Victoria's Secret Direct, LLC v. United States

908 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 2013 CIT 55, 2013 WL 1831780, 35 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1408, 2013 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 58
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedMay 1, 2013
DocketSlip Op. 13-55; Court 07-00347
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 908 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (Victoria's Secret Direct, LLC v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Victoria's Secret Direct, LLC v. United States, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 2013 CIT 55, 2013 WL 1831780, 35 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1408, 2013 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 58 (cit 2013).

Opinion

OPINION

STANCEU, Judge:

Plaintiff Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC (“Victoria’s Secret”) brought this action to contest the tariff classification that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs” or “CBP”) applied to a women’s garment made of predominantly-cotton knitted fabric and containing an interior fabric insert marketed as a “shelf bra.” The garment, Victoria’s Secret style number 194-423, was marketed under the description “Bra Top” and imported by Victoria’s Secret in July 2006. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 16 (Nov. 21, 2007), ECF No. 5. It is worn on the upper body, has narrow straps, and has no shoulder or neck coverage. Id. ¶¶ 24, 30, 31. Defendant United States maintains that the Bra Top is properly classified as a “tank top” or similar article, as Customs determined upon liquidation. Answer ¶ 9 (Mar. 24, 2008), ECF No. 8. Plaintiff claims classification of the Bra Top as a “brassiere” or similar article or, in the alternative, under a residual provision for other garments of cotton, knitted or crocheted.

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated herein, determined following a bench trial, the court concludes that the subject merchandise is properly classified according to plaintiffs alternative claim.

I. Background

Victoria’s Secret entered a shipment of Bra Tops on July 19, 2006 at the Port of Seattle, Washington on entry number 113— 3588476-0. Summons (Sept. 17, 2007), ECF No. 1; Compl. ¶ 2. The commercial invoice described the merchandise as “ladies knit sleeveless basic tank pack with shelf bra tank top (95 pet cotton 5 pet spandex).” Joint Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 4 (Nov. 29, 2011), ECF No. 53 (“JPO”). Upon liquidating the entry on June 1, 2007, Customs classified the merchandise in subheading 6109.10.00, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) (2006) (“T-shirts, singlets, tank tops and similar garments, knitted or cro *1337 cheted: Of cotton”), at 16.5% ad val. 1 Answer ¶ 9. Victoria’s Secret timely protested the determination of classification on June 29, 2007 (protest no. 3001-07-100282). Summons 1. Customs denied the protest on July 19, 2007 without issuing an official ruling. Id. On September 17, 2007, Victoria’s Secret timely filed its summons, id., and on November 21, 2007, Victoria’s Secret filed its complaint, claiming classification in subheading 6212.90.00, HTSUS (“Brassieres, girdles, corsets, braces, suspenders, garters and similar articles and parts thereof, whether or not knitted or crocheted: Other”) at 6.6% ad val, Coippl. ¶¶ 11-26. In the alternative, plaintiff claims classification in subheading 6114.20.00, . HTSUS (“Other garments, knitted or crocheted: Of cotton”), at 10.8% ad val. Id. ¶¶ 28-34.

Due to the presence of common issues of fact, the court directed that this case be tried jointly with Lerner New York, Inc. v. United States, Court No. 07-00361. 2 The parties submitted identical post-trial briefing in the Victoria’s Secret and Lemer actions. Pis.’ Post-Trial Br. (Feb. 22, 2012), ECF No. 68 (“PL’s Mem.”); Def.’s Post-Trial Mem. of Law (Feb. 22, 2012), ECF No. 67 (“Def.’s Mem.”). Plaintiff responded to defendant’s post-trial brief on March 23, 2012. Resp. to Def.’s Post-Trial Br. (Mar. 23, 2012), ECF No. 71 (“PL’s Resp.”). 3

II. Discussion

The court exercises jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Section 201 of the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). 4 In cases Contesting the denial of a protest, the court makes its findings of fact' de novo based upon the record made before the Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a), and “the merchandise itself is often a potent witness.” Simod Am. Corp. v. United States, 872 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1989) (citations omitted). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the government’s classification of the subject merchandise was incorrect but does not bear the burden of establishing the correct classification; instead, it is the court’s independent duty to arrive at “the correct result, by whatever procedure is best suited to the case at hand.” Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed.Cir. 1984). In making this determination, the court “must consider whether the government’s classification is correct, both independently and in comparison with the importer’s alternative.’’ 1 Id. While “[t]he proper scope and meaning of a tariff classification term is a question of law[,] determining whether the goods at issue *1338 fall within a particular tariff term as properly construed is a question of fact.” Franklin v. United States, 289 F.3d 753, 757 (Fed.Cir.2002) (citations omitted).

On questions of law, a Customs’ classification decision may be accorded a “respect proportional to its ‘power to persuade.’ ” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)). But when Customs has summarily denied a protest of the classification without issuing an official ruling, the court considers the parties’ arguments without deference. Hartog Foods v. United States, 291 F.3d 789, 791 (Fed.Cir.2002). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1), a trial begins with a statutory presumption of correctness for the factual components of a Customs classification decision. To overcome the presumption, the party challenging that decision must produce a preponderance of evidence on a disputed factual question. See Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492 (Fed.Cir. 1997).

Classification under the HTSUS is determined according to the General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”) and, if applicable, the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation (“ARIs”). GRI 1 requires that tariff classification, in the first instance, “be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes.” GRI 1, HTSUS.

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908 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 2013 CIT 55, 2013 WL 1831780, 35 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1408, 2013 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 58, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/victorias-secret-direct-llc-v-united-states-cit-2013.