TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal of an order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, upholding an Orlando, Florida, ordinance which requires as a condition for the granting of a permit for persons wishing to use the public streets and parks for demonstrations, the prepayment of fees for additional police protection. For the reasons set forth herein, the Orlando city ordinance on its face, as well as the manner in which it was applied violates the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly of the United States Constitution made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. BACKGROUND
The appellants, the Central Florida Nuclear Freeze Campaign, a non-profit antinuclear organization, and Bruce Gagnon, its coordinator, desired to conduct a parade and rally in Orlando, Florida on a Saturday in October, 1983 to communicate their views about the nuclear arms race. As required by the Orlando City Ordinances, 18A.10-11,1 the appellants filed an application for a permit with the Chief of Police of Orlando to conduct their outdoor march and rally. The application estimated that 1,000 people would participate in a nine-hour rally and approximately 700 to 800 marchers in a two and one-half hour parade. It is clear that the term “assembly” in the code applies to both parades and rallies. The proposed parade route covered approximately four miles through major thoroughfares and ending at “Tinker Field,” an Orlando recreation area, where the rally would be conducted.
Before a permit can be issued, Section 18A.122 of the Orlando City Ordinance re[1517]*1517quires the Chief of Police to “determine whether and to what extent additional police protection reasonably will be required for purposes of traffic and crowd control.” In determining whether additional police protection is required, the Code requires the Chief of Police ,to consider such factors as the size, location and nature of the assembly and if additional police protection is then warranted, the applicant has the duty of prepaying the expenses as a condition of the issuance of the permit.
Pursuant to this Ordinance, the city determined that 18 additional officers would be needed to police the nuclear freeze march and three additional officers were needed to police the appellants’ rally. The city based its decision on a number of factors including its belief that due to the controversial nature of the rally and the location of the Martin Marietta plant, a major defense manufacturer and a large local employer in Orlando,3 the potential for hostile counter activity existed which necessitated the need for additional police protection. The City’s decision was also based on the expectation that the rally and parade would draw many non-local participants who, based on past police experience, the City concluded would be more likely to cause disorder than would local residents.4 The cost of this additional police protection totaled $1,435.74 ($1,202.64 to compensate police working the parade and $233.10 for the rally.) This amount was computed on the basis of what it would cost to pay police officers to work off duty at the rate of one and one-half pay at the regular hourly rate by working on the day of the event which was a non-workday.5 Because [1518]*1518the event was to take place on Saturday, the fee charged to the appellant for payment of police protection was computed on this overtime pay basis.
Prior to the payment of this fee, the appellants filed a complaint in the United States District Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of Section 18A. 12 of the Orlando City Ordinance alleging that conditioning the exercise of First Amendment rights upon the payment of a “substantial” and “unreasonable” fee placed an insurmountable burden on First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and assembly and violated the equal protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs then moved for a preliminary injunction to require the issuance of the parade permit without payment of the fees.
The district court heard oral argument on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and denied the injunction, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941). The parties thereafter entered into a stipulation that the plaintiff would pay the sum of $1,435.74 under protest, as pre-payment for City of Orlando police services in connection with the plaintiff’s parade and rally. The fee was paid and the defendant granted the plaintiffs permission to conduct the parade and rally. Subsequently, the parties filed motions for summary judgment to resolve the constitutionality of the statute.
II. THE ISSUE
The parties stipulated that the issue “to be determined was whether the city’s ordinance requiring the payment of a fee for additional police services violate the First Amendment on its face or as applied in this case.”
III. DISCUSSION
In the City’s motion for summary judgment, the defendant claimed that the requirements of Orlando City Code Section 18A.12 requiring the payment of a fee to defray the costs of policing the event was constitutional under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cox v. New Hampshire.6 Moreover, the defendant asserted that the ordinance was both reasonable and was related to legitimate government concerns as a valid time, place and manner restriction on the use of the public streets and that the license scheme in Cox is directly analogous to the ordinance scheme in the City of Orlando. It contends that the Orlando ordinance in question simply passes along the actual costs of policing the event and protecting the public safety to the event participants.
The defendant suggests that the Court in Cox did not limit the permissible fee to $300.00 and that relative dollar values should therefore be considered when comparing the $300.00 fee approved in Cox with the fee charged in the case at hand.
