Caputo v. Continental Construction Corp.
Opinion
The defendant, as general contractor, entered into a contract with the Commonwealth for the repair and construction of the French King Bridge. Thereafter subcontracts for certain work and materials for the bridge were made by the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff seeks in this action to recover for labor and materials furnished to the defendant under three contracts. This action was tried with a cross action brought by the defendant to recover damages for alleged breaches of contracts by the plaintiff. The judge found for the plaintiff in the original action and the case is here on the defendant’s exceptions.
The question for decision arises out of a ruling on evidence which occurred in these circumstances. The contracts which are the basis of counts 1, 2, and 3 are three letters which are set forth below. 1 The defendant sought to show through *17 Ragone, its president, conversations with the plaintiff prior to March 28, 1955, the date of the first of the three letters. This evidence was objected to by the plaintiff but the judge *18 admitted it de bene. Ragone testified that on or about March 25, 1955, he had a telephone conversation with the plaintiff during which Ragone had “stressed to . . . [the plaintiff] the importance of getting the work quickly started and of speedily completing the project . . . so as to enable the defendant to take advantage of the bonus clause in its master contract with the Commonwealth.” Ragone further testified that the parties had “also agreed that the plaintiff would be paid by the defendant in the same manner as the defendant was paid by the Commonwealth . . . and that the plaintiff would carry the insurance required by the specifications” for the job. Evidence was also admitted de bene that the plaintiff had neither supplied the materials nor performed the work “as called on by the defendant” and by failing to do so had delayed the completion of the job with the result that the defendant lost the bonus it might have received had the plaintiff performed seasonably.
Thereafter, subject to the defendant’s exception, the judge ordered struck from the record all the evidence admitted de bene “pertaining to the alleged terms and performance of the . . . oral agreement.”
The governing principles of law are very familiar and need not be restated. Unless the letters can be said to state the entire agreements of the parties, the excluded evidence should have been admitted. Glackin v. Bennett, 226 Mass. 316, 319. Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 567-568, and cases cited. We are of opinion that the letters did not state the entire agreements and that the excluded evidence was admissible. Matters of importance which normally would be included in contracts of the sort under consideration would be the time when the plaintiff was to complete performance, the method of payment, provisions as to insurance, and the specifications and standards to be complied with. None of the letters sheds any light on these matters. This indicates, we think, that the parties never intended that the letters were to constitute their entire agreements. In these circumstances extrinsic evidence was admissible. Peerless Petticoat Co. v. Colpak-Van Costume Co. 273 Mass. *19 289, 292. Kesslen Shoe Co. Inc. v. Philadelphia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 295 Mass. 123, 131. International Business Mach. Corp. v. Quinn Bros. Elec. Co. 321 Mass. 16, 19. Cotty v. Meister, 339 Mass. 202, 204-205.
Exceptions sustained.
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162 N.E.2d 813 (Caputo v. Continental Construction Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.