HOWELL, Justice.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of indecency with a child. The trial court assessed punishment at ten years’ confinement. We reverse and remand on a holding that it was error to allow expert opinion to the effect that the child complainant was telling the truth.
The prosecution was based on an incident allegedly occurring on March 24, 1986. Appellant, who was retired, lived with his common-law wife; she provided day care for children in her home. The seven-year-old complainant testified that, shortly after lunch, the common-law wife and the other children took a nap, but that she (the complainant) could not go to sleep. She stated that appellant asked her to come to the kitchen table where he was sitting alone, and that he then pulled down her jeans and panties, and then touched her in the “wrong spot,” “in the middle of the legs,” with his hand.
According to appellant’s version of the facts, the complainant got up from her nap to use the bathroom and returned to tell him that her zipper was stuck. Appellant testified that he fixed her zipper and that he never touched the complainant in the way she described. No medical evidence was adduced at trial, and there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged incident.
In points three through seven, appellant urges that the trial court erred in permitting expert witnesses to testify that (1) they could determine whether the complainant was telling the truth when she told them that she had been sexually abused, (2) in their opinion, the complainant was in fact sexually abused, and (3) the complainant exhibited the same behavioral characteristics as those exhibited by children who in fact had been sexually abused. With one exception,1 defense counsel’s objections to the admissibility of testimony concerning common behavioral characteristics and the complainant’s credibility were overruled.
The admissibility of expert testimony in a child sexual abuse case (1) that concerns the alleged victim’s credibility or (2) that compares behavioral characteristics of the complainant with those of other victims of abuse is an issue of first impression for this court. However, we perceive no reason why the admissibility of expert testimony in a child sexual abuse case should not be governed by the same rules of evidence that apply to all expert opinion testimony, notwithstanding the obvious temptation to liberalize those rules, given the offensive nature of child molestation. See State v. Rivera, 139 Ariz. 409, 413 n. 1, 678 P.2d 1373, 1377 n. 1 (1984).
We recognize that expert testimony is no longer objectionable on the ground that it “invades the province of the jury.” See Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). However, expert testimony in a criminal proceeding is admissible only when (1) the witness is competent and qualified to testify; (2) the testimony will assist the jurors, as triers of fact, in evaluating and understanding matters not within their common experience, Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 325 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), [835] cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928, 99 S.Ct. 1264, 59 L.Ed.2d 484 (1979) (citing Hopkins, 480 S.W.2d at 218) (see also TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 7022); and (3) the testimony’s probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Rule 403. Because appellant has not challenged the competency or qualifications of the experts who testified in this case, the question before us narrows to (1) whether the experts’ testimony was limited to providing information that was outside the jurors’ common understanding or experience, and (2) whether the testimony’s usefulness was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Our review is further limited to whether the court abused its discretion. Steve v. State, 614 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Mullins v. State, 699 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, no pet.). However, such discretion is not unlimited. Ginther v. State, 672 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); see also Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir.1983) (appellate courts need not uphold “a purported exercise of discretion [that] was infected by an error of law”); Williams v. State, 159 Tex.Crim. 443, 449, 265 S.W.2d 92, 95 (1954) (on reh’g) (“an abuse of discretion usually means doing differently from what the reviewing authority would have felt called upon to do”). In some instances, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has restricted the use of psychiatric opinion testimony. See, e.g., Hopkins, 480 S.W.2d at 220 (psychiatric testimony not permissible for impeachment purposes). Conversely, the court has permitted psychiatric and psychological testimony for other purposes. See, e.g., Rumbaugh v. State, 629 S.W.2d 747, 755-56 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (psychiatric testimony that defendant suffered from antisocial behavior rather than organic brain damage admissible to rebut testimony supporting insanity defense); Ex Parte Harris, 618 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (psychiatric testimony that defendant was a sociopath held admissible). Because the courts of this state have not yet addressed directly the admissibility of psychiatric or psychological opinion testimony for the purposes present in this child sexual abuse case, we have analyzed the decisions of other jurisdictions, which permit such testimony in varying degrees.3
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HOWELL, Justice.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of indecency with a child. The trial court assessed punishment at ten years’ confinement. We reverse and remand on a holding that it was error to allow expert opinion to the effect that the child complainant was telling the truth.
