[429]*429CAMPBELL J.
Defendant contends that his daughter’s prior consistent statements of details of her rape and testimony by social workers stating that the daughter’s reaction to the rape was typical of such a victim were improperly admitted in his jury trial for rape, and appeals his conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We also affirm.
The 14 year-old child asserted that her father raped her in the early morning of December 23, 1980. She reported the rape to a friend’s mother, to a Children’s Services worker, and also to a doctor at the hospital. The following day a police officer recorded her statement at the police station. Within the same week she wrote out her statement before testifying before the grand jury. These reports were all consistent.
On February 6, 1981, in the presence of her mother, defense counsel’s wife and another woman, the child wrote a statement saying she had lied about the rape. In that note she said that she had not been raped, but that she had lied so she could get “out on her own.” She also said she was under a lot of pressure to stick to her original story. She wrote at least two other notes that said the same thing.
At the trial on April 4, 1981, the child, who was the first witness, testified that the defendant raped her. During cross-examination, defendant introduced statements the daughter wrote in February. Following this impeachment, the state offered to introduce evidence from four other witnesses that the daughter had reported the rape to them within two days of the alleged occurrence. The trial court allowed this evidence over objection. The witnesses testified not only that the daughter had told them the rape had occurred, but also two of these witnesses testified at length to details reported by the daughter. Thus, the jury heard a detailed account of the rape three times.
Later in the trial, both the state and the defense presented testimony from two social workers who worked with abused children. Both of them were accepted as expert witnesses without objection. In response to questions from the state, both testified over objection concerning the reactions of young victims of family sexual abuse, and one [430]*430testified that the daughter’s behavior was typical of most victims. Defendant objected on the basis that this testimony invaded the province of the jury and was opinion evidence.
The defendant denied the rape. He offered testimony suggesting that the daughter stole some money, skipped school, and ran away twice. He also strongly suggested she had been pressured by her older sister and by employees of Children’s Services Division to testify falsely.
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
The court ruled that the testimony of one of the four state’s witnesses referred to above was admissible both as a “res gestae”1 exception to the hearsay rule and as a prior consistent statement; the testimony of the other witnesses was admissible only as prior consistent statements. The state does not assert the “res gestae” exception on appeal, so we do not consider it.
Defendant relies on State v. Yielding, 238 Or 419, 422, 395 P2d 172 (1964), which holds that a witness may testify that another witness complained of rape but may give no particulars unless it fits into the “res gestae” exception.2 This holding is not controlling in the present [431]*431case because it ignores the prior inconsistent statements introduced by the defense. Here the state was attempting to rehabilitate a witness after her impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. Although prior consistent statements are generally inadmissible, there are exceptions. When a witness has been assailed on the ground that she has some motive for testifying falsely, prior consistent statements are admissible.3 We approve the statement in State v. Clark, 26 Or App 55, 57, 551 P2d 1313, rev den (1976):
“Ordinarily a witness’s out-of-court statements are not competent evidence to corroborate his in-court testimony. However, where the witness’s credibility has been attacked on the ground that his testimony is a recent fabrication or that he had some motive for testifying falsely, evidence that he made consistent statements when the motive did not exist is admissible.”
The defendant contended that the daughter invented the rape story so that she could live with her boyfriend and that she testified to it in court because of pressure from various people. The desire to move away from her home was a motive that could have been present before her initial report, so it would not support the admission of prior consistent statements. However, the pressure that the defendant contends various people exerted would be a motive for testifying falsely that did not exist at the time of the initital report, but arose sometime after the initial report. Thus consistent statements would be admissible to rebut it.
Indeed, defendant’s trial counsel conceded that these prior consistent statements would have been admissible in rebuttal, but argued that the state should not have been allowed to present them in its case in chief. This [432]*432ignores the fact that the defense itself had already introduced impeaching documents. By defendant’s theory, if defendant had presented no other evidence, the state would have been completely foreclosed from rehabilitating the daughter. This is not the law.
We find that the daughter’s out of court statements concerning the rape were admissible as prior consistent statements following her impeachment.4
EXPERT TESTIMONY
As described above, two social workers were witnesses in this case. The state called L. Bohlen, a juvenile counselor for the county, and the defense presented F. Lindemann, a child protective social worker for Children’s Services Division. Both witnesses were accepted as experts without objection, and their expertise is not challenged now.
During Bohlen’s testimony, defendant objected to a question concerning the typical response of a rape victim, apparently on the grounds that it would require a comment on the credibility of the victim.5
[433]*433During cross-examination, the state asked Lindemann if she was familiar with the behavior of the type of children who have reported a claim of rape by a family member and whether the daughter’s behavior was consistent with what she described as typical behavior.6 Defendant objected to both these questions contending that they [434]*434invaded the province of the jury and that the answers would be opinions. We take this to mean opinions that are inadmissible because they are not helpful to the jury, for it is well settled that experts may offer opinions in some situations.7
[435]*435Defendant’s contention that this testimony invades the province of the jury is not well founded. It is the settled law in Oregon that testimony on the ultimate issue is not inadmissible solely on that basis. State v. Breen, 250 Or 474, 479, 443 P2d 624 (1968). As we said earlier in Schwieger et ux v. Solbeck et ux, 191 Or 454, 472-73, 230 P2d 195 (1951), it is impossible to usurp the jury’s function.
