing upon challenge for cause seventeen prospective jurors for bias against the minimum punishment for murder. Each prospective juror expressed his bias against the minimum punishment and stated that he was unable to consider such punishment in a murder case. The court excused each upon challenge by the State.
In Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), we held that Article 35.16(b), V.A.C.C.P., authorizes the State to challenge for cause prospective jurors who oppose the minimum punishment. Appellant concedes that Moore was decided adversely to him, but argues that there is no basis for sustaining a challenge to veniremen who oppose the minimum punishment for a lesser included offense.
Subsection (b)(3) of Article 35.16 provides that the State may challenge if the prospective juror “has a bias or prejudice against any phase of the law upon which the State is entitled to rely for conviction or punishment.”
For these reasons we find no error in the excusing of the prospective jurors challenged on the basis of their bias against the minimum punishment for murder.
Appellant also urges that prospective juror Veltman was erroneously excused for his bias against the minimum punishment for murder. The record discloses that Veltman was not excused on this basis but was excused because he recalled news accounts concerning the instant offense, and because his home had been recently burglarized and was disturbed that the burglars received probation in that case. No error is reflected.
Next, appellant contends that eighteen veniremen were excused in violation of [319]*319Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968).1
In Hovila v. State, 532 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Cr.App.1975), we held that the holding of Witherspoon was still alive and well in light of the new statutory scheme providing for the imposition of the death penalty, the adoption of which followed in the wake of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).
The new statutory scheme for capital murder [V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 19.03 (formerly Article 1257, Y.A.P.C., as amended in 1973) and Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P.], including the possible infliction of the death penalty, has been upheld by this Court in Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975), and by the United States Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976).
With this background we turn to the examination of the veniremen in question.
Prospective jurors Everett, Davis, Andrews, Arboqast, Fry, George, Wolford, Plamo, Bullock, Patterson and Null were excused without objection. Failure to object to the constitutionally improper exclusion of veniremen waives that right and such exclusion cannot be considered on appeal. Boulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), cert, denied 430 U.S. 959, 97 S.Ct. 1610, 51 L.Ed.2d 811 (1977). See and compare also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 96 S.Ct. 1708, 48 L.Ed.2d 149 (1976).
Prospective jurors Nixon, Meigs and McQueen did not believe in the death penalty and would not vote for that penalty under any circumstances. These prospective jurors were excused in compliance with Witherspoon.
Prospective jurors Hamilton, Chase and McLarty expressed strong opposition to the death penalty and stated that their beliefs would affect their deliberations on the fact issues submitted to them.
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 12.31(b), provides:
“Prospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or death is mandatory on conviction of a capital felony. A prospective juror shall be disqualified from serving as a juror unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.”2
In Moore v. State, supra, this Court held that it was unnecessary to consider the Witherspoon question where a prospective juror had stated that her opposition to the death penalty would affect her delibera[320]*320tions upon the fact issues submitted in the case. We conclude that prospective jurors Hamilton, Chase and McLarty in the instant case were properly excused under the State statutory provision. Moore v. State, supra; Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
Further, appellant made no objection in the trial court to the disqualification of potential juror McLarty on the basis now urged that she was excused in violation of Witherspoon. He waived any right to complain of her disqualification on appeal. Burns v. State, supra. See also Boulware v. State, supra.
Prospective juror Godbolt expressed his opposition to the death penalty and then vacillated as to whether his beliefs would affect his deliberations on the fact issues submitted to the jury. He finally decided that these beliefs would not influence his deliberations on those issues. While it might be argued as to whether Godbolt’s testimony would have disqualified him under the holding in Witherspoon, the record reflects that the court excused him for personal business reasons over the objection of appellant.
Godbolt stated that he was the manager of a barber shop and that he had only one employee who also had been called for jury duty at that time. He related that he would have to close down his business if he served on the jury and that he was already in financial trouble because he was attending school as well as managing the barber shop.