The prosecution was based on an incident allegedly occurring on March 24, 1986. Appellant, who was retired, lived with his common-law wife; she provided day care for children in her home. The seven-year-old complainant testified that, shortly after lunch, the common-law wife and the other children took a nap, but that she (the complainant) could not go to sleep. She stated that appellant asked her to come to the kitchen table where he was sitting alone, and that he then pulled down her jeans and panties, and then touched her in the “wrong spot,” “in the middle of the legs,” with his hand.
According to appellant’s version of the facts, the complainant got up from her nap to use the bathroom and returned to tell him that her zipper was stuck. Appellant testified that he fixed her zipper and that he never touched the complainant in the way she described. No medical evidence was adduced at trial, and there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged incident.
In points three through seven, appellant urges that the trial court erred in permitting expert witnesses to testify that (1) they could determine whether the complainant was telling the truth when she told them that she had been sexually abused, (2) in their opinion, the complainant was in fact sexually abused, and (3) the complainant exhibited the same behavioral characteristics as those exhibited by children who in fact had been sexually abused. With one exception,1 defense counsel’s objections to the admissibility of testimony concerning common behavioral characteristics and the complainant’s credibility were overruled.
The admissibility of expert testimony in a child sexual abuse case (1) that concerns the alleged victim’s credibility or (2) that compares behavioral characteristics of the complainant with those of other victims of abuse is an issue of first impression for this court. However, we perceive no reason why the admissibility of expert testimony in a child sexual abuse case should not be governed by the same rules of evidence that apply to all expert opinion testimony, notwithstanding the obvious temptation to liberalize those rules, given the offensive nature of child molestation. See State v. Rivera, 139 Ariz. 409, 413 n. 1, 678 P.2d 1373, 1377 n. 1 (1984).
We recognize that expert testimony is no longer objectionable on the ground that it “invades the province of the jury.” See Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). However, expert testimony in a criminal proceeding is admissible only when (1) the witness is competent and qualified to testify; (2) the testimony will assist the jurors, as triers of fact, in evaluating and understanding matters not within their common experience, Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 325 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), [835] cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928, 99 S.Ct. 1264, 59 L.Ed.2d 484 (1979) (citing Hopkins, 480 S.W.2d at 218) (see also TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 7022); and (3) the testimony’s probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Rule 403. Because appellant has not challenged the competency or qualifications of the experts who testified in this case, the question before us narrows to (1) whether the experts’ testimony was limited to providing information that was outside the jurors’ common understanding or experience, and (2) whether the testimony’s usefulness was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Our review is further limited to whether the court abused its discretion. Steve v. State, 614 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Mullins v. State, 699 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, no pet.). However, such discretion is not unlimited. Ginther v. State, 672 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); see also Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir.1983) (appellate courts need not uphold “a purported exercise of discretion [that] was infected by an error of law”); Williams v. State, 159 Tex.Crim. 443, 449, 265 S.W.2d 92, 95 (1954) (on reh’g) (“an abuse of discretion usually means doing differently from what the reviewing authority would have felt called upon to do”). In some instances, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has restricted the use of psychiatric opinion testimony. See, e.g., Hopkins, 480 S.W.2d at 220 (psychiatric testimony not permissible for impeachment purposes). Conversely, the court has permitted psychiatric and psychological testimony for other purposes. See, e.g., Rumbaugh v. State, 629 S.W.2d 747, 755-56 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (psychiatric testimony that defendant suffered from antisocial behavior rather than organic brain damage admissible to rebut testimony supporting insanity defense); Ex Parte Harris, 618 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (psychiatric testimony that defendant was a sociopath held admissible). Because the courts of this state have not yet addressed directly the admissibility of psychiatric or psychological opinion testimony for the purposes present in this child sexual abuse case, we have analyzed the decisions of other jurisdictions, which permit such testimony in varying degrees.3