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[429]*429CAMPBELL J.
Defendant contends that his daughter’s prior consistent statements of details of her rape and testimony by social workers stating that the daughter’s reaction to the rape was typical of such a victim were improperly admitted in his jury trial for rape, and appeals his conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We also affirm.
The 14 year-old child asserted that her father raped her in the early morning of December 23, 1980. She reported the rape to a friend’s mother, to a Children’s Services worker, and also to a doctor at the hospital. The following day a police officer recorded her statement at the police station. Within the same week she wrote out her statement before testifying before the grand jury. These reports were all consistent.
On February 6, 1981, in the presence of her mother, defense counsel’s wife and another woman, the child wrote a statement saying she had lied about the rape. In that note she said that she had not been raped, but that she had lied so she could get “out on her own.” She also said she was under a lot of pressure to stick to her original story. She wrote at least two other notes that said the same thing.
At the trial on April 4, 1981, the child, who was the first witness, testified that the defendant raped her. During cross-examination, defendant introduced statements the daughter wrote in February. Following this impeachment, the state offered to introduce evidence from four other witnesses that the daughter had reported the rape to them within two days of the alleged occurrence. The trial court allowed this evidence over objection. The witnesses testified not only that the daughter had told them the rape had occurred, but also two of these witnesses testified at length to details reported by the daughter. Thus, the jury heard a detailed account of the rape three times.
Later in the trial, both the state and the defense presented testimony from two social workers who worked with abused children. Both of them were accepted as expert witnesses without objection. In response to questions from the state, both testified over objection concerning the reactions of young victims of family sexual abuse, and one [430]*430testified that the daughter’s behavior was typical of most victims. Defendant objected on the basis that this testimony invaded the province of the jury and was opinion evidence.
The defendant denied the rape. He offered testimony suggesting that the daughter stole some money, skipped school, and ran away twice. He also strongly suggested she had been pressured by her older sister and by employees of Children’s Services Division to testify falsely.
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
The court ruled that the testimony of one of the four state’s witnesses referred to above was admissible both as a “res gestae”1 exception to the hearsay rule and as a prior consistent statement; the testimony of the other witnesses was admissible only as prior consistent statements. The state does not assert the “res gestae” exception on appeal, so we do not consider it.
Defendant relies on State v. Yielding, 238 Or 419, 422, 395 P2d 172 (1964), which holds that a witness may testify that another witness complained of rape but may give no particulars unless it fits into the “res gestae” exception.2 This holding is not controlling in the present [431]*431case because it ignores the prior inconsistent statements introduced by the defense. Here the state was attempting to rehabilitate a witness after her impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. Although prior consistent statements are generally inadmissible, there are exceptions. When a witness has been assailed on the ground that she has some motive for testifying falsely, prior consistent statements are admissible.3 We approve the statement in State v. Clark, 26 Or App 55, 57, 551 P2d 1313, rev den (1976):
“Ordinarily a witness’s out-of-court statements are not competent evidence to corroborate his in-court testimony. However, where the witness’s credibility has been attacked on the ground that his testimony is a recent fabrication or that he had some motive for testifying falsely, evidence that he made consistent statements when the motive did not exist is admissible.”
The defendant contended that the daughter invented the rape story so that she could live with her boyfriend and that she testified to it in court because of pressure from various people. The desire to move away from her home was a motive that could have been present before her initial report, so it would not support the admission of prior consistent statements. However, the pressure that the defendant contends various people exerted would be a motive for testifying falsely that did not exist at the time of the initital report, but arose sometime after the initial report. Thus consistent statements would be admissible to rebut it.
Indeed, defendant’s trial counsel conceded that these prior consistent statements would have been admissible in rebuttal, but argued that the state should not have been allowed to present them in its case in chief. This [432]*432ignores the fact that the defense itself had already introduced impeaching documents. By defendant’s theory, if defendant had presented no other evidence, the state would have been completely foreclosed from rehabilitating the daughter. This is not the law.
We find that the daughter’s out of court statements concerning the rape were admissible as prior consistent statements following her impeachment.4
EXPERT TESTIMONY
As described above, two social workers were witnesses in this case. The state called L. Bohlen, a juvenile counselor for the county, and the defense presented F. Lindemann, a child protective social worker for Children’s Services Division. Both witnesses were accepted as experts without objection, and their expertise is not challenged now.