According to the defendant, other cases have cited Cox in approving fees designed to defray the actual expenses of administering a First Amendment activity. The defendant cites Collins v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1050, 1054 (2d Cir.1983) as citing Cox for the proposition that the government may impose financial burdens on the exercise of First Amendment rights when the amount involved is reasonable and directly related to legitimate government purposes.
In addressing the question of requiring the plaintiffs to pay overtime costs for [1519]*1519police protection, the defendant argued that the payment of overtime for all off-duty work was a reasonable way to insure that police will be able to work at public assemblies and that in this regard, it meets the Cox requirement that fees be reasonable and non-arbitrary.
The defendant also argued that it was not improper to consider the content of the speech in determining the level of police protection required. The consideration of whether an activity might create disorder was only one factor in assessing the police protection costs. Moreover, the defendant asserted that the Orlando ordinance does not allow the denial of a permit because of a perceived potential for disorder. “That potential is simply one element of the assembly which is considered along with several other factors in assessing whether additional police protection is warranted.”
Lastly, the defendant concluded that in light of the interest in public safety, the requirements of City Code 18A.12 are not only reasonable but necessary to ensure that all persons are provided equal access to public forums.
In the cross-motion for summary judgment the plaintiffs alleged that: (1) a city could not condition the exercise of First Amendment rights upon payment of the full costs of additional police protection necessitated by the exercise of First Amendment rights and that costs charged must be narrowly tailored and reflect the least restrictive means of accomplishing the governmental purpose; (2) the Orlando ordinance was not applied in a content neutral narrowly tailored fashion, but in a manner which interfered with the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.
Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the license fee charged for the police services was based partially on the content of its views. As evidence to support this claim, the plaintiffs refer to the deposition of deputy chief of police Frederick Walsh, who testified that in addition to the usual factors of traffic control and the size of the demonstration, the police were concerned with the possibilities of hostile counter demonstrators and the presence of out-of-town demonstrators.
It was the plaintiffs’ contention that it was improper to force the plaintiffs to pay projected police costs of protecting themselves from being attacked by possible hostile counter demonstrators. To the extent that the fees charged the plaintiffs were based upon the hostile counter activity and based on the content of the plaintiffs’ speech, the plaintiffs contended that “the Defendant charged them for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution” and that no case stands for the proposition that a demonstrator must pay the police to protect enjoyment of First Amendment rights from violence. Moreover, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ consideration of the controversial nature of the plaintiffs’ speech in determining what costs would be charged for the protection of that speech, constituted an impermissible restriction on the expression of speech.
Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that the City’s concern in assessing the costs for protection was not solely based on the need for public safety, but partly on the concern for protecting the public fisc. The plaintiffs introduced deposition testimony of deputy chief Walsh who acknowledged that the City’s concern was whether the general fund which subsidizes police services “to perform a certain function” should absorb costs or should it be absorbed by the people who are actually in the process of exercising their rights.7 The plaintiffs contended [1520]*1520that the City’s initial concern of public safety and protecting the public fisc goes beyond the holding of Cox v. New Hampshire’s concern for public safety. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that if protection of the public fisc is considered a legitimate governmental concern then the ordinance fails to achieve those objectives by the least restrictive means available. It fails to differentiate between commercial speech and non-commercial speech and lumps together all expression without acknowledging the greater protection accorded to public issue expression. The plaintiffs argued that the City could have chosen the less restrictive means of pursuing its legitimate governmental interests by treating public issue communication as a part of its basic law enforcement duty and utilizing, whenever possible, regular police officers at straight hourly rates or utilizing reserve officers not benefited by the time and half pay, which would have reduced the costs for policing the event substantially. Thus, the plaintiffs argued there were alternative means of achieving the City’s governmental concerns without charging public issue proponents the full costs of policing the event at the overtime rate of off-duty police officers.
The district court, without oral argument, entered a judgment for the City of Orlando holding the City ordinance to be facially valid and constitutionally applied. It rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the decision to impose a fee for additional police protection was both content based and a prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. The district court stated that it was reasonable for the defendant to consider the ideas or policies being espoused by the license applicant in making a determination as to the quantity and quality of police protection needed to ensure an orderly parade or rally. This information, the court concluded, “was relied on in an objective, non-discriminatory fashion which comported with both common sense and the Constitution.” In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that consideration of possible hostile counter demonstration was forcing them to pay for the exercise of First Amendment rights, the court stated that “Chief Walsh properly and objectively considered the potential for counter demonstrations in calculating additional police requirements and the amount of the license fee was reasonably related to the expected costs.”