The conduct of the voir dire examination must rest largely within the sound discretion of the trial court. Moore v. State, supra; Abron v. State, 523 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). It is clear from the record in the present case that prospective juror God-bolt was preoccupied by personal and business problems that would interfere with his ability to serve on the jury. We find no abuse of discretion in the court excusing him. Cf. Moore v. State, supra.
Appellant again urges that the court erred in sustaining a challenge for cause to a prospective juror, Doris Minieks.
She was a secretary for the Department of Housing and Urban Development. It was developed that the father of Sam Hudson, appellant’s trial counsel, was also an employee there but “in another section.” When asked whether she knew Hudson’s father, Minieks stated that she had spoken to him but did not really know him personally. She then testified as follows:
“Q. Would it put you in an uncomfortable position, I mean I know you don’t know Sam Hudson personally, but since you know his dad, would it put you in ' an uncomfortable position if you found against Sam’s client, for example, and had to go back there and work with his dad?
“A. No. See, I don’t work with him directly. I see him in the hall. He — he works in another section and I’m in another section and I just see him, you know, to speak to him; other than that—
“Q. Oh, I see. Well, if you think it might affect, you know, your business or, for that matter, listening to the testimony in some way, then that’s fine.
“A. I don’t think — you know, I don’t think it would.
“THE COURT: Both of you work for the government?
“MISS MINICKS: Uh-huh.
“THE COURT: Federal government? You all have lunch in the same place?
“MISS MINICKS: No, I’ve never had lunch with him, no.
“THE COURT: How did you know that was his dad?
“MISS MINICKS: Somebody — let me see. One of the attorneys I work with told me that his son was an attorney and, you know, somebody pointed him out to me.
“THE COURT: You’ve never had any business dealings with him?
“MISS MINICKS: No, he don’t know me at all.
“THE COURT: What’s the State’s position?
[321]*321“MR. BURNHAM: Well, Judge, we feel like that since she does know Sam’s dad it might be better for her to sit on another case and that way neither side would have someone on the jury that they know; we wouldn’t want someone on the jury that we know.
“THE COURT: I think that’s more or less a fair proposition. Don’t you? You look like an awful fair-minded young lady. I’m going to agree with that because, after all, you’d run into him when this is over with and there you’d be, you know. You’re very fair minded. Thank you so much. I’m sorry you had to wait so long to find this out.”
Minicks was excused over appellant’s objection.
Article 35.16(a), supra, provides, in part, that:
“A challenge for cause is an objection made to a particular juror, alleging some fact which renders him incapable or unfit to serve on the jury. A challenge for cause may be made by either the State or the defense for any of the following reasons:
U * ♦ *
“8. That he has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant.”
In Pigg v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 521, 287 S.W.2d 673 (1956), a juror knew the injured party “only when he saw him.” We held that such a relationship would not affect the juror’s verdict and was not grounds for mistrial.
The record in the instant case is devoid of any hint that Miss Minicks could not be a fair and impartial juror. The fact that she worked in the same building as defense counsel’s father did not render her “incapable or unfit to serve on the jury.” We find that the court abused its discretion in excusing her.
However, because there is no showing that appellant did not receive a fair and impartial jury, and because the State exercised only 13 of its 15 peremptory challenges, one of which could have been used to remove prospective juror Minicks, no reversible error is shown. Culley v. State, 505 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Weaver v. State, 476 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). And cf. Henriksen v. State, 500 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
Appellant next contends the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s challenge for cause to prospective juror Patricia Brightman.
Brightman stated that she would require evidence of premeditation to support a capital murder conviction even though Texas law does not require such evidence. After much effort by defense counsel to rehabilitate her she then stated that she would adhere to the law despite her personal feelings. The record then reflects the following:
“Q. Now, Miss Brightman, I won’t belabor the point, but I had just asked you the same question and you had said that you would require some evidence of premeditation.
