Mr. Justice CLIFFORD
delivered the opinion of the court.
Original cognizance of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, is given to the Circuit Courts by the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act, concurrent with the courts of the several States, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $500, . . . and an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the $uit is brought and a citizen of another State, subject, however, to the restriction that no civil suit shall be brought before any Circuit Court against any inhabitant of the United States by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is .an inhabitant or in which he shall be found at the time of .serving the writ.
Suits commenced in a State court against an alien, or by a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another State, may, under the twelfth section of the same act, be removed for trial by the defendant into the Circuit Court for the same district if- the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $500, provided the defendant file a petition requesting such removal at the time of entering his appearance in the State court, and offer good and sufficient surety that he will enter copies of the process against him in such Circuit Court oi. the first day of its next session, and for his appearance, and that he will give special bail in the case if such bail would be requisite in the State. ■ court.
Jurisdiction in such a ease is concurrent between the proper State court and- the Circuit Court for the- same distinct, and the provision is that such a suit, if comipenced in the State court, may be removed by the defendant for trial into the Circuit Court, subject to the conditions before mentioned, the privilege being given to the defendant only, as
the plaintiff, when he institutes his suit, may elect in which of the two concurrent jurisdictions he prefers to go to trial.
These expressions in the act of Congress, where an alien is a party or the suit is between a citizen of a State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State, says Marshall, C. J., the court understands to rñean that each distinct interest should be represented by persons all of whom are entitled to sue or may be sued'in the Federal courts; or, in other words, that where the interest is joint each of the persons concerned in that interest must be competent to sue or be liable to be sued in the court .to which the suit is removed.
All of the complainants in that case were citizens of Massachusetts,- and so also were all of the respondents, except one, who, it was admitted, was a citizen of Vermont. Due service was made upon the resident respondents, and the record showed that the subpoena had. also been served upon the other respondent in the State where he resided. Want of jurisdiction was set .up by the respondents in the Circuit Court, and the judge presiding in-the Circuit Court entered a decree dismissing the bill of complaint. Appeal was taken to the Supreme 'Court, and the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the decree of the Circuit Court. Repeated decisions have since been made by this court and by many other courts, State and-Federal, to .the same effect. Prior to the case of
Railroad
v.
Letson,
it had frequently been held by this court that a corporation aggregate, as such, was not properly included in the word citizen, as used in the Judiciary Act, and consequently that such a corpbration, if regarded merely as an artificial being, could not sue in the Federal courts, yet the court decided, in sevpral cases, that the court would look beyoud the corporate character of such an artificial being to the individuals- of whom it was composed, and if it appeared that they were citizens of a different State from the party sued, that the suit, whether an action at law or a suit in equity, could be maintained in the
proper Circuit Court. Cases of that description are quite numerous, and yet in all of them it was held by this court that all of the corporators must be citizens of a different State from the party sued,- else the jurisdiction could not be sustained.
Corporations, it is true, are now regarded by this court as inhabitants of the State by which.they are created and in which they transact their corporate business, and it is also held that a corporation is capable of being treated as a citizen for all purposes of suing and being sued in a Circuit Court, but the rule as modified, in that regard, does not diminish the authority of those cases as precedents to show that by the true construction of the Judiciary Act it requires that each of the plaintiffs, if the interest be joint, must be competent to sue each of the defendants in the Circuit Court to sustain the jurisdiction under the eleventh section of that act.