The court also disagreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that the Orlando ordinance lacked narrow, objective, and definite standards and gave the chief of police unbridled discretion to grant or deny a permit under the Supreme Court’s holding in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). The district court noted that there were several provisions in the Orlando ordinance which limited the police chief’s discretion so as to protect First Amendment rights. First, the Court interpreted the Orlando ordinance as implicitly requiring that fees charged as prepayment of certain reasonable costs expected to be created by the activity must bear a reasonable relationship to anticipated costs. Secondly, the ordinance provided for an expedited appeal to the council of a decision of the chief of police to deny a permit. Such an appeal would permit summary review of any adverse action by the chief of police resulting in a denial of the permit. These provisions, the Court stated “sufficiently restrict and channel the police chief’s discretion so as to protect First Amendment rights.” Additionally, the Court disregarded the argument that fees charged cannot be based on the notion of protecting the public fisc. The Court read Cox to rest in part on that justification. “Where the public activities of a specific person or group generate abnormal requirements for public protection to secure [1521]*1521the right of the general public to order and safety, Cox allows the cost thereof to be passed on to those whose activities occasion it. Although the City could choose to absorb the costs of all speech activity, nothing in the Constitution requires it to do so. Cox, supra.” Lastly, the court concluded that the doctrine of least restrictive means did not require the chief of police to utilize the least expensive way of providing the public protection. The defendant’s decision to use active off-duty police, even at an overtime pay rate was not on its face a constitutional violation nor was it, in the Court’s view, an unreasonable choice under the unique facts at hand.
IV. THE DECISION
The issue raised by this appeal concerns the constitutionality of the Orlando ordinance 18A.2 which authorizes the chief of police to charge persons exercising First Amendment rights, the full cost of additional police protection, as a condition to the granting of a permit. The crucial concern here is the extent of the right of the public to use the city streets and parks, which the Supreme Court has regarded as quintessential public forums, to exercise First Amendment activity, without the imposition of pecuniary burdens which allegedly go beyond a municipality’s concern of legitimate governmental interests. The appellant essentially raises two arguments with respect to the unconstitutionality of the Orlando ordinance: (1) a governmental entity may not charge a public issue commentator the full costs of all police services believed necessary for traffic and crowd control and for the protection of demonstrators from hostile citizens’ attack; (2) if costs for additional police services can be passed on to First Amendment users of the public forum, then the Orlando ordinance fails to achieve that governmental purpose by the constitutional requirement of narrow, objective and definite standards and the least restrictive means of accomplishing the governmental purposes. Since the Orlando ordinance may not be applied in a content neutral way, nor in the least restrictive manner, the ordinance is unconstitutional.
We begin with the question to what extent and under what circumstances costs for additional police protection may be passed on to those wishing to demonstrate in a public forum as a pre-condition to the granting of a permit. At the outset, we note that the Supreme Court in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941), approved a New Hampshire statute that required demonstrators to first obtain a license permit and the payment of a fee, as a pre-condition to those wishing to use the public streets and sidewalks to demonstrate. A group of Jehovah’s Witnesses who were convicted for parading without a permit, challenged the statute on constitutional grounds as interfering with their First Amendment rights. In upholding the permit requirement, the court held that First Amendment rights were not threatened by a law regulating the time, place and manner of conducting a parade on the streets. The Court then considered the fee requirements in a single paragraph of the opinion:
There remain the question of license fees which, as the [state supreme] court said, had a permissible range from $300 to a nominal amount. The court construed the Act as requiring “a reasonable fixing of the amount of the fee.” “The charge”, said the court, “for a circus parade or a celebration process of length, each drawing crowds of observers, would take into account the greater public expense of policing the spectacle, compared with the slight expense of a less expansive and attractive parade or procession, to which the charge would be adjusted.” The fee was held to be “not a revenue tax, but one to meet the expense incident to the administration of the act and to the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed.” There is nothing contrary to the Constitution in the charge of a fee limited to the purpose stated. The suggestion that a flat fee should have been charged fails to take account of the difficulty of framing a fair schedule to meet all circumstances, and we perceive no constitutional ground for denying to local governments that [1522]*1522flexibility of adjustment of fees which in the light of varying conditions would tend to conserve rather than impair the liberty sought.