“A. Yes.
“Q. Is that still the way you feel ?
“A. My personal feeling—
“Q. Yes.
“A. —yes, that’s the way I feel. But going by the law, then I would have to go by the law.
« * * *
“Q. All right, my question is: Before you could find him guilty of murder where he’s going to get a sentence of death or a sentence of life, would you have to have some evidence of premeditation?
“A. Well, my—
“MR. HUDSON: Object to the question, Your Honor. She’s answered it.
“THE COURT: Well, since she’s answered both ways — .
“A. My personal feeling, I would have to, but by the law, I would have to go with everyone else. This is my personal feeling. I would have to have some evidence, but if I had to go by the law — ”
[322]*322Although there was much vacillation on Brightman’s part, it appears that she would probably require some evidence of premeditation and thus could not follow the law. Premeditation is not an element of a murder case. The court’s ruling that she was subject to challenge on this basis was sanctioned by Article 35.16(b)(3), supra. No error is shown. Further, the State did not exercise two of its peremptory challenges. One could have been used on this prospective juror as well as with the prospective juror Minicks.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his challenge for cause to venirewoman Mrs. Rayford Bolin and in refusing to grant him an additional peremptory challenge in connection with her examination.
Mrs. Bolin was the last prospective juror interrogated and last juror chosen. During the voir dire examination, she stated that her husband, an insurance agent, had an ongoing business relationship with Deia Sutton’s father. Although Mr. Bolin handled Mr. Sutton’s insurance matters and knew the Sutton family, Mrs. Bolin did not know them personally. She related that she learned of the business connection with Deia’s family when she and her husband discussed appellant’s case several months prior to trial. She then testified as follows:
“Q. Yes. Do you feel that this would cause you any problems in serving as a juror and seeing her in court and, of course, your husband would know and the family would know, I assume, possibly. We’re trying to get a fair—
“A. Yes.
“Q. —you see, and that’s what we’re looking for, this sort of thing—
“A. Yes, right.
“Q. —exactly.
“MR. TOKOLY: Well, I object to that as if there’s some innuendo— “MR. HALSEY: No.
“MR. TOKOLY: —that she could not be fair—
“MR. HALSEY: That’s not—
“MR. TOKOLY: —because according to the question—
“MR. HUDSON: Nobody made that kind of innuendo.
“A. Well, see, I don’t know the girl. I don’t know the family; I don’t know anything about them at all. All I know is that they are customers of ours or, I say ours, my husband’s.
“Q. Well, let me put it to you this way and I’ll explain how there could be a conflict perhaps: You find a defendant not guilty after she says what happened, perhaps this is the man and so forth. You have to go home and tell your husband that ‘We found him not guilty,’ and he’s going to have to tell—
“A. Oh, no, this — this would have no— no bearing, I don’t think, at all.
“Q. ‘How could you do that to my best customer?’
“A. Oh, we’re not on that close a personal relationship with our customers. Most of our customers are names.
“Q. Okay so—
“A. And I say — I use the term ‘ours’ strictly because, you know, I don’t work in the agency and I don’t — .
“Q. You don’t know the extent of the business then that Mr. Sutton has with your husband?
“A. I have no earthly idea.
“Q. And you don’t feel that this would influence you in any way in arriving at a decision?
“A. I don’t think so because I don’t know the people.
“Q. Well—
“A. But that is a, you know, they are people that we have that — that contact with.
“Q. Okay. And you are telling me that this would not influence you in any way in listening to the testimony and reaching a decision?
“A. I don’t think so. No, I really don’t, but I can only say that, see.
“Q. Right, right.
[323]*323“A. I’m saying what I really think.
“THE COURT: That’s all you can do lady, you’ve told the Court here it will not, is that right?
“MRS. BOLIN: ‘Yes.
“THE COURT: All right, let’s get on to something else.”