Certain sums of money, it is alleged, in excess of what could properly be exacted by the defendant corporations, had been paid to those corporations by the plaintiffs, and the corporation defendants refusing to refund the amount of such alleged excess the corporation plaintiffs instituted an action at law, in the Supreme Judicial Court of the State, against the corporation defendants, to recover back the amount of the alleged overpayments. Patent rights, it seems, are owned by the three corporation defendants, for the exclusive privilege to construct, use, and vend certain patented sewing' machines, and the inference is that the corporation plaintiffs are or have been licensees of the corporation defendants. What the precise terms of the license are or were, does not very satisfactorily áppear, but it may be inferred that the plaintiffs covenanted to pay to the defendants a certain pat
ent rent or tariff for the use of the patent right, subject to be reduced in amount in case the defendants granted licenses to other parties at a lower rate, and the charge is that the defendants did.grant licenses to others at a lower rate without making to the plaintiffs the stipulated reduction; that the corporation defendants have ever since exacted the higher patent fee or tariff in violation of the terms of the license. Payments having been made the plaintiffs commenced this suit to recover back the amount. They joined as defendants the Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company, which is a corporation established under the laws of Massachusetts; the .Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Company, which is a corporation established under the laws of Connecticut; and the Singer Manufacturing Company, which is a corporation established under the laws of New York. Seasonable appearance was entered by the company first named at the return term, and they filed an answer within the time required by the rules -of the court. Neither of the other corporation defendants entered a general .appearance- at the return term, but the plaintiffs caused an order of notice to issue to those corporations respectively to appear at the next term of the court, and subsequently filed proof that the order of notice was duly served by publication. ' By the return of the marshal it appears that personal property of those respective corporations was attached on the original process, and the plaintiffs claim that by virtue of the attachment and the due service of the order of notice the State court acquired jurisdiction of all the parties. Subsequently, however, both of the non-resident corporations appeared and, having obtained the leave of the court for the purpose, filed their answers to the action, and on the same day they filed their several petitions for the removal of the cause for trial to the Circuit Court for that district. Each of the petitions was accompanied by an affidavit executed by the-president of the company, and by a bond of the company in usual form as required by law in such a case. Hearing was had and the State court refused to grant the prayer of the respective petitions, and directed that the parties
should proceed to trial, to which rulings the defendants then and there excepted, and the verdict and judgment were for the plaintiffs.*
Exceptions were-also taken by the defendants to the rulings of the court in the progress of the trial and to, certain instructions given by the court to the jury, but it will not be necessary to re-examine the exceptions taken during the trial, as the only question to be determined under this writ of error js whether the rulings of the court in overruling the respective petitions for the removal of the cause into the Circuit Court, and in directing that the parties should proceed to trial in the State court were or .were not correct.
Circuit Courts do not derive their judicial power, immediately, from the Constitution, as appears with sufficient explicitness from the Constitution itself, as the first section-of the third, article provides that
“
the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Consequently the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in every case must depend upon some act of Congress, as it is clear that Congress, inasmuch as it possesses the power to ordain aud establish all courts inferior to the Supreme Court, may- also define their jurisdiction. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction in controversies between party and party but.such as. the statute .confers.
Congress, it may be conceded, may confer such jurisdiction upon the Circuit Courts as it may see fit, within the scope of the judicial power of the Constitution, not vested in the Supreme Court, bu.t as such tribunals are neither created by, the Constitution nor is their jurisdiction defined by that instrument, it follows that inasmuch as they are created by an act of Congress it is necessary, in every attempt to define their power, to look to that source as the means of accomplishing that end.
Federal-judicial power,
beyond all doubt, has its
origin
in the Constitution, but the organization of the system and the distribution of the subjects of jurisdiction among such inferior courts as Congress ' may from time to time ordain and establish, within the scope of the judicial power, always-have been, and of right must be the work of the Congress.
Attempt is made in argument to maintain the right, claimed by the defendants, to remove the cause for trial in this case from the State court where it was commenced into the Circuit Court, as being derived under the act of the 2d of March,'1867, which is entitled an act to amend a prior act entitled an act for the removal of causes, in certain cases, from State courts.
Neferenee will first be made, to the prior act referred to in the title of the amendá'tory act, as the prior act. followed the Judiciary Act in many respects and, like that act, limits the right of removal to the alien defendant and the defendant who is a citizen of a State other than that in which the suit is brought. Subsequent to those preliminary recitals it provides, in effect, that where the suit is commenced in' the State court against an alión, or by a citizen of the State against a citizen of another State, the non-resident defendant or the alien defendant, as the case may be, may remove the cause from the State court into the Circuit Court, even though it appears that a citizen of the State where the suit is brought is also a defendant, if. the suit, so far as it relates to the alien defendant or the non-resident defendant, was instituted and is prosecuted for the purpose of restraining or enjoining such defendant; or if the suit is. one which, so far as it respects such alien or non-resident defendant, can be finally determined without the presencé of the other defendant or defendants as parties in the cause, then and in every such case the alien or non-resident defendant may, at any time before the trial or final hearing of the cause, file a petition for the removal of the same, as against the petitioner, into the Circuit Court; but the provision in the same act also is, that such removal of the cause shall not be deemed to prejudice or take away the right of the plaintiff'
to proceed, at the same time, with the suit in the State court, if he shall 3ee fit, against the other defendants.