312 U.S. at 576, 61 S.Ct. at 766. The Court therefore viewed the fee requirement as charges to meet expenses incidental to the administration of the regulation and the costs of policing the event. Although the Court did uphold the fee requirement, it is important to note that the Court did not touch on the reasonableness of the fees or how they could be fixed. Thus, important questions still remain about the application of Cox under modern constitutional doctrine. Importantly, the Cox Court did not address circumstances where persons who wish to demonstrate are unable to pay the required fee, nor did the Court concern itself with a statute which is unlimited in the amount of fees that can be charged as expenses, nor with the question whether the charge can be based, at least partially on the content of the speech.
However, two years after the Cox holding, the Supreme Court in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943), gave further clarification on the extent to which a municipality can charge fees as a prerequisite to the exercise of First Amendment rights in a public forum. In Murdock, the Court invalidated a city ordinance which as construed and applied, required distributors of religious literature to pay a flat license fee as a prerequisite to conducting their activities. In rejecting the fee as a license tax on the exercise of First Amendment rights, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated: “It is a license tax — a flat fee imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A State may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution.” 319 U.S. at 113, 63 S.Ct. at 875. Moreover, twice the Court observed that the fees imposed under the Pennsylvania ordinance were not nominal fees imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. Referring to Cox, the Court stated: “And the fee is not a nominal one, imposed as a regulatory measure and calculated to defray the expense of protecting those on the streets and at home against the abuse of solicitors. See Cox v. New Hampshire....” 319 U.S. at 116-17, 63 S.Ct. at 876. The Murdock ruling therefore indicates that Cox should be read as authorizing a municipality’s charging of fees for the use of the public streets only when such fees are both nominal and related to the expenses incidental to the policing of the event. The Supreme Court has not heard a First Amendment service charge case since Murdock in 1943 and as a consequence, there has been no further guidance by the Court on the application of the Cox rationale to the modern free speech cases. Importantly, however, the court has adopted a broad view on the public’s right to the use of the streets and parks as quintessential public forums to further freedom of expression. In Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983), and United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983), the Court reaffirmed the public’s guaranteed access to streets and parks, as public forums for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens and discussing public questions. In United States v. Grace, the Court, in guaranteeing the right of members of the public to picket on public sidewalks outside of the Supreme Court building, stated:
“[Pjublic places” historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered without more, to be “public forums.” In such places, the government’s ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited: the government may enforce reasonable time, place and manner regulations as long as the restrictions “are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.’’ Additional restrictions such as an absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.
[1523]*1523461 U.S. at 177, 103 S.Ct. at 1706-07 (emphasis added).
There is no question here that the type of speech engaged in by the appellants, demonstrating through the public streets and conducting an assembly on the issue of nuclear arms is the type of speech which is constitutionally protected in the highest order. As this Court has stated, “certain types of speech traditionally are accorded greater protection in our society by virtue of the fact that the speech goes to the heart of the Democratic process.” Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir., 1983). The appellants’ demonstration and march through the streets of the city of Orlando is “public issue speech which occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Moreover, the places in which the appellants sought to exercise their First Amendment rights, the streets and parks, were quintessential public forums, “where the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.” Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939).
Governmental limitations on the exercise of First Amendment rights in traditional public forums, are proper only when they are valid time, place and manner restrictions which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. See, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736; Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallandale, 734 F.2d 666, 673 (11th Cir.1984).
These limitations do not permit the imposition of unlimited charges for the costs of additional police protection based on the content of the speaker’s views. Although license fees are proper for the costs of administering an event, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Cox v. New Hampshire, we read Cox as authorizing only nominal charges for the use of city streets and parks to further First Amendment activities. An ordinance which charges more than a nominal fee for using public forums for public issue speech, violates the First Amendment. We, therefore, hold that the Orlando City Ordinance 18A.12 which requires persons wishing to use city streets and parks to demonstrate, to prepay an amount of costs for additional police protection determined by the discretion of the chief of police is unconstitutional.