Thereafter, defense counsel inquired whether Mrs. Bolin was prejudiced against blacks. She responded that she did not think she was, “any more than the average person my age who’s lived in Texas all their life.” She later stated that she was not bigoted and that she would be a fair and impartial juror.
Mrs. Bolin was accepted as the twelfth juror. Appellant challenged her on the grounds that she was racially prejudiced and that her husband had a business relationship with Deia Sutton’s father. However we find on the record before us that the court properly overruled the challenge for cause on the ground of racial prejudice. See Article 35.16(a)(8), supra.
With respect to the business relationship between the juror’s husband and Mr. Sutton, we stated in Moore v. State, supra, the following:
“. . . The statute (Article 35.16, V.A.C.C.P., is divided into three parts, providing challenges for cause which both the State and the defense may make, those which the State may make and those which the defense may make. Wé find nothing in the statute which renders these lists an exclusive basis for challenges for cause. Challenges for cause not based on any ground mentioned in the statutes are ordinarily addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. ...” 542 S.W.2d at 669.
In the instant case, Mrs. Bolin did not know the Sutton family personally and she testified that her husband’s business connection with the family would not affect her ability to sit as a fair and impartial juror. We find no abuse of discretion by the court in overruling the challenge for cause and denying the additional peremptory challenge on this ground.
Appellant next contends that the trial court unreasonably restricted the voir dire examination of prospective juror Mrs. Carl Nelson.
The record discloses that defense counsel attempted to question Mrs. Nelson about the meaning of the term “deliberately” as that term is used in Article 37.071(b)(1), V.A.C.C.P.—the first special issue to be submitted to the jury at the punishment phase of the trial. He first asked her whether she thought deliberate conduct meant carefully considered conduct. When she responded affirmatively, the prosecutor objected on the ground that defense counsel was inferring that the State was required to prove premeditation. The court sustained the objection on the basis that the term “deliberately” as used in the statutory provision was given its commonly accepted meaning, “what it means to her (Nelson).” The court then refused to permit defense counsel to explore the matter further. Appellant’s objection was overruled.
In the case at bar, the voir dire examination was limited with respect to certain questions as to one prospective juror only. She was chosen as the second juror when defense counsel stated that appellant “will be happy to accept this juror.” Voir dire examination could take an unreasonable length of time if attorneys on both sides selected different words throughout a contemplated charge and asked each prospective juror what those words meant. We find no abuse of discretion.
In another ground of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred in excusing prospective juror Delgadillo without challenge either by the State or the defense. A court should not, on its own motion, excuse any prospective juror for cause unless he is absolutely disqualified. Valore v. State, 545 S.W.2d 477 (Tex.Cr. App.1977); Pearce v. State, 513 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.Cr .App.1974).
Delgadillo was a statistician and had extensive training in mathematical probability theory. With regard to Article 37.071(b)(2) V.A.C.C.P., whether there is a [324]*324probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society—Delgadillo stated that that issue could not be determined with reason and logic. He related that, from a statistical standpoint, whether an act will probably occur in the future cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then determined that the prospective juror was biased against that phase of the law and excused him.
Whether or not the concept of determining the probability of future conduct is mathematically viable, it is clear that the concept is viable in law. See Jurek v. Texas, supra. As a result the State was entitled to rely upon this phase of the law for punishment. We conclude that prospective juror Delgadillo was disqualified under Article 35.16(b)(3), supra, and that the court properly excused him.
II. The Punishment Phase
Appellant contends that the evidence at the punishment phase of the trial is insufficient to show that he would probably commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. See Article 37.071(b)(2), supra.
Dr. James Grigson testified that he had examined appellant and diagnosed him to be a severe sociopath who was not insane but who had no respect for anyone else’s life or property. Dr. Grigson expressed the opinion that appellant was aware of the difference between right and wrong, that he understood the nature and quality of his acts, and that he showed no remorse for the instant offense. He further testified that there was no known cure for appellant’s personality disorder and that he would continue to be an absolute threat to society.