Remarks to show that the act referred to contains nothing to support the view that Congress intended by it to depart from the essential principle embodied in the Judiciary Act are hardly necessary, as it is obvious that the language of the act does not empower any defendant, unless he be an alien or non-resident, to remove the cause or to elect any other for.um for the trial of the same than the one to which the suit is returnable, nor does it give any sanction whatever to the proposition that the resident defendant shall be compelled or permitted under any circumstances to go elsewhere to answer the suit. Defendants in certain cases may sever, after final judgment, for the purpose of prosecuting au appeal or writ of error, which is effected by a proceeding usually called summons and severance, which will enable one of several defendants, or any number less than the whole, to sue out a writ of error or take an appeal in a case where the other defendants or respondents réfuse to join in the petition for the same.
Modes of effecting a severance among executors, so that less thau the whole number may sue, were also known at common law, but in such a case it was necessary that such a proceeding should be perfected before the suit was instituted.
By virtue of the provision under consideration the alien defendant or the defendant who is a citizen of a State other than that in which the suit is brought is empowered, subject to the conditions specified, without any summons and severance, to remove the cause, as between him and the plaintiff, into the Circuit Court for trial, leaving the cause, as between the plaintiff and the other defendants, to proceed in the State court where the suit was commenced, wholly unaffected by such removal, the only effect of the removal in such a case being to sever to that
'extent the defendants in the cause for .the special purpose provided in the enactment, but the provision affords no support whatever to the theory set up by the defendants in the case before the court.
Before the passage of that act no removal could be made in such á case, as some of the defendants are by that act supposed to be citizens of the State where the suit is brought, aud all the courts, Federal and State, had uniformly decided that unless the cause was removable as to all the defendants it could not be removed at all, as the act of Congress contained no provision warranting any such proceeding as summons and severance for any purpose.
Unlike the Judiciary Act, however, the alien defendant or the defendant who is a citizen of a State other than that in which the suit is brought may, under the “ Act tor the removal of causes in certain cases from State courts,” have the cause removed, as to himself, subject to the condition that such severance or partial removal shall not prejudice or take away the' right of the-plaintiff to proceed, at the same time, with the suit in the State court as against the other defendants, showing that the right of removal is- still, confined to the alien and non-resident defendant,, and that no removal of the cause as to any other defendant can be made under that enactment.
Grant all that, still it is insisted by the defendants that the rulings of the State court in refusing to grant the prayers of their petitions and in directing that the parties should proceed to trial was erroneous, as the petitions were filed under the later act of Congress, which, as they contend, very much enlarges the right to remove causes from the State courts into the Circuit Courts for trial.
Important changes undoubtedly are made by that act in the law upon that subject, as it clearly extends the privilege
to a non-resident plaintiff' as well as tó a non-resident defendant, subjecting both, however, to a new condition, wholly unknown in the prior acts of Congress, vesting such a right in an alien defendant or in a defendant who was a citizen of a State other than that in which the suit is brought. Where a suit is now pending or may hereafter be brought in any State court in which there is controversy between a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another State, such citizen of another State, whether he be plaintiff or defendant, if he will make and file in such State court an affidavit stating that he has reason to believe and does believe that, from prejudice or other local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such State court, may, at any time before the final hearing or trial of the suit, file a petition in such State court for the removal of the suit into the next Circuit Court to be held in the district where the suit is pending. Aliens it will be seen are not included in the provision, but the right to petition for the removal is extended to the nonresident plaintiff as well as to the nonresident defendant, in a case where it appears that a resident defendant is sued by a non-resident plaintiff, as in such a case there is controversy between a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another State, just as much as there is in a case where a resident plaintiff' sues a non-resident defendant in his own district, the defendant being fouud within the same district and served there with the original process.