Such unrestricted discretion fails to require consideration of the purpose of the speech — commercial speech such as a circus parade compared to public advocacy concerning a political and social issue as here. Nor does it take into account the ability to pay by the applicant of the permit. Instead of weighing these factors, the chief of police chose to consider that some of the demonstrators were non-residents of Orlando, thus putting a premium on the enjoyment of the right of public speech and assembly on intrastate and interstate travelers.8
Moreover, indigent persons who wish to exercise their First Amendment rights of speech and assembly and as a consequence of the added costs of police protection, are unable to pay such costs, are denied an equal opportunity to be heard. Although the Orlando permit scheme does provide for a review of a denial of a permit before the Orlando City Council, there is no provision in the ordinance which exempts those persons from paying the costs for additional police protection who are unable to pay. The granting of a license permit on the basis of the ability of persons wishing to use public streets and parks to demonstrate, to pay an [1524]*1524unfixed fee for police protection, without providing for an alternative means of exercising First Amendment rights, is unconstitutional. Cf. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702. “Freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way.” Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 at 111, 63 S.Ct. 870, at 874, 87 L.Ed. 1292.
In Lubin v. Panish, the Supreme Court invalidated a California statute which required candidates to pay a filing fee in order to have their names placed on the election ballot, without providing any alternative means of access to those who were unable to pay. The absence of alternative means of gaining access to the ballot inevitably rendered the California election system exclusionary as to some aspirants. The payment of the filing fees was an absolute, not an alternative condition and the failure to meet the filing requirement disqualified a person from running for office. The California scheme therefore operated to exclude some potentially serious candidates from the ballot without providing them with any alternative means of coming before the voters. The Court held that in the absence of reasonable alternative means of ballot access, a state may not consistent with constitutional standards require from an indigent candidate filing fees he cannot pay. 415 U.S. at 712, 94 S.Ct. at 1318.
Although Lubin concerned the right of access to the ballots of those candidates who were unable to pay the filing fees, we find that the same rationale should apply to the right of access to the streets for purposes of exercising First Amendment rights of freedom of speech. Although the record before us does not show that the appellants were unable to pay the costs of police protection, we are not bound by these considerations on reviewing the granting of a motion for summary judgment. The ordinance is attacked on facial constitutional grounds and the inability of some persons wishing to parade or demonstrate, who are unable to pay in advance, the costs for police protection, renders this statute unconstitutional.
Moreover, to the extent that the fees charged to the Central Florida Nuclear Freeze Campaign were based upon the content of the demonstrator’s views, the City of Orlando charged the organizers of the march and rally for the enjoyment of a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The right of free speech, exercised in a public forum, on issues of public concern, cannot be abridged by a governmental regulation which requires the speakers to prepay the costs of police protection, based on the content of the speaker’s views. Murdock, supra. A function of speech in our society, as the Supreme Court has stated, is to invite dispute. “It may indeed best serve its high purposes when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.” Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 895, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1979). The possibility of hostile counter demonstrators, as a reaction to the Central Florida Nuclear Freeze Demonstration and Rally, was considered by the deputy chief of police in assessing the amount of costs it would charge the appellants for the additional police protection in conducting their activities. Such an inquiry into the content of the speakers’ views in determining how much police protection is needed and as a consequence, how much the speakers would have to pay to voice their views, constitutes an impermissible price tag on the exercise of free speech based on the content of the speech. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113, 63 S.Ct. 870, 875, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943). It is clear that an ordinance which has the effect of conditioning the granting of a park permit based on the content of the speaker’s view is unconstitutional. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 328, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951). It is also clear, that in the case at hand, the defendant chief of police considered the effects of hostile counter demonstrators in assessing the costs of police protection. In answers to the plaintiff’s interrogatories, the defendant stated that in addition to consider[1525]*1525ing traffic control and the size of the demonstration, considerations of police protection from hostile counter demonstrators were also given effect. The defendant stated: “Due to the conventional nature of the rally and the close location of the Martin Marietta plant in Orlando, the potential for hostile counter activity was considered.” The deputy chief of police, Frederick Walsh, testified in his deposition that the Nuclear Freeze Campaign permit costs included subjective considerations of police protection from hostile counter activity and the presence of out-of-town demonstrators.