Expert testimony has been admitted widely for the purpose of explaining general behavior characteristics of child sexual abuse victims as a class. See, e.g., State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 381, 384, 728 P.2d 248, 251, 254 (1986), and cases cited therein; State v. Hansen, 82 Or.App. 178, 182-85, 728 P.2d 538, 540-42 (1986). The rationale is that while the common experience of jurors enables them to assess the credibility of alleged assault victims generally, the unique pressures surrounding a child victim, and their concomitant effects on the child’s behavior, are such that an expert’s testimony is deemed useful in assisting the jurors’ assessment of the child’s credibility. State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 440, 657 P.2d 1215, 1222 (1983) (Roberts, J., concurring). The expert’s testimony about the general behavioral traits of child victims— e.g., delay in reporting the incident, recantation, truancy, embarrassment, running away from home, and inconsistent versions of abuse — explains to the jurors that such [836] behavior, which might otherwise be attributed to inaccuracy or falsification, is typical of the class of victims and does not necessarily indicate a lack of credibility. Thus, such testimony, which allows the jury to assess the credibility of a particular complainant more fairly by explaining the emotional antecedents underlying the typical victim’s behavior, meets the requirements of Rule 702. See Rose v. State, 716 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, no pet.) (citing Holloway v. State, 613 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.Crim.App.1981)) (expert opinion evidence admissible when jurors’ unfamiliarity with a body of relevant expertise renders them incompetent to infer the existence of facts to be determined from other facts actually proved without the aid of greater skill than their own); cf. Chambers, 568 S.W.2d at 325-26 (psychiatric testimony describing the typical traits of a sociopathic personality held admissible). Further, we conclude that, although the receipt of evidence of the general behavioral characteristics of child victims as a class will usually benefit the State’s case, it will not unfairly prejudice the defendant. Indeed, without such testimony, the defendant might maintain an unfair advantage.
However, after the jurors have become familiarized with the typical behavioral traits of the class, there is no need for further expert testimony, through which the expert expresses, either directly or indirectly, her opinion as to the credibility of a particular child complainant. It is well settled that a witness may not give an opinion as to the truth or falsity of other testimony. Ayala v. State, 171 Tex.Crim. 687, 689, 352 S.W.2d 955, 956 (1962) (cited in Black v. State, 634 S.W.2d 356 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, no pet.)); accord United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir.1986) (Rule 702 precludes admission of expert testimony that alleged child victim is “believable”).
The need for expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases is limited to information that explains the aspects of a child victim’s behavior that are beyond the jurors’ common experience, and thus permits the jury more properly to draw inferences and conclusions from other evidence. Once the jurors possess the same enlightening information as the expert witness, and can more fully understand the matter at hand, further expert testimony is unnecessary and inadmissible. Steve, 614 S.W.2d at 139. A psychiatric or psychological expert must not be permitted, even implicitly, to advise the jury as to which witness is more credible, especially in cases lacking physical evidence or eyewitnesses, where the resolution of the pivotal issues entirely depends on the complainant’s credibility. In the case in hand, as is typical of child molestation cases, there was no evidence outside the child complainant’s testimony that a crime even occurred.
Of course, Rule 704 authorizes opinion testimony that embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. However, such opinion testimony must be “otherwise admissible,” and the opinion of one witness as to the veracity of another’s testimony is not “otherwise admissible.” Cf. Ayala, 171 Tex.Crim. at 689, 352 S.W.2d at 956. Rule 704, in and of itself, cannot be construed as authority permitting an expert to tell the jury whom the expert considers that the jury should believe. Moran, 151 Ariz. at 383, 728 P.2d at 253 (citing FED.R.EVID. 704 advisory committee note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 284 (1973)). When the only evidence consists of the conflicting accounts of the defendant and the complainant, expert testimony advising the jurors who is more credible may not be admitted,4 even when the expert’s opinion as to the alleged victim’s credibility is merely implied or indirect. See, e.g., Moran, 151 Ariz. at 385, 728 P.2d at 255 (expert testimony that results of personality tests performed on alleged victim were consistent with those of an individual who had in fact experienced trauma “like a molestation]” held inadmissible); State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa [837]*8371986) (improper to admit expert testimony that children rarely lie about sexual abuse).