Under the Judiciary Act and the succeeding act for the removal of certain causes, the plaintiff, if he elected to commence his suit in a State court, whether he was resident or non-resident, was bound by his election, nor was it ever supposed that he could subsequently be permitted to remove the cause from the State court into the Circuit Court in ordinary circumstances, as neither of those acts of Congress vest in the plaintiff any such right, nor do they contain any language to wamant the conclusion that Congress ever intended to confer upon a plaintiff any such power. Nonresident defendants and alien defendants might cause such
removal to be made, but under the Judiciary Act the condition was that such a defendant must file his petition requesting such removal at the time he entered his appearance in such State court; which condition is relaxed in this act, so far as it respects non-resident defendants and non-resident plaintiffs, and it is provided that the right may be exercised “ at any time before the final hearing or trial of the suit.”
Viewed in the light of these suggestions it is clear that it is a mistake to suppose that the act will operate to limit the right conferred by the Judiciary Act unless the court give it the broad construction assumed by the defendants, as it extends the right to a non-resident plaintiff as well as to a non-resident defendant, and allows both to file the necessary petition at any time before the final hearing or trial of the suit, leaving the case of the alien defendant unaffected by any of its provisions.
Mere regulation, such as requiring the cause of removal to be stated,, and that the petition should be supported by an affidavit, is not sufficient change in.the principle of the Judiciary Act to support the proposition, as the great purpose of the new enactment is to extend the right'to a nonresident plaintiff as well as to a non-resident defendant, audio eularge the time within which the petition may be filed, leaving the alien defendant wholly unaffected by the new ■ regulations.
Apply these rules of construction to the three acts of Cougress referred to in this case, and it is clear that they will work out the following results: (1) In a case where the suit is commenced by a plaintiff in the court of a State of which he is a citizen, against a defendant who is >a citizen of another State, the defendant may remove the cause into the Circuit Court of that district for trial. (2) Where the plaintiff brings his suit in the court of a State other than that of which he is a citizen, against a defendant who is a citizen of the State where the suit-is brought, the plaintiff may remove the cause into the Circuit Court under the last-named act.
Suppose, however, the plaintiff brings his suit in. the court of a State other than that of which either he or the defendant is a citizen, the defendant having been found therein and been duly served with the original process, then neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can remove the cause from the State court into the Circuit Court for trial under any existing act of Congress, as in that case there is not controversy between a citizen of a State in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another State, nor is the suit one commenced by a citi ¡en of a State in which the suit is brought against a citizen off another State, as the condition is as provided in the Judiciary Act. Both plaintiff and defendant being non-residents, the acts of Congress make no provision for the removal of such a cause into the Circuit Court for trial.
Unaffected as the Judiciary Act.is by the latest of the three acts mentioned, the law still is that if the suit is commenced against an alien in a State court, he may file a petition for the removal of the same for trial into the next Circuit Court to be held in the district, at the time of entering his appearance in such State court. Non-resident defendants or alien defendants may also remove certain causes from a State court into a Circuit Court for trial, under the intermediate act of Congress, as before explained. Where the suit is commenced in a State' court against an alien, or by a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another State, the non-resident defendant or the alien defendant, as the case may be, may remove the cause from the State court into the Circuit Court for trial, even though it appears that a citizen of the State where the suit-is brought is also a defendant, if the suit, so far as it relates to the non-resident or alien defendant, was instituted and is prosecuted for the purpose of restraining or enjoining such defendant, or if the suit is one which, so far as it respects such defendant, can be finally determined without the presence of the other defendants as parties in the cause. Considering the stringent conditions which are embodied in the last-named act, it is doubtful whether it will prove to be one
of much practical value, but as it remains in full force it cannot be properly overlooked in this investigation. Suggestion is made that it is a step in advance of the Judiciary Act, but the force of the suggestion is not perceived, as it makes no provision that any party shall go into the Circuit Court for trial except such as may go or be sent there under the twelfth section of the Judiciary Act. Divest that act of the feature which provides for the severance of the defendants and that which empowers the plaintiff to proceed with the suit in the State court as against the other defendants, and it is exactly the same as the corresponding feature. of the Judiciary Act, except that it extends the time for filing the petition for the removal of the cause from the time the petitioner enters his appearance in the State court to the time of the trial or final hearing of the cause. Separately considered the language employed in the “ act for the removal of causes in certain cases from the State courts
”
to describe the parties and the suit in which the alien defendant or the non-resident defendant may remove the cause into -the Circuit Court for trial, is identical with the language employed in the. Judiciary Act, the two provisions differing only in the particulars heretofore sufficiently explained, showing that the well-established rule applies in construing the later act, that words and phrases, the meaning of which in a statute have been ascertained by judicial interpretation, are; when used in asubsequent statute, to be understood in the same sense.
