Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. Harang

131 So. 2d 398, 1961 La. App. LEXIS 1221
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 22, 1961
Docket5226
StatusPublished
Cited by35 cases

This text of 131 So. 2d 398 (Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. Harang) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. Harang, 131 So. 2d 398, 1961 La. App. LEXIS 1221 (La. Ct. App. 1961).

Opinion

131 So.2d 398 (1961)

CENTRAL LOUISIANA ELECTRIC CO., Inc.
v.
Jack F. HARANG.

No. 5226.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

May 22, 1961.
Rehearing Denied June 30, 1961.

*399 Jack J. Cousin, New Iberia, J. Monroe Simmons, Covington, Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Burke & Hopkins, New Orleans, for appellant.

Dalton J. Barranger, Covington, for appellee.

Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER, JONES, HERGET and LANDRY, JJ.

LANDRY, Judge.

The instant matter being one of the causes consolidated with Central Louisiana Electric Co., Inc. v. Covington & St. Tammany Land & Improvement Co., 131 So.2d 369, all issues raised by defendant herein, excepting defendant's claim for compensation both for property taken and severance damages to remaining property, have therein been resolved adversely to defendant for reasons which will not be herein reiterated.

In the court below judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff granting the servitude requested and awarding defendant *400 damages in the sum of $4,300 for the value of the land expropriated and severance damages in the amount of $5,900 to remaining property of defendant diminished in value by the taking. Plaintiff herein has appealed contending that the amount awarded by the trial court for property taken should be reduced and severance damages disallowed in toto. Defendant has answered the appeal urging affirmation of the awards made by the lower court.

The servitude sought to be acquired from defendant Harang consists of 8.32 acres to be taken from a 160-acre tract part of which is wooded but which is largely comprised of open land presently devoted only to cattle grazing but formerly employed both for grazing and rice farming. The property is situated 2½ miles from Covington, 3½ miles from Madisonville and approximately 10½ miles from the North Plaza of the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway. The tract is bounded on its entire southern boundary by a gravel road colloquially referred to as "Bootlegger Road". The Covington-Madisonville Highway, known as Turnpike Road, a blacktopped highway, traverses the property in a north-easterly-southwesterly course entering the land approximately 1,576 feet north of the southwest corner and exiting therefrom at the intersection of said Turnpike Road and Bootlegger Road some 550 feet east of the southwest corner of the property, thus placing the southwest corner of defendant's land in a triangle bounded by Turnpike Road, Bootlegger Road and the western limits of the tract. The centerline of the 125-foot servitude commences at the western boundary of the land 576 feet north of the tract's southwest corner, continues northeasterly crossing the land near its geographical center and finally intersects the eastern boundary thereof approximately 800 feet south of its northeast corner. Within the right of way will be constructed three towers, the first near the southwest corner within the triangle formed by Turnpike Road and Bootlegger Road, the second in the approximate center of the tract, and the third near the eastern boundary thereof. On the property is situated defendant's residence with accompanying outbuildings, a three-acre artificial pond or lake constructed by defendant and an airstrip.

When the instant suit was filed the property was being used principally for cattle grazing although the record shows defendant had made three rice crops thereon in former years during which operations he had utilized from 40 to 80 acres of the land. For two seasons next preceding trial he planted no rice and received a government allotment for desisting in said farming operation. It further appears the property contains numerous wells used by defendant for irrigation purposes.

It is undisputed defendant must abandon the airstrip formerly used by planes engaged in fertilizing and planting his rice crops. Although it appears that if defendant may not hereafter use planes in his rice farming his operating costs will be somewhat increased, it does not appear with any degree of certainty whether or not the airstrip may be relocated elsewhere on the land. Undoubtedly the presence of the wires will render future use of planes somewhat more hazardous but it is not shown it will render their use impossible. The distance separating defendant's residence from the line is a matter in dispute. Defendant testified the line is approximately 300 feet from his residence whereas the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses is to the effect the home is at least 400 feet from the right of way which would place the house at least 462½ feet from the centerline of the servitude. All parties agree the wires will overhang defendant's lake or pond. The record discloses neither the length nor character of construction of the airstrip from which we feel safe in assuming it to be merely a graded and maintained dirt runway.

Edward Deano and Robert Baldwin, appraisers (whose qualifications have been set forth and discussed at length in the companion case of Louisiana Central Electric *401 Co., Inc. v. Covington & St. Tammany Land & Improvement Co., 131 So.2d 369), were called as experts on behalf of plaintiff to appraise defendant's property.

Deano considered the property suitable only for cattle grazing and was of the opinion the land had no reasonably immediate potential value as residential subdivision property.

Baldwin considered the land suitable for pasture only.

The trial court, however, accepted the valuations of defendant's appraisers (who based their estimates largely upon the assumption the highest and best use of defendant's property was for subdivision purposes and the property could be subdivided into small homesites or residential building plots) and awarded damages in the amounts stated by defendant's witnesses to be the value of the land taken and the sum due in severance damages.

It is the settled jurisprudence of this state that the valuation to be placed on expropriated land is its market value at the time of taking and that market value is the fair value as between a willing purchaser and a willing seller under ordinary and usual circumstances. Louisiana Highway Commission v. Israel, 205 La. 669, 17 So.2d 914; Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So.2d 260.

Market value of property expropriated for public use must be determined in the light of the best and highest use to which the property may reasonably be put but to constitute best and highest use for residential subdivision purposes in determining market value, it must be made to appear that there is reasonable expectation the property may be so used or developed in the not too distant future. Plaquemines Parish School Board v. Miller, 222 La. 584, 63 So.2d 6.

It is common knowledge that any tract of land wheresoever situated may be physically divided into residential plots or lots and subdivided irrespective of the demand for such property. However, potential subdivision use, to serve as the basis for establishing market value in an expropriation proceeding, must be shown to be reasonably prospective, as distinguished from remotely prospective, so as to remove said potential use or classification from the realm of guesswork, speculation and conjecture. If such potential future use is shown within the reasonably near future the owner is entitled to compensation on the basis of best and highest use for subdivision purposes even though the property affected be not in use for such purpose at the time of taking.

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Bluebook (online)
131 So. 2d 398, 1961 La. App. LEXIS 1221, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/central-louisiana-electric-co-v-harang-lactapp-1961.