Castillo v. Weissberg

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 16, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-07959
StatusUnknown

This text of Castillo v. Weissberg (Castillo v. Weissberg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Castillo v. Weissberg, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOHANNA CASTILLO, Plaintiff, -against- 19-CV-7959 (CM) JAN WEISSBERG, General Manager; ORDER TO AMEND ARAMARK FOOD SERVICE CORPORATION, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, alleging that her employer discriminated against her on the basis of her age. By order dated September 26, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to

state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff Johanna Castillo uses the Court’s “Employment Discrimination Complaint” to bring her claims and checks off the boxes indicating that she is bringing the action under the ADEA, and that her employer, Aramark Food Service Corporation (“Aramark”), terminated her employment because of her age. She sues Aramark and Jan Weissberg, Aramark’s General Manager. The following facts are taken from the complaint, which is not a model of clarity: On February 16, 2018, Defendant Jan Weissberg called Plaintiff into his office and told her that Kim Mapp, who appears to be Plaintiff’s co-worker, said that Plaintiff asked Ms. Mapp to take a bag of food for Plaintiff. Plaintiff denies asking Ms. Mapp to take food for her. Three days later, Weissberg suspended Plaintiff for three days without pay. Plaintiff later heard from Shawn1 that Plaintiff had to be suspended “so that Kim didn’t lose her job.” (ECF No. 2, at 7.) On May 10, 2018, Plaintiff was walking with Shawn, who Plaintiff states was drunk. Plaintiff later received a call from Marcos Chaves2 informing her that Weissberg told him to tell Plaintiff “not to come back to work.” (Id.) Chaves did not give Plaintiff an explanation. On May

15, 2018, Weissberg informed Plaintiff that her register was $140.00 short. Plaintiff denies that her register was missing money. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and, on May 28, 2019 the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue, which Plaintiff attaches to the complaint. (See ECF No. 2, at 11.) She asks the Court to issue an order directing Defendant Aramark to re-employ her. DISCUSSION The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). The ADEA

protects workers who are at least 40 years old from discrimination on the basis of age. Feldman v. Nassau Cnty., 434 F.3d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 2006); 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (“The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age.”). A plaintiff asserting a claim for age discrimination in violation of the ADEA must allege that age was the “but for” cause of the employer’s adverse actions. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009) (holding that in contrast to Title VII, the ADEA does not provide

1 Shawn appears to be another Aramark employee, but Plaintiff does not provide any information about Shawn’s role at Aramark. 2 Plaintiff provides no additional information about Chaves’ role or position at Aramark. that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor); Barone v. S & N Auerbach Mgmt., Inc., 645 F. App’x 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Under the ADEA, a plaintiff must allege that age was the ‘but for’ cause – not merely a motivating factor – of the adverse employment action.”). Plaintiff fails to allege facts suggesting that Aramark terminated her employment because

of her age. The complaint therefore fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. While the Court is inclined to dismiss the claim, because it is not clear that amendment would be futile, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to amend her complaint to plead facts suggesting that Aramark terminated her employment because of her age. LEAVE TO AMEND In the statement of claim, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant named in the amended complaint.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
557 U.S. 167 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Barone v. S & N Auerbach Management, Inc.
645 F. App'x 13 (Second Circuit, 2016)

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Bluebook (online)
Castillo v. Weissberg, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/castillo-v-weissberg-nysd-2019.