Such a construction in the case supposed becomes a part of the law, as it is presumed that the legislature in passing the later law. knew what the judicial construction was which .had been given to the words of the prior enactment. Support, therefore, to the theory put forth by the defendants cannot be derived either
from the Judiciary .Act or from the later act entitled An act for the removal of causes in certain cases from State courts.
Admit that and still it is insisted by the defendants that they had the right-to remove the cause from the State court under the act to amend the act called the Removal Act.
Much stress is placed upon the particular language of that act, which is that “ when a suit is now pending or may hereafter be brought in any State court,
in which there is controversy between a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another Slate.”.
Instead of that the corresponding language of the Judiciary Act is, if-a suit be commenced in any State court by a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another State.
Different words are. certainly employed in the two provisions, but it is difficult to see in what particular the jurisdiction of the State court is lessened by the last act or in what respect the difference of phraseology supports the theory of the defendants, as “ a suit by á, plaintiff against a defendant” must mean substantially the same thing, in the practical sense as “ a suit in which there is controversy between the parties,” as each provision includes the word suit, which applies to any proceeding in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues his remedy to recover a right or claim.
Indubitably they differ in this, that it is the defendant only who can remove the cause under the Judiciary Act, but the last-named act empowers the non-resident plaintiff', in a proper case, as well as the non-resident defendant, to exercise the same privilege, as in the former case, as well as in the latter, there is a suit pending in which there is controversy between a eitizeu of the State in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another State, and the express enactment is that in the case supposed “ such citizen-of another State, whether he be plaintiff or defendant,” if he will comply with the conditions stated, may, at any time
before the final hearing or trial of the suit, file a petition for the removal of the cause.
Real parties only are empowered to claim that right under either act, and it is equally clear that the right of the defendant cannot be defeated by joining with him a mere'nominal party in the action.
Special attention is also invited to the fact that the judicial power conferred by the Constitution extends to controversies between citizens of different States, and the proposition is submitted in argument that it would be competent for
.Congress to
pass a law empowering one of a number of plaintiff's,- or one of a number of defendants, to remove such a suit for trial from a State court into the Circuit Court for the same district, if it appeared that the petitioner, whether plaintiff or defendant, was a citizen of a State other than that in which the suit was brought, even though all the other plaintiffs or other defendants were citizens of the State in whose court the suit was pending, but. the court is of the opinion that the question does n'ot arise in this case, as the act of Congress in question, in the judgment of .the court, does not purport to confer any such right. Were it true that the Circuit Courts derive their judicial power immediately from the provisions of the Constitution, it might bo necessary to examine that proposition, but inasmuch as it is settled law-that the jurisdiction of such courts depends upon the acts of Congress passed for the purpose of defining their powers and prescribing their duties, it is clear that no such question can arise iu a case like the present, unless it first be ascertained that Congress has pa'ssed an act purporting to confer the disputed power. Courts are disinclined to. adopt a construction of an act of Congress which would extend its operation beyond what is warranted by the Constitution, but the suggestion that
Congress possesses the power to confer a new privilege is not a sufficient reason to induce the court to extend an existing enactment hy construction so as to embrace the privilege, unless the words of the enactment are of a character to warrant the construction.
Either the non-resident plaintiff or non-resident defendant may remove the cause under the last-named act, provided all the plaintiffs or all the defendants join in the petition, and all the party,petitioning are non-residents, as required under the Judiciary Act, but it is a great mistake to suppose that any such right is conferred by that act where one ór more of the plaintiffs or one or more of the petitioning defendants are citizens of the Sffite in which the suit is pending, as the' act is destitute of any language which can be properly construed to confer any such right unless all the plaintiffs or all the defendants are non-residents and. join in the petition.
' Two cases only, besides the opinion given in this same case in the Circuit Court, to wit,
Johnson
v.
Monell,
Sands v. Smith,
are cited to support the assumed theory, neither of which necessarily involved any such question, and the reasons given for the conclusion by the learned circuit judge, on the motiou to dismiss the case in the Circuit Court, are not satisfactory.
Judgment affirmed.
Justices MILLER and BRADLEY dissented from the preceding opinion of the court in reference to the construction of the act under consideration, and for this reason dissented from the judgment.