There are two reasons why such testimony must be excluded. First, after the expert explains the classic behavior of child victims, the jurors are as qualified as the expert to draw inferences as to credibility, based on the other evidence in the case. Thus, any expert opinion regarding credibility is superfluous. Hopkins, 480 S.W.2d at 218. Second, psychiatrists and psychologists, who are trained to accept their patients’ word as fact, are not necessarily experts at verifying credibility. There is no acid test for veracity. Cf. Crawford v. State, 617 S.W.2d 925, 930 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 3067, 69 L.Ed.2d 431 (1981) (results of polygraph examinations, by virtue of their unproven reliability, are inadmissible for any purpose)5; see also Azure, 801 F.2d at 341 (“no reliable test for truthfulness exists”). Thus, the use of expert testimony must be limited to providing knowledge that will assist the jury’s rational decision of the issues before it; it cannot be used to advise the jurors who is telling the truth.
We now apply these principles to the facts of our case. In points five and seven, appellant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the following exchanges between the prosecutor and the two psychological experts, Wanda White and Sue James:
PROSECUTION: Do you feel ... that [the complainant] would be able to fool you so that you would be mistaken in your evaluation of her story?
DEFENSE: Your Honor, we’ll object. This question goes to the veracity and truthfulness of the child again.
THE COURT: No, overruled.
WITNESS WHITE: No, I don’t think she could fool me....
PROSECUTOR: Do you feel ... that your training qualifies to you [sic] make a determination whether or not [the complainant’s] story is a product of her imagination?
DEFENSE: Your Honor, we’ll object. This goes to the truthfulness and veracity of the [complainant]. It invades the province of the jury.
THE COURT: Overrule you.
WITNESS WHITE: I don’t think it has anything to do with her imagination.
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PROSECUTION: And you feel like you’re qualified to ferret out those cases where [the alleged incident of abuse] is something [the alleged victims] invented out of thin air or whether it actually happened?
WITNESS WHITE: Yes, I do.
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PROSECUTION: Do you feel ... that you would be able to make a determination, based on your contact with this case and viewing the video tape [of the alleged victim recounting her version of the facts], whether or not the complainant is telling this story out of some figment of her imagination?
WITNESS JAMES: I can make that determination.
DEFENSE: Your Honor, I’ll object to the question as being invasive of the province of the jury. It goes to the ultimate facts and circumstances.
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THE COURT: I’m going to overrule your objection.
PROSECUTION: In your opinion, is what [the complainant] is telling you a figment — Is she telling a story that is invented in her own mind, a figment of her imagination?
WITNESS JAMES: No, she is telling an experience that she actually had.
The obvious purpose of this testimony was to convey to the jury that the two psychologists were experts in discerning veracity. Rule 702 precludes the admission of such testimony for two reasons. First, [838] no expert witness is qualified to ascertain credibility; thus, such opinion testimony as that quoted above is outside the scope of any witness’ expertise. Second, the determination of credibility is vested in the exclusive province of the jury, Johnson v. State, 503 S.W.2d 788, 793 (Tex.Crim.App.1974), and jurors are not so unfamiliar with deciding when someone is being truthful that they require “expert” assistance to perform their duty, especially when the experts’ testimony concerning child victims’ typical behavioral characteristics has dispelled any misconceptions that might otherwise cloud or distort the jurors’ evaluation of the evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the experts’ testimony that attempted to establish their expertise in discerning the complainant’s veracity was improperly admitted. Points five and seven are sustained.
