Lerner New York, Inc. v. United States

908 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 2013 CIT 56, 2013 WL 1831790, 35 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1428, 2013 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 60
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedMay 1, 2013
DocketSlip Op. 13-56; Court 07-00361
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 908 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (Lerner New York, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lerner New York, Inc. v. United States, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 2013 CIT 56, 2013 WL 1831790, 35 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1428, 2013 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 60 (cit 2013).

Opinion

OPINION

STANCEU, Judge:

Plaintiff Lerner New York, Inc. (“Lerner”) 1 brought this action to contest the tariff classification that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs” or “CBP”) applied to a women’s garment made of predominantly-nylon knitted fabric and containing an interior fabric insert marketed as a “shelf bra.” The garment, Lerner style number 9843233, was marketed under the description “Bodyshaper” and imported by Lerner in July 2005. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 15 (Oct. 10, 2007), ECF No. 2; PL’s Ex. 1. The garment is worn on the upper body, has narrow straps, and has no shoulder or neck coverage. Id. ¶¶ 16, 21, 24. Defendant United States maintains that the Bodyshaper is properly classified in a residual provision for knitted garments made of man-made fibers, as Customs determined upon liquidation. Answer 4 (Mar. 13, 2008), ECF No. 7. Plaintiff claims classification of the Bodyshaper as a “brassiere” or similar article.

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated herein, reached following a bench trial, the court concludes that the tariff classification determined by Customs upon liquidation, and advocated before the court by defendant, is correct.

*1317 I. Background

Lerner entered a shipment of Bodyshapers on May 27, 2005 at the Port of Long Beach, California on entry number 113— 3085123-6. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3; Summons (Jul. 12, 2007), ECF No. 1 (Court No. 07-00260). 2 The commercial invoice described the garment as “Ladies 92 pet nylon 8 pet spandex knitted top bodyshaper w/ shelf bra.” Joint Pretrial Order, Schedule C ¶ 4 (Nov. 29, 2011), ECF No. 52 (“JPO”). Upon liquidating the entry on April 7, 2006, Customs classified the merchandise in subheading 6114.30.10, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) (2005) (“Other garments, knitted or crocheted: Of man-made fibers: Tops”), at 28.2% ad val. 3 Compl. ¶ 9; Answer 4. Lerner timely protested the determination of classification on June 27, 2006 (protest no. 2704-06-101253). Summons 3. Customs denied the protest on February 2, 2007 -without issuing an official ruling. Id. On August 12,.2007, Lerner timely filed its summons, id., and on November 21, 2007, Lerner filed its complaint, claiming classification in subheading ■ 6212.90.00, HTSUS (“Brassieres, _ girdles, • corsets, braces, suspenders, garters and similar articles and parts thereof, whether or not knitted or crocheted: Other”), at 6.6% ad val, Compl. ¶¶ 10-25.

Due to the presence of common issues of fact, the court directed that this case be tried jointly with Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC v. United States, Court No. 07-00347. 4 The parties submitted identical post-trial briefing in the Victoria’s Secret and Lerner actions. Pls.’ Posh-Trial Br. (Feb. 22, 2012), ECF No. 67 (“Pl.’s Mem.”); Def.’s Post-Trial Mem. of Law (Feb. 22, 2012), ECF No. 66. Plaintiff responded to defendant’s posttrial brief on March 23, 2012. Resp. to Def.’s Post-Trial Br. (Mar. 23, 2012), ECF No. 70 (“Pl.’s Resp.”). 5

II. Discussion

The court exercises jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Section 201 of the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). 6 In cases contesting the denial of a protest, the court makes its findings of fact de novo based upon the record made before the court, 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a). The plaintiff has the burden of *1318 establishing that the government’s classification of the subject merchandise was incorrect but does not bear the burden of establishing the correct classification; instead, it is the court’s independent duty to arrive at “the correct result, by whatever procedure is best suited to the case at hand.” - Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed.Cir.1984). In making this determination, the court “must consider whether the government’s classification is correct, both independently and in comparison with the importer’s alternative.” Id. While “[t]he proper scope and meaning of a tariff classification term is a question of law[,] ... determining whether the goods at issue fall within a particular tariff term as properly construed is a question of fact.” Franklin v. United States, 289 F.3d 753, 757 (Fed.Cir.2002) (citations omitted).

On questions of law, a classification decision of Customs may be accorded a “respect proportional to its ‘power to persuade.’ ” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)). But when Customs has summarily denied a protest of the classification without issuing an official ruling, the court considers the parties’ arguments without deference. Hartog Foods v. United States, 291 F.3d 789, 791 (Fed.Cir.2002). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1), a trial begins with a statutory presumption of correctness for the factual components of a Customs classification decision. To overcome the-presumption, the party challenging that decision must produce a preponderance of evidence on a disputed factual question. See Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492 (Fed.Cir.1997). In the resolution of disputed facts, “the merchandise itself is often a potent witness.” Simod Am. Corp. v. United States, 872 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir.1989) (citations omitted).

Classification under the HTSUS is determined according to the General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”) and, if applicable, the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation (“ARIs”). GRI 1 requires that tariff classification, in the first instance, “be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter'notes.” GRI 1, HTSUS. The chapter and' section notes of the HTSUS are not optional interpretive rules but statutory law. Libas, Ltd. v. United States,

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908 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 2013 CIT 56, 2013 WL 1831790, 35 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1428, 2013 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 60, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lerner-new-york-inc-v-united-states-cit-2013.