Cardinal Point, LLC v. Edgewood Partners Insurance Center, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedApril 16, 2024
Docket1:22-cv-23170
StatusUnknown

This text of Cardinal Point, LLC v. Edgewood Partners Insurance Center, Inc. (Cardinal Point, LLC v. Edgewood Partners Insurance Center, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cardinal Point, LLC v. Edgewood Partners Insurance Center, Inc., (S.D. Fla. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 22-23170-CIV-ALTONAGA

CARDINAL POINT, LLC; et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

EDGEWOOD PARTNERS INSURANCE CENTER, INC.; et al.,

Defendants. ________________________________/

ORDER SETTING FORTH FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

THIS CAUSE came before the Court for a non-jury trial beginning March 4, 2024. The Court has carefully considered the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted in evidence, the parties’ written submissions, and applicable law. Based on its review of the record and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1), the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. I. INTRODUCTION This case is about a failed business relationship between Plaintiffs, Cardinal Point, LLC (“Cardinal”), Alex Soria, Tony Rodriguez, Kenneth Knopp, and Randy Baker (the “Cardinal Members”); and Defendants, Edgewood Partners Insurance Center, Inc. and its parent company, EPIC Holdings, Inc. (in most instances referred to collectively as “EPIC”), following EPIC’s 2019 acquisition of Cardinal, a Florida limited liability company that sold healthcare-related reinsurance policies. Plaintiffs filed this suit in September 2022. In Count I of their Amended Complaint [ECF No. 5], Plaintiffs allege EPIC breached an Asset Purchase Agreement (the “APA”)1 entered with Cardinal; and in Count II, they allege EPIC breached the APA’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In Count III, Plaintiffs allege EPIC breached Employment Agreements2 entered

with the Cardinal Members concurrent with the APA. Upon review, the Court finds EPIC did not breach the APA, although it breached the Employment Agreements, and the Cardinal Members are entitled to damages. The Court awards the Cardinal Members nominal and compensatory damages totaling $1,035.86 to Soria; $848.25 to Rodriguez; and $753.44 each to Knopp and Baker. The Court will enter a separate money judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Edgewood Partners, dismiss the claims against EPIC Holdings, and reserve jurisdiction to address requests for costs and attorney’s fees. II. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. EPIC Holdings is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Delaware. EPIC Holdings is a national retail insurance brokerage and consulting firm. Edgewood

Partners is EPIC Holdings’ subsidiary and is a California corporation with its principal place of business in California. Edgewood Partners is registered to do business in Florida and has an office in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Edgewood Partners is a non-operational, pass-through entity that makes certain acquisitions and hires employees. Functionally, Edgewood Partners is inseparable from EPIC Holdings. 2. Cardinal is a Florida limited liability company with its principal place of business in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The Cardinal Members own 100 percent of the membership

1 Of the two related Defendants, EPIC Holdings is the entity that signed the APA.

2 Edgewood Partners is the entity that signed the Employment Agreements. interests of Cardinal. Soria and Rodriguez reside in and are citizens of Florida. Knopp resides in and is a citizen of Tennessee. Baker resides in and is a citizen of Colorado. 3. The Cardinal Members operated a managing general underwriter business known as RBS, which sold health maintenance organization (“HMO”) reinsurance and stop loss policies.

In 2006, HM Life Insurance Company (“HM Life”) purchased RBS for an upfront payment of approximately $10 million and a five-year earnout arrangement. At the time of HM Life’s purchase, RBS had a book of business and was profitable. 4. In 2012, the Cardinal Members formed Cardinal and entered a mutually exclusive arrangement with HM Life, whereby Cardinal served as the sole distributor of HM Life’s HMO reinsurance product. Any customer who wanted HM Life products had to buy through Cardinal. Cardinal sold HM Life products directly to health plans and providers and through brokers. 5. In December 2015, HM Life gave Cardinal notice that it was terminating Cardinal’s exclusive arrangement, and Cardinal could not write new business for a two-year period, from January 2, 2018, through some time in 2019. Consequently, Cardinal experienced a downward trend in revenue and EBITDA3 each year since 2017, as well as a downward trend in customers

after 2015. 6. In 2018, Cardinal began negotiating the sale of its operations to Integro USA, a national retail insurance broker like EPIC. The proposed transaction contemplated that Cardinal would operate as a broker.