In point of error six, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in permitting the following testimony by psychologist White:
PROSECUTION: In your opinion, has [the complainant] been sexually abused?
DEFENSE: Your Honor, we’ll object. This question again invades the province of the jury. That’s their — -These twelve people have the obligation to decide whether the [complainant’s] allegation is true....
THE COURT: I’m going to overrule you on that. She can answer.
WITNESS WHITE: Yes, [the complainant] was abused, in my opinion.
The only issue in this case was whether the complainant’s allegation of sexual abuse was true. The necessary inference from the expert’s testimony, “[y]es, [the complainant] was abused,” was that the expert believed that the complainant's version was true and that she had indeed been sexually abused. We hold that such testimony was an improper comment on the complainant’s credibility and was therefore, erroneously admitted. See Black, 634 S.W.2d at 357-58. Point six is sustained.
In points three and four, appellant complains of the trial court’s admission of the following testimony:
PROSECUTION: Does [the complainant] exhibit classic characteristics that you have seen, in your experience, of a child who has been sexually abused?
DEFENSE: Your Honor, we renew the objection on the ... basis [that such testimony would invade the province of the jury].
THE COURT: I’m going to allow that one. Overruled.
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WITNESS WHITE: Yes, she does.
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PROSECUTION: [I]n [the complainant’s] case, does she exhibit the same characteristics as you have seen in other cases where you have found that the claim was truel
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WITNESS WHITE: Yes.
(Emphasis added.) This testimony, which directly compared the complainant’s behavioral characteristics with those exhibited by verified child victims as a class, did not ask for a point blank opinion on the complainant’s credibility as did the testimony discussed under points five, six, and seven. However, the inference which the expert offered the jury was that because the complainant’s behavior was consistent with that of victims of proven credibility, the complainant must be telling the truth and the alleged sexual abuse must have occurred. Once the jurors were familiarized with the typical behavior of actual victims, the expert had given the jury all the expertise that it needed to perform its function. From that point forward, it was as capable as the expert to determine the consistency (or lack of it) of the complainant’s behavior by correlating evidence concerning the complainant’s post-incident behavior with the classic behavior pattern described by the expert.
Of course, the expert was free to detail her personal observations of the complainant’s behavior, as may other lay witnesses; however, it was the jury’s exclusive role to assess the complainant’s credibility by drawing comparisons between the behavior [839] of the complainant and of others similarly situated. See Moran, 151 Ariz. at 385, 728 P.2d at 255 (“the matching” of testimony improperly permits the expert to indicate how she views the credibility of a particular witness). The testimony challenged under these points did not assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue. See TEX.R.CRIM. EVID. 702. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in admitting this testimony. Points three and four are sustained.
In summary, we point out that the rule precluding a witness, particularly an expert witness, from testifying with respect to an ultimate issue was with us for many years, perhaps generations. The rule has properly been discarded as too mechanical, too arbitrary. However, we must recognize that the rule was based on certain wisdoms, else it would not have persisted near so long. One of its wisdoms is the broad principle that expert witnesses should not be permitted to give opinions as to the credibility of fact witnesses. See Hopkins, 480 S.W.2d at 220-21. If such be permitted without limitation, we can envision the day when each party would be calling experts to posit their opinions that the witnesses for the other side are not credible and the witnesses for the side with whom the expert is aligned are extremely believable. Suffice to say, the entire concept of trial by jury could be drastically altered if this practice were allowed to grow unchecked. Among the other problems that we can foresee are the problems of those litigants without the funds necessary to compensate those practitioners of the testifying acts who would be filling this envisioned new field of expertise.
It is not necessary for us to hold that an expert may never be allowed to give an opinion, either directly or indirectly, that a witness is or is not credible, that a witness’ testimony on a particular point is or is not believable. We do hold that such area is to be jealously guarded. We further hold that the expert testimony proffered in this case was inadmissible.6
Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.