Wagner Spray Tech Corp., Inc. v. United States

493 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 31 Ct. Int'l Trade 676, 31 C.I.T. 676, 29 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1759, 2007 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 64
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedMay 4, 2007
DocketSlip Op. 07-64; Court 04-00521
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 493 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (Wagner Spray Tech Corp., Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wagner Spray Tech Corp., Inc. v. United States, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 31 Ct. Int'l Trade 676, 31 C.I.T. 676, 29 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1759, 2007 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 64 (cit 2007).

Opinion

OPINION

WALLACH, Judge.

I

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for *1267 Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, Wagner Spray Tech Corporation, Inc. (‘Wagner”) challenges the United States Customs and Border Protection’s (“Customs”) classification of its imported merchandise under Heading 9603 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2003) (“HTSUS”) as “paint rollers” and “paint pads” at a duty rate of 7.5% or 4% ad valorem, respectively. Plaintiff contends that the subject merchandise is properly classified at lower rates or duty free under HTSUS Headings 8413 and 8424 as “[plumps for liquid .... ” and “[mjeehanical appliances ... for projecting, dispersing or spraying liquids.” The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). Because the subject merchandise can be classified as paint rollers and pads under HTSUS Heading 9603, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

II

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the patent holder of component parts of a painting system designed to hold paint in a reservoir within the handle of the painting device and express the paint upon contact with the surface to be covered. 1 According to Plaintiff, the purpose of its products is “to allow painters and homeowners to apply paint or stain to a surface without being required to repeatedly bend down to fill the pad or roller with paint or stain.” Complaint ¶ 12. Between November 15, 2002 and July 17, 2003 Wagner entered subject merchandise known as “Paint-N-Roll,” “PaintMate Plus,” “StainMate” and “Trim-It” (collectively “Wagner products”) through the port of Minneapolis, Minnesota. Summons, Court No. 04-00521 (October 14, 2004); Amended Summons, Court No. 04-00521 (May 10, 2005). Customs liquidated all entries between April 11, 2003 and May 28, 2004 and classified the subject merchandise under HTSUS Heading 9603, Subheadings 9603.40.2000 or 9603.40.4020, 2 as “Paint Rollers” and “Paint Pads,” assessing a duty of 7.5% or 4% on the merchandise depending on whether the products were classified as rollers or pads. Complaint ¶ 18; see also Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant’s Motion”) at 1. Plaintiff paid all liquidated duties, taxes and fees associated with the entries at issue. Complaint ¶ 3; Answer ¶3. Wagner filed a protest on June 16, 2003 contesting Customs’ classification of its imported merchandise. 3 Amended *1268 Summons. Customs denied Plaintiffs protest on May 26, 2004. 4 Id. Plaintiff filed another protest concerning the importation of identical merchandise classified under HTSUS Heading 9603 on August 11, 2004, which was denied on August 18, 2004. 5 Id. On October 14, 2004, Plaintiff timely commenced a civil action contesting Customs’ denial of these protests pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). In Plaintiffs Motion, it asserts that the merchandise is properly classified in any of HTSUS Subheadings 8413.20.00, 6 8424.20, 8424.20. 10 or 8424.20.90. 7 Both parties to this case submitted motions for summary judgment. The court may only grant a motion for summary judgment in classification cases where there is no genuine issue as to what the merchandise is, or where none of the articles’ “pertinent characteristics” are in dispute. Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481, 483 (Fed.Cir.1997). The parties’ disagreements on the issues of fact are not material to the outcome of this case and therefore do not preclude entry of a summary judgment. 8 Oral argument was held on February 7, 2007.

Ill

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if “the pleadings, deposi *1269 tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT R. 56(c). Where both parties have moved for summary judgment the court need not grant either motion because “summary judgment for either party is not proper if disputes remain as to material facts.” Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed.Cir.1987). However, “the Court of International Trade has not hesitated to decide classification cases on summary judgment when that was appropriate.” Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1998). In classification cases, summary judgment is appropriate where there is no underlying factual issue of what the merchandise is, because “the proper classification under which [an article] falls ... has always been treated as a question of law.” Id. at 1366; see also Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342, 1345-46 (Fed.Cir.2002). The court employs a two-step analysis when deciding classification cases: “the first step concerns the proper meaning of the tariff provisions at hand ... [t]he second step concerns whether the subject imports properly fall within the scope of the possible headings.” Universal Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 491 (Fed.Cir.1997). In addition, because Customs’ factual determination is statutorily presumed to be correct, “the party challenging the classification ... bears the burden of proof.” Totes, Inc. v. United States, 69 F.3d 495, 498 (Fed.Cir.1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1)). The court reviews de novo classification cases brought pursuant to § 1581(a) in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a).

IV

ANALYSIS

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493 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 31 Ct. Int'l Trade 676, 31 C.I.T. 676, 29 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1759, 2007 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 64, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wagner-spray-tech-corp-inc-v-united-states-cit-2007.