3 EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, and is used to measure profitability. See Adam Hayes, EBITDA: Definition, Calculation Formulas, History, and Criticisms, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 28, 2024), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/ebitda.asp. 7. Cardinal had never operated as an insurance broker — representing the customer, rather than the insurance carrier — and the Cardinal Members had never competed with other brokers selling the same insurance policies. 8. In 2019, EPIC acquired Integro and continued negotiations with Cardinal.

9. In late 2018, Soria, Cardinal’s President, created projections for Cardinal’s performance as a broker from 2019 through 2022. Soria represented Cardinal would obtain 12 customers in the first 12 months and 25 to 30 customers over three years. Soria’s projections showed substantial year over year revenue and profit growth for Cardinal: 2019 2020 2021 2022 Revenue $1,495,710 $2,354,274 $3,626,267 $5,035,750 Profit (Loss) ($123,205) $310,477 $1,033,661 $2,173,302 EBITDA -8% 13% 29% 43% Percentage

10. Undisclosed to EPIC, Soria’s projections were based largely on his “experience.” Soria did not seek the input of Cardinal’s primary salespeople when preparing the projections. EPIC relied on Soria’s projections in negotiating the Cardinal transaction. 11. EPIC supplied the initial draft of the APA. The parties — represented by counsel — exchanged multiple drafts of the Indication of Interest, the APA, and Employment Agreements. The final versions of the APA and Employment Agreements were executed on August 16, 2019. 12. In the parties’ final Indication of Interest for the transaction, EPIC agreed to purchase Cardinal for its “profitable top line revenue growth.” 13. The APA stated the Cardinal purchase price was based on future performance under an earnout formula measured in the fourth year after closing, with a minimum threshold of $2.5 million in revenue and EBITDA above 20 percent. EBITDA was the driving factor of the purchase price. 14. The Cardinal purchase price was allocated entirely to intangible assets such as goodwill, as Cardinal contributed no hard assets or existing revenue streams. Cardinal’s existing business stayed with HM Life, and Cardinal was starting from zero as a first-time broker. The purchase price formula aligned the parties’ interests: the more Cardinal produced, the more money

EPIC and Cardinal would make. 15. Under section 8.09 of the APA, the parties agreed that Cardinal would be EPIC’s “featured platform” for health plan reinsurance and stop loss products. EPIC rejected a prior version of the APA that designated Cardinal as the “exclusive platform” for health plan reinsurance and stop loss products because EPIC does not enter exclusivity arrangements. 16. Soria knew Cardinal would not be EPIC’s exclusive platform. EPIC already employed other specialty brokers, including Blake Kirk, who overlapped with Cardinal’s market. EPIC nonetheless agreed it would not target or acquire a competing “business” unless it was part of a larger acquisition.4 17.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Burger King Corp. v. Weaver
169 F.3d 1310 (Eleventh Circuit, 1999)
Richard A. Brough, Jr. v. Imperial Sterling Ltd.
297 F.3d 1172 (Eleventh Circuit, 2002)
Centurion Air Cargo, Inc. v. United Parcel Service Co.
420 F.3d 1146 (Eleventh Circuit, 2005)
HGI Associates, Inc. v. Wetmore Printing Co.
427 F.3d 867 (Eleventh Circuit, 2005)
Nebula Glass International, Inc. v. Reichhold, Inc.
454 F.3d 1203 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Corey Airport Services, Inc. v. DeCosta
587 F.3d 1280 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
MEE INDUSTRIES v. Dow Chemical Co.
608 F.3d 1202 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
Walter Int'l Productions v. Walter Mercado Salinas
650 F.3d 1402 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Ross v. Twenty-Four Collection, Inc.
617 So. 2d 428 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1993)
MSM GOLF, LLC v. Newgent
853 So. 2d 1086 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2003)
Hammond v. DSY DEVELOPERS, LLC
951 So. 2d 985 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2007)
Jackson v. Anderson
230 So. 2d 503 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1970)
WW Gay Mech. Contr., Inc. v. Wharfside Two, Ltd.
545 So. 2d 1348 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1989)
Sepe v. City of Safety Harbor
761 So. 2d 1182 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2000)
Dows v. Nike, Inc.
846 So. 2d 595 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2003)
Acosta v. District Bd. of Trustees
905 So. 2d 226 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2005)
Kel Homes, LLC v. Burris
933 So. 2d 699 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2006)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Cardinal Point, LLC v. Edgewood Partners Insurance Center, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cardinal-point-llc-v-edgewood-partners-insurance-center-inc-flsd-2024.