This testimony, in conjunction with that offered at the guilt phase of the trial, is sufficient to sustain the jury’s affirmative answer to the second issue submitted at the penalty phase. Cf. Moore v. State, supra; Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
Appellant next contends that psychiatric opinion testimony is inadmissible to show that the defendant would constitute a continuing threat to society. The thrust of his argument is that the discipline of psychiatry is not sufficiently advanced to permit predictions of future violent behavior. Although his counsel had submitted a well-written brief citing many authorities on the subject of psychiatric diagnosis, his contention was rejected in Moore v. State, supra.3 See also Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gholson and Ross v. State, 542 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); and Smith v. State, supra.
Appellant next contends the State did not establish that Dr. Grigson was qualified to give expert opinion testimony.
Dr. Grigson was certified by the American Board of Neurology and Psychiatry and was a member of several medical and psychiatric organizations. He had examined over 7,000 felony defendants in the course of his practice. His psychiatric evaluation of appellant was within his area of expertise, and, thus, he was well qualified to state his opinion regarding the probability that appellant would be a continuing threat to society. Cf. Hogan v. State, 496 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
We further observe that appellant made no objection at trial to the qualifications of the expert witness. Hence, nothing is preserved for review. Jackson v. State, 477 S.W.2d 879 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
Appellant urges that Dr. Grigson’s opinion testimony was improperly admitted because it was based on hearsay.
The psychiatrist made several references to documents or reports that he had read concerning the offense. But he also testified that he had thoroughly examined appellant and diagnosed him on the basis of that examination before he read those reports. No error is shown.
[325]*325Appellant asserts that Dr. Grig-son’s opinion regarding appellant’s propensity to commit future acts of violence was improperly admitted because it invaded the province of the jury. This rationale was repudiated in Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). There, we set forth the following criteria which must be met before expert opinion testimony can be admissible: (1) the witness must be competent and qualified to testify; (2) the subject must be one upon which the aid of an expert’s opinion will be of assistance to the jury; and (3) his testimony may not state a legal conclusion. Those criteria were met in the instant case. Appellant’s contention is overruled.
Next, appellant urges that Dr. Grigson’s testimony was improperly admitted because he failed to comply with the provisions of Article 46.02, Section (3)(d), V.A.C.C.P., which provides:
“A written report of the examination shall be submitted to the court within 21 days of the examination, and the court shall furnish copies of the report to the defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney. The report shall include a description of the procedures used in the examination, the examiner’s observations and findings pertaining to the defendant’s competency to stand trial, and recommended treatment. If the examiner concludes that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the report shall include the examiner’s observations and findings about whether there is a substantial probability that the defendant will attain the competence to stand trial in the foreseeable future.”
Dr. Grigson was appointed by the court to examine appellant and determine whether he was competent to stand trial and whether he was sane at the time of the offense. The psychiatrist was thus required to submit a report of that examination. The record, however, contains no such report and there is no showing that one was ever submitted. But the record also reveals that no issue of insanity at the time of the offense or of incompetency to stand trial was raised. Appellant did not request a copy of the report for any purpose and did not object at trial on the ground that the report was not submitted. No harm is shown.
In five grounds of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Grigson to testify with regard to matters concerning the psychiatric examination.
No objection was made to any of the testimony now challenged. Nothing is presented for review. Braxton v. State, 528 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Ryan v. State, 523 S.W.2d 954 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
In his next contention, appellant argues that the court erroneously permitted Dr. Grigson to describe sociopaths as manipulative.
The record reflects that Grigson, having diagnosed appellant as a sociopath, testified that persons suffering from such a personality disorder never develop a conscience or feel remorse, guilt, or shame. He further testified that sociopaths are convincing liars and have the ability to manipulate “people, lawyers, preachers, doctors” and jurors “as long as it’s to their advantage. . . .” Appellant’s objection was overruled.
