State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Fontane

185 So. 2d 573, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 5397
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 4, 1966
DocketNo. 6620
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 185 So. 2d 573 (State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Fontane) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Fontane, 185 So. 2d 573, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 5397 (La. Ct. App. 1966).

Opinion

ELLIS, Judge.

Plaintiff, under authority of R.S. 48:441 et seq., expropriated 5.577 acres of defendants’ property in the City of Baton Rouge for the purpose of constructing part of a controlled access highway which is now in use. Pursuant to statute, the Highway Department secured the services of two appraisers, Mr. John Lejeune and Mr. Le-Roy Cobb, who appraised the value of the land taken at $21,895.00 and the damage to the remainder of the land at $10,977.00. The sum of these two amounts was deposited with the court at the time the order of expropriation was signed.

As a result of the trial in the District Court, judgment was rendered fixing just compensation for the land taken at $45,-525.00 and fixing the severance damages to the remainder at $45,051.00. An additional $200.00 was allowed by the trial court to compensate for fencing and a temporary construction servitude. Plaintiff has appealed this verdict and the matter is now before this court for decision.

Prior to the taking defendant owned a rectangular piece of property running northeast and southwest, containing a total of about eighteen acres situated near the Perkins Road — Acadian Thruway intersection. Part of the land lies south of Dawson Creek which runs in a general east-west direction severing the subject property. The consensus of all the experts, however, is that the property south of Dawson Creek was not affected by the taking and it may be excluded from further consideration. The portion of defendants’ land north of the creek contains 13.73 acres. Access west to Acadian was obtained by purchase of a wedge-shaped piece of property on February 16, 1962.

On January 24, 1963, the plaintiff expropriated 4.999 acres of the rectangle running east-west, diagonally across the subject property. Also expropriated was a portion of the wedge which completely cut off access to Acadian. The total expropriated area is 5.577 acres. The defendants’ property was thus severed into two parts, 4.914 acres and a part of the wedge south of the new highway and 3.242 acres north of the new highway. The pieces have no access to Acadian and no access to each other. Ingress and egress to the remaining subject property is now had [575]*575through Valley Park and Valley Park Annex, two low economic adjacent subdivisions.

In arriving at just compensation for the value of the land taken and the amount of severance damages to the part remaining, it is first necessary to consider the uses to which the land might reasonably have been put and to determine the highest and best use of the land. Then the highest and best use of the remainder after expropriation must be determined to arrive at the severance damages. Care must be exercised in this regard not to accept a mere speculative use. State Through Department of Highways v. Riley, La.App., 143 So.2d 396, Parish of Iberia v. Cook, 238 La. 697, 116 So.2d 491, State Through Dept. of Highways v. Rapier, 246 La. 150, 164 So.2d 280.

At the time of the expropriation the tract in question was being used as a boarding stable for horses. This enterprise was conducted for profit but was also in the nature of a hobby with the defendant. The property is, nevertheless, adjacent to Valley Park Subdivision and Valley Park Annex, both low economic residential developments. These subdivisions border the property on the north and east sides. On the western side of the property a wedge-shaped tract gave the defendant access to Acadian Thruway. There are a number of subdivisions within the immediate vicinity of the subject property and it is zoned 1-A, the top rated residential classification. Development of the subject property as a subdivision appears to be the highest and best use which could be made of it.

The real question arises, however, as to whether the property should be developed as a low economic or as an expensive subdivision, the greater value obviously being found in the latter.

The experts for the Department attempted to downgrade the property and relegate its use prior to the taking to a low economic subdivision, because its logical access prior to the acquisition of the access to Acadian Thruway was through Valley Park and Valley Park Annex, because of a drainage problem and because of a nearby railroad.

We shall consider those three objections in that order.

It is conceded by defendants’ experts that without access to Acadian the highest and best use of the property before the taking would have been for a low economic subdivision. This is clearly the best use that can be found for the remainder now that access to Acadian is impossible. The reason for this is that entrance to an expensive subdivision through a low economic area impairs the value of the subdivision and makes the success of the venture doubtful.

The Department contends that the access to Acadian Thruway was acquired by the defendant at a time when he knew that it would be expropriated and that, therefore, his acquisition should not be considered by this court in determining the value of the property. The evidence does not support the Department’s contention. It was disclosed that for many years the defendant had been attempting to purchase an access to Acadian Thruway but that the owner of the necessary property was not disposed to sell. Sometime before the final plans of the Expressway were made public defendant managed to purchase his access to Acadian Thruway from an estate and it was only thereafter that it became known that the access would be expropriated along with a portion of his land. Actual expropriation took place eleven months after the acquisition. Even if it were conclusively shown that the defendant had acquired the access with the knowledge that it would be expropriated at some future date, we do not believe that this court can entirely disregard the access to Acadian in arriving at the highest and best use o.f the property in view of the fact that defendant had sought the access for years before the new highway was considered. The fact that the acquisition of [576]*576the access was accomplished indicates that the property could have been developed as a first-class subdivision and, accordingly, the value of the land and severance damages must be computed on that basis unless other facts preclude such development.

Experts for the Department also attempted to downgrade the property on the basis that it had a serious drainage problem. Mr. Horton, a civil engineer, prepared surveys, drawings, and cost estimates for defendant as to the development of an expensive subdivision and these cost estimates were later used by the experts for the defendant in determining land values.

While it is true that these documents were prepared after it became known that the property was to be expropriated and with the knowledge that the subdivision could never materialize for that reason, the cost estimates and engineering data which stand almost uncontradicted establish the feasibility of the project. Mr. Horton did not consider the drainage problem serious. Mr. Jack Muse, chief hydraulic engineer for the City-Parish government of Baton Rouge, testified that the maximum flood stage of Dawson Creek was twenty-nine feet above sea level. Contour maps indicated that the elevation of the subject property was in the vicinity of thirty feet, or possibly that it had an average elevation of twenty-nine feet. Mr.

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Related

State Ex Rel. Department of Highways v. Wolfe
252 So. 2d 483 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1971)
State v. Jenkins
207 So. 2d 380 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1968)
State, Department of Highways v. Mouledous
200 So. 2d 384 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1967)
Louisiana Southern Railway Co. v. Gore
198 So. 2d 729 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1967)
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Busch
188 So. 2d 495 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1966)
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Fontane
187 So. 2d 446 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1966)

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Bluebook (online)
185 So. 2d 573, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 5397, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-department-of-highways-v-fontane-lactapp-1966.