Casio, Inc., Plaintiff/cross-Appellant v. United States

73 F.3d 1095, 17 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2249, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 443
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedJanuary 16, 1996
Docket95-1099, 95-1111
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 73 F.3d 1095 (Casio, Inc., Plaintiff/cross-Appellant v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Casio, Inc., Plaintiff/cross-Appellant v. United States, 73 F.3d 1095, 17 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2249, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 443 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

Opinion

MICHEL, Circuit Judge.

The United States appeals the decision'of the United States Court of International Trade, No. 89-07-00385, reclassifying 5 of 38 electronic musical synthesizer models, imported by Casio, Inc. (“Casio”), as “electrical articles which produce sound,” Tariff Schedules of the United States (“TSUS”) 1 688.34, as opposed to their original classification as “electronic musical instruments,” TSUS 725.47. Casio cross-appeals the court’s determination that the remaining models of imported electronic musical synthesizers were properly classified as “electronic musical instruments.” We affirm.

I. BackgRound

Casio imports into the United States electronic musical synthesizers. 2 All of the imported synthesizer models were classified by the Customs Service, upon entry into the United States, as “Electronic musical instruments: Other,” TSUS 725.47, with a duty rate of 6.8% ad valorem.

Casio timely challenged the classification by filing suit in the United States Court of International Trade. Casio argued that these synthesizers were improperly classified as electronic musical instruments and should instead have been classified under TSUS 688.34 as “Electrical articles and electrical parts of articles, not specifically provided for: Electrical articles using pre-programmed digital integrated circuits to produce sound,” dutiable at the rate of 3.9% ad valorem.

Each of the synthesizers at issue in this case includes at least one of the following features.

1. ROM Pack — computer chip driven device containing ROM (read only memory) programmed to play a melody on the keyboard or to guide in a teaching function {e.g., to light indicator lights associated with a specific key).

2. Sampling — the ability to capture a sound {e.g., a dog bark) and then play it back at different pitches {e.g., “Jingle Bells” as done by barking dogs).

3. Sequencer — a device that remembers a sequence of key depressions, including note, duration, and sometimes pressure, and then plays it back. A multiple track sequencer allows additional sounds to be added on top of a *1097 previously recorded sequence. Using this function, a musician can record a background beat and additional musical phrases to the sequencer, and then play the melody on top.

4. Auto-rhythm — generates a rhythm selected from a number of pre-pro-grammed rhythms (e.g., country, reggae, samba, waltz, etc.). The musician can then play a melody over the generated rhythm.

5. Auto-accompaniment — automatically generates an accompaniment of “fill-in” notes for the keys depressed on the right side of the keyboard.

6. Mixer — A device that permits the adjustment of relative volumes of various functions, such as auto-rhythm and the keys being pressed by the musician.

Inasmuch as the imported articles contained substantial non-musical instrument functions and features, Casio claimed, the articles were “more than” electronic musical instruments and could not be classified as such.

In addition, Casio argued that five of the imported models, VZ-1, VZ-10M, HZ-600, MG-510 and PG-380, could not be classified as electronic musical instruments because they were imported and sold in commerce without an amplifier and speakers or headphones and thus did not make an audible sound as imported. The ability to make an audible sound, they argued, was a requirement for classification as an electronic musical instrument.

The trial court concluded that the Casio synthesizers were not “more than” electronic musical instruments, finding that “[t]he primary design and function of the features at issue appear to become part of and enhance the musical instruments in which they are found. The features that are part of the subject articles make playing the instruments easier.” Casio, Inc. v. United States, No. 89-07-00385, slip op. at 11, 1994 WL 548786 (Ct.Int’l Trade Oct. 7, 1994). It did conclude, however, that the decision of one of our predecessor courts in Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1283 (CCPA1974), requires that an electronic musical instrument make a sound to be considered as such, and therefore, Casio synthesizer models imported without amplifier or speakers should be classified under TSUS 688.34.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Proper classification of imported merchandise under an appropriate tariff provision “entails a two-step process of (1) ascertaining the proper meaning of specific terms within the tariff provision and (2) determining whether the merchandise at issue comes within the description of such terms as properly construed. The first step is a question of law which we review de novo and the second is a question of fact which we review for clear error.” Marcel Watch Co. v. United States, 11 F.3d 1054, 1056 (Fed.Cir.1993) (citing Stewarb-Wamer Corp. v. United States, 748 F.2d 663, 664-65, 3 Fed.Cir. (T) 20, 22 (1984)). “The ultimate issue as to whether particular imported merchandise has been classified under an appropriate tariff provision is a question of law subject to de novo review,” and the resolution of that ultimate issue involves the two-step process outlined above. Marcel Watch, 11 F.3d at 1056.

III. ELECTRONIC Synthesizers With Amplifiers and Speaxers

The “electronic musical instrument” classification, under which the Customs Service classified all of Casio’s electronic musical synthesizer models, is an eo nomine designation, i.e., “one which describes [a] commodity by a specific name, usually one well known to commerce.” Black’s Law Dictionary 535 (6th ed. 1990). When an object “is in character or function something other than as described by a specific statutory provision— either more limited or more diversified — and the difference is significant, it cannot find classification within such [eo nomine ] provision.” Robert Bosch Corp. v. United States, 63 Cust.Ct. 96, 103-04, 1969 WL 13787 (1969). Casio argues that because each of the models of electronic musical synthesizers in question has at least one additional feature, 3 which is not a musical instrument fea *1098 ture, each is “more than” an electronic musical instrument and cannot be classified under TSUS 725.47.

Casio’s argument, however, is unpersuasive. On the contrary, an article which has been improved or amplified but whose essential characteristic is preserved or only incidentally altered is not excluded from an unlimited eo nomine

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73 F.3d 1095, 17 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2249, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 443, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/casio-inc-plaintiffcross-appellant-v-united-states-cafc-1996.