Canal Co. v. Ray

101 U.S. 522, 25 L. Ed. 792, 1879 U.S. LEXIS 1948
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedDecember 18, 1879
Docket67
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 101 U.S. 522 (Canal Co. v. Ray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Canal Co. v. Ray, 101 U.S. 522, 25 L. Ed. 792, 1879 U.S. LEXIS 1948 (1879).

Opinion

Mb. Justice Stbong

delivered the opinion of the court.

Assuming the facts to be such as are averred in the bill, and not denied in the answer, we have this case: In 1860 the complainants were engaged in enlarging the machinery and capacity of their flouring mill, situate near the canal of-the defendants, between it and the Potomac River, and dependent for its power upon water obtained from the canal. While thus engaged it was agreed between them and the defendants that for a stipulated rent they should have full right, permission, and authority to draw from the canal, for the uses of their mill, so much water as would pass through an aperture 'of specified dimensions, in an iron plate not exceeding an half inch in thickness,on certain conditions. The first of these related to the form of the aperture and its capacity. The second was that the aperture should not be placed nearer the canal bottom proper than two feet. The third prohibited any attachment, contrivance, or device to increase the quantity of water that could be drawn through the aperture above what could be drawn if such device were not used. The fourth required that a sliding gate or gates should be placed in front of the aperture, so that the whole water-power granted might, as occasion under the provisions of the contract required, be entirely or partially stopped from passing through it. The fifth condition related to the construction of the forebay, the aperture and sliding gates, requiring them,, inter alia, to be put down, constructed, and thereafter kept in repair at the sole cost of the complainants, under the special direction and superintendence, and subject in every particular to the approval of such officer of the company *523 as might be charged with that duty. The sixth condition was that, in liko- manner, at the sole cost of the grantees or complainants, and' under the special direction of .the officers of the company charged with that duty, such alterations should be made from time to time in the forebay or trunks, cover, or bridge aperture, and sliding gate or gates as might be considered necessary by the company or their officers, to prevent or lessen the inconvenience to the navigation of. the canal and the use of its towing-path, which might be found to arise from said use of the water, or that might be thought necessary by the company for the greater security of the canal or of its works. The seventh condition reserved to the company the right of full ingress and egress, by.their officers, to and from the premises of the grantees for the purpose of examining, repairing, and preserving the fixtures and works connected with drawing off the water, repairing the embankment and other parts of the canal, and also for the purpose of ascertaining, whether any defects existed in the fixtures and works for drawing off water, repairing the embankment and other parts of the canal, and also for the purpose of ascertaining whether any defects existed in the fixtures and works' for drawing off water, occasioning leakage from the canal, or endangering its security and that of its works, and also for ascertaining whether more water was drawn off than was granted by the contract. The remaining conditions need not be noticed. They .have no possible bearing upon the matter now in controversy.

Obviously this grant of the water privilege contemplated that the aperture, the trunk or forebay, and the sliding gate or gates should be constructed after the grant was made. To that extent the contract was executory. It did not .expressly require that the aperture and guage should be located at the bank of the canal, in front of an opening there made, though probably such was the understanding of the parties. But conceding that it was, and that the contract in terms required such a location, it was nevertheless competent for the parties in the subsequent execution thereof to substitute another location in place of that first contemplated, and if such a change, was made-by mutual consent it amounted to a compliance with the provi *524 sions of the contract. The company, after having accepted or acquiesced in a location of the aperture and gate at a point nearer the complainants’ mill than the canal bank, could not afterwards complain that the condition respecting the location had not been performed, unless a right to require arbitrarily a change was reserved.

The bill avers that after the enlargement of the complainants’ mill had been completed, the works for conducting "the water from the canal to the mill, and for measuring the quantity of water granted by the contract, were constructed and located under the special direction of the engineer and superintendent of the canal company, the officers charged with the duty, and with their approval, and that with like approval the aperture or gauge, and sliding gate thereat, were constructed and located at the wheel of the complainants’ mill, where they have since remained, having been repeatedly inspected and approved by the officers of the company. This averment is, at most, only evasively denied. The answer does indeed deny that- the gauge and sliding gate were located at the wheel of the complainants’ mill with the knowledge and consent of the company, and denies that such location was made with the approval or by the direction of the officers of the company, “if it is meant hy the averment ” (of the bill) “ to that effect, that such arrangement was intended as permanent, or as other than a temporary indulgence.” Such an equivocal denial cannot be considered as breaking the force of the complainants’ allegation. Then, what is the effect of that averment'? If, in executing the contract between the parties, the gauge and sliding gate were placed at the wheel of the mill with the knowledge of the company and with thpir consent, and if the location was thus made under the special direction of their engineer and superintendent, the officers charged with the duty; if for years the location remained unchanged and unchallenged, having been repeatedly inspected and approved b}r the company’s proper officers, as averred in -Míe bill .and not' denied, it would be grossly inequitable to hold that the location was not intended by both parties to be .an execution of"the'contract, and accepted as such. Especially is this true when the location was made at the cost of the grantees of the water, and when, at the time when the works were *525 thus constructed and located, there was also placed at the opening of the forebay into the canal, as part and in consideration thereof, and at the cost of the grantees, a gate to enable the company to ■ control the water-power granted, in accordance with the provisions of the grant. And it matters not that the company may hot have intended such location'of. the gauge to be permanent, unless such was the understanding of both parties, which is not averred. There can be no doubt that a party to a contract imposing mutual obligations may accept, as performance by the opposite party, some other thing than that specifically designated; and if he does, he cannot afterwards insist upon exact performance. Nothing is more common than such fulfilment of contract obligations. In equity it is certainly regarded as sufficient fulfilment. In the present cáse the location..

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Bluebook (online)
101 U.S. 522, 25 L. Ed. 792, 1879 U.S. LEXIS 1948, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/canal-co-v-ray-scotus-1879.