During Bohlen’s testimony, defendant objected to a question concerning the typical response of a rape victim, apparently on the grounds that it would require a comment on the credibility of the victim.5
[433]*433During cross-examination, the state asked Lindemann if she was familiar with the behavior of the type of children who have reported a claim of rape by a family member and whether the daughter’s behavior was consistent with what she described as typical behavior.6 Defendant objected to both these questions contending that they [434]*434invaded the province of the jury and that the answers would be opinions. We take this to mean opinions that are inadmissible because they are not helpful to the jury, for it is well settled that experts may offer opinions in some situations.7
[435]*435Defendant’s contention that this testimony invades the province of the jury is not well founded. It is the settled law in Oregon that testimony on the ultimate issue is not inadmissible solely on that basis. State v. Breen, 250 Or 474, 479, 443 P2d 624 (1968). As we said earlier in Schwieger et ux v. Solbeck et ux, 191 Or 454, 472-73, 230 P2d 195 (1951), it is impossible to usurp the jury’s function. Even if there is uncontradicted expert testimony, the jury is not bound by it, for the jury alone must make the ultimate decision. W. R. Chamberlin & Co. v. Northwestern Agencies, Inc., 289 Or 201, 207, 611 P2d 652 (1980).
Defendant contends that the evidence given by the experts here was a direct effort to support the credibility of the complaining witness. It is true that if the jurors believed the experts’ testimony, they would be more likely to believe the victim’s account. Neither of the experts directly expressed an opinion on the truth of the victim’s testimony. Much expert testimony will tend to show that another witness either is or is not telling the truth. See State v. Stringer, 292 Or 388, 639 P2d 1264 (1982). This, by itself, will not render evidence inadmissible.
However, not all expert testimony, opinion or otherwise, is admissible. We recently restated the rule concerning admissibility of opinion evidence by experts in State v. Stringer, supra, 292 Or at 391:
“The test is not whether a jury is capable of drawing its own inferences from the evidence presented. Rather, the test is whether the expert’s testimony, if believed, will be of help or assistance to the jury.”
If a complaining witness in a burglary trial, after making the initial report, denied several times before testifying at trial that the crime had happened, the jury would have good reason to doubt seriously her credibility at any time. However, in this instance we are concerned with a child who states she has been the victim of sexual abuse by a member of her family. The experts testified that in this [436]*436situation the young victim often feels guilty about testifying against someone she loves and wonders if she is doing the right thing in so testifying. It would be useful to the jury to know that not just this victim but many child victims are ambivalent about the forcefulness with which they want to pursue the complaint, and it is not uncommon for them to deny the act ever happened. Explaining this superficially bizarre behavior by identifying its emotional antecedents could help the jury better assess the witness’s credibility.8
We recognize that sexual abuse of children is a problem in our culture.9 Defendant does not deny that this form of behavior may exist following familial sexual abuse, or that the experts described it correctly. It is information that the jury did not have. In the present case, 18 of the [437]*437prospective jurors questioned during voir dire were asked whether they knew a child victim of sexual abuse or if they had heard of any children who had been abused sexually by members of their families. Fifteen reported that they knew no one who had suffered from this sort of abuse; two others said they remembered hearing reports of such abuse.10 Because the jurors said they had no experience with victims of child abuse, we assume they would not have been exposed to the contention that it is common for children to report familial sexual abuse and then retract the story. Such evidence might well help a jury make a more informed decision in evaluating the credibility of a testifying child.
Perhaps the jury itself would have been capable of deciding whether the daughter’s behavior actually fit the pattern decribed by the experts. However, as said in 4 Weinstein’s Evidence 702[02] (1981) there is no bright line separating issues within the comprehension of the jurors from those that are not. Generally the admission of expert testimony is within the discretion of the trial court. Yundt v. D & D Bowl, Inc., 259 Or 247, 258, 486 P2d 553 (1971). If a qualified expert offers to give testimony on whether the reaction of one child is similar to the reaction of most victims of familial child abuse, and if believed this would assist the jury in deciding whether a rape occurred, it may be admitted.11
We recognize that jurors could be so impressed by the “aura of reliability” of expert testimony that they might trust it more than their own perceptions. However, the trial court must first find that the witness is indeed an expert and is testifying to a subject that is a proper one for expert testimony. The court must also find the offered testimony is relevant. Opposing counsel will have an opportunity to attempt to discredit the testimony through cross-[438]*438examination and show any possible bias the expert may have.12
The dissent from the Court of Appeals stated: “The door is now open to permit an expert or other ‘skilled’ witness to testify that it is typical behavior for a witness, a victim or a criminal defendant to tell the truth the first time and then later to recant.” State v. Middleton, 58 Or App 447, 456, 648 P2d 1296 (1982). This is a legitimate concern, but our holding today does not open the door so widely. We expressly hold that in Oregon a witness, expert or otherwise, may not give an opinion on whether he believes a witness is telling the truth. We reject testimony from a witness about the credibility of another witness, although we recognize some jurisdictions accept it.13
We hold that if a witness is accepted as an expert by the trial court, it is not error to allow testimony describing the reaction of the typical child victim of familial sexual abuse and whether a testifying victim impeached by her prior inconsistent statement reacted in the typical manner when she made that inconsistent statement.
Affirmed.