His analysis of the sociopathic personality was permissible expert testimony and thus was properly admitted. It is further observed that appellant did not testify at trial. No error is shown.
Appellant complains of several answers given by Dr. Grigson during cross-examination.
The record reflects the first challenged remark was made as follows:
“Q. (Defense counsel) Dr. Grigson, really, I’m not trying to belabor the point, I’m not trying to be, well, offensive or anything like that, but I must say that I don’t think the question was answered because the pattern that I’m speaking of has to be supported by some other , incidents—
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. —that you—
[326]*326“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. —are aware of.
“A. Yes, sir, I’m sorry, I misunderstood. Yes, that is true. You have one human being that is dead that did not die of natural causes. And in order to get what you want, we would have to have two dead, three dead, four dead, twenty dead. With my training and my experience, my profession states, ‘Doctor, you are qualified to call, diagnose somebody that is like this. You can diagnose them as a sociopathic personality disorder of a very severest degree.’ My profession doesn’t state that I’ve got to wait until he kills twenty people before I can call him a sociopath.”
An objection was overruled.
Dr. Grigson had previously testified as follows:
“. . . Now, sometimes the person doesn’t die, but, now, this type problem where an individual has, without a conscience, taken another human being’s life in the manner in which this was done, this was not somebody in war shooting at another person; this was not somebody defending their home or defending their wife; this was a stranger that was killed, and murdered. This in itself, without the conscience, it says, ‘Say, that is a sociopath.’ He doesn’t have to kill a dozen times before you can say, ‘Now then we know it,’ you know. He’s already — you know it now; now is when you know it.”
There was no objection to this testimony. The improper admission of evidence does not constitute reversible error if the same facts were shown by facts to which no objection was addressed. Watson v. State, 532 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Hayles v. State, 507 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
During further cross-examination Dr. Grigson was asked why another examination of appellant was not needed. He answered that another psychiatric examination of appellant was unnecessary to determine whether he would present a continuing threat to society. Dr. Grigson then commented that “I don’t need to see him again and put my life in jeopardy. . The court sustained appellant’s objection and instructed the jury to disregard the remark. Appellant contends the court erred in overruling the motion for mistrial.
The trial court’s prompt instruction in the instant case cured any error. Appellant was not entitled to a mistrial. Cf. Tristan v. State, 510 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
Appellant next complains that Dr. Grigson referred to him as a “cancerous type person” who should be removed from society. The record reveals that Dr. Grigson had used the cancer metaphor earlier without objection. Any error was waived. Watson v. State, supra; Hayles v. State, supra.
In two grounds of error appellant complains that Dr. Grigson made improper references to extraneous offenses. Dr. Grigson stated that he had discussed “previous type trouble” with appellant, and later that appellant had told him some things he (appellant) had done.” No objection was made to either statement. Error, if any, was waived. Braxton v. State, 528 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Vera v. State, 473 S.W.2d 22 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
Appellant challenges the trial court’s limitation of his cross-examination of Dr. Grigson who testified on direct examination that appellant was a sociopath and that he was a continuing threat to society. On cross-examination, appellant asked him whether he had testified to the same effect on behalf of the State in many capital cases. Dr. Grigson responded that he had so testified on numerous occasions whereupon the State objected. The court sustained the objection. There was no instruction for the jury not to consider the statement.
Appellant contends that the excluded testimony was admissible to show bias, prejudice or interest on the part of the State’s expert witness and, therefore, bore heavily on his credibility. Appellant, however, did [327]*327not ask the court to retire the jury so he could develop the proffered testimony. Absent a showing of what such testimony would have been, or an offer of a statement containing what the excluded evidence would show, nothing is presented for review. Article 40.09, Section 6(d)(1), V.A.C. C.P.; Stein v. State, 514 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Hicks v. State, 493 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
The Rev. R. Hunter testified that he had known appellant since he was four years old. After Rev. Hunter stated that appellant’s reputation in the community was good, defense counsel inquired whether the minister thought appellant would commit a similar offense in the future. The court sustained the State’s objection to the question. Rev. Hunter then was permitted to testify that, to his knowledge, appellant had committed no other acts of violence.
Appellant contends that the court erroneously excluded Rev. Hunter’s opinion as to whether appellant would represent a continuing threat to society. Since he did not show what the excluded testimony would have been, nothing is presented for review. Article 40.09, Section 6(d)(1), supra; Stein v. State, supra; Hicks v. State, supra.
In three grounds of error appellant complains of improper jury argument at the punishment phase of the trial. The prosecutor argued as follows:
“Now, as I listened to Mr. Hudson, I thought back and I recall yesterday he was telling you to find the Defendant not guilty because there was a reasonable doubt in the case. Yesterday he wanted you to turn him loose and today he wants you to disregard your belief in the death penalty, .
“. . . Now, ladies and gentlemen, I know and I believe as I’m standing here, from talking to you folks over a long period of days, that you would not be on this jury unless you believed in the death penalty in a proper case. .
“The answer to all three questions is yes and I’m simply going to ask you to follow your oaths and answer them yes.
No objection was made to the argument now challenged. Hence, nothing is presented for review. Rodriguez v. State, 530 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Jackson v. State, 516 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
Appellant next contends the court erroneously overruled his motion for mistrial after the prosecutor made the following comment during argument:
“. . . And I’m going to suggest something to you, ladies and gentlemen: If Mr. Hudson had seriously believed that this man was sick and not a criminal of the worst kind, as the evidence shows him to be — ”
The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the comment and overruled the motion for mistrial.
Generally, an instruction to disregard is sufficient to cure an error in argument. McClure v. State, 544 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Gholson and Ross v. State, supra. We find that the court’s prompt instruction in the instant case was sufficient to remove the harm, if any, in the prosecutor’s unfinished statement. The motion for mistrial was properly denied. Thomas v. State, 519 S.W.2d 430 (Tex.Cr. App.1975); Morgan v. State, 502 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
Appellant asserts that the prosecutor improperly referred to an extraneous offense during jury argument. The record reflects:
“. . . And don’t you know as he sits here today he wishes with all his heart that he had struck her harder and maybe he wouldn’t be sitting where he is.”
An objection was overruled.
The prosecutor was referring to the vicious beating which appellant inflicted on • Deia Sutton, who lived to give the most damaging testimony against him. She was shot and choked before appellant struck her. When the two robbers thought their [328]*328victims were dead, they prepared to leave, but after the young man called to his companion, they went back and inflicted further injuries and killed the young man. Appellant believed Sutton was also dead when he left her and the evidence shows that he wanted her to die. We conclude that the prosecutor’s argument was a discussion of, or a reasonable deduction from, the evidence. Cf. Burns v. State, supra; Cain v. State, 549 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
III. The Motion for New Trial
Appellant’s final contention is that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of the systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit jury panel at the hearing on the motion for new trial. Appellant’s trial counsel made an oral motion to quash the panel on the ground of systematic exclusion at the conclusion of the voir dire examination but made no allegation regarding this or any other racial issue in the motion for new trial. Assuming the contention is properly before us for review, we conclude that it is without merit.
The apparent thrust of appellant’s argument is that the State used its peremptory challenges to strike qualified blacks from the panel. The same argument was advanced in Ridley v. State, 475 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), wherein we stated:
“We hold that no systematic exclusion has been shown. To hold otherwise would in effect be abolishing our peremptory challenge practice which has always been a part of our system to help an accused as well as the State obtain an impartial jury and a fair trial.”
We adhere to our holding in Ridley. See also Hill v. State, 487 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Smith v. State, supra; and Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 74 S.Ct. 667, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954).
No reversible error is shown. The judgment is affirmed.