The district court concluded that it was reasonable for the defendant to consider the ideas and policies being espoused by the license applicant and “that this information was relied on in an objective, nondiscriminatory fashion which comported with both common sense and the Constitution.”
Although the presence of out-of-town demonstrators and the potential for hostile counter activity are proper factors to be considered in determining what level of police protection is needed for a public demonstration, we conclude that such factors cannot be considered in fixing the costs of protection to those asking to exercise their First Amendment rights. Otherwise, the result would operate to charge more for speech which is unpopular or controversial, in the mind of a public official. This does not comport with the First Amendment principle of equality of expression under the Constitution. The principle of equality of expression, inherent in the First Amendment, means that in the context of a public forum, the government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. It forbids content discrimination and denies the government the power to determine which messages shall be heard and which suppressed. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 Chi.L.Rev. 20, 28 (1975-76). “Even a content neutral time, place and manner restriction may have unequal effects on various types of messages [and] [t]he resulting inequality may be constitutionally unacceptable, whether or not the discrimination is intended.”
The effect of the Orlando ordinance, as applied in the case at hand, is to charge more for First Amendment activity which may require more police protection than less controversial speech; such a result places an undue burden on speech which is constitutionally unacceptable.
Lastly, we turn to the district court’s holding that the Orlando ordinance did not import unbridled discretion to the chief of police in deciding whether or not to grant a permit.
The appellants also attack the Orlando ordinance on the grounds that it lacked narrow objective and definite standards in determining whether to pass on the additional costs of police protection to appellants and further that the ordinance was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing the governmental purposes served by the imposition of fees.
In determining whether additional police protection is needed for purposes of traffic and crowd control, the Orlando ordinance directs the chief of police to consider such factors as the “size, location and nature of the assembly.” The ordinance offers no other standards by which to judge the nature of the assembly and it is clear that the deputy chief of police considered the content of the demonstration and rally in determining the need for additional police protection. Contrary to the district court’s holding, the ordinance does not import objective and definite standards to guide the licensing official in considering “whether additional police protection reasonably will be required for the assembly for purposes of traffic and crowd control.” A law subjecting the right of free expression in publicly owned places to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective and definite standards is unconstitutional. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51, 89 S.Ct. 935, 938, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). There is here in the ordinance a potential for bias by the chief of police in determining how much police protection is needed in considering the nature of the assembly of the permit applicants. There are no standards in guiding [1526]*1526the licensing officials in deciding whether the costs of additional police protection should be passed on to those who wish to exercise their First Amendment rights of free speech in a public forum, between those who wish to hold a picnic in a city park on a Sunday afternoon. The phrase “nature of the assembly” simply leaves too much discretion in the chief of police to determine whether additional costs for police protection are needed.
An issue has also been raised whether the city has chosen the least restrictive means of achieving its governmental objective of controlling traffic on public streets and protecting the public safety. The city contends that the regulations are designed to protect “those public interests by requiring persons who parade or march to pay for police protection necessary to protect public safety along the route and are clearly a legitimate exercise of governmental authority.”
However, the appellants argue that the chief concerns are not simply public safety but rather, the protection of the public treasury from the costs associated with policing the events. Moreover, the charging of overtime payment for police salaries is not the least restrictive means of achieving the governmental concerns of protecting the public safety. The use of state-certified reserve officers or the use of regular officers at non-overtime pay, would have served to diminish the restraints upon the exercise of First Amendment rights. We disagree with the district court’s holding that the defendants’ decision to use active off-duty police, even at an overtime pay rate was not an unreasonable choice under the facts at hand. The city has other reasonable alternatives which it could have utilized to keep the costs for additional police protection that it charged the appellants as low as possible. The use of reserve police officers, who are not entitled to contractual overtime pay, rather than active duty police officers, was a reasonable alternative for the city to employ.9
V. THE CONCURRING OPINION
The concurring opinion agrees that the ordinance is unconstitutional, but only because of its failure to provide for prompt judicial review. Since this particular challenge to the ordinance was neither mentioned in the complaint nor in appellants’ brief, we did not discuss it in the original majority opinion. However, since the trial court’s failure to find the ordinance unconstitutional on this ground was “plain error,” we agree with the concurring opinion to the extent that it considers the ordinance unconstitutional on the ground stated.
VI. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face and as applied.
